Esco v. City of Chicago, et al

Filing 27

MEMORANDUM Opinion and Order signed by the Honorable Elaine E. Bucklo on 1/17/2023. Mailed notice. (mgh, )

Case: 1:22-cv-02324 Document #: 27 Filed: 01/17/23 Page 1 of 15 PageID #:99

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION
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Terrell Esco,
Plaintiff,

v.
THE CITY OF CHICAGO, a
Municipal Corporation; Chicago
Police Officers MATT SEGOVIA,
RAQUEL ALTRUZ, NIKO LOPEZ,
NICHOLAS CLEDON, SEAN DRISKILL,
JONATHAN FANTAUZZI, VIOLETA
SANTILLAN, ARTHUR BROWN,
NATHANIEL J. HOLLIS, MAURICIO
RODRIGUEZ, and JAIR TRUJILLOAYALA
Defendants.

No. 22 C 2324

Memorandum Opinion and Order
Plaintiff Terrell Esco sues the City of Chicago and a number of
its police officers for constitutional violations he claims they
committed in seizing him, searching him, and prosecuting him for
weapons offenses. He seeks damages against the individual officers
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for alleged Fourth Amendment violations
as well as for state law malicious prosecution. Against the City,
plaintiff

asserts

state

claims

for

indemnification

and

for

respondeat superior with respect to the officers’ alleged violations
of state law.
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Defendants seek dismissal of all claims under Fed. R. Civ. P.
12(b)(6), arguing that video footage from several of the officers’
body worn cameras (“BWC”), which they argue I may consider because
plaintiff references it in his complaint and it is integral to his
claims,

definitively

refutes

his

allegations

and

establishes

affirmatively that the officers had probable cause for his arrest.
For the reasons that follow, I grant the motion.
I.
According

to

the

complaint,

Chicago

police

officers

were

conducting video surveillance of a residence in the 300 block of
North Pine Street when they saw an individual holding a handgun
emerge from the residence and approach a vehicle double-parked in
the street. When this individual saw the officers, plaintiff asserts,
he threw the gun under a parked car and fled. Officers later seized
plaintiff, transported him to the police station, and initiated
weapons

charges

against

him.

The

weapons

charges

were

false,

plaintiff claims, because defendant officers “can be heard on body
worn camera discussing the fact that Plaintiff was not the individual
they saw with the gun. Defendant-officers continued to participate
in his arrest and/or failed to intervene to stop it.” Compl. at ¶ 12.
The complaint goes on to allege that plaintiff was charged in
a four-count information and was detained for over year, during which
time

“Defendant-Officers

took

steps

to

continue

his

criminal

prosecution, including, but not limited to: drafting false police
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reports, giving false information to the State’s Attorney’s Office,
appearing in court, and failing to bring the truth to light.” Id. at
¶ 20. All of this occurred, plaintiff claims, despite the fact that
the officers’ BWC footage “confirmed that Plaintiff was not the
individual seen with the gun.” Id. at ¶ 22. Plaintiff claims that
the charges against him were “dismissed in a manner indicative of
his innocence after defense counsel urged the state’s attorney to
closely examine the evidence of Plaintiff’s innocence tendered in
discovery.” Id. at 22.
II.
A

motion

to

dismiss

under

Rule

12(b)(6)

“challenges

the

sufficiency of the complaint to state a claim upon which relief may
be granted.” Hallinan v. Fraternal Order of Police of Chicago Lodge
No. 7, 570 F.3d 811, 820 (7th Cir. 2009). My review is generally
limited to the pleadings, and I must “construe all allegations and
any

reasonable

inferences

in

the

light

most

favorable

to

the

plaintiff.” Dix v. Edelman Fin. Servs., LLC, 978 F.3d 507, 512–13
(7th Cir. 2020). Nevertheless, I am “free to consider any facts set
forth

in

the

complaint

that

undermine

the

plaintiff’s

claim,”

including documents or other materials “referenced in the pleading
if they are central to the claim,” including video footage that
“shows in real time the content and context of the alleged wrongs.”
Bogie v. Rosenberg, 705 F.3d 603, 608-09 (7th Cir. 2013). If a video
on which a plaintiff relies to support his allegations “clearly
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contradicts” those allegations, the video controls. Felton v. City
of Chicago, 827 F.3d 632, 637 (7th Cir. 2016) (quoting Scott v.
Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 378 (2007)). See also Brownmark Films, LLC v.
Comedy Partners, 682 F.3d 687, 690–91 (7th Cir. 2012).
III.
The

parties agree that all of plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment

claims ultimately turn on whether the defendant officers had probable
cause to arrest him.1 See Neita v. City of Chicago, 830 F.3d 494,
497 (7th Cir. 2016) (“[t]o prevail on a false-arrest claim under
§ 1983, a plaintiff must show that there was no probable cause for
his arrest”); Campbell v. Miller, 499 F.3d 711, 716–17 (7th Cir.
2007) (“[a] custodial arrest of a suspect based on probable cause is
a reasonable intrusion under the Fourth Amendment; that intrusion
being lawful, a search incident to the arrest requires no additional
justification.”); see also Zhang v. Schuster, No. 18-CV-3283, 2022
WL 615015, at *18 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 2, 2022) (“The officers had
probable cause to arrest Zhang, so they could conduct a search
incident to arrest.”); Lewis v. City of Chicago, 914 F.3d 472, 477
(7th Cir. 2019) (“a pre-trial detention...both before formal legal
process and after—and is justified only on probable cause.”). An

Probable cause is necessary but not sufficient for a seizure to be
reasonable, since reasonableness “depends both on its justification
and the manner in which it was effectuated,” Gutierrez v. Kermon,
722 F.3d 1003, 1008 (7th Cir. 2013). But plaintiff does not claim
that his arrest was carried out in an unreasonable manner, so the
probable cause issue is dispositive of his claim.
4
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arrest is supported by probable cause “if the totality of the facts
and circumstances known to the officer at the time of the arrest
would warrant a reasonable, prudent person in believing that the
arrestee had committed, was committing, or was about to commit a
crime.” Abbott v. Sangamon County, 705 F.3d 706, 714 (7th Cir. 2013).
This is “a practical, commonsense standard that requires only the
type of fair probability on which reasonable people act.” Gutierrez
v. Kermon, 722 F.3d 1003, 1008 (7th Cir. 2013).
Importantly, however, “police do not always need probable cause
to detain an individual when reasonable suspicion exists. Reasonable
suspicion amounts to an ‘objective manifestation that the person
stopped is, or is about to be, engaged in criminal activity.’” United
States v. Lenoir, 318 F.3d 725, 729 (7th Cir. 2003) (quoting United
States v. Swift, 220 F.3d 502, 506 (7th Cir. 2000)). The Fourth
Amendment

allows

law

enforcement

officers

to

initiate

an

investigative detention “when the police have reasonable suspicion,
supported by articulable facts, that criminal activity is afoot.”
United States v. Adamson, 441 F.3d 513, 520 (7th Cir. 2006) (quoting
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968)).
Here, plaintiff’s central theory is that footage from the
officers’ body-worn cameras shows that the officers knew from the
moment they arrived on Pine Street that plaintiff was not the
individual observed leaving the surveilled residence with a gun, yet
they arrested him, searched him, and instigated criminal proceedings
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against him for weapons offenses anyway. There is no dispute that
plaintiff is not the individual seen by video surveillance; that
much is true. See Def.’s Mot., ECF 8 at 2 and n.1. But whatever the
officers observed of that individual, plaintiff’s claim that the
officers had no reason to believe that he himself was involved in
any unlawful conduct simply cannot be squared with the sequence of
events seen and heard on camera.
According to the complaint, the individual who emerged from the
residence “threw the gun and ran” as the officers approached, while
plaintiff was merely “in the area.” Compl. at 6, 9. Plaintiff alleges
that “[p]rior to seizing and arresting Plaintiff, Defendant-Officers
had not seen Plaintiff engage in any illegal activity[.]” Compl. at
10. But this summary of events ignores everything that happens
between the officers’ approach and plaintiff’s arrest. Footage from
cameras worn by Officers Segovia and Cledon shows these officers
walking

towards

the

surveilled

residence

when

Segovia

suddenly

exclaims, “there he is! He’s [unintelligible] his gun!” after which
both officers begin running up the street in the direction of the
residence, with Segovia shouting “hey, come here!” Exh. A (Segovia
BWC) at 3:00-3:10. At this point, plaintiff takes off running—a fact
he acknowledges.2 See Pl.’s Resp., ECF 17 at 5, 6 (“[d]efendants’

Plaintiff asserts that because is not clear from the videos that
he heard Officer Segovia’s command to “come here,” the footage does
not establish that the officers had probable cause to arrest him for
the offense of obstructing a peace officer. The trouble with this
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2

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video exhibit shows Plaintiff running far ahead of the officers” and
“shows him being chased by police”). Officer Segovia’s BWC shows
that Segovia stops outside the surveilled residence, recovers a
weapon from under a parked car, and barks commands at the three
individuals who remain at the scene. Id., at 3:10-4:20. Meanwhile,
Officer Cledon’s camera shows him running after plaintiff—who is
visible up ahead—for several blocks and shouting out plaintiff’s
trajectory (“going towards Ferdinand”), and physical appearance
(“black shirt, white sleeves...dreads”) to other officers via radio.
Exh. B (Cledon BWC) at 1:55-2:50. As plaintiff disappears into
darkness, Officer Cledon reports, “we lost him in the park.” Id. at
2:56. Seconds later, a voice reports over the radio: “we got him.”
Id. at 3:06.
Officer Cledon’s BWC then shows him crossing the park to where
multiple police vehicles and a dozen officers surround plaintiff—
who, as Officer Cledon described, has “dreads” and is wearing a black
shirt with white sleeves. Exh. B at 2:40-2:49. Footage from Officer
Rodriguez’s body-worn camera depicts plaintiff standing next to a
squad car in handcuffs as officers question him. The audio portion
of this footage begins with an officer asking, “how much weed you
got on you?” Exh. D (Rodriguez BWC) at 1:59. Plaintiff responds, “a
lot.” Id. at 2:02-2:04. Plaintiff then indicates that the drugs are

argument is that probable cause is evaluated from the officers’
perspective, not plaintiff’s perspective.
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inside his pants leg, and as officers begin searching his pants, he
volunteers: “that’s why I ran officer.” Id. at 2:07-2:09. An officer
repeats, “why’d you run?” and plaintiff reiterates: “I got a lot of
weed on me.” Id. at 2:19-2:20. An officer then asks, “no gun?” to
which plaintiff responds, “no sir.” Id. at 2:21-22. See also Exh. B
(Cledon BWC) at 4:19-4:24 (same exchange). Officer Cledon, standing
nearby, offers: “we got the gun.” Id. at 4:25.
Moments later, an officer approaches Cledon and says, “hey
that’s not the same guy that they were looking at with the camera.”
Id. at 4:50-4:53. This is presumably the centerpiece of plaintiff’s
claim that the officers knew they had the wrong guy. But the
remaining footage, which reveals ongoing radio contact among the
responding

officers

in

the

moments

before,

during,

and

after

plaintiff’s arrest, adds context to this statement that directly
refutes plaintiff’s allegations that he was merely “in the area,”
and that defendant officers “had not seen Plaintiff engage in any
illegal

activity

nor

did

they

have

probable

cause,

reasonable

suspicion, or any other lawful basis to stop, detain, or arrest”
him. Compl. at ¶¶ 9, 10. To the contrary, it shows that whoever
officers observed on the surveillance video, the arresting officers
reasonably believed that plaintiff threw the gun that Officer Segovia
recovered from under the car outside the surveilled residence.
In Haligas v. City of Chicago, No. 22 C 313, 2022 WL 2340878
(N.D. Ill. June 29, 2022), I considered the circumstances under which
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video footage referred to in a complaint could appropriately be
relied upon at the motion to dismiss stage. In that case, the
plaintiff claimed that she was arrested without probable cause,
citing footage from the arresting officer’s body-worn camera, which
showed statements the plaintiff’s ex-husband made outside of the
plaintiff’s presence. In Haligas, as in this case, the plaintiff’s
claims about what the officers knew at the time they arrested her
were based on facts that the plaintiff herself knew only because she
had viewed the referenced footage. Under these circumstances, I held
that it was appropriate to review the footage, even on a motion to
dismiss, under Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380-81 (2007), and
Bogie v. Rosenberg, 705 F.3d 603, 608–09, 610–12 (7th Cir. 2013),
explaining

that

when

a

video

cited

in

the

complaint

“utterly

discredit[s]” the plaintiff’s account of the facts, the most sensible
approach is to consider the video but to view it in the light most
favorable to the plaintiff. Haligas, 2022 WL 2340878, at *10. See
also Hyung Seok Koh v. Graf, No. 11-CV-02605, 2013 WL 5348326, at
*10 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 24, 2013) (considering video submitted with
motion to dismiss) (citing Bogie, 705 F.3d at 609 (“When an exhibit
contradicts the allegations in the complaint, ruling against the
non-moving party on a motion to dismiss is consistent with our
obligation to review all facts in the light most favorable to the
non-moving party.”)).

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I continue to find that approach to be sensible. Unlike in
Haligas,

however,

concluding

that

where
the

I

denied

video

the

footage

motion

to

dismiss

after

supported,

rather

than

discredited, the plaintiff’s version of events, the only reasonable
inference that can be drawn from the sequence of events captured on
the BWCs at issue is that plaintiff’s arrest was supported by
probable cause. Officer Segovia’s sudden exclamation, “there he is!
He’s [unintelligible] his gun!” as he and Officer Cledon arrived at
the surveilled residence indicates that he believed someone had a
gun just before plaintiff took off running.3 Officer Cledon pursued
plaintiff on foot, and moments later, an individual matching the
description Cledon provided was apprehended in the location Cledon
reported that plaintiff was headed. Meanwhile, back on Pine Street,
a voice captured on Officer Segovia’s BWC confirms, “we got him in
custody,” Exh. A (Segovia BWC) at 4:24-4:25, and Officer Segovia
reports, “the guy that ran that they grabbed, he’s the one I watched
put the gun under the car. I just saw him right with my eyes....yeah
he threw it, I watched him put it right under the f***ing car.”
Exhibit A at 10:50-11:10. While it is true that Segovia was not at
the scene of plaintiff’s arrest, his statement reasonably led the
arresting officers to believe that the person they apprehended, whose

Officer Segovia’s BWC shows three individuals—two in a car and one
on the street—who remained at the scene. None of the footage
suggests, and plaintiff does not contend, that anyone else was
present or fled the scene.
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3

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physical description corresponded to that of the individual Cledon
had pursued from the Pine Street residence, was the same person that
Officer Segovia saw throw the gun. In other words, this footage
directly contradicts plaintiff’s allegation that the BWC footage
“confirmed that Plaintiff was not the individual seen with the gun.”
Id. at ¶ 22.
“As the term suggests, probable cause deals not with hard
certainties but with probabilities.” Abbott 705 F.3d at 714 (7th
Cir. 2013) (citing Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 231 (1983)). To
be sure, “mere proximity to suspected criminal activity does not,
without more, generate probable cause.” United States v. Richards,
719 F.3d 746, 757 (7th Cir. 2013). But where additional circumstances
would lead a reasonable officer to believe that an individual
observed in an area where criminal activity is suspected is or was
involved in the criminal conduct, the totality of these circumstances
gives rise to probable cause. United States v. Howard, 883 F.3d 703,
708 (7th Cir. 2018). Importantly, police officers may rely on
information

provided

determination.

Id.

at

by

other

707.

officers

The

for

“collective

a

probable

knowledge

cause

doctrine”

provides that officers “who actually make the arrest need not
personally know all the facts that constitute probable cause if they
reasonably are acting at the direction of another officer or police
agency.” Id.

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In

Lenoir—a

case

on

which

plaintiff

himself

relies—police

officers heard a report over the radio of a disturbance involving an
unidentified male with a weapon, then they observed the defendant in
the area, apparently intoxicated and carrying a gun. When the
defendant saw the officers, he fled into a nearby home as an officer
called out, “Police, Stop!” The officers followed the defendant into
the home—which, unbeknownst to the officers, turned out to be the
defendant’s—where they apprehended him and performed a warrantless
search that yielded several weapons. Id. at 727-28.
The Lenoir court denied the defendant’s motion to suppress
evidence of the weapons, rejecting his argument that police did not
have authority to stop him. The court noted that “a person’s flight
upon seeing the police approach in a high crime area establishes
reasonable suspicion to justify a Terry stop.” Id. at 124 (citing
Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124 (2000)). Here, Officers
Segovia and Cledon observed plaintiff fleeing not just from a “high
crime area” but from a location at which surveilling officers had
observed an individual holding a weapon.4 This is surely enough,
under Lenoir, to entitle the officers to perform an investigatory

While there is no dispute that plaintiff was not the individual
whose surveilled conduct prompted the officers to approach the Pine
Street residence, the video footage captures Officer Segovia
reporting unequivocally that it was plaintiff he saw toss the gun
under a car. This information was conveyed to the officers present
at plaintiff’s arrest. See Exh. B (Cledon BWC) at 5:58-6:01. (Cledon:
“this guy just has weed?” Unidentified officer: “no, he’s the one
who tossed [the gun]!”)
12

4

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stop of the individuals present. Plaintiff’s flight at the officers’
approach for that purpose reasonably enhanced their suspicion that
he was involved in criminal activity.
That one of officers at the scene of plaintiff’s arrest remarked
that plaintiff was “not the same guy” seen on the surveillance camera
does not alter the probable cause analysis. Cledon responded to this
observation that plaintiff “was with them...we got that guy too. We
got the gun,” id. at 4:50-4:55, and Cledon later says, “he walked up
to the car, tossed the gun, he took off running,” id. at 5:37-5:40.
While these comments, standing alone, do not establish probable cause
for

plaintiff’s

arrest,

taken

together

with

Officer

Cledon’s

description of the individual he was pursuing and Officer Segovia’s
report that the person Officer Cledon ran after was the same one he
saw toss the gun under the car—all of which was captured in the BWC
audio and video footage—they leave no doubt about the officers’
collective belief that plaintiff tossed a gun and ran at the approach
of law enforcement. That conduct is sufficient to warrant at least
an investigative stop under Terry and its progeny. See, e.g., United
States v. Cherry, 920 F.3d 1126, 1136 at n. 3 (7th Cir. 2019)
(“[a]lthough flight cannot, on its own, provide probable cause to
arrest, the determination of probable cause depends on a totality of
circumstances that may take into account ‘commonsense judgments and
inferences about human behavior,’ including unprovoked flight.”
(citing Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 125 (2000)).
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Then, upon his apprehension, plaintiff “revealed in short order
evidence that gave [the officers] probable cause for a full-blown
arrest,” Matz v. Klotka, 769 F.3d 517, 525 (7th Cir. 2014), namely,
that he was secreting a significant quantity of drugs in his pants
leg. Even assuming that officers had, up to that point, only a
reasonable
activity,

suspicion
his

of

plaintiff’s

admission—clearly

audible

involvement
on

footage

in

criminal

captured

by

Officer Rodriguez’s BWC—that he had “a lot” of weed on him was
sufficient to give the officers probable cause for his arrest. See
generally 720 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 550/4 (setting forth criminal
charge for possession of cannabis). While it is true that plaintiff
was ultimately charged with weapons offenses, not a drug offense,
“[a]n arrest may be supported by probable cause that the arrestee
committed any offense, regardless of the crime charged or the crime
the officer thought had been committed.” United States v. Shields,
789 F.3d 733, 745 (7th Cir. 2015).
The upshot is that the very videos whose content plaintiff cites
to

support

his

theory

that

the

defendants

knowingly

arrested,

searched, and prosecuted him without probable cause establishes just
the opposite. Even taking plaintiff’s allegations in the light most
favorable to him, it is clear from the video and audio footage of
the events as they unfolded, taken from the officers’ perspective,
that the defendant officers had probable cause to arrest him. This
conclusion, as all agree, is fatal to all of plaintiff’s claims.
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III.
For the foregoing reasons, defendants’ motion to dismiss is
granted.
ENTER ORDER:

_____________________________
Elaine E. Bucklo
United States District Judge
Dated: January 17, 2023

15