Stewart v. Kijakazi
Filing
33
(CORRECTED) MEMORANDUM Opinion and Order: For the reasons stated in the accompanying Memorandum Opinion and Order, plaintiff's motion for summary judgment 19 is denied, and the Acting Commissioner's motion for summary judgment 23 is granted. The Clerk is directed to enter judgment in favor of the Acting Commissioner. Enter Memorandum Opinion and Order. Civil case terminated. Signed by the Honorable Jeannice W. Appenteng on 1/28/2025. Mailed notice. (kp, )
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION
JASON S.,
v.
Plaintiff,
MICHELLE KING, Acting
Commissioner of Social Security, 1
Defendant.
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
Case No. 1:22-cv-2867
Magistrate Judge Jeannice W. Appenteng
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff Jason S. seeks to overturn the final decision of the Acting
Commissioner of Social Security (“Commissioner”) terminating his Supplemental
Security Income (“SSI”) benefits. The parties consented to the jurisdiction of the
United States Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), and filed crossmotions for summary judgment. After review of the record and the parties’
respective arguments, the Court grants the Commissioner’s motion.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff applied for SSI on September 2, 2009. Administrative Record (“R.”)
282-87. He suffered a heart attack in late 2010, and on October 21, 2011, an
administrative law judge (“ALJ”) found that he was disabled as of July 15, 2009 due
to chronic heart failure. R. 134-38. Five years later in October 2016, the Social
Security Administration determined as part of a periodic “continuing disability
review” that plaintiff had experienced medical improvement and was no longer
1 Michelle King became the Acting Commissioner of Social Security on January 20, 2025.
She is automatically substituted as the named defendant pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P. 25(d).
disabled. R. 139-40. A Disability Hearing Officer upheld that decision, R. 178-86,
and plaintiff requested an administrative hearing. He appeared before another ALJ
on July 24, 2018 but reported that his attorney had recently withdrawn. R. 84-96.
The ALJ continued the hearing to allow plaintiff to secure new representation. Id.
On April 8, 2019, plaintiff (now 42 years old) appeared at a second hearing.
He still did not have counsel but he provided an informed waiver and chose to
proceed without representation. R. 99-100. See Jozefyk v. Berryhill, 923 F.3d 492,
496 (7th Cir. 2019). The ALJ heard testimony from plaintiff and from vocational
expert Susan A. Entenberg (the “VE”). R. 97-127. On August 28, 2019, the ALJ
found that since October 31, 2016, plaintiff has suffered from the following severe
impairments: chronic heart failure with dependent edema, hypertension, obesity,
diabetes mellitus with diabetic neuropathy, and metabolic syndrome. R. 54. Though
these impairments are severe, they have not alone or in combination with plaintiff’s
non-severe impairments met or medically equaled any of the listed impairments in
20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. R. 54-55.
After reviewing the evidence, the ALJ concluded that plaintiff has the
residual functional capacity (“RFC”) to perform sedentary work involving:
occasional lifting and carrying of 10 pounds; standing and walking for two hours in
an eight-hour workday; sitting for six hours in an eight-hour workday; occasional
climbing of ramps and stairs; no climbing of ladders, ropes, or scaffolds; occasional
stooping, kneeling, crouching, and crawling; no work at unprotected heights or
driving or operating moving machinery; and no concentrated exposure to
2
temperature extremes. R. 55-58. The ALJ accepted the VE’s testimony that a person
with plaintiff’s background and this RFC could perform a significant number of jobs
available in the national economy. R. 58-59. As a result, the ALJ concluded that
plaintiff’s disability ended on October 31, 2016 and he has not been entitled to
benefits since that date. R. 59. On May 19, 2020, the Appeals Council declined to
review the ALJ’s decision, R. 34-39, making it the final decision of the
Commissioner and reviewable by this Court under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). See Haynes v.
Barnhart, 416 F.3d 621, 626 (7th Cir. 2005); Whitney v. Astrue, 889 F. Supp. 2d
1086, 1088 (N.D. Ill. 2012).
In support of his request for reversal or remand, plaintiff argues that the ALJ
erred in discounting his subjective statements regarding his limitations. 2 For
reasons discussed in this opinion, the Court finds that the ALJ’s decision is
supported by substantial evidence.
DISCUSSION
A.
Standard of Review
A claimant is disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act if he is
unable to perform “any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically
determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in
death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not
less than 12 months.” 20 C.F.R. § 416.905(a). Where, as here, a claimant has been
2 Arguments not specifically addressed in this opinion were not reasonably developed and
have been waived. See, e.g., Crespo v. Colvin, 824 F.3d 667, 673 (7th Cir. 2016)
(“perfunctory and undeveloped arguments, and arguments that are unsupported by
pertinent authority, are waived”).
3
deemed disabled, the Social Security Administration (“SSA”) “must periodically
conduct a continuing disability review to determine if the benefits recipient remains
eligible.” Fitschen v. Kijakazi, 86 F.4th 797, 803 (7th Cir. 2023); 20 C.F.R. § 416.989.
A claimant is no longer eligible for benefits if there has been “medical
improvement,” meaning “any decrease in the medical severity of [the]
impairment(s) which was present at the time of the most recent . . . decision [in the
claimant’s favor].” 20 C.F.R. § 416.994(b)(1); Kimberly T. v. Saul, No. 19 C 487, 2019
WL 6310016, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 25, 2019).
In assessing medical improvement, the SSA considers an eight-part test: “(1)
whether the claimant is engaged in substantial gainful activity; (2) if not, whether
the claimant has an impairment or combination of impairments that meets or
equals the severity of an impairment listed in Appendix 1; (3) if not, whether there
has been medical improvement (as defined above); (4) if there has been medical
improvement, is it related to the claimant’s ability to do work (i.e., has it caused an
increase in his RFC); (5) if there has not been medical improvement or if the
medical improvement is not related to the claimant’s ability to work, whether any
exceptions to medical improvement apply; (6) if the medical improvement is related
to the claimant’s ability to do work or if certain exceptions apply, are his current
impairments in combination severe; (7) if the claimant’s impairment is severe, does
he have the RFC to do past relevant work; and (8) if the claimant cannot do past
relevant work, does his RFC enable him to do other work.” Milton B. v. Kijakazi,
4
No. 20 C 5482, 2023 WL 4134812, at *2 (N.D. Ill. June 22, 2023). See also 20 C.F.R.
§ 416.994(f).
In reviewing an ALJ’s decision, the Court “will not reweigh the evidence,
resolve debatable evidentiary conflicts, determine credibility, or substitute [its]
judgment for the ALJ’s determination so long as substantial evidence supports it.”
Warnell v. O’Malley, 97 F.4th 1050, 1052-53 (7th Cir. 2024) (quoting Gedatus v.
Saul, 994 F.3d 893, 900 (7th Cir. 2021)). Substantial evidence is “such relevant
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.”
Biestek v. Berryhill, 587 U.S. 97, 103 (2019) (citation omitted). “[S]ocial-security
adjudicators are subject to only the most minimal of articulation requirements,” and
ALJs need only provide “an explanation for how the evidence leads to their
conclusions that is sufficient to allow us, as a reviewing court, to assess the validity
of the agency’s ultimate findings and afford [the appellant] meaningful judicial
review.” Warnell, 97 F.4th at 1053-54 (internal quotations omitted) (in “shorthand
terms,” an ALJ must build a “logical bridge from the evidence to his conclusion.”);
Morales v. O’Malley, 103 F.4th 469, 471 (7th Cir. 2024).
B.
Analysis
Plaintiff argues that the case must be reversed or remanded because the ALJ
erred in finding that his statements regarding the intensity, persistence, and
limiting effects of his symptoms were not fully supported. 3 Dkt. 19 at 7-12; Dkt. 27
3 In his opening brief, plaintiff also suggested that the ALJ erred because he failed to seek
an updated medical opinion regarding the significance of a 2017 EMG test and instead
relied on outdated state agency opinions. Dkt. 19 at 10-11. The Commissioner responded
with a detailed explanation as to why an updated medical opinion was not necessary, Dkt.
5
at 1-7. In evaluating a claimant’s subjective symptom allegations, an ALJ must
consider several factors including: the objective medical evidence; the claimant’s
daily activities; the location, duration, frequency, and intensity of the claimant’s
pain or other symptoms; precipitating and aggravating factors; type, dosage,
effectiveness, and side effects of medication; treatment and other measures besides
medication taken to relieve pain or other symptoms; and functional limitations due
to pain or other symptoms. 20 C.F.R. § 416.929(c); SSR 16-3p, 2017 WL 5180304, at
*5, 7-8 (Oct. 25, 2017). “‘An ALJ need not discuss every detail in the record as it
relates to every factor,’ but an ALJ may not ignore an entire line of evidence
contrary to her ruling.” Benito M. v. Kijakazi, No. 20 C 5966, 2022 WL 2828741, at
*8 (N.D. Ill. July 20, 2022) (quoting Grotts v. Kijakazi, 27 F.4th 1273, 1278 (7th Cir.
2022)). “As long as an ALJ gives specific reasons supported by the record, [the
Court] will not overturn a credibility determination unless it is patently wrong.”
Grotts, 27 F.4th at 1279; Murphy v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 811, 816 (7th Cir. 2014)
(patently wrong “means that the decision lacks any explanation or support”).
“Subjective statements by claimants as to pain or other symptoms are not alone
conclusive evidence of disability and must be supported by other objective evidence.”
Grotts, 27 F.4th at 1278.
24 at 11-15, and plaintiff did not address the issue in his reply brief. Dkt. 27 at 1 (stating
only that “[r]egardless of whether the ALJ should have sought an updated medical opinion,
his decision must still be remanded because his subjective symptom analysis was legally
and factually flawed and cannot withstand scrutiny”). The Court thus deems the argument
withdrawn.
6
Plaintiff testified that after he had gastric bypass surgery in January 2015,
he lost weight (getting down to 245 pounds) and was able to walk two or three
blocks. R. 107, 110. As of the April 2019 hearing, however, his weight had increased
to 309 pounds and he “can’t even walk a whole block without getting out of breath
real fast.” R. 110. Plaintiff stated that if he sits for too long, his back starts hurting,
and he suffers from neuropathic foot pain that feels like pins and needles and
“comes and goes randomly.” R. 115-16. In addition, he experiences leg swelling and
knee pain that limit his ability to walk. R. 109-11. Plaintiff testified that the
“biggest barrier” to working is that his medications make him feel sleepy all the
time. R. 111, 120. He has “like 13” prescriptions and spends most of his day lying
down. R. 112.
In discounting this testimony, the ALJ first found it inconsistent with the
objective medical evidence. R. 56. Following plaintiff’s January 2015 bariatric
surgery, he routinely presented with regular cardiac rate and rhythm throughout
2015 and 2016 and no longer needed diabetes medication. R. 56 (citing R. 411, 43235, 442-45, 460, 464, 470). An October 14, 2016 internal medicine consultative exam
revealed: regular cardiac rate and rhythm; full and symmetric peripheral pulses; no
extremity edema; an ability to walk 50 feet without assistance despite a wide-based
gait; normal grip strength; normal range of motion in all joints except the knees;
normal range of motion in the spine; full strength of 5/5 in all extremities; and no
use of an assistive device despite decreased foot sensation. R. 57, 424.
7
Records from 2017 and 2018 continued to document stable cardiac symptoms.
Though a March 2017 note showed elevated hypertension, this was secondary to
plaintiff not taking his morning medication. R. 57, 615. A July 17, 2017
echocardiogram showed an ejection fraction of 55% to 65%, in the normal range,
R. 57, 661, and on November 29, 2017, plaintiff’s hypertension was well-controlled,
he had no chest pain, and his peripheral neuropathy was stable. R. 57, 631. Plaintiff
exhibited some worsening edema in May 2018, but exams in July and October 2018
revealed no edema, regular cardiac rate and rhythm, and clear lungs. R. 57 (citing
R. 645, 698, 710, 718, 794). The ALJ discussed all of this evidence and reasonably
found it inconsistent with plaintiff’s complaints of a near total inability to walk or
sit for any length of time. See Thorps v. Astrue, 873 F. Supp. 2d 995, 1006 (N.D. Ill.
2012) (citing Arnold v. Barnhart, 473 F.3d 816, 823 (7th Cir. 2007)) (“[A] patient’s
subjective complaints are not required to be accepted insofar as they clashed with
other, objective medical evidence in the record”).
The ALJ further considered the opinion evidence of record in assessing
plaintiff’s testimony. On October 25, 2016, Vidya Madala, M.D. opined that plaintiff
can perform light work with no additional restrictions aside from occasional
balancing. R. 472-79. On January 4, 2017, James Hinchen, M.D. affirmed the RFC
for light work but included some additional postural and environmental restrictions
(occasional climbing of ramps and stairs; no climbing of ladders, ropes, or scaffolds;
occasional balancing; and no concentrated exposure to hazards). R. 480-87. The ALJ
found these opinions partially persuasive but limited plaintiff to sedentary work
8
with some additional postural and environmental restrictions to account for his
peripheral neuropathy and obesity. R. 57. Plaintiff does not identify any physician
of record who found him more limited. See Tutwiler v. Kijakazi, 87 F.4th 853, 860
(7th Cir. 2023) (“The lack of an opposing medical opinion [imposing greater
restrictions than those the ALJ found in his decision] makes it difficult for us to find
that the ALJ misjudged the evidence so significantly as to warrant reversal”);
Castile v. Astrue, 617 F.3d 923, 929 (7th Cir. Aug. 13, 2010) (finding no error where
“[i]t was because of and not in spite of [the claimant’s] testimony that the ALJ
limited her to a more restrictive residual functional capacity finding than any
physician on the record”).
Plaintiff argues that the ALJ ignored or misconstrued other evidence that
supports his claims of disabling symptoms. Dkt. 19 at 9-10; Dkt. 27 at 3-6. For
example, exams conducted in May 2018 and in January, February, April, and May
2019 all revealed edema in plaintiff’s lower extremities, which he says is consistent
with his July 2018 report of “on/off” swelling. R. 711. And plaintiff complained of
bilateral foot tingling requiring periodic increases to his gabapentin dosage. R. 618,
631-32, 638. This argument fails because the ALJ expressly considered plaintiff’s
leg swelling and peripheral neuropathy in determining the RFC, R. 57, and plaintiff
does not explain how these conditions evidence greater functional restrictions. See
Weaver v. Berryhill, 746 F. Appx. 574, 578-79 (7th Cir. 2018) (“It was [plaintiff]’s
burden to establish not just the existence of the conditions, but to provide evidence
that they support specific limitations affecting her capacity to work”).
9
Also unavailing is plaintiff’s objection that the ALJ discounted his statements
solely based on the objective evidence. Rather, the ALJ additionally found the
statements inconsistent with plaintiff’s activities of daily living, which included
shopping in stores, going to the laundromat, performing personal care, and driving
on occasion. R. 56, 308-11. “[I]t is entirely permissible to examine all of the
evidence, including a claimant’s daily activities, to assess whether testimony about
the effects of his impairments was credible or exaggerated.” Alvarado v. Colvin, 836
F.3d 744, 750 (7th Cir. 2016). And here, the ALJ did not equate plaintiff’s ability to
engage in these activities with an ability to work full-time but simply noted that
plaintiff was able to engage in more robust activities than would be expected for a
person with his claimed limitations. This was entirely proper. See Burmester v.
Berryhill, 920 F.3d 507, 510 (7th Cir. Apr. 5, 2019) (“ALJ did not equate
Burmester’s ability to perform certain activities of daily living with an ability to
work full time. Instead, he used her reported activities to assess the credibility of
her statements concerning the intensity, persistence, or limiting effects of her
symptoms consistent with the applicable rules”).
Plaintiff finally argues that the ALJ committed reversible error by failing to
consider limitations on his activities. For example, he only goes to the grocery store
once a month for half an hour at a time, he needs his mother’s help washing his
clothes at the laundromat, and he takes frequent naps. Dkt. 19 at 8; Dkt. 27 at 2.
With respect to napping, no physician of record indicated that plaintiff needs to
sleep during the day. See Imse v. Berryhill, 752 F. Appx. 358, 360-62 (7th Cir. 2018)
10
(ALJ properly disregarded claimant’s hearing testimony of needing to lie down or
nap 90 minutes to 4 hours a day 2 to 5 days a week, where “no physician, treating or
otherwise, has ever indicated that there was a medical reason why she would need
to lay down/nap as frequently as alleged during the day”).
As for plaintiff needing his mother’s help and shopping infrequently, it is true
that “an ALJ is supposed to consider [such] limitations in performing household
activities, [but] the ALJ’s opinion must be looked at in its entirety.” Kenlee F. v.
Colvin, No. 21 C 50355, 2025 WL 92589, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 14, 2025) (internal
citation omitted). Viewing the record as a whole using a common-sense approach,
Winsted v. Berryhill, 923 F.3d 472, 478 (7th Cir. 2019), the ALJ provided good
reasons for discrediting plaintiff’s testimony and that decision is supported by
substantial evidence and not patently wrong. R. 56-57. See Bruno v. Saul, 817 F.
Appx. 238, 241 (7th Cir. 2020) (quoting Biestek, 587 U.S. at 103) (“Substantial
evidence is not a high hurdle to clear – it means only ‘such relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion’”); Dawson v.
Colvin, No. 11 C 6671, 2014 WL 1392974, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 10, 2014) (citing
Schreiber v. Colvin, 519 F. Appx. 951, 961 (7th Cir. 2013)) (an ALJ’s credibility
assessment “need not be perfect; it just can’t be patently wrong”).
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment
[19] is denied, and the Commissioner’s motion for summary judgment [23] is
11
granted. The Clerk is directed to enter judgment in favor of the
Commissioner.
SO ORDERED.
__________________________________
Jeannice W. Appenteng
United States Magistrate Judge
Dated: January 28, 2025
12
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?