Gecht v. Guevara et al

Filing 172

MEMORANDUM Opinion and Order written by the Honorable Lindsay C. Jenkins on 9/26/2024. Mailed notice. (jlj, )

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION
David Gecht,
Plaintiff,

No. 23 CV 1742

v.
Reynaldo Guevara, et al.,
Defendants.
________________________________________
Richard Kwil,

No. 23 CV 4279

Plaintiff,

Judge Lindsay C. Jenkins

v.
Reynaldo Guevara, et al.,
Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

In March of 1999, Plaintiffs David Gecht and Richard Kwil were arrested and
interrogated in connection with the murder of Roberto Cruz. Each made an
incriminating confession, was convicted, and served 23 and 24 years in prison before
being exonerated and released. Plaintiffs bring individual actions against the
Assistant Cook County State’s Attorneys (“ASA”) involved in taking their statements,
Cook County, and others. Before the Court are the ASA Defendants and Cook
County’s motions to dismiss the complaints in their entirety. Given that Gecht and
Kwil are related cases, and the parties have filed joint briefs, the Court resolves both

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motions in this single order. For the reasons stated below, the motions are granted in
part and denied in part.
I.

Background
The Court takes Plaintiffs’ well-pleaded factual allegations as true for purposes

of ruling on the motion to dismiss. See Smith v. First Hosp. Lab’ys, Inc., 77 F.4th 603,
607 (7th Cir. 2023). On January 29, 1999, Roberto Cruz was murdered shortly after
leaving a nightclub in Chicago, Illinois. [Gecht Dkt. 95, ¶¶ 29–31; Kwil Dkt. 50,
¶¶ 25–27.]1 A bouncer gave police descriptions of two men seen arguing with Cruz at
the club. [Gecht Dkt. 95, ¶ 32; Kwil Dkt. 50, ¶ 28.] The next day, police received an
anonymous tip that Ruben Hernandez and another individual, “Benjamin D.,”
bragged that they’d shot Cruz because he owed Benjamin money. The tipster also
correctly stated that Cruz had been killed by his car shortly after leaving a bar in the
area. [Gecht Dkt. 95, ¶¶ 34–35; Kwil Dkt. 50, ¶¶ 30–31.] This information was shared
with Detectives Reynaldo Guevara and Ernest Halvorsen, who are also defendants
in these cases (“Police Defendants”). [Gecht Dkt. 95, ¶ 36; Kwil Dkt. 50, ¶ 32.] Cruz’s
mother confirmed that Hernandez and Benjamin were enemies of Cruz. The
detectives also pulled rap sheets and Central Booking Reports and for the two men
and discovered that Benjamin matched the description of one of the men seen arguing
with Cruz on the night of his murder. [Gecht Dkt. 95, ¶¶ 36–38; Kwil Dkt. 50, ¶¶ 32–

Citations to docket filings generally refer to the electronic pagination provided by
CM/ECF, which may not be consistent with page numbers in the underlying documents.
1

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34.] There is no indication that police questioned or took immediate action against
Hernandez or Benjamin. [Gecht Dkt. 95, ¶¶ 39–40; Kwil Dkt. 50, ¶ 35–36.]
Five weeks later, Police Defendants arrested Gecht, Kwil, and Hernandez in a
24-hour period in March of 1999. 2 [Gecht Dkt. 95, ¶ 41; Kwil Dkt 50, ¶ 37.] The
complaints do not present a clear timeline of events, but in some order during this
period, all three were individually taken to the Area Five police station for
interrogations resulting in false confessions.
Police Defendants questioned Gecht over several hours, showing him pictures
of Cruz, and feeding him details about how they thought the crime occurred. [Gecht
Dkt. 95, ¶¶ 44, 48, 51.] Throughout this time, Police Defendants physically abused
Gecht, including when he denied involvement in the crime and asked for a phone call
and attorney. [Id. at ¶¶ 47–50.] Gecht was slapped and punched multiple times and
left with a cut in his mouth and a chipped tooth. [Id. at ¶ 50.] Police Defendants told
Gecht that he could go home if he signed a statement confessing to participating in
the crime. [Id. at ¶ 52.] Gecht eventually relented; he gave a signed statement to ASA
Defendant Brenden McGuire confessing to shooting Cruz with Kwil and Hernandez
assisting. 3 [Id. at ¶¶ 54, 56.] McGuire “walk[ed]” Gecht through Police Defendants’
version of events and had Gecht confirm them. [Id. at ¶ 59.] McGuire was also present
at Area Five while the interrogation was ongoing. [Id. at ¶ 57.]

Ruben Hernandez brought a separate case against the same defendants based on the
same events. Hernandez v. Guevara, No. 23-cv-15375 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 27, 2023).
3
Defendant Brendan McGuire was incorrectly captioned as “Brendan Maguire.” [Gecht
Dkt. 106 at 1.]
2

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Police Defendants also arrested Kwil. As with Gecht, they interrogated Kwil
about Cruz’s murder for multiple hours at the Area Five police station. [Kwil Dkt. 50,
¶ 38.] They attempted to force Kwil to confess to participating in the murder by
yelling at and threatening him. [Id. at ¶ 41.] Over the course of the interrogation,
Police Defendants fed Kwil details about the crime and their theory of how it
occurred. [Id. at ¶ 42.] They showed Kwil a photo of Gecht and told Kwil that he could
go home if he signed a statement confessing that Gecht murdered Cruz. [Id. at ¶ 44.]
Kwil eventually relented and gave a signed statement to ASA Defendant Michael
Hood, confessing that Gecht committed the crime with Kwil and Hernandez assisting.
[Id. at ¶¶ 45–47.] Hood “walk[ed]” Kwil through this version of events to have him
confirm it. [Id. at ¶ 50.] Hood was also present at Area Five while the interrogation
was ongoing. [Id. at ¶ 48.]
Hernandez was arrested the same day and similarly interrogated at Area Five
about Cruz’s murder. [Gecht Dkt. 95, ¶ 62; Kwil Dkt. 50, ¶ 41.] After numerous
interrogations involving physical abuse and accusations, he ultimately gave a false
statement to McGuire implicating himself, Gecht, and Kwil, which he refused to sign.
[Gecht Dkt. 95, ¶¶ 67–68; Kwil Dkt. 50, ¶¶ 61, 65–66.]
Police Defendants also allegedly arrested and interrogated Colleen Miller,
Gecht’s girlfriend, at Area Five. [Gecht Dkt. 95, ¶ 77, 83; Kwil Dkt. 50, ¶ 68, 74.] They
threatened to charge her as well if she did not cooperate and provide a statement.
[Gecht Dkt. 95, ¶ 80; Kwil Dkt. 50, ¶ 71.] Within 20 minutes of being arrested, Miller

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provided a statement to McGuire claiming Gecht had confessed to her about the
murder. [Gecht Dkt. 95, ¶ 81, 84; Kwil Dkt. 50, ¶ 72, 75.]
Gecht and Kwil’s statements were used to convict them (and Hernandez), as
co-defendants, of Cruz’s murder. [Gecht Dkt. 95, ¶¶ 60, 75, 88–95; Kwil Dkt. 50,
¶¶ 51, 66, 79–84.] Miller’s statement was also allegedly used to further their
prosecutions. [Gecht Dkt. 95, ¶¶ 86; Kwil Dkt. 50, ¶¶ 77.] Between June 2022 and
July 2023, their convictions were vacated, and the State entered a motion of nolle
prosequi and dismissed all charges against them. [Gecht Dkt. 95, ¶¶ 104–05; Kwil
Dkt. 50, ¶¶ 93–94.]
Plaintiffs filed these lawsuits pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 raising three
federal and three state law claims against both Hood and McGuire: coercing a false
confession and fabricating evidence in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments (Count II); malicious prosecution and unlawful detention in violation of
the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments (Count III); failure to intervene (Count IV);
malicious prosecution (Count VII); intentional infliction of emotional distress (Count
VIII); and willful and wanton conduct (Count IX). [Gecht Dkt. 95, ¶¶ 157–77, 197–
209; Kwil Dkt. 50, ¶¶ 146–66, 186–98.] They also bring indemnification claims
against Cook County based on ASA Defendants’ liability (Count XII). [Gecht Dkt 95,
¶¶ 223–24; Kwil Dkt 50, ¶¶ 212–13.]
II.

Legal Standard
At the motion to dismiss stage, the Court takes well-pleaded factual allegations

as true and draws reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff. Choice v. Kohn L.
Firm, S.C., 77 F.4th 636, 638 (7th Cir. 2023); Reardon v. Danley, 74 F.4th 825, 826–
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27 (7th Cir. 2023). “To survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), plaintiff’s
complaint must allege facts which, when taken as true, plausibly suggest that the
plaintiff has a right to relief, raising that possibility above a speculative level.”
Cochran v. Ill. State Toll Highway Auth., 828 F.3d 597, 599 (7th Cir. 2016) (cleaned
up). This occurs when “the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to
draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged.” Garrard v. Rust-Oleum Corp., 575 F. Supp. 3d 995, 999 (N.D. Ill. 2021)
(quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal citations omitted)).
III.

Analysis
Hood and McGuire move to dismiss the complaints on several grounds,

including qualified immunity, improper group pleading, and failure to state a claim.4
The Court addresses each argument in turn.
A.

Qualified Immunity

Hood and McGuire argue that all their alleged actions are entitled to qualified
immunity. The doctrine of qualified immunity “protects government officials from
liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established
statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.”
Siler v. City of Kenosha, 957 F.3d 751, 758 (7th Cir. 2020). This inquiry asks (1)
“whether the plaintiff's allegations make out a deprivation of a constitutional right”
and (2) “whether the right was clearly established at the time of defendant's alleged

Hood and McGuire also argue that absolute immunity bars all federal claims against
them. [Gecht Dkt. 106 at 5–10; Kwil Dkt. 57 at 9–10.] Because the Court dismisses all federal
claims and gives Gecht and Kwil an opportunity to cure any pleading defects, there is no need
to address absolute immunity at this stage.
4

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misconduct.” Taylor v. City of Milford, 10 F.4th 800, 806 (7th Cir. 2021). The Court
may consider these issues in either order. Tousis v. Billiot, 84 F.4th 692, 697 (7th Cir.
2023).
Claims are generally not dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6) on qualified immunity
grounds because qualified immunity depends on the facts of the case, and plaintiffs
are “not required initially to plead factual allegations that anticipate and overcome”
an affirmative defense. Alvarado v. Litscher, 267 F.3d 648, 651 (7th Cir. 2001)
(quoting Jacobs v. City of Chi., 215 F.3d 758, 765 n.3 (7th Cir. 2000)). However,
resolution at this stage is appropriate when qualified immunity turns on the second
prong—whether the constitutional right at issue was clearly established at the time
it was allegedly violated—because it is purely a legal question. Jacobs, 215 F.3d at
765 n.3.
Hood and McGuire first argue that their actions are broadly entitled to
qualified immunity because Gecht and Kwil have not alleged facts showing the
prosecutors were aware that their confessions were coerced or false. [Gecht Dkt. 106
at 19–20; Kwil Dkt. 57 at 19–20.] But the arguments for dismissal are fact dependent
and dismissal on qualified immunity grounds would be premature. Alvarado, 267
F.3d at 651; Jacobs, 215 F.3d 758, n.3 (“[I]n many cases, the existence of qualified
immunity will depend on the particular facts of a given case.”).
By contrast, qualified immunity as to the failure to intervene claim (Count IV)
can be resolved now as a question of law. Gecht and Kwil claim that Hood and
McGuire failed to stop Police Defendants from violating their constitutional rights

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despite having an opportunity to do so. [Gecht Dkt. 95, ¶¶ 172–77; Kwil Dkt. 50,
¶¶ 161–66.] Hood and McGuire counter that there was no clearly established duty for
prosecutors to intervene when Defendants’ alleged misconduct occurred in 1999.
[Gecht Dkt. 106 at 20–21; Kwil Dkt. 57 at 20–21.] The Court agrees.
“To be clearly established, the right must be ‘sufficiently clear that every
reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that right.’”
Schimandle v. Dekalb Cnty. Sheriff's Off., No. 23-2151, 2024 WL 3964260, at *4 (7th
Cir. Aug. 28, 2024) (quoting Mullenix v. Luna, 577 U.S. 7, 11 (2015)). Plaintiffs must
show that precedent “placed the statutory or constitutional question beyond debate”
or that the “conduct is so egregious and unreasonable that . . . no reasonable officer
could have thought he was acting lawfully.” Id.; see also Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730,
741–42 (2002). Notice is key; precedent need not be identical, but it should be “closely
analogous,” such that the “state of the law” at the time of an incident provided “fair
warning” to the defendants “that their alleged [conduct] was unconstitutional.” Tolan
v. Cotton, 572 U.S. 650, 656 (2014) (quoting Pelzer, 536 U.S. at 739).
Gecht and Kwil cite two pre-1999 cases recognizing a duty intervene: Byrd v.
Brishke, 466 F.2d 6 (7th Cir. 1972) and Yang v. Hardin, 37 F.3d 282 (7th Cir. 1994).
[Gecht Dkt. 115 at 26.] Byrd and Yang are not closely analogous to Gecht and Kwil’s
circumstance because they only acknowledge a duty to intervene for law enforcement
officers—there is nothing to suggest that these cases would have put prosecutors on
notice of a similar duty to intervene. The very evolution of the duty to intervene belies
this notion.

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Byrd is a “seminal case . . . on the duty of an officer to intervene,” Yang, 37
F.3d at 285 (emphasis added). Since then, the duty of law enforcement officers to
intervene has been widespread in the Seventh Circuit. See, e.g., id. (law enforcement
officers can be liable under section 1983 if they fail to intervene to prevent other
officers from infringing on citizens’ constitutional rights); Harper v. Albert, 400 F.3d
1052, 1064 (7th Cir. 2005) (same); Lewis v. Downey, 581 F.3d 467, 473 (7th Cir. 2009)
(same). By contrast, courts in this district grappled with whether there was such a
duty for prosecutors and repeatedly rejected it. See, e.g., Gordon v. Devine, No. 08 C
377, 2008 WL 4594354, at *17 (N.D. Ill. October 14, 2008); Andrews v. Burge, 660
F. Supp. 2d 868, 876 n.6 (N.D. Ill. 2009); Hobbs v. Cappelluti, 899 F. Supp. 2d 738,
773 (N.D. Ill. 2012).
The tide only turned in 2012 when the Seventh Circuit held (outside of the
failure to intervene context) that “prosecutors and police are subject to the same
constraints” when acting in an investigatory capacity. Whitlock v. Brueggemann, 682
F.3d 567, 581 (7th Cir. 2012). District courts have since interpreted Whitlock to
impose a duty to intervene on prosecutors as well as police officers. See, e.g., Saunders
v. City of Chi., No. 12-cv-09158, 2013 WL 6009933, at *10 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 13, 2013)
(extending failure to intervene liability to prosecutors due to Whitlock); Wilson v.
Burge, 667 F. Supp. 3d 785, 851 (N.D. Ill. 2023) (collecting cases). But these recent
decisions only prove the point: such a right was nonexistent in 1999.
Gecht and Kwil alternatively cite Hope, which held that “officials can still be
on notice that their conduct violates clearly established law even in novel factual

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circumstances” where no precedent exists. Hope, 536 U.S. at 741. Hope is reserved
for “rare cases” where the conduct is “so egregious” that it is a “patently obvious”
violation. Leiser v. Kloth, 933 F.3d 696, 702, 704 (7th Cir. 2019) (quoting Jacobs, 215
F.3d at 767). Gecht and Kwil briefly posit that the violations were clear because
prosecutors have a duty to ensure that investigations are constitutionally compliant
and, as lawyers, “they know the rules.” [Gecht Dkt. 115 at 26–27.] But they have not
explained why Hood or McGuire’s alleged conduct was particularly egregious such
that it provides unmistakable notice or shown how it fits into the narrow line of Hope
cases. Instead, they merely presume notice, which is precisely what Hope’s narrow
scope guards against.
Gecht and Kwil had a burden to show a right clearly established in 1999. They
failed to meet it. Consequently, Hood and McGuire are entitled to qualified immunity
on Count IV.
B.

Group Pleading

Next, Hood and McGuire argue that the remaining section 1983 claims are
deficient because the complaints use improper “group pleading” by referring to
“Defendants” broadly throughout the complaint instead of specifying which
allegations apply to Hood and McGuire as opposed to Police Defendants. [Gecht Dkt.
106 at 10–14; Kwil Dkt. 57 at 10–14.] Consequently, Hood and McGuire lack adequate
notice as to how they are alleged to have been personally involved in violating Gecht
and Kwil’s constitutional rights. [Id. at 11.]
It is well established that section 1983 lawsuits against individuals “require
personal involvement in the constitutional deprivation to support a viable claim.”
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Gonzales v. McHenry Cnty., Ill., 40 F.4th 824, 828 (7th Cir. 2022); see also Johnson v.
Rimmer, 936 F.3d 695, 710 (7th Cir. 2019). “To establish personal liability, the
plaintiff must show that the relevant official ‘caused the constitutional deprivation at
issue’ or ‘acquiesced in some demonstrable way in the alleged constitutional
violation.’” Gonzalez, 40 F.4th at 828 (quoting Palmer v. Marion Cnty., 327 F.3d 588,
594 (7th Cir. 2003)). Despite the personal involvement requirement, “[g]roup
pleading, while not ideal, is not categorically impermissible” for a section 1983 claim.
Fulton v. Bartik, 547 F. Supp. 3d 799, 810 (N.D. Ill. 2021); see also Dukes v.
Washburn, 600 F. Supp. 3d 885, 898 (N.D. Ill. 2022). The Seventh Circuit has allowed
group pleading where, “reading the allegations sensibly and as a whole, there is no
genuine uncertainty regarding who is responsible for what.” Engel v. Buchan, 710
F.3d 698, 710 (7th Cir. 2013).
The complaints satisfy this minimal standard. They separate defendants into
two groups: “Prosecutor Defendants,” consisting of Assistant Cook County State’s
Attorneys Hood and McGuire, and “Police Defendants,” consisting of Chicago Police
officers named as defendants, and largely adhere to this bifurcated terminology
throughout. [Gecht Dkt. 95, ¶¶ 21, 25; Kwil Dkt. 50, ¶¶ 18, 21.] Although Hood and
McGuire identify over 50 paragraphs that use the collective term “Defendants,”
context makes clear which defendants are referenced at any given point.
One portion of these paragraphs consists of factual allegations. [Gecht Dkt. 95,
¶¶ 2–3, 8–9, 14, 16–17, 23, 26, 54–56, 60, 62, 66, 74–75, 77, 85–86, 91, 94, 101, 109–
12, 124–25, 134, 144; Kwil Dkt. 50, ¶¶ 2, 5–7, 13, 20, 22, 51, 53, 66, 68, 77, 79, 82–83,

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86, 90, 98–99, 101, 113–14, 123, 133, 139, 149–51, 153, 157, 159, 163, 165, 172, 185,
188, 191, 194, 197–98, 202, 204.] In some cases, the paragraph first references a
subgroup of defendants and thereafter refers to “Defendants” generally. Read in
context, these collective references are unambiguous in whether they refer to Police
or Prosecutor Defendants. [E.g., Gecht Dkt. 95, ¶¶ 23, 77, 109; Kwil Dkt. 50, ¶¶ 20,
68, 98.] Similarly, references to “Defendants” related to the City of Chicago, [E.g.,
Gecht Dkt. 95, ¶¶ 109–11, 124–25, 134, 144; Kwil Dkt. 50, ¶¶ 98–100, 113–14, 123,
133], logically refer to Police Defendants since the complaint defines Police
Defendants as agents and employees of the City of Chicago and Prosecutor
Defendants as agents and employees of Cook County. [Gecht Dkt. 95, ¶¶ 26–27, 221,
223; Kwil Dkt. 50, ¶¶ 22–23, 210, 212.] Other allegations describe “Defendants” as
having participated in violent and psychological coercion and fabricating Hernandez,
Gecht, Kwil, and Miller’s false confessions. [Gecht Dkt. 95, ¶¶ 2–3, 8, 60; Kwil Dkt.
50, ¶¶ 2, 5–6.] But elsewhere, the complaints make the same claims specifically about
Hood and McGuire. [Gecht Dkt. 95, ¶¶ 158–59; Kwil Dkt. 50, ¶¶ 147–48.] Overall, it
is clear what specific actions Hood and McGuire are alleged to have taken, such as
being present at Area Five during the interrogations and walking suspects and
witnesses through their statements. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 680–81. [Gecht Dkt. 95, ¶¶ 54,
56–57, 59; Kwil Dkt. 50, ¶¶ 46, 48–50.]
Hood and McGuire also point to paragraphs that assert claims using the
collective term “Defendants.” [Gecht Dkt. 95, ¶¶ 150, 160–62, 164, 168, 170, 174, 176,
183, 188, 196, 199, 202, 205, 208–09, 213, 215; Kwil Dkt. 50, ¶¶ 149–51, 153, 159, 163

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165, 172, 185, 188, 191, 194, 197–98, 202, 204.] Here too, each count begins by
identifying the specific defendant group it is brought against. 5 More general
references to “Defendants” thereafter logically refer to the defendants against whom
the specific claim is made.
Reading each complaint as a whole, “there is no genuine uncertainty regarding
who is responsible for what.” Engel, 710 F.3d at 710.
C.

Rule 12(b)(6) Motion

To survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, Fed. R. Civ. P.
12(b)(6), a complaint must include sufficient factual allegations to show a plausible
right to relief. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). Although “detailed
factual allegations” are not required, the facts in the complaint must present a claim
that rises “above the speculative level.” Id. at 545. “Threadbare recitals of the
elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements” cannot by
themselves satisfy Rule 8’s requirement that the complaint show the plaintiff is
entitled to relief. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2); see also Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
1.

Count II: Coerced & False Confession

Gecht and Kwil’s claims under Count II are two-fold: they bring coerced and
false confession claims under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. They also
assert fabrication of evidence claims under the Fourteenth Amendment.

For example, Count VIII refers to both Police and Prosecutor Defendants while Count
I only refers to Police Defendants. [Gecht Dkt. 95, ¶¶ 146, 204; Kwil Dkt. 50, ¶¶ 135, 193.]
References to “these Defendants” later in each count clearly refer to the subgroup initially
identified.
5

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The Fifth Amendment, made applicable to the states by the Fourteenth
Amendment, prohibits the use of “involuntary” or coerced confessions in criminal
cases. Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760, 766, 770–71 (2003); Sornberger v. City of
Knoxville, Ill., 434 F.3d 1006, 1023–24 (7th Cir. 2006). To bring a Fifth Amendment
claim, Gecht and Kwil must show (1) that their confessions were involuntary and
coerced, and (2) that their own confessions were used against them in a criminal case.
Chavez, 538 U.S. at 770–71. Fourteenth Amendment claims require a showing of
evidence obtained through “conscience-shocking” conduct, regardless of whether the
evidence is used at trial. Id. at 774. A fabricated evidence claim requires (1) the
defendant knowingly fabricated evidence against the plaintiff, (2) the evidence was
used at his criminal trial, (3) the evidence was material, and (4) the plaintiff was
damaged as a result. Patrick v. City of Chi., 974 F.3d 824, 835 (7th Cir. 2020).
For Hood and McGuire to be liable under section 1983, Gecht and Kwil must
show that the prosecutors were “personally responsible” for deprivation of their
constitutional rights. Childress v. Walker, 787 F.3d 433, 439–40 (7th Cir.
2015). Personal responsibility is established for one who, “having a duty under the
Constitution to the plaintiff, act[s] or fail[s] to act with a deliberate or reckless
disregard of plaintiff's constitutional rights . . . or the conduct causing the
constitutional deprivation occurs at her direction or with her knowledge or consent.”
Id. at 440 (citations omitted) (quotations omitted).
Gecht and Kwil allege that Hood and McGuire “acting as investigators and
without probable cause . . . forced [them] to make false [incriminating] statements

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involuntarily and against [their] will[s] . . . which were used against [them] in
criminal proceedings.” [Gecht Dkt. 95, ¶ 158; Kwil Dkt. 50, ¶ 147.] Although they do
not claim that Hood and McGuire directly engaged in all the coercive behavior of
Police Defendants, they claim to allege facts showing that the prosecutors knowingly
and willingly participated in a “course of conduct” that deprived Plaintiffs of their
constitutional rights. [Gecht Dkt. 115 at 20–21.] Hood and McGuire protest that none
of those allegations show that they coerced or fabricated any confession or knew the
confessions were coerced or false. [Gecht Dkt. 106 at 15–16; Kwil Dkt. 57 at 16–16.]
As an initial matter, Gecht and Kwil have improperly lumped both ASA
Defendants together in their coerced confession claims. Each Plaintiff alleges that
only one ASA Defendant took their statement—McGuire took Gecht’s; Hood took
Kwil’s. Neither Plaintiff alleged any other interaction with the other ASA Defendant.
Yet, they each allege that the ASA Defendant with whom they did not interact
violated the Plaintiff’s due process rights by coercing false confessions from their codefendants that were used against them in criminal proceedings. For instance, while
McGuire took Gecht’s statement, Hood allegedly violated Gecht’s rights by coercing a
confession from Kwil implicating Gecht.
It is well-established in the Seventh Circuit that “where a plaintiff attempts to
assert a due process claim based upon allegations that [officials] coerced statements
from co-defendants . . . he or she does not state a due process claim, but rather, a
malicious prosecution claim.” Taylor v. City of Chi., 80 F. Supp. 3d 817, 826–27 (N.D.
Ill. 2015) (citing Petty v. City of Chi., 754 F.3d 416, 422–23 (7th Cir. 2014)). As the

15

Seventh Circuit has explained, “[c]oercing witnesses to speak . . . is a genuine
constitutional wrong, but the persons aggrieved [are the witnesses] rather than [the
arrestee]” and “[r]ights personal to their holders may not be enforced by third
parties.” Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 20 F.3d 789, 794–95 (7th Cir. 1994). Consequently,
the Court dismisses without prejudice Gecht’s coerced confession claim against Hood
and Kwil’s coerced confession claim against McGuire. 6 Their fabricated evidence and
malicious prosecution claims are cognizable against both ASA Defendants in each
case if properly alleged.
The Court next addresses Gecht’s coerced confession claim against McGuire,
Kwil’s coerced confession claim against Hood, and their fabricated evidence claims.
In response to the motion, Gecht and Kwil point to a handful of allegations: (1) Hood
and McGuire were present at Area Five while Gecht, Kwil, and Miller were
interrogated. [Gecht Dkt. 95, ¶ 57; Kwil Dkt. 50, ¶ 48]; (2) during the interrogation,
Police Defendants physically abused Gecht, chipping his tooth and cutting the inside
of his mouth [Gecht Dkt. 95, ¶ 50]; (3) Gecht had a discernable learning disability and
emotional disorder [Id. at ¶ 55]; (4) during the interrogation, Police Defendants
threatened Kwil that he wouldn’t see his daughter again unless he signed a statement
[Kwil Dkt. 50, ¶ 41]; (5) after the interrogations, McGuire took Gecht and Miller’s
statements and Hood took Kwil’s statements implicating themselves, each other, and
Hernandez, which largely consisted of them “walking [each of them] through

The parties did not raise this issue in briefing, but the Court exercises its discretion
to address an unpreserved prudential standing question sua sponte. RK Co. v. See, 622 F.3d
846, 851 (7th Cir. 2010).
6

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Defendants’ version of events to have them confirm” it. [Gecht Dkt. 95, ¶ 59; Kwil
Dkt. 50, ¶ 50]; and (6) Hood and McGuire “ignored indicators” that their statements
were “obviously false.” [Id.]
Thin allegations are not fatal at the motion to dismiss stage so long as the
Court can draw reasonable inferences in a plaintiff’s favor that amount to a plausible
claim. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. But on these allegations, the Court would have to strain
to infer that Hood and McGuire participated in coercion or were aware that Gecht
and Kwil had been coerced. First, mere presence at Area Five is insufficient to show
coercion or awareness of it. There are no factual allegations that Hood or McGuire
participated in the interrogation, or allegations explaining how Hood and McGuire
would have known Gecht and Kwil were being interrogated, much less coerced. See
Andrews v. Burge, 660 F. Supp. 2d 868, 877 (N.D. Ill. 2009) (presence at police station
insufficient to show knowledge of coercion).
Once Hood and McGuire were face to face with Gecht and Kwil, knowledge of
coercion would be inferable if there were apparent signs. See, e.g., Abrego v. Guevara,
No. 23-cv-1740, 2024 WL 3566679, at *4 (N.D. Ill. July 29, 2024) (plaintiff’s “body was
marred by bruises” and his “underwear was soiled”); Orange v. Burge, No. 04 C 0168,
2008 WL 4443280, at *11 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 29, 2008) (plaintiff told prosecutor about his
mistreatment by police). But the allegations here fall short. Gecht was allegedly
physically beaten, resulting in a cut in his mouth and chipped tooth. [Gecht Dkt. 95,
¶ 50.] But it’s not apparent that these injuries would be visible or attributable to
recent violence and Gecht does not make the allegation that the injuries were

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apparent. It’s also not clear why Gecht’s learning disability or emotional disorder
would indicate coercion. Gecht isn’t alleged to have told McGuire what happened.
Kwil did not allege that he was physically abused at all. His “will was broken,” [Kwil
Dkt. 50, ¶ 45], but there are no allegations about how that visibly manifested. Kwil
also did not allege that he told Hood about the interrogation. Without more, it is not
plausible to infer that Hood or McGuire knew Gecht or Kwil had been coerced.
Finally, Hood and McGuire’s alleged behavior while taking Gecht and Kwil’s
statements only shows fabrication, coercion or knowledge of coercion or false
statements in a conclusory fashion. “[W]alking” a suspect through their statement to
“have them confirm” it is abstract and does not bespeak coercion or fabrication
without more. It is not the same as handing a suspect a pre-typed statement, coaching
a suspect, or feeding them details to include in their statement. Cf. Hill v. Coppleson,
627 F.3d 601, 603–04 (7th Cir. 2010) (prosecutor alleged to have fed plaintiff details
about murder he later confessed to); Orange, 2008 WL 4443280, at *10 (prosecutor
alleged to have coached plaintiff on false confession). Hood and McGuire also
allegedly ignored signs that the statements were false, but there are no factual
allegations showing they knew they were false.
Hernandez and Miller’s interrogations don’t add any more color to Plaintiffs’
fabrication claims. Police Defendants allegedly physically abused Hernandez and
threatened Miller to obtain false confessions against Plaintiffs. [Gecht Dkt. 115 at
18.] Again, the complaints fail to allege that any abuse was visible or otherwise

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known to McGuire or explain how he knew their confessions were false. This gap in
the pleadings is fatal for a fabrication claim. Patrick, 974 F.3d at 835.
The Court is aware that this case is one among many brought by exonerated
defendants against former Chicago Police Detective Guevara and his Area Five
colleagues for coercion and other constitutional violations. See, e.g., Abrego, 2024 WL
3566679, at *1 (collecting cases). And it recognizes that ASAs might have been
involved. But plaintiffs still have a burden to allege concrete facts demonstrating that
defendants were personally responsible for any coercion or fabrication that occurred.
They have not done so here.
The Court’s normal practice, in accordance with Seventh Circuit guidance, is
to give one chance to amend after a motion to dismiss is briefed, even if a plaintiff has
amended previously. Zimmerman v. Bornick, 25 F.4th 491, 494 (7th Cir. 2022). And
Seventh Circuit precedent is clear that the Court should err on the side of allowing
an amendment; “a court should deny leave to amend only if it is certain that
amendment would be futile or otherwise unwarranted.” Runnion ex rel. Runnion v.
Girl Scouts of Greater Chi. & Nw. Ind., 786 F.3d 510, 520 (7th Cir. 2015). The Court
dismisses Count II with leave to amend.
2.

Count III: Malicious Prosecution & Unlawful Detention

Count III asserts malicious prosecution and unlawful detention claims under
the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments.
For malicious prosecution, a plaintiff must allege that: (1) the prosecution was
instituted without any probable cause; (2) the motive in instituting the prosecution
was “malicious”; and (3) a favorable termination of the underlying criminal
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prosecution. Thompson v. Clark, 142 U.S. 36, 44 (2022). “Malicious” is defined as
“without probable cause.” Id. Unlawful detention claims also require lack of probable
cause. Manuel v. City of Joliet, 580 U.S. 357, 364–65 (2017).
Given that Gecht and Kwil have not alleged sufficient facts to show that Hood
or McGuire coerced Gecht or Kwil or knew their confessions were false or coerced,
supra Part III.C.1, it follows that Gecht and Kwil have not shown a lack of probable
cause to charge them. Cf. Wilson, 667 F. Supp. 3d at 873 (absence of probable cause
alleged where defendants alleged to have known plaintiff’s confession was coerced).
Thus, the Court also dismisses their Fourth Amendment claims with leave to amend.
Count III also brings malicious prosecution claims under the Fourteenth
Amendment. Hood and McGuire argue that this claim is improper because Gecht and
Kwil also bring malicious prosecution claims under Illinois law. [Gecht Dkt. 106 at
16–17.] Generally, a plaintiff “cannot invoke the substantive due process clause
where state laws provide an adequate postdeprivation remedy for the complained-of
conduct.” Fox v. Hayes, 600 F.3d 819, 841 (7th Cir. 2010). Accordingly, the Seventh
Circuit has rejected federal malicious prosecution claims because Illinois law
recognizes tort claims for malicious prosecution. See e.g., id.; Ray v. City of Chi., 629
F.3d 660, 664 (7th Cir. 2011).
Gecht and Kwil argue that this Court should chart a new course because the
Supreme Court has “implied” that the Fourteenth Amendment can support a
malicious prosecution claim. [Gecht Dkt. 115 at 22–23 (citing McDonough v. Smith,
588 U.S. 109, 115 n.2 (2019)).] The Court declines to do so. McDonough did not

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approve such a claim and Thompson, which post-dates McDonough, declined to
consider it. Thompson, 596 U.S. at 43 n.2. Although it might be considered an “open
question,” it is “likely preclude[d]” by the availability of a state remedy. Jones v. York,
34 F.4th 550, 564 n.8 (7th Cir. 2022).
Count III also cites the Fourteenth Amendment as a basis for their unlawful
detention claims. Such a claim only sounds in the Fourth Amendment. “Manuel I
makes clear that the Fourth Amendment, not the Due Process Clause, governs a
claim for wrongful pretrial detention.” Lewis v. City of Chi., 914 F.3d 472, 475 (7th
Cir. 2019) (citing Manuel, 580 U.S. at 365-69); see also Patrick, 974 F.3d at 834.
In sum, the Court dismisses Gecht and Kwil’s Fourth Amendment claims with
leave to amend, and their Fourteenth Amendment claims with prejudice.

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IV.

Conclusion

For the reasons stated herein, Hood and McGuire’s motions to dismiss are
granted in part and denied in part. Plaintiffs’ Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment
(Count II), and Fourth Amendment claims (Count III) are dismissed without
prejudice. Their failure to intervene (Count IV) and remaining Fourteenth
Amendment claims (Count III) are dismissed with prejudice. Gecht and Kwil may file
amended complaints by or before October 14, 2024. If they do not, their remaining
state law claims (Counts VII, VIII, and IX) will be dismissed for lack of supplemental
jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3), and their indemnification claims against Cook
County (Count XII) will be dismissed for lack of Cook County ASA defendants to
indemnify. The motions are otherwise denied.

Enter: 23 CV 1742 and 23 CV 4279
Date: September 26, 2024

__________________________________________
Lindsay C. Jenkins
United States District Judge

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