Gesture Technology Partners LLC v. Motorola Mobility LLC
Filing
157
MEMORANDUM Opinion and Order written by the Honorable Lindsay C. Jenkins on 9/24/2024. Mailed notice. (jlj, )
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION
Gesture Technology Partners, LLC,
Plaintiff,
No. 22 CV 3535
v.
Judge Lindsay C. Jenkins
Motorola Mobility LLC,
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Gesture Technology Partners, LLC, (“GTP”) has sued Motorola Mobility LLC,
(“Motorola”) alleging patent infringement. Before the Court is Motorola’s motion for
summary judgment. Because no reasonable jury could conclude Motorola is infringing
the patent, the motion is granted.
I.
Background
The following facts are taken from the parties’ Local Rule 56.1 statements and
supporting exhibits. The Court presents the facts in the light most favorable to GTP,
the non-moving party. Emad v. Dodge Cty., 71 F.4th 649, 650 (7th Cir. 2023).
GTP owns Patent No. 8,878,949, (“’949 Patent”) titled “Camera Based
Interaction and Instruction.” [Dkt. 139-1 at 1.] 1 GTP’s founder, Dr. Timothy Pryor, is
the named inventor. [Id.] The patented technology in the ‘949 Patent allows a user to
control an electronic device through gestures. For example, the camera in a cell phone
capturing an image in response to detecting a wave, smile, or some other movement.
Citations to docket filings generally refer to the electronic pagination provided by
CM/ECF, which may not be consistent with page numbers in the underlying documents.
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[Id. at 11 (“the invention … provide[s] a method for taking pictures when certain
poses of objects, sequences of poses, motions of objects, or any other states or
relationships of objects are represented.”).]
GTP contends Motorola infringes the ‘949 Patent in 35 of its products (the
“Accused Devices”) through technology embedded in three of Motorola’s own
functionalities, as well as functionalities from three third-party applications installed
on the Accused Devices (collectively, the “Accused Functionalities”). [Dkt. 139-3 at
10-12, 61-70.]
Motorola disagrees and has moved for summary judgment, raising two theories
for dismissal. [Dkt. 137.] First, the Accused Functionalities do not infringe the ’949
Patent, but even if they did, the ‘949 Patent is invalid.
II.
Legal Standard
Summary judgment is proper where “the movant shows that there is no
genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986).
A genuine issue of material fact exists if “the evidence is such that a reasonable jury
could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477
U.S. 242, 248 (1986). Summary judgment “is the ‘put up or shut up’ moment in a
lawsuit, when a party must show what evidence it has that would convince a trier of
fact to accept its version of events.” Wade v. Ramos, 26 F.4th 440, 446 (7th Cir. 2022)
(quoting Schacht v. Wis. Dept’ of Corr., 175 F.3d 497, 504 (7th Cir. 1999)). This is
equally true in patent cases. Sunoco Partners Mktg. & Terminals L.P. v. U.S. Venture,
Inc., 2017 WL 4283946, at *7 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 27, 2017) (“Patent cases can be resolved
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at summary judgment just as other litigation can”) (citing Tokai Corp. v. Easton
Enterps., Inc., 632 F.3d 1358, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2011)).
III.
Analysis
Motorola argues there is no genuine dispute that it is not infringing the ‘949
Patent. [Dkt. 138 at 18-22.]
The Court’s infringement analysis is a two-step process: “The first step is
determining the meaning and scope of the patent claims asserted to be infringed. The
second step is comparing the properly construed claims to the device accused of
infringing.” Duncan Parking Techs., Inc. v. IPS Group, Inc., 914 F.3d 1347, 1360 (Fed.
Cir. 2019). Step one is a legal question, whereas step two is “primarily factual”,
though for infringement to exist, “the accused device must satisfy every limitation in
the asserted claims.” LoggerHead Tools, LLC v. Sears Holding Corp., 328 F. Supp. 3d
885, 902 (N.D. Ill. 2018). Ultimately, “[t]o support a summary judgment of
noninfringement it must be shown that, on the correct claim construction, no
reasonable jury could have found infringement on the undisputed facts or when all
reasonable factual inferences are drawn in favor of the patentee.” Kove IO, Inc. v.
Amazon Web Services, Inc., 2024 WL 450028, at *11 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 6, 2024); see also
Chicago Mercantile Exchange, Inc. v. Technology Research Group, LLC, 789
F.Supp.2d 986, 991 (N.D. Ill. 2011) (summary judgment for non-infringement proper
when “no reasonable jury could find that the accused system meets every limitation
recited in the properly construed claims.”)
There is only a single claim at issue in the ‘949 Patent, claim 4, which is
dependent on claim 1. Accordingly, GTP must show that there is a genuine question
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of material fact that the Accused Devices “meet[] every limitation recited” in these
claims. 35 U.S.C. § 112(d) (“a claim in dependent form shall be construed to
incorporate by reference all the limitations of the claim to which it refers”); Chicago
Mercantile Exchange, Inc., 789 F.Supp.2d 986, at 991; Ottah v. Fiat Chrysler, 884
F.3d 1135, 1142 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (“the patentee must show that the accused device
meets each claim limitation…”) The text of claims 1 and 4 are reproduced below:
Claim 1
A portable device comprising:
a device housing including a forward facing portion, the forward facing portion
of the device housing encompassing an electro-optical sensor having a field of
view and including a digital camera separate from the electro-optical sensor;
and
a processing unit within the device housing and operatively coupled to an
output of the electro-optical sensor, wherein the processing unit is adapted to:
determine a gesture has been performed in the electro-optical sensor field of
view based on the electro-optical sensor output, and
control the digital camera in response to the gesture performed in the electrooptical sensor field of view, wherein the gesture corresponds to an image
capture command, and wherein the image capture command causes the digital
camera to store an image to memory.
Claim 4
The portable device of claim 1 wherein the electro-optical sensor is fixed in
relation to the digital camera.
[Dkt. 139-1 at 18.]
The first paragraph in claim 1 requires (i) a portable device with; (ii) a device
housing that contains both; (iii) an electro-optical sensor with a field of view; and (iv)
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a digital camera that is separate from the electro-optical sensor. 2 The parties agree
that the Accused Devices contain a device housing with an electro-optical sensor.
More specifically, the parties agree that each Accused Device has a substantially
identical camera module, the RacerTurbo 108MP (the “Module”), and that the Module
contains a metallic housing, lens, ribbon cable, and a CMOS electro-optical sensing
array with a field of view (the “Sensor”). 3 [Dkt. 148 at 13; see also Dkt. 138 at 19.] In
addition, the parties agree that the Sensor performs the gesture-detecting function
in the Accused Functionalities and that the Module captures digital images. 4 [Dkt.
138 at 20.]
Where the parties disagree, and the basis for Motorola’s argument that it is
not infringing the ‘949 Patent, is limitation (iv): that the electro-optical sensor in the
Accused Devices is not “separate from” the “digital camera.” [Dkt. 138 at 7 (“Motorola
does not infringe claim 4 … because none of the accused functionalities in the accused
devices use an electro-optical sensor that is ‘separate from’ the digital camera.”).]
Motorola contends the Sensor cannot be separate from the camera because the Sensor
performs the dual functions of detecting gestures and serving as the sensor required
for the digital camera to function. [Id. at 18-19.] GTP’s response is that each Accused
Claim 1’s second paragraph requires the device housing to have a “processing unit”
that is “coupled to an output of the electro-optical sensor” where the processing unit can
“determine a gesture has been performed in the electro-optical sensor field of view based on
the electro-optical sensor output.” [Dkt. 139-1 at 18.] For ease of reference, the Court will
refer to the sensor’s ability to detect gestures, even though this is an oversimplification.
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Because each Accused Device has the same parts, the Court need not engage in
individualized analysis; what applies to one applies to all.
4
Dr. Myler, GTP’s expert, identified two other sensors in the Accused Devices—
ambient light and proximity sensors—but admitted at his deposition that those sensors are
not capable of detecting gestures. [Dkt. 139-6 at 38, 41.]
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Device contains a camera module with both an electro-optical sensor and digital
camera, rendering them separate. [Dkt. 148 at 6.] Resolution of this issue requires
the Court to construe the terms “digital camera” and “separate from” as they appear
in claim 1.
Digital camera is neither given a special definition in the ‘949 Patent, nor did
the parties request a specific construction of this term at the Markman hearing. [See
Dkt. 100.] Accordingly, the Court will apply the term’s “ordinary and customary
meaning.” Aventis Pharms., Inc. v. Amino Chems. Ltd., 715 F.3d 1363, 1375 (Fed. Cir.
2013); Ignite USA, LLC v. Pac. Mkt. Int’l, LLC, 2018 WL 2412375, at *2 (N.D. Ill. May
29, 2018) (a term in a patent claim “takes on its ordinary meaning unless the patentee
demonstrates an intent to deviate from that meaning…”).
A camera is “a device that consists of a lightproof chamber with an aperture
fitted with a lens and a shutter through which the image of an object is projected onto
a surface for recording (as on a photosensitive film or an electronic sensor).” Camera,
Merriam-Webster, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/camera (last visited
September 23, 2024). A digital camera is a subset of cameras “that records images as
digital
data
instead
of
on
film.”
Digital
Camera,
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/digital%20camera
Merriam-Webster,
(last
visited
September 23, 2024); see also [Dkt. 139-1 at 11 (“High Resolution Digital still cameras
employing matrix photodetector array chips to scan the image produced by the
camera lens.”).]
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Based on these definitions, the Court concludes a digital camera must be
capable of capturing images and recording them digitally. A device that cannot do
both is not a digital camera. In addition, the Court construes the term “separate
from” 5 to mean “distinct” or “disconnected.”
Applying these constructions to claim 1, the electro-optical sensor that detects
gestures cannot be the same sensor used to facilitate the capture of images in the
digital camera; otherwise “separate from” in claim 1 would be superfluous. Intel Corp.
v. Qualcomm Inc., 21 F.4th 801, 810 (Fed. Cir. 2021) (“It is highly disfavored to
construe terms in a way that renders them void, meaningless, or superfluous.”)
Therefore, for GTP to overcome Motorola’s non-infringement argument, it must put
forth sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to conclude the Module of the Accused
Devices contains the components of a digital camera, and another, separate sensor
that is capable of detecting gestures.
As discussed above, there is no dispute that the Sensor (i) is the only sensor
within the Module; (ii) the only sensor within the Accused Device itself capable of
detecting gestures; and (iii) is the sensor used in conjunction with the other Module
components to capture images (i.e., the digital camera). Accordingly, Motorola
contends it is not infringing the ‘949 Patent because there is no electro-optical sensor
that is “separate from” the digital camera; there is only one Sensor and it is an
integral part of the digital camera. [Dkt. 138 at 19.]
The term “separate from” only appears once in the ‘949 Patent, so its ordinary
meaning likewise applies. Aventis Pharms., Inc., 715 F.3d 1363, at 1375.
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The Court agrees. The undisputed facts demonstrate that the Sensor both
detects gestures and functions as part of the digital camera. Put differently, the
processing unit would not be able to detect gestures without the Sensor, and without
the Sensor, the digital camera could not capture or record images. See e.g., Fullview,
Inc. v. Polycom, Inc., 635 F.Supp.3d 917, 924 (N.D. Cal. 2022) (“a ‘camera’ comprises
of a single image sensor and lens that forms an image on the sensor”); [Dkt. 139-6 at
40-42 (Dr. Myler discussing the Sensor’s role within the digital camera, and
admitting all Accused Devices have a sensor)]; see also LENOVO 6, (listing “essential
parts of a camera” as “the body, the lens, the shutter, the aperture, and the image
sensor”); see also id. (“Digital cameras capture images electronically using a sensor”);
PHOTONICS
MARKETPLACE 7,
(“digital cameras use electronic sensors to convert light
into digital data that can be stored, displayed, and manipulated electronically.”) If
the digital camera within the Module needs the Sensor to capture images—and GTP
does not claim the contrary—the two are not “separate from” one another.
Accordingly, the Accused Devices do not infringe the ‘949 Patent.
GTP raises several arguments in response, but none are persuasive. First, it
contends that the Sensor is separate from the digital camera because its “fields of
view … are separate and distinct from the lens, which defines the field of view of the
digital camera.” [Dkt. 148 at 14.] But as shown above, a lens is a component of a
https://www.lenovo.com/us/en/glossary/cameracomponents/?orgRef=https%253A%252F%252Fwww.google.com%252F&srsltid=AfmBOoofE
Z1q7LJ7z3Suibwn9EpG5OdCztsxWBzh0IK8syiUMXifvrPQ (last accessed September 23,
2024).
7
https://www.photonics.com/EDU/digital_camera/d3531 (last accessed September 23,
2024).
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camera, not its own camera. The ‘949 Patent itself recognizes this. [Dkt. 139-1 at 11
(“High Resolution Digital still cameras employing matrix photodetector array chips
to scan the image produced by the camera lens are now commonplace.”).] Put simply,
a lens alone cannot capture images, so it is not a camera, digital or otherwise.
Moreover, the relevant limitation in claim 1 does not state that the sensor’s field of
view must be separate from the digital camera’s. Rather, it says that the electrooptical sensor must have a field of view, and that the sensor itself must be “separate
from” the digital camera. [Dkt. 139-1 at 18; Dkt. 153 at 9.]
GTP also contends testimony from both Dr. Myler and Motorola’s expert, Dr.
Creusere, creates a triable issue of fact. Not so. As to Dr. Creusere, GTP merely points
to snippets of his deposition where he acknowledges the Sensor has a different field
of view than the lens, and how the Sensor and lens function together. [Dkt. 148 at
14.] But as just discussed, this admission does not impact the analysis.
For Dr. Myler, GTP relies on the below except from his deposition:
And now we get to, what do we mean by a “camera”?· And basically, you
have the [Sensor], and he’s arguing that since the [Sensor] is in a little
contained box with a lens and it’s called a camera module, that that’s
the camera, and therefore, the sensor, which is the CCD array, is part
of a camera and not separate as required by the claims. And the reality
is that this is not the whole camera. And so I don’t agree that the digital
camera and electro-optical sensor of the – I’m reading Paragraph 64:·
(Reading) That the digital camera and electro-optical sensor of the
accused devices are not separate as required by Limitation 1A.
[Dkt. 148 at 15 (emphases in original).] What is missing from this (confusing) quote,
however, is any explanation of the basis for Dr. Myler’s belief that the Sensor is
separate from the digital camera. Additionally, even if the Sensor and lens are “not
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the whole camera” it does not follow that the Sensor is “separate from” it; they are
both component parts.
Tellingly, GTP does not cite to a single portion of Dr. Myler’s expert report that
explains how the Sensor is separate from the digital camera. And as Motorola notes,
this is likely because Dr. Myler’s report does not even mention the Sensor. [Dkt. 138
at 20-21.] Instead, his report summarily concludes that “For each Motorola Accused
Instrumentality, one or more of the cameras and/or sensors that I identified in Section
V.A operate as an electro-optical sensor separate from the digital camera.” But the
only sensors discussed in Section V.A (or elsewhere) are the ambient light and
proximity sensors that Dr. Myler admitted could not detect gestures. [Id.] This is
insufficient to survive summary judgment. Davis v. Brouse McDowell, L.P.A., 596
F.3d 1355, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (“an expert’s naked conclusion is insufficient to
survive summary judgment”); USC IP P’ship, L.P. v. Meta Platforms, Inc., 2023 WL
5606977, at *3 (Fed. Cir. 2023) (“conclusory expert opinion[s] do[] not present a
genuine factual dispute to prevent summary judgment.”)
Based on this record, no reasonable jury could conclude the Accused Devices
contain a sensor that is separate from the digital camera. Accordingly, Motorola
cannot be found liable for infringement, and summary judgment is proper. The Court
need not reach Motorola’s alternative argument that the ‘949 Patent is invalid.
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IV.
Conclusion
For these reasons, Motorola’s motion for summary judgment is granted.
Enter: 22 CV 3535
Date: September 24, 2024
__________________________________________
Lindsay C. Jenkins
United States District Judge
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