Theta IP, LLC v. Motorola Mobility LLC et al

Filing 94

OPINION AND ORDER. The Court grants LGL's motion to dismiss 54 . The Court dismisses LGL from the case without prejudice for lack of personal jurisdiction. Signed by the Honorable Sara L. Ellis on 3/25/2024:Mailed notice(rj, )

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION
THETA IP, LLC,
Plaintiff,
v.
MOTOROLA MOBILITY LLC;
LENOVO (UNITED STATES) INC, and
LENOVO GROUP LTD,
Defendant.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

No. 22 C 3441
Judge Sara L. Ellis

OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff Theta IP, LLC (“Theta”) filed this lawsuit against Motorola Mobility LLC
(“Motorola”), Lenovo (United States) Inc. (“Lenovo US”), and their parent company, Lenovo
Group Limited (“LGL”), alleging infringement of multiple of Theta’s patents that detail
technology used to preserve cell phone battery life. LGL filed a motion to dismiss for lack of
personal jurisdiction pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2). 1 Because LGL does
not have sufficient minimum contacts with Illinois, this Court lacks jurisdiction over LGL and
dismisses it from this case.

The parties filed their briefs and accompanying exhibits under seal, also providing redacted versions. If
the Court refers to a sealed document, it attempts to do so without revealing any information that could
reasonably be deemed confidential. Nonetheless, if the Court discusses confidential information, it has
done so because it is necessary to explain the path of its reasoning. See In re Specht, 622 F.3d 697, 701
(7th Cir. 2010) (“Documents that affect the disposition of federal litigation are presumptively open to
public view, even if the litigants strongly prefer secrecy, unless a statute, rule, or privilege justifies
confidentiality.”); Union Oil Co. of Cal. v. Leavell, 220 F.3d 562, 568 (7th Cir. 2000) (explaining that a
judge's “opinions and orders belong in the public domain”).

1

BACKGROUND 2
Theta manufactures high performance wireless networking equipment for mobile devices.
Its founder, Professor Yannis Tsividis, invented systems to reduce the loss of cell phone’s battery
power that occurs when a cell phone connects to a wireless transmitter. He patented various
aspects of his system in U.S. Patent No. 7,010,330 (the “’330 Patent”), U.S. Patent No.
10,129,825 (the “’825 Patent”), and U.S. Patent No. 10,524,202 (the “’202 Patent”) (collectively,
the “Patents”).
Motorola and Lenovo US import, design, and sell various cellphones and tablet devices
that connect to wireless receivers throughout the United States. Motorola is incorporated in
Delaware and has its principal place of business in Chicago, Illinois. Lenovo US is incorporated
in Delaware and has its principal place of business in Morrisville, North Carolina. Theta asserts
that at least some of the products sold by Motorola and Lenovo US use cell phone battery
designs that infringe on Theta’s patents. 3
LGL is a Chinese holding company, serving as the indirect parent company for Motorola
and the direct parent company for Lenovo US. As explained by Adrian Chim, the Director of
Group Financial Reporting and Accounting Policy for LGL, in his affidavit (the “Chim
In addressing personal jurisdiction, the Court is not limited to the pleadings. See Purdue Rsch. Found.
v. Sanofi-Synthelabo, S.A., 338 F.3d 773, 782 (7th Cir. 2003). Therefore, the Court draws the facts from
the complaint and the additional documents submitted by the parties. The Court resolves all factual
conflicts and draws all reasonable inferences in Theta’s favor. Id. at 782–83.
2

These products include the following Motorola phones: the Moto G Family phones (including Moto G
Power (2021), Moto G Stylus (2022), Moto G Stylus 5G, Moto G Stylus (2021), Moto G Stylus 5G
(2022), Moto G Pure, Moto G 100, Moto G Play, Moto G Stylus (2020), Moto G Fast, Moto G Power
(2022), Moto G Power (2020)); the Motorola Edge Family (including Edge, Edge (2021), Edge (2020),
Edge Plus, Edge 5G, Edge Plus (2022)); the Motorola One Family (including One, One 5G, One 5G Ace,
One Fusion Plus, One Action, One Hyper, One Zoom); the Moto X4; the Moto E Family; the Moto Z
Family; and the RAZR Family (including, without Razr, Razr (2020), Razr (2nd Gen)). They also
include the following Lenovo branded series smartphones: S Series; K Series; Legion Series; P Series; Z
Series; VIBE Series; A Series; and the Tab Series products with cellular capabilities. The Court will refer
to these products as the “Accused Products.”
3

2

Affidavit”), LGL is incorporated and has its principal place of business in Hong Kong. See Doc.
54-1 ¶¶ 1–2. As a holding company, LGL does not manufacture or sell any merchandise, nor
does it participate in the research and development of the Motorola or Lenovo US products. Id.
¶ 5. LGL does not participate in Motorola’s or Lenovo US’ decision making related to the sales,
marketing, distribution, or importation of Motorola or Lenovo US products. Id. ¶ 6. Nor does
LGL pay any wages or salaries to employees of Lenovo US or Motorola. Id. ¶ 8.
Both Motorola and Lenovo US have agreements with other LGL subsidiaries. In 2015,
Motorola contracted with another LGL subsidiary and cell phone manufacturer, Motorola
Wuhan, to sell cell phones throughout the United States. See Doc. 80-9 (the “Motorola and
Motorola Wuhan Purchase Agreement”). Lenovo US entered into a distribution agreement with
another LGL subsidiary, Lenovo PC HK Limited, to sell cell phones throughout the United
States. See Doc. 80-10 (the “Lenovo US/Lenovo PC HK Agreement”). As part of the Lenovo
US/Lenovo PC HK Agreement, Lenovo US agreed to consider, but would not be bound by,
recommended prices provided by Lenovo PC HK. See Doc. 80-10 at 15. If Lenovo US chose to
sell a product for less, it needs to consult “with the appropriate delegation levels within the
Lenovo Group.” Id. The Lenovo US/Lenovo PC HK Agreement defines Lenovo Group as “the
group of companies owned, directly or indirectly, by Lenovo Group Limited.” Id. at 5.
LEGAL STANDARD
A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(2) challenges the Court’s jurisdiction over a party.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2). When a defendant raises a Rule 12(b)(2) challenge, “the plaintiff bears
the burden of demonstrating the existence of jurisdiction.” 4 Curry v. Revolution Lab’ys, LLC,
Theta argues that the burden should shift to LGL to prove a lack of personal jurisdiction because LGL
filed the motion in an untimely manner, after Theta filed a motion for default against LGL. See be2 LLC
v. Ivanov, 642 F.3d 555, 557 (7th Cir. 2011) (“Because he knew about the suit and chose to default rather
than defend, he must bear the burden of proof on his post-judgment motion challenging personal

4

3

949 F.3d 385, 392 (7th Cir. 2020) (citation omitted). If the Court rules on the Rule 12(b)(2)
motion without an evidentiary hearing, the plaintiff need only establish a prima facie case of
personal jurisdiction. Id. at 392–93; N. Grain Mktg., LLC v. Greving, 743 F.3d 487, 491 (7th
Cir. 2014). In resolving a Rule 12(b)(2) motion, the Court “accept[s] as true all well-pleaded
facts alleged in the complaint,” Felland v. Clifton, 682 F.3d 665, 672 (7th Cir. 2012), and “reads
the complaint liberally with every inference drawn in favor of [the] plaintiff,” GCIU-Emp. Ret.
Fund v. Goldfarb Corp., 565 F.3d 1018, 1020 n.1 (7th Cir. 2009). However, if the defendant
submits “evidence opposing the district court’s exercise of personal jurisdiction, the plaintiff[ ]
must similarly submit affirmative evidence supporting the court’s exercise of jurisdiction.”
Matlin v. Spin Master Corp., 921 F.3d 701, 705 (7th Cir. 2019). The Court “accept[s] as true
any facts contained in the defendant’s affidavits that remain unrefuted by the plaintiff,” GCIUEmp. Ret. Fund, 565 F.3d at 1020 n.1, but resolves “any factual disputes in the [parties’]
affidavits in favor of the plaintiff,” Felland, 682 F.3d at 672.
ANALYSIS
I.

Personal Jurisdiction
In patent cases, the Court applies the law of the Federal Circuit to determine whether

personal jurisdiction exists. Avocent Huntsville Corp. v. Aten Int’l Co., 552 F.3d 1324, 1328
(Fed. Cir. 2008). 5 Under Federal Circuit law, personal jurisdiction is appropriate if authorized
by Illinois’ long-arm statute and consistent with due process. Grober v. Mako Prod., Inc., 686

jurisdiction.”). But the Court denied Theta’s motion for default and ordered LGL to file its responsive
pleading by May 24, 2023, which LGL did. Doc. 52; Doc. 54. Thus, be2’s burden-shifting instruction in
the case of a post-default motion has no relevance to this case and the burden remains on Theta to prove
jurisdiction exists over LGL.
The law of the Federal and Seventh Circuits is in harmony on the question of whether the Court may
exercise jurisdiction here, so the Court cites to them interchangeably. Chamberlain Grp., Inc. v.
Techtronic Indus. Co., No. 16 C 6097, 2017 WL 3394741, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 8, 2017).
5

4

F.3d 1335, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2012). Although theoretical differences may exist between the
federal and Illinois constitutional standards, “no Illinois case has provided a definitive
explanation” of these differences. Matlin, 921 F.3d at 705. Moreover, both constitutional
standards focus on whether exercising jurisdiction over a defendant is fair and reasonable. See
KM Enters., Inc. v. Glob. Traffic Techs., Inc., 725 F.3d 718, 732 (7th Cir. 2013). Accordingly, a
single inquiry into whether the United States Constitution permits jurisdiction suffices. See, e.g.,
Curry, 949 F.3d at 393; Illinois v. Hemi Grp. LLC, 622 F.3d 754, 756–57 (7th Cir. 2010); see
also Wesly v. Nat’l Hemophilia Found., 2020 IL App (3d) 170569, ¶ 16 (“[I]t is generally true
that, when federal due process concerns regarding personal jurisdiction are satisfied, so are
Illinois due process concerns.” (alteration in original) (citation omitted)).
Jurisdiction is proper under the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution if
the defendant has “certain minimum contacts with [the forum state] such that the maintenance of
the suit does not offend ‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.’” Int’l Shoe Co.
v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (quoting Millikin v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)).
Minimum contacts exist where “the defendant’s conduct and connection with the forum State are
such that he should reasonably anticipate being haled into court there.” World-Wide Volkswagen
Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980); Brook v. McCormley, 873 F.3d 549, 552 (7th Cir.
2017). Personal jurisdiction comes in two forms: general and specific. 6 See Daimler AG v.
Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 126–28 (2014). Theta does not assert that Illinois has general
jurisdiction over LGL and instead only discusses specific jurisdiction. The Court limits its
analysis accordingly.
The Supreme Court has recently emphasized that a third method of establishing personal jurisdiction
exists where a defendant has consented to suit in the forum. Mallory v. Norfolk S. Ry. Co., 600 U.S. 122,
138 (2023). Because Theta does not argue that LGL consented to suit in Illinois, the Court need not
address the implications of Mallory further.

6

5

Specific jurisdiction arises “when the defendant purposefully directs its activities at the
forum state and the alleged injury arises out of those activities.” Mobile Anesthesiologists Chi.,
LLC v. Anesthesia Assoc. of Hous. Metroplex, P.A., 623 F.3d 440, 444 (7th Cir. 2010); see also
Abelesz v. OTP Bank, 692 F.3d 638, 654 (7th Cir. 2012) (“Specific jurisdiction is jurisdiction
over a specific claim based on the defendant’s contacts with the forum that gave rise to or are
closely connected to the claim itself.”). For purposes of specific jurisdiction, “[t]he relevant
contacts are those that center on the relations among the defendant, the forum, and the litigation.”
Advanced Tactical Ordnance Sys., LLC v. Real Action Paintball, Inc., 751 F.3d 796, 800–01 (7th
Cir. 2014). A defendant is not subject to jurisdiction solely because the plaintiff suffered injury
in the forum state. Id. at 802. Instead, to establish specific jurisdiction over LGL, Theta must
show that “(1) [LGL] purposefully directed activities at residents of the forum; (2) [Theta’s]
claim arises out of or relates to those activities; and (3) [the] assertion of personal jurisdiction is
reasonable and fair.” Polar Electro Oy v. Suunto Oy, 829 F.3d 1343, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
Theta asserts two grounds for why this Court may exercise specific jurisdiction over
LGL: first, that Motorola and Lenovo US, over whom this Court has jurisdiction, acted as LGL’s
agents; and second, that under a stream of commerce theory, LGL directs and controls its
distribution channel to bring accused products into the United States to sell. The Court addresses
each theory in turn.
A.

Agency

Generally, “constitutional due process requires that personal jurisdiction cannot be
premised on corporate affiliation or stock ownership alone where corporate formalities are
substantially observed and the parent does not exercise an unusually high degree of control over
the subsidiary.” Cent. States, Se. & Sw. Areas Pension Fund v. Reimer Express World Corp.,

6

230 F.3d 934, 943 (7th Cir. 2000). In other words, a “parent’s mere knowledge of its
subsidiary’s business in a particular jurisdiction does not render the parent amenable to suit
there.” Neterval-Quiel v. CMC SRL, No. 21-CV-1279-BHL, 2022 WL 4131921, at *6 (E.D.
Wis. Sept. 12, 2022). But a court may have jurisdiction over a parent corporation where the
contacts of its subsidiaries “may be imputed to [LGL] under either an agency or alter ego
theory.” 7 Celgard, LLC v. SK Innovation Co., 792 F.3d 1373, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2015); see also
Daimler AG, 571 U.S. at 135 n.13 (“Agency relationships . . . may be relevant to the existence of
specific jurisdiction.”); Bilek v. Fed. Ins. Co., 8 F.4th 581, 590 (7th Cir. 2021) (“[T]he attribution
of an agent’s conduct to a principal to establish specific personal jurisdiction comports with
federal due process.”).
Agency may be based on actual or apparent authority. The parties do not explicitly argue
that a certain type of agency governs, instead they dispute whether LGL has sufficient control
over its subsidiaries to establish jurisdiction. See Bilek, 8 F.4th at 587 (noting that one factor
Theta must show to establish jurisdiction under an agency theory is that “the principal controlled
or had the right to control the alleged agent’s conduct”); Celgard, 792 F.3d at 1379 (finding the
court did not have personal jurisdiction over parent because the plaintiff failed to present
evidence of the “requisite control for jurisdiction to be premised on the acts of agents.”). Theta
asserts three different categories of evidence to establish LGL’s control: LGL’s public statements
from its corporate reports; the alleged overlap of some senior leadership between LGL,
Motorola, and Lenovo US; and contractual agreements between LGL’s subsidiaries that grant
either privileges or responsibilities to LGL.

LGL argues that personal jurisdiction does not exist under the alter ego theory as well. See Bilek, 8
F.4th at 590. Theta does not assert that the Court should find jurisdiction based on an alter ego theory, so
the Court does not address it.
7

7

The language that Theta relies on from the corporate reports does not accurately reflect
the conclusions Theta seeks to draw—that LGL controlled the day-to-day operations of Lenovo
US’ and Motorola’s cell phone sales. LGL’s corporate report includes a statement that the
“Group . . . has the ability to affect those returns through its power to direct the activities of the
entity.” Doc. 82-2 at 197. However, as LGL notes, the report defines “Group” to include LGL
and its subsidiaries. Id. at 64; see also Doc. 82-3 at 2. Because the “Group” thus includes more
than just LGL or its leadership, the Court cannot draw the conclusion that it shows LGL’s
control over its subsidiaries. See Kitt Holdings, Inc. v. Mobileye B.V., No. 1:17-CV-2421 RLMMPB, 2018 WL 3389747, at *2 (S.D. Ind. July 11, 2018) (determining that language from
corporate documents that clarified that “we” referred to “Mobileye [B].V. together with its
subsidiaries” did not show the defendant’s control over its subsidiaries). This is particularly true
given the Chim affidavit, which asserts that LGL does not manufacture, sell, or distribute the
Accused Products, much less participate in the daily activities of its subsidiaries. Accordingly,
the Court finds LGL’s corporate filings do not demonstrate that LGL controls its subsidiaries in a
way that supports a finding of jurisdiction over LGL in Illinois.
Theta also identifies two officers, Laura Quatela and Sergio Buniac, whom LGL lists as
part of its leadership team on its website but also identified in its interrogatory responses as only
Lenovo US, and not LGL, employees. See Doc. 80-1 at 10; Doc. 82-1. Even if Quatela and
Buniac are executives for both LGL and Lenovo US, the existence of two overlapping executives
does not establish LGL’s control over the sales of the Accused Products by its subsidiaries,
particularly given the lack of other evidence of LGL’s participation in the staffing, marketing,
sales, and pricing decisions of its subsidiaries. See Convergence Aviation, Ltd. v. United Techs.
Corp., No. 10 C 2021, 2012 WL 698391, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 29, 2012) (finding that five

8

overlapping executives between the parent company and relevant subsidiary “insufficient to
show substantial control” when the plaintiff could not explain how the executives have “at the
direction of [the parent company]” directed the subsidiary.); Bray v. Fresenius Med. Care
Aktiengesellschaft Inc., No. 06 C 50197, 2007 WL 7366260, at *8 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 30, 2007)
(finding no personal jurisdiction existed because the defendant was not involved in “staffing,
marketing, sales or pricing decisions of Holdings,” “Holdings is responsible for developing its
own budget,” “[t]he entities maintain separate books, records and bank accounts,” “[n]othing
presented by plaintiffs demonstrates that FMC KGaA is involved in the day-to-day business of
Holdings,” even where there was a similar composition of the entity managing the defendant and
the board of directors of the subsidiary); see also Camasta v. Omaha Steaks Int’l, Inc., No. 12CV-08285, 2013 WL 4495661, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 21, 2013) (finding that the parent company
did not control its subsidiary where the parent and subsidiary “are independently operated, albeit
through common ownership.”).
Finally, the contractual relationships between LGL and its subsidiaries do not support the
conclusion that LGL controlled the manufacturing and sale of the Accused Products. Theta first
emphasizes that LGL maintains the insurance policy for the Motorola and Motorola Wuhan
Purchase Agreement. However, these accusations alone do not rise to the level of intermingling
that would pull LGL into this Court’s jurisdiction. Maintaining insurance with respect to a
contract between two subsidiaries is not evidence of LGL’s control over its subsidiary’s sales
and distribution decisions. Instead, it constitutes a standard administrative service that does not
create sufficient minimum contacts to support the exercise of jurisdiction as “parent [companies]
do not expect that performing these [standard administrative] activities may subject them to
liability because of the actions of the subsidiaries.” Cent. States, 230 F.3d at 945.

9

Theta also argues that LGL retains control over the price points of the Accused Products
based on language in the Lenovo US/Lenovo PC HK Agreement. While price setting may rise to
the level of involvement justifying subjecting someone to the jurisdiction of this Court, the
language Theta relies on from the Lenovo US/Lenovo PC HK Agreement does not grant LGL
the power to set pricing. Convergence Aviation, 2012 WL 698391, at *7 (declining to exercise
personal jurisdiction over a parent company where “there is no evidence that [the parent
company] controls its subsidiaries’ staffing, marketing, sales, or pricing decisions”). As the
Lenovo US/Lenovo PC HK Agreement states, “in case the price for a product is lower than the
recommended price” Lenovo US “shall consult with the appropriate delegation levels within the
Lenovo Group.” See Doc. 80-10 at 15. Like with reference to other LGL corporate documents,
Lenovo Group is defined as “the group of companies owned, directly or indirectly, by Lenovo
Group Limited.” Id. at 5. Otherwise, the distributor, here Lenovo US, “will establish the prices

and any discounts for the products.” Id. Even drawing all inferences in favor of Theta, Theta’s
misreading of the agreement does not lend itself to the conclusion that LGL has the power to set
any product prices. Because Theta has not provided sufficient evidence that LGL controls
Lenovo US or Motorola, Theta cannot rely on an agency theory to establish personal jurisdiction
over LGL in Illinois.
B.

Stream of Commerce

Theta also argues that this Court has jurisdiction over LGL because it controlled all
aspects of the supply chain for the Accused Products. The law surrounding the “stream of
commerce” theory for specific personal jurisdiction remains split between two tests presented by
Justice O’Connor and Justice Brennan in Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court of
California, Solano County, 480 U.S. 102 (1987). See Polar Electro Oy, 829 F.3d at 1349

10

(recognizing that the Supreme Court’s most recent decision discussing the stream of commerce
theory, McIntyre v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873 (2011), did not change the split identified in Asahi).
For jurisdiction to exist under the stream of commerce theory, Justice O’Connor’s test requires
more than placing a product in the stream of commerce and instead evidence that the defendant
had the “intent or purpose to serve the market in the forum State.” Asahi, 480 U.S. at 112. By
contrast, Justice Brennan’s test only requires evidence that a participant in the stream of
commerce process be “aware that the final product is being marketed in the forum State.” Id. at
117.
The Court does not need to address the Asahi split because Theta has not provided
sufficient evidence under either test. Celgard, 792 F.3d at 1382 (“Similarly, in this case, we do
not need to resolve the question as the results of the case are the same under either formulation of
the stream-of-commerce test.”). Theta relies on the close relationship that LGL’s various
subsidiaries have with each other, including the Motorola and Motorola Wuhan Asset Purchase
Agreement and the Lenovo US/Lenovo PC HK Agreement, to suggest that LGL must control the
supply chain. However, the fact that LGL’s subsidiaries work with each other does not speak to
their relationship with LGL or LGL’s role in manufacturing, selling, or marketing the Accused
Products, or any other products for that matter. Cf. Chamberlain, 2017 WL 3394741, at *5
(finding jurisdiction over a foreign company “who approved and allocated capital necessary to
develop and bring to market the allegedly infringing product” and “had at least some say in the
decision to continue exploiting a longstanding distribution channel that inexorably deposits a
significant number of the products at issue in Illinois.”). At best, Theta’s evidence establishes
that both Motorola and Lenovo US partner with foreign LGL subsidiaries. And, as discussed
previously, LGL’s payment for insurance policies and its ability to weigh in on some pricing in

11

limited circumstances do not create the control that Theta asserts it has. Accordingly, the stream
of commerce theory does not allow this Court to exercise jurisdiction over LGL.
II.

Jurisdictional Discovery
Because the Court finds it lacks personal jurisdiction over LGL, it now addresses Theta’s

request for jurisdictional discovery. For a court to permit jurisdictional discovery, “[a]t a
minimum, the plaintiff must establish a colorable or prima facie showing of personal
jurisdiction.” Cent. States, 230 F.3d at 946 (citation omitted); Medline Indus., Inc. v. Diversey,
Inc., No. 20 C 4424, 2020 WL 5763637, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 28, 2020) (the plaintiff “must
make a colorable showing of personal jurisdiction before discovery is allowed”). This requires a
plaintiff to “show that the factual record is at least ambiguous or unclear on the jurisdiction
issue.” Gilman Opco LLC v. Lanman Oil Co., No. 13-CV-7846, 2014 WL 1284499, at *6 (N.D.
Ill. Mar. 28, 2014) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). Theta has not met its
burden by making a prima facie or colorable showing of jurisdiction or demonstrating an
ambiguous factual record. The Court thus denies Theta’s request for jurisdictional discovery.
See Medline Indus., 2020 WL 5763637, at *4 (“[W]hen a lack of personal jurisdiction is clear,
jurisdictional discovery would serve no purpose and should not be permitted.” (citing John
Crane Inc. v. Simon Greenstone Panatier Bartlett, APC, No. 16 C 5918, 2017 WL 1093150, at
*12 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 23, 2017))).
III.

Transfer
The Seventh Circuit has recently explained that “when federal courts find that they lack

jurisdiction, they bear an independent obligation under § 1631 to consider whether to transfer the
case.” North v. Ubiquity, Inc., 72 F.4th 221, 228 (7th Cir. 2023); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1631
(“Whenever a civil action is filed in a court . . . and that court finds that there is a want of

12

jurisdiction, the court shall, if it is in the interest of justice, transfer such action or appeal to any
other such court . . . in which the action or appeal could have been brought at the time it was
filed.”). But see Astornet Techs. Inc. v. BAE Sys., Inc., 802 F.3d 1271, 1282–83 (Fed. Cir. 2015)
(“With no argument for transfer from Astornet, however, we do not consider transfer as an
alternative to dismissal and so do not definitively address § 1631’s applicability.”). This
obligation is “quite limited,” however, and requires consideration of whether transfer of the case
is “in the interest of justice.” North, 72 F.4th at 228. A bar on refiling based on the statute of
limitations amounts to a compelling reason to transfer a case. Id. (citing Phillips v. Seiter, 173
F.3d 609, 610 (7th Cir. 1999)). But where the statute of limitations would not bar refiling, the
Court need not transfer the case pursuant to § 1631. Id. (“If a plaintiff may, on its own, refile its
case in a proper forum, the interests of justice do not demand transfer.” (quoting Danziger v. De
Llano, 948 F.3d 124, 133 (3d Cir. 2020)). Here, the statute of limitations does not appear to
stand as a bar to refiling. See 35 U.S.C. §286. Therefore, the Court does not find that the
interests of justice require transfer under § 1631 and so dismisses LGL as a defendant without
prejudice for lack of personal jurisdiction.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court grants LGL’s motion to dismiss [54]. The Court
dismisses LGL from the case without prejudice for lack of personal jurisdiction.

Dated: March 25, 2024

______________________
SARA L. ELLIS
United States District Judge

13