Andrade (Yuqui) v. Kijakazi

Filing 23

MEMORANDUM Opinion and Order: For all the reasons set forth in the attached Memorandum Opinion and Order, Claimant's Brief in Support of Reversing of the Decision of the Commissioner of Social Security [ECF No. 10] is granted, and the Commission er's Motion for Summary Judgment [ECF No. 13] is denied. This matter is remanded to the Social Security Administration for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion. Civil case terminated. Signed by the Honorable Jeffrey T. Gilbert on 3/10/2025. Mailed notice (ber, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION
CYNTHIA Y.,
Claimant,

No. 22 C 705

v.

Magistrate Judge Jeffrey T. Gilbert

LELAND DUDEK,
Acting Commissioner of Social Security,
Respondent.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Cynthia Y. 1 (“Claimant”) seeks judicial review of the final decision of the Acting
Commissioner of the Social Security Administration 2 (“Commissioner”), denying her
applications for disability insurance benefits and supplemental security income for a
closed period from May 28, 2014 through October 3, 2019. The parties consented to
the jurisdiction of a United States Magistrate Judge for all proceedings, including
entry of final judgment, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). [ECF No. 5]. After reviewing
the record and the parties’ arguments, Claimant’s Brief in Support of Reversing the
Decision of the Commissioner of Social Security [ECF No. 10] is granted, and the
Commissioner’s Motion for Summary Judgment [ECF No. 13] is denied. This case is

1 In accordance with Northern District of Illinois Local Rule 8.1, the Court refers to Claimant

only by her first name and the first initial of her last name.

2 Leland Dudek was appointed as the Acting Commissioner of Social Security on February

16, 2025. Pursuant to Rule 25(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, he automatically is
substituted as the named defendant in this case.

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remanded to the Social Security Administration for further proceedings consistent
with this Opinion.
BACKGROUND
I.

Procedural History
On August 30, 2016, Claimant filed an application for a period of disability and

disability insurance benefits and two months later, on November 3, 2016, filed an
application for supplemental security income. (R.13). In both applications, Claimant
alleged a disability beginning May 28, 2014. (R.13). The applications were denied
initially and on reconsideration after which Claimant requested a hearing before an
Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”). (R.13). A telephonic hearing was held on October
4, 2018, and the ALJ issued a decision on February 14, 2019, denying benefits. (R.1226). The Appeals Council denied review, making the ALJ’s decision the final decision
of the Commissioner. (R.1, 26),
Claimant sought review in federal district court pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g),
and this Court remanded the case back to the Social Security Administration for
further consideration. (R.1437-1441). A second hearing was held on July 28, 2021
before a new ALJ, at which Claimant appeared and testified and was represented by
counsel. (R.1449). A vocational expert also testified during the hearing. (R.1449). The
ALJ granted Claimant’s request to amend her claim for benefits for a closed period of
alleged disability from May 28, 2014 to October 3, 2019, because Claimant had
returned to work after medical improvement. (R.1449). On October 12, 2021, the ALJ
issued a decision denying benefits and finding Claimant was not disabled under the
Social Security Act during the amended period. (R.1449-1465). Claimant filed another
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lawsuit again seeking judicial review of the Commissioner’s decision, and this Court
has jurisdiction pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). See Villano v. Astrue, 556 F.3d 558,
561-62 (7th Cir. 2009).
II.

The ALJ’s Decision
Under the Social Security Act, disability is defined as an “inability to engage

in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical
or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted
or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than twelve months.” 42
U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). The regulations prescribe a five-part, sequential test for
determining whether a claimant is disabled. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a), 416.920(a).
The Commissioner must determine whether: (1) the claimant has performed any
substantial gainful activity during the period for which she claims disability; (2) the
claimant has a severe impairment or combination of impairments; (3) the claimant’s
impairments or combination of impairments meet or equal any listed impairment; (4)
the claimant retains the residual functional capacity (“RFC”) to perform any past
relevant work; and (5) the claimant is able to perform any other work existing in
significant numbers in the national economy. Id.; see Zurawski v. Halter, 245 F.3d
881, 885 (7th Cir. 2001). The claimant bears the burden of proof at steps one through
four, and the burden shifts to the Commissioner at step five. Gedatus v. Saul, 994
F.3d 893, 898 (7th Cir. 2021); Wilder v. Kijakazi, 22 F.4th 644 (7th Cir. 2022). A
decision by an ALJ becomes the Commissioner’s final decision if the Appeals Council
denies a request for review. Sims v. Apfel, 530 U.S. 103, 106-07 (2000).

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Applying the five-part test in this case, the ALJ found at step one that
Claimant had engaged in substantial gainful activity from October 4, 2019 through
the date of the ALJ’s decision, but she had not engaged in any substantial gainful
activity during the closed period of alleged disability from May 28, 2014 through
October 3, 2019. (R.1452). At step two, the ALJ found Claimant had the following
severe impairments: lumbar spine degenerative joint disease, obesity, left shoulder
impingement, left knee ligament sprain and partial tear, and left knee patellar
tendinosis. (R.1452). At step three, the ALJ found that Claimant did not have any
impairment or combination of impairments that met or equaled any of the listed
impairments in 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(d), 404.1525, 404.1526 416.920(d), 416.925,
and 416.926. (R.1455). With respect to Claimant’s mental impairments, the ALJ
undertook the paragraph B analysis3 and determined that Claimant did not have any
limitation in understanding, remembering or applying information and had mild
limitations in interacting with others, in concentrating, persisting or maintaining
pace, and in adapting and managing herself. (R.1454). Before step four, the ALJ
determined:

To determine whether a mental impairment meets or equals listing level severity at step
three of the sequential analysis, a claimant must prove she meets the severity criteria of
either paragraph B or C. 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1, §§ 12.04, 12.06. To satisfy the
paragraph B criteria, a claimant must demonstrate an “[e]xtreme limitation of one, or
marked limitation of two” of four areas: understanding, remembering, or applying
information; interacting with others; concentrating, persisting, or maintaining pace; and
adapting and managing oneself. Id. To evaluate these four areas, ALJs will investigate how
an impairment interferes with a claimant's ability to function independently, appropriately,
effectively, and on a sustained basis, as well as the quality and level of overall functional
performance, any episodic limitations, the amount of supervision or assistance required, and
the settings in which a claimant is able to function. 20 C.F.R. § 404. 1520a(c)(2).
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[C]laimant had the residual functional capacity from May 28, 2014
capacity to October 3, 2019 to perform sedentary work as defined in 20
CFR 404.1567(a) and 416.967(a) except she could never climb ladders,
ropes, or scaffolds or work at unprotected heights. She could not operate
dangerous or moving machinery and could not operate foot controls. She
could occasionally balance, stoop, kneel, crouch, crawl, and climb ramps
and stairs. She could no more than occasionally reach overhead
bilaterally. She occasionally required a cane for ambulation in the
workplace. She required the ability to alternate into a standing position
once per hour for five minutes while remaining on task.
(R.1455-1456). At step four, the ALJ found that Claimant was cable of performing her
past relevant work as an appointment clerk/timekeeper and as an administrative
assistant. (R.1463). Based on these findings, the ALJ denied Claimant’s applications
for benefits and found her not disabled under the Social Security Act from May 28,
2014 through October 3, 2019. (R.1465).
DISCUSSION
I.

Standard of Review
Section 405(g) provides in relevant part that “[t]he findings of the

Commissioner of Social Security as to any fact, if supported by substantial evidence,
shall be conclusive.” 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Judicial review of the ALJ’s decision,
therefore, is limited to determining whether the ALJ’s findings are supported by
substantial evidence and whether the ALJ applied the correct legal standard in
reaching her decision. Nelms v. Astrue, 553 F.3d 1093, 1097 (7th Cir. 2009); Clifford
v. Apfel, 227 F.3d 863, 869 (7th Cir. 2000); Stevenson v. Chater, 105 F.3d 1151, 1153
(7th Cir. 1997). An ALJ’s decision should be affirmed even in the absence of
overwhelming evidence in support: “whatever the meaning of ‘substantial’ in other
contexts, the threshold for such evidentiary sufficiency is not high. Substantial
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evidence is ... ‘more than a mere scintilla.’ ... It means – and means only – ‘such
relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion.’” Biestek v. Berryhill, 139 S. Ct. 1148, 1154, (2019) (quoting Richardson v.
Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971)).
The Seventh Circuit has made clear that ALJs are “subject to only the most
minimal of articulation requirements” and “need not address every piece or category
of evidence identified by a claimant, fully summarize the record, or cite support for
every proposition or chain of reasoning.” Warnell v. O'Malley, 97 F.4th 1050, 1053-54
(7th Cir. 2024) (citations omitted). More specifically, the Seventh Circuit stated:
All we required is that ALJs provide an explanation for how the evidence
leads to their conclusions that is “sufficient to allow us, as a reviewing
court, to assess the validity of the agency’s ultimate findings and afford
[the appellant] meaningful judicial review.” … At times, we have put
this in the shorthand terms of saying an ALJ needs to provide a “logical
bridge from the evidence to his conclusion.”
Id. at 1054 (citations omitted). When conflicting evidence would allow reasonable
minds to differ, the responsibility for determining whether a claimant is disabled falls
upon the Commissioner, not the court. See Herr v. Sullivan, 912 F.2d 178, 181 (7th
Cir. 1990); see also Beardsley v. Colvin, 758 F.3d 834, 837 (7th Cir. 2014) (“Where
conflicting evidence allows reasonable minds to differ as to whether a claimant is
entitled to benefits, the court must defer to the Commissioner’s resolution of that
conflict.”) (internal quotations and citation omitted). The court may not substitute
its judgment for that of the Commissioner by reevaluating facts, reweighing evidence,
resolving conflicts in evidence, or deciding questions of credibility. See Skinner v.
Astrue, 478 F.3d 836, 841 (7th Cir. 2007); see also Elder v. Astrue, 529 F.3d 408, 413
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(7th Cir. 2008) (holding that the ALJ’s decision must be affirmed even if “‘reasonable
minds could differ’” as long as “the decision is adequately supported”) (citation
omitted).
II.

Analysis
Claimant argues the ALJ’s decision cannot stand in this case because: (1) the

ALJ erred in his assessment of Claimant’s upper extremity limitations; (2) the ALJ
erred by failing to assess Claimant’s sitting limitations; and (3) the ALJ’s symptom
evaluation was legally insufficient. Claimant’s Brief [ECF No. 10] at 6-14. At base,
Claimant’s arguments essentially challenge the ALJ’s RFC determination as not
supported by substantial evidence. The Court agrees with Claimant.
The RFC is the “assessment of an individual's ability to do sustained workrelated physical and mental activities in a work setting on a regular and continuing
basis. A ‘regular and continuing basis’ means 8 hours a day, for 5 days a week, or an
equivalent work schedule.” SSR 96-8p, 1996 WL 374184, at *1 (July 2, 1996);
Mandrell v. Kijakazi, 25 F.4th 514, 516 (7th Cir. 2022); Jeske v. Saul, 955 F.3d 583,
593 (7th Cir. 2020). The RFC is a determination of the maximum work-related
activities a claimant can perform despite his limitations. Young v. Barnhart, 362 F.3d
995, 1000-1001 (7th Cir. 2004). Social Security regulations require that the RFC
assessment is “based on all the relevant evidence in the record.” Id. at 1001, citing 20
C.F.R § 404.1545(a)(1).
As noted above, the ALJ found that Claimant was capable of performing
sedentary work with additional limitations. Although both the state agency

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physicians concluded that Claimant could perform work at the light exertional level
with other differing limitations (R.1462-1463), the ALJ did not give full credit to their
opinions. Instead, the ALJ found Claimant had greater limitations and only was
capable of sedentary work, stating “the stress of the claimant’s morbid obesity, when
combined with her lumbar degenerative disc disease and her left knee impairment,
limit her to sedentary work.” (R.1462). Although he considered Claimant’s obesity
and back and knee pain when limiting her to sedentary work, the ALJ did not address
Claimant’s ability to sit for a sustained period of time to be able to perform sedentary
work. Although the ALJ concluded that Claimant could sit for an extended period of
time consistent with sedentary work, he did not explain how he reached that
conclusion nor did he cite the record evidence on which he relied. This was an error,
particularly in light of the evidence in the record that Claimant, in fact, had difficulty
sitting for long periods of time.
The Seventh Circuit has recognized that morbid obesity “might make it
difficult for [a claimant] to sit for long periods of time, as sedentary work normally
requires” and “the likely difficulties that morbidly obese persons ... face even in doing
sedentary work are sufficiently obvious.” Browning, 766 F.3d at 707; Michael W. v.
Kijakazi, 2022 WL 3684628, at *2-3 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 25, 2022) (remanding ALJ’s
decision “because it lacks an adequate discussion of Plaintiff's sitting abilities (or lack
thereof)” in light of her obesity); Stevens v. Colvin, No. 2016 WL 1535156, at *4-5
(N.D. Ill. Apr. 15, 2016) (remanding for the ALJ to analyze how claimant’s extreme
obesity interacted with her other impairments and how that interaction factored into

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her RFC). Clearly, the ALJ thought Claimant’s obesity did not have an impact on her
ability to sit and perform sedentary work, but he should have explained how he
reached that conclusion and tied it to evidence in the record. Without that
explanation, the Court cannot trace the path of the ALJ’s analysis to his conclusion,
and the Court cannot, and will not, speculate.
In his decision, the ALJ acknowledged that Claimant had difficulty sitting for
long periods of time due to pain. (R.1456, 1459). However, the ALJ did not specifically
address the pain Claimant said she experienced when sitting for longer periods of
time notwithstanding his determination that she could perform sedentary work. With
respect to an ALJ's obligation to consider the evidence of record, the law is clear that
the ALJ “may not ignore entire swaths of it that point toward a finding of disability.”
Lothridge v. Saul, 984 F.3d 1227, 1234 (7th Cir. 2021); Denton v. Astrue, 596 F.3d
419, 425 (7th Cir. 2010) (“An ALJ has the obligation to consider all relevant medical
evidence and cannot simply cherry-pick facts that support a finding of non-disability
while ignoring evidence that points to a disability finding.”). If the ALJ did consider
the evidence that Claimant said she could not sit for long periods of time and rejected
it or was not persuaded by it, he does not say that. The ALJ also does not explain how
or why including a restriction in the RFC that Claimant should have the “ability to
alternate into a standing position once per hour for five minutes while remaining on
task” would accommodate any limitations Claimant may have in sitting for a long
period of time. (R.1456). The Court cannot speculate. Therefore, remand is required.

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Claimant also challenges the ALJ’s analysis of her subjective symptoms.
Claimant’s Brief [ECF No. 10], at 12-15. The ALJ acknowledged that Claimant
reported that she experienced some pain. (R.1456, 1459). The ALJ, however, does not
further address her complaints of pain when formulating the RFC other than to say
that she “reported decreased pain with injections and therapy” which in the ALJ’s
opinion “demonstrate[d] the claimant was more capable that she alleged.” (R.1463).
The Seventh Circuit, however, repeatedly has noted that “pain alone can be
disabling,” even in the absence of objective test results that evidence a disabling
condition. Stark v. Colvin, 813 F.3d 684 (7th Cir. 2016); Carradine v. Barnhart, 360
F.3d 751, 753 (7th Cir. 2004). Although the ALJ is not required to accept Claimant’s
testimony or other evidence about her pain or any other complaints without question,
the ALJ must at least minimally explain why he did not fully credit that testimony
and/or how the limitations he included in the RFC accommodate Claimant's
subjective symptoms and complaints. The ALJ did not do so here. While the ALJ
points out that there are some normal findings and examinations in the record, those
findings do not completely negate the fact that Claimant testified she was in pain
every day and that she could not sit for long periods of time. (R.1456, 1459). Without
further explanation, the Court cannot trace the ALJ’s reasoning as to why he accepted
some of Claimant’s complaints but not others and which complaints he determined
were not supported by the medical evidence and why.
In the Court’s view, this is an unfortunate result in this case. The ALJ clearly
believed that Claimant had the ability to work during the closed period of time, and

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there is evidence in the record that shows Claimant’s symptoms continued to improve
during this time. The problem with the ALJ’s analysis is that he does not adequately
explain

how

the

RFC

takes

into

consideration

some

of

Claimant’s

limitations. Without a more fulsome discussion, it is impossible for this Court to
conclude that the ALJ built an accurate and logical bridge from the evidence to his
conclusions. Scott v. Barnhart, 297 F.3d 589, 595 (7th Cir. 2002). The Court cannot
assume or speculate what the ALJ was thinking. Although the ALJ claimed to credit
Claimant’s testimony, the additional limitations he purported to include in the RFC
to accommodate Claimant’s symptoms and complaints do not fully address
Claimant’s asserted limitations. On remand, the ALJ should provide a sufficient
explanation as to what evidence he considered, how he weighed that evidence, and
why he made the findings he made.
The Court is mindful of the deference that is owed to an ALJ’s decision under
the substantial evidence standard and that a reviewing court should not substitute
its judgment for that of the ALJ's by reweighing the evidence. Although this standard
is generous, it is not entirely uncritical. Clifford v. Apfel, 227 F.3d 863, 869 (7th Cir.
2000). In this case, the Court is not persuaded by the Commissioner’s arguments and
agrees with Claimant that the ALJ’s explanation for his decision in this case is legally
insufficient. The Court is not reweighing the evidence. There simply is not enough of
an explanation (i.e., the logical bridge between the evidence and the ALJ’s ultimate
conclusions) to be able to conclude that the ALJ’s decision is supported by substantial
evidence. This does not mean the Court agrees with Claimant that she is disabled

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within the meaning of the applicable law and that she cannot work. Rather, it means
that the ALJ did not sufficiently explain his analysis of Claimant’s subjective
symptoms for the Court to be able to conclude that the ALJ’s decision is supported by
substantial evidence. Therefore, remand is required for the reasons discussed above.
Claimant’s last argument is that the upper extremity limitation in the RFC is
flawed because the ALJ misunderstood a finding made by the consultative examining
physician, Dr. Benjamin Lumicao, M.D., and as a result, the ALJ erroneously
analyzed the opinions of the state agency physicians who relied on Dr. Lumicao’s
findings. Claimant’s Brief [ECF No. 10], at 6-8. Because this case is being remanded
for other reasons discussed above, the Court declines to address this argument and,
therefore, does not express any opinion on the decision to be made on remand. The
Court, however, encourages the ALJ to evaluate all relevant evidence on remand and
provide enough explanation for the Court to be able to conclude that the upper
extremity limitation in the RFC is supported by substantial evidence.
Finally, the Court cautions Clamant not to read more into this decision than
the Court intends. There is significant evidence in the record that Claimant’s
symptoms improved during the period at issue, and she eventually returned to work.
Based on Claimant’s activities and other evidence in the record, the Court
understands why the ALJ found that Claimant may not have been as disabled as she
claimed to be during the period at issue, particularly in light of the fact that there
was little evidence in the record from June 2017 through October 3, 2019, after which
Claimant returned to work. (R.1461-1462). The ALJ, however, must provide more

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explanation and a logical bridge between the evidence in the record and his ultimate
finding that Claimant was cable of sustaining sedentary work with prolonged sitting
to show that his decision is supported by substantial evidence. Therefore, the
standard of review requires remand on this record. See, e.g., Myles v. Astrue, 582 F.3d
672, 678 (7th Cir. 2009); Smith v. Apfel, 231 F.3d 433, 437 (7th Cir. 2000); Luna v.
Shalala, 22 F.3d 687, 693 (7th Cir. 1994).
CONCLUSION
Accordingly, for all the reasons set forth above, Claimant’s Brief in Support of
Reversing of the Decision of the Commissioner of Social Security [ECF No. 10] is
granted, and the Commissioner’s Motion for Summary Judgment [ECF No. 13] is
denied. This matter is remanded to the Social Security Administration for further
proceedings consistent with this Opinion.
It is so ordered.

____________________________________
Jeffrey T. Gilbert
United States Magistrate Judge
Dated: March 10, 2025

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