Lajeunesse v. Walmart Inc.

Filing 52

MEMORANDUM Opinion and Order: For the stated reasons, Walmart's motion for summary judgment 38 is granted. The puddle Lajeunesse slipped on was an open and obvious condition and the distraction exception does not apply. The Clerk is directed to enter judgment in Defendant's favor and against Plaintiff and terminate the case. Signed by the Honorable Mary M. Rowland on 3/7/2025. Mailed notice. (jg, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION
MARY ELLEN LAJEUNESSE,
Plaintiff,

Case No. 22-cv-06150

v.

Judge Mary M. Rowland

WALMART, INC.,
Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff Mary Ellen Lajeunesse (“Lajeunesse”) has sued Defendant Walmart,
Inc. (“Walmart”) for damages arising from an incident at a Walmart store located in
Chicago, Illinois. For the reasons stated below, Defendant’s motion for summary
judgment [38] is granted.
SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD
Summary judgment is proper where “the movant shows that there is no
genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317,
322 (1986). A genuine dispute as to any material fact exists if “the evidence is such
that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v.
Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). The substantive law controls which facts
are material. Id. After a “properly supported motion for summary judgment is made,
the adverse party ‘must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue
for trial.’” Id. at 250 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)).

1

The Court “consider[s] all of the evidence in the record in the light most
favorable to the non-moving party, and [ ] draw[s] all reasonable inferences from that
evidence in favor of the party opposing summary judgment.” Logan v. City of Chicago,
4 F.4th 529, 536 (7th Cir. 2021) (quotation omitted). The Court “must refrain from
making credibility determinations or weighing evidence.” Viamedia, Inc. v. Comcast
Corp., 951 F.3d 429, 467 (7th Cir. 2020) (citing Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255). In ruling
on summary judgment, the Court gives the non-moving party “the benefit of
reasonable inferences from the evidence, but not speculative inferences in [its] favor.”
White v. City of Chicago, 829 F.3d 837, 841 (7th Cir. 2016) (internal citations omitted).
“The controlling question is whether a reasonable trier of fact could find in favor of
the non-moving party on the evidence submitted in support of and opposition to the
motion for summary judgment.” Id.
BACKGROUND
I.

Local Rule 56.1
“Local Rule 56.1 statements serve to streamline the resolution of summary

judgment motions by having the parties identify undisputed material facts and cite
the supporting evidence.” Laborers’ Pension Fund v. Innovation Landscape, Inc., No.
15 CV 9580, 2019 WL 6699190, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 9, 2019). The Seventh Circuit has
“consistently upheld district judges’ discretion to require strict compliance with Local
Rule 56.1.” Kreg Therapeutics, Inc. v. VitalGo, Inc., 919 F.3d 405, 414 (7th Cir. 2019)
(quotation omitted). “We have frequently said that it is within the district court’s
discretion to strictly enforce local rules regarding summary judgment by accepting

2

the movant’s version of facts as undisputed if the non-movant has failed to respond
in the form required.” Zuppardi v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 770 F.3d 644, 648 (7th Cir.
2014). “[I]t is not the duty of the district court to scour the record in search of material
factual disputes.” Kreg, 919 F.3d at 414.
Lajeunesse has failed to follow the requirements of Local Rule 56.1. As the
party opposing summary judgment, if Lajeunesse wished to assert additional facts
not set forth in Walmart’s statement of material facts, Lajeunesse was required to
submit “a statement of additional material facts that complies with LR 56.1(d) and
that attaches any cited evidentiary material not attached to the LR 56.1(a)(2)
statement or LR 56.1(b)(2) response.” LR 56.1(b)(3). And when addressing facts in
briefing, a party’s “memorandum must cite directly to specific paragraphs in the LR
56.1 statements or responses.” LR 56.1(g).
Lajeunesse did not submit a LR 56.1(b)(3) statement of additional facts and
repeatedly asserted additional facts in its response by citing directly to the record.
See e.g., [43]. The Court exercises its discretion to enforce Local Rule 56.1(g) and will
disregard any facts asserted in Lajeunesse’s response that is not contained in
Walmart’s statement of facts, [39], or Lajeunesse’s response to Walmart’s statement
of facts, [44]. Zuppardi, 770 F.3d at 648; see also Cichon v. Exelon Generation Co.,
L.L.C., 401 F.3d 803, 810 (7th Cir. 2005) (“Because Cichon failed to comply with Rule
56.1 which requires that a litigant file a separate statement of additional facts, we
hold that it was not an abuse of discretion for the district court to ignore most of
Cichon's proposed ‘facts’ when ruling on Exelon's motion for summary judgment.”).

3

The Court notes that Walmart also failed to fully comply with Local Rule 56.1’s
requirements. Walmart’s memorandum of law also cites directly to the record,
specifically screenshots of the surveillance video, rather than specific paragraphs of
its statement of facts in violation of LR 56.1(g). See [40] at 5-6. Walmart’s
memorandum also addresses facts without citing to specific paragraphs of its
statement of facts. See [40] at 5 (discussing plaintiff’s testimony without any citation).
However, the facts Walmart relies on were properly presented in its LR 56.1
statement of facts. See [39]. Therefore, the Court will not disregard the improperly
cited factual assertions that appear in Walmart’s memorandum. See Sojka v. Bovis
Lend Lease, Inc., 686 F.3d 394, 398 (7th Cir. 2012) (abuse of discretion to disregard
facts properly brought to the court’s attention through Rule 56.1 statement).
II.

Factual Background 1
On March 22, 2021, Lajeunesse visited a Walmart store located at 2844 N.

Broadway in Chicago, Illinois to buy Easter candy. [39] at ¶¶ 5, 9. Lajeunesse walked
to the back of the store and saw there was candy against the back wall. Id. at ¶ 11.
While walking towards the candy aisle, Lajeunesse slipped and fell on a puddle of
brown liquid on the floor. Id. at ¶¶ 12-13. The puddle of liquid was about two feet long
and a foot and a half wide. Id. at ¶ 16. Lajeunesse did not have a shopping cart or
basket and testified that she was paying attention to where she was walking and did
not have any problems with the lighting in the store. Id. at ¶¶ 20-22. Lajeunesse

These facts are taken from Walmart’s statement of facts [39] and Lajeunesse’s response to the statement
of facts [44] and are undisputed unless otherwise noted.
1

4

testified that she did not see the puddle of brown liquid on the floor at any time before
she fell, but if she had seen it, she would have walked around it. Id. at ¶¶ 18-19.
Lajeunesse saw a Walmart employee standing at the far end of the aisle she
was walking down before her fall. Id. at ¶ 23. Lajeunesse stepped into the puddle
with her right foot first, then slipped and fell. Id. at ¶ 14. At the exact moment
Lajeunesse encountered the puddle with her right foot, she heard the Walmart
employee say something to her. Id. at ¶ 24. Lajeunesse turned her head towards the
Walmart employee and slipped. Id. at ¶ 25. The Walmart employee was not blocking
Lajeunesse’s path or line of walking as she approached the puddle of liquid. Id. at ¶
26.
ANALYSIS
Lajeunesse sued Walmart for negligence. [1]. Walmart contends that the
puddle of brown liquid was an open and obvious condition, therefore Walmart is
entitled to summary judgment. [40] at 4. Walmart further argues that the distraction
exception to the open and obvious rule does not apply here. Id. at 7.
“The elements of a cause of action for negligence are: (1) a duty owed to the
plaintiff by the defendant; (2) a breach of that duty; and (3) an injury proximately
caused by the breach.” Wilfong v. L.J. Dodd Const., 930 N.E.2d 511, 519 (Ill. App. 2d
Dist. 2010). An open and obvious condition is “a recognized exception to the duty of
care.” Id. at 520.
I.

Open and Obvious Condition

5

Under Illinois law, “persons who own, occupy, or control and maintain land are
not ordinarily required to foresee and protect against injuries from potentially
dangerous conditions that are open and obvious.” Buchaklian v. Lake Cnty. Fam.
Young Men's Christian Ass'n, 732 N.E.2d 596, 600 (Ill. App. 2d Dist. 2000)
(citing Bucheleres v. Chicago Park Dist., 665 N.E.2d 826 (Ill. 1996)). “For a condition
to be open and obvious, an invitee must reasonably be expected to discover it and
protect himself against it.” Id. (citing Deibert v. Bauer Bros. Const. Co., Inc., 566
N.E.2d 239 (Ill. 1990)). The obviousness of a condition is “determined by the objective
knowledge of a reasonable person, not the plaintiff's subjective knowledge.” Id. at 602
(quoting Menough v. Woodfield Gardens, 694 N.E.2d 1038 (Ill. App. 1st Dist. 1998)).
Determining whether a condition is open and obvious is a question of law when
“there is no dispute about the physical nature of the condition.” Wilfong, 930 N.E.2d
at 520 (citing Belluomini v. Stratford Green Condo. Ass'n, 805 N.E.2d 701 (Ill. App.
2d Dist. 2004)). “However, where there is a dispute about the condition's physical
nature, such as its visibility, the question of whether a condition is open and obvious
is factual.” Id.
Here, there is no dispute about the puddle’s physical nature or visibility. There
is no dispute that the puddle consisted of brown liquid, was two feet long and one and
a half feet wide, there were no issues with lighting in the store, and Lajeunesse did
not have a basket or shopping cart which could have obstructed her view. [39] at ¶¶
13, 16, 20, 21. Lajeunesse testified that she simply did not see the puddle, but if she
had seen it, she would have walked around it. Id. at ¶¶ 18-19. Whether the puddle

6

was an open and obvious condition is therefore a question of law for the Court to
decide. Lajeunesse contends that the visibility of the puddle is in dispute because she
did not see it before encountering it. [43] at 4. But the obviousness of a condition does
not depend on Lajeunesse’s subjective knowledge and is instead determined by the
objective knowledge of a reasonable person. Buchaklian, 732 N.E.2d at 602.
In Montenegro, the Illinois appellate court affirmed that cracks in a walkway
were an open and obvious condition. Montenegro v. Voltattorni, No. 1-09-2632, 2011
WL 9918782, at *3 (Ill. App. 1st Dist. Mar. 11, 2011). The court noted that there was
“no question of fact that plaintiff could have avoided the crack if he had been looking
down while walking.” Id. The crack in the walkway was not hidden or concealed, and
it was not dark at the time the injury occurred. Id. Therefore, “a reasonable person
in the exercise of ‘ordinary perception, intelligence and judgment’ would have
recognized the crack and the risk it presented.” Id. (citing Deibert, 566 N.E.2d at 241);
see also Stephen v. Swiatkowski, 635 N.E.2d 997, 1003 (Ill. App. 1st Dist. 1994)
(affirming that protruding nail was open and obvious where plaintiff testified “that
he would have seen the protruding nail if he had only looked down at it.”); Deibert,
556 N.E.2d at 243 (finding tire rut was open and obvious where plaintiff testified “if
he had watched where he was walking, he would have seen the rut when he left the
bathroom.”).
Lajeunesse did not see the puddle before slipping on it, but she testified that if
she had seen it, she would have simply walked around it. [39] at ¶¶ 18-19. The puddle
was not concealed or hidden, and Lajeunesse did not have any problems with the

7

lighting in the store. Id. at ¶¶ 20-21. The surveillance video of the incident also shows
the open and obvious nature of the puddle. Id. at 40; [41] at Ex. C. Like the plaintiff
in Montenegro, Lajeunesse “could have avoided the [puddle] if [s]he had been looking
down while walking.” 2011 WL 9918782, at *3. A reasonable person would have
recognized the puddle and the risk it presented. Id. Therefore, the open and obvious
rule applies.
II.

Distraction Exception
The “distraction exception” to the open and obvious rule applies where “the

landowner has reason to expect that the invitee's attention may be distracted, so that
he will not discover what is obvious, or will forget what he has discovered, or fail to
protect himself against it.” Wilfong, 930 N.E.2d at 521 (internal quotations omitted).
“The question is whether the defendant should reasonably anticipate injury to those
entrants on his premises who are generally exercising reasonable care for their own
safety, but who may reasonably be expected to be distracted.” Montenegro, 2011 WL
9918782, at *4 (quoting Ward v. K Mart Corp., 554 N.E.2d 223, 232 (Ill. 1990)).
Lajeunesse argues that she was deliberately distracted by the Walmart
employee speaking to her. [43] at 5. However, it is undisputed that Lajeunesse heard
the Walmart employee say something at the exact moment her foot encountered the
puddle. [39] at ¶ 24; [44] at ¶ 24. “[T]he distraction exception will only apply where
evidence exists from which a court can infer that plaintiff was actually distracted.”
Bruns v. City of Centralia, 21 N.E.3d 684, 691 (Ill. 2014). Based on the undisputed
facts, the Walmart employee saying something to Lajeunesse could not have

8

distracted her from exercising reasonable care to avoid the puddle because
Lajeunesse’s foot encountered the puddle at the same moment she heard the Walmart
employee speak. See [39] at ¶ 24. Therefore, Lajeunesse’s foot would have
encountered the puddle, and she would have slipped, regardless of whether the
Walmart employee said anything or not. There are no undisputed facts from which
the Court can infer that Lajeunesse was actually distracted. Accordingly, the
distraction exception does not apply.
CONCLUSION
For the stated reasons, Walmart’s motion for summary judgment [38] is
granted. The puddle Lajeunesse slipped on was an open and obvious condition and
the distraction exception does not apply. The Clerk is directed to enter judgment in
Defendant’s favor and against Plaintiff and terminate the case.

E N T E R:
Dated: March 7, 2025
MARY M. ROWLAND
United States District Judge

9