Billups v. City Of Harvey et al

Filing 61

MEMORANDUM Opinion and Order: The motion to dismiss 12 is granted in part and denied in part. Plaintiff's claims arising from Defendant's conduct occurring on April 6, 2021 and April 15, 2021, are barred by the statute of limitations; tho se claims are dismissed with prejudice. Her claims under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1985 and 1986 are dismissed without prejudice. Plaintiff's claims against Christopher Clark in his official capacity are dismissed as redundant. Her claim under 42 U .S.C. § 1983 against Christopher Clark in his personal capacity for the actions occurring on or after May 13, 2021, and her Monell claim against the City of Harvey survive this motion, as do her state law claims in Counts III and IV. See attached Memorandum Opinion and Order for further details. Signed by the Honorable Rebecca R. Pallmeyer on 9/24/2024. Mailed notice. (cp, )

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION
ANDREA BILLUPS-DRYER,

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Plaintiff,
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v.
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THE CITY OF HARVEY, an ILLINOIS
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municipal corporation, CHRISTOPHER
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CLARK, individually and as an agent of the )
City of Harvey, and Does 1-50,
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Defendants.
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No. 23 C 2429
Judge Rebecca R. Pallmeyer

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Andrea Billups-Dryer (“Plaintiff”) brings this pro se action under 42 U.S.C §§ 1983, 1985,
and 1986 against the City of Harvey, Illinois and its mayor, Christopher Clark (“Defendants”),
alleging that Defendants authorized the dumping of debris and demolition on Plaintiff’s properties
located in Harvey, Illinois. (Am. Compl. [6] ¶ 7). Plaintiff has also brought supplemental state
claims against Defendants for conversion and trespass to land arising from the same conduct.
(Id. ¶¶ 6-7). Defendants have moved to dismiss the Amended Complaint under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim on which relief may be granted. For the
reasons stated below, Defendant’s motion is granted in part and denied in part.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff is a resident of Cook County, Illinois who claims ownership of four properties
located in Harvey, Illinois. (See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 5, 13). These properties are located at 15402
Oakley Court, 15408 Oakley Court, 15409 Oakley Avenue, and 15419 Oakley Avenue, all within

the Coronet Village neighborhood of Harvey. 1 (Id.) Plaintiff names the City of Harvey and its
Mayor, Christopher Clark, as Defendants.
Although Plaintiff’s pleadings are not a model of clarity, the court gleans the following from
the allegations contained in the Amended Complaint and information set forth in her memorandum
in opposition to the motion to dismiss: since at least 2009, Defendants have sought to redevelop
the Coronet Village area of Harvey, Illinois for residential use. (See Pl.’s Opp’n [23], 6, see also
Ex. 1 to Defs.’ Reply [30], 8-9). Though neither party fully explains the details or scope of this
redevelopment plan, it appears from the Amended Complaint that some or all of Plaintiff’s
properties in Coronet Village are in the area the City intended to redevelop. (See Ex. 1 to Defs.’
Reply at 61-62; see also Am. Compl. ¶ 16). Plaintiff resists the City’s redevelopment effort; she
claims to have met with Mayor Clark in her home at some point “[p]rior to [Defendants’ alleged]
actions” and explained that “all she wanted to do” was “to be allowed to rehab” her properties and
rent them out without “constant harassment” from the City—the Amended Complaint does not
elaborate on what this “constant harassment” consisted of, or how Plaintiff’s rehab plans would
have been consistent or inconsistent with the City’s redevelopment proposal. (Id. ¶ 17).
Evidently unsuccessful in attempting to redevelop the Coronet Properties with Plaintiff’s
permission, Plaintiff claims that the Defendants changed their strategy. (See Id. ¶¶ 8-9). First,
on October 27, 2020, Defendants filed Resolution 2530 for Comprehensive Redevelopment and
Economic Incentive Agreement (“the Resolution” or “Resolution 2530”) with the Cook County
Recorder of Deeds. (See Pl’s Opp’n at 5-6; see also Ex. 1 to Defs.’ Reply at 1). 2 Originally
Plaintiff has, in her pleadings and opposition motion, equivocated on whether she
owns and/or is claiming damages to a fifth parcel located at 15400 Oakley Court. (Compare Am.
Compl. ¶ 13 with id. ¶ 20 and Pl.’s Opp’n at 1). Furthermore, neither party has explained to the
court what exactly these properties are—multi-family apartments, single-family homes,
undeveloped lots, etc.—but as Plaintiff’s pleadings suggest that she intended the properties for
rent (See Am. Compl. ¶ 17), the court will assume that they are apartment buildings.
1

Plaintiff only references the Resolution in her pleadings without attaching the
document itself, but Defendants have provided the full text of the Resolution as Exhibit 1 to their
reply. The document is also publicly accessible through the Cook County Clerk’s Office.
2

2

passed some ten years earlier, the Resolution purported to require the City to use best efforts to
acquire various properties known as the “Dixie Property” in Coronet Village and convey them to
a private developer. (See Ex. 1 to Defs.’ Reply at 2-4). The Resolution authorized the developer
to demolish the conveyed property pursuant to a referenced—but not included in the Resolution
or elsewhere in the record—“Demolition Plan.” (Id. at 17-18). While Plaintiff’s properties were
not within the area described as the “Dixie Property,” the Resolution designated two addresses
describing Plaintiff’s properties—15408 Oakley Court and 15409 Oakley Avenue— among three
parcels to be acquired and conveyed as “Ancillary Property.” (Id. at 61-62 (identifying the
properties), 59 (designating as “Ancillary Property”)). The Resolution defined “Ancillary Property”
as property neighboring the Dixie Property which was, according to the Resolution, “prone to
flooding” and, as a result, “abandoned” by “the majority of the owners of the parcels comprising
the Ancillary Property.” (See id. at 8). 3 The Resolution thus authorized and obligated the City to
acquire the Ancillary Property through “any and all available methods,” including condemnation,
foreclosure, tax purchasing, and “all standard acquisition methods; and/or any other means
permitted by law.” (Id. at 18). The Resolution was approved by the Harvey City Council on
December 30, 2009. (Id. at 3). It appears, however, that the City took no action to carry out the
Resolution for over a decade; Defendants were still offering the Coronet Village properties to
private developers as late as 2022. (See Am. Compl. ¶ 16; see also Pl’s Opp’n at 5). At no point
in the negotiation, passage, or filing of the Resolution was Plaintiff given notice that her property
was subject to a redevelopment plan, or that the City sought to formally acquire her property.
(See Am. Compl. ¶ 8).
Though the Resolution remained dormant for over a decade after its passage, shortly after
filing the Resolution with the County Recorder in October 2020, Defendants appeared to spring

The Resolution does not identify who the City believed the owners of the Ancillary
Property to be, nor does it explain which of the properties the City deemed were in fact
abandoned.
3

3

into action. On April 6, 2021, Plaintiff claims to have first discovered that Defendants had
authorized City employees to enter Plaintiff’s properties at 15402 Oakley Court and 15408 Oakley
Court, and dump “tons of debris” including “huge piles of tree trunks” on Plaintiff’s property. (Pl.’s
Opp’n at 2.). Days later, on April 15, 2021, Plaintiff first noticed a “large hole” in the wall of a
structure on her property at 15419 Oakley Avenue due to bricks being missing or removed, with
similar holes present in other buildings she owned. (Ex. E to Pl.’s Opp’n). Plaintiff claims that
Defendants authorized City employees to “tear[] off the roof and bricks with a backhoe” at one or
more of her properties (the Amended Complaint does not specify which one). (Id. ¶ 15). Plaintiff
then discovered the recording of the Resolution in the County Recorder’s Office, (Pl.’s Opp’n at
2), and promptly filed a document with the County Recorder challenging the Resolution and
asserting her ownership of the Ancillary Property on April 28, 2021. (Ex. E to Pl.’s Opp’n). On
May 13, 2021, Plaintiff found that additional debris had been dumped on her property and that a
sidewall had collapsed in the unit “next to 15411 Oakley Avenue.” (Id.). The Amended Complaint
claims that Defendants took such action in the absence of a court order and without notice to
Plaintiff, whom Defendants knew to be the rightful owner to the properties. (Am. Compl. ¶ 8).
On May 17, 2021, Plaintiff contacted Mayor Clark and informed him that City employees
had dumped debris on her property and that she was aware of the filing of the Resolution; she
implored him to stop his employees from tearing down her buildings, warning that the City’s
actions “would leave [her] no other choice than to take legal action against the City.” (Pl’s Opp’n
at 2-3). Apart from denying knowledge of the Resolution and stating that he believed that the City
owned the properties, the Mayor directed Plaintiff to contact the City administrator and promised
to get back to her. (Id.). Plaintiff was unable to get a response from the City administrator, and
was unable, despite repeated additional calls, to get in touch with Mayor Clark again. (Id.)
Between October 3 and October 5, 2021, the front of Plaintiff’s property at 15409 Oakley
Avenue “was collapsed.” (Ex. E to Pl.’s Opp’n). Most recently, in October 2023, Plaintiff noticed
propane tanks and further dumping near her property in Coronet Village. (Id.) As a result of
4

Defendants’ actions, Plaintiff alleges that she has been harmed by the reduction of value of the
properties in Coronet Village. (Am. Compl. ¶ 19).
Plaintiff initially filed a Complaint for a violation of constitutional rights on April 18, 2023,
under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985, and 1986, specifically for claims arising out of the demolition
occurring on May 13, 2021. (Compl. [1], 2). On June 13, 2023, Plaintiff filed an Amended
Complaint, including claims dating back to the alleged dumping on April 6, 2021 and alleging that
Defendants conspired to violate her rights. (See Am. Compl.). The Amended Complaint further
alleged state law claims of conversion (Count III) and trespass to land (Count IV). (Id. ¶ 22).
Plaintiff seeks an injunction requiring Defendants to cease the dumping and demolition of her
property, as well as compensatory damages. (Id. ¶ 23).
Defendants move to dismiss all counts under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for
failure to state a claim, contending that (1) Plaintiff’s claims are barred by the statute of limitations,
(2) Plaintiff’s allegations are not actionable under §§ 1983, 1985, or 1986 because the allegations
sound in negligence, (3) Plaintiff failed to plead sufficient facts to meet the elements of §§ 1983,
1985, or 1986, (4) Plaintiff’s state law claims are factually duplicative of her federal civil rights
claims, and (5) Plaintiff’s claims against Mayor Clark in his official capacity are redundant given
the claims against the City directly. 4 (See generally Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss [12]).

In Defendants’ reply to Plaintiff’s response in opposition, Defendants introduce a
new argument in support of dismissal: they contest Plaintiff’s ownership of the properties in
Coronet Village and draw the court’s attention to records, or the absence of records, in the County
Recorder’s Office that appear to raise questions about Plaintiff’s title to the Coronet Village
properties. (Defs.’ Reply [30], 6-7). The court will not consider the merits of this argument at this
time. It is settled law in the Seventh Circuit that arguments raised for the first time in a reply brief
are deemed forfeited. Bonte v. U.S. Bank, N.A., 624 F. 3d 461, 466 (7th. Cir. 2010). While
Plaintiff’s response provided numerous new factual explanations, Defendants’ challenge to
Plaintiff’s ownership of the Coronet Village properties was available and appropriate at the time
of their initial motion to dismiss. Plaintiff has alleged that she owns the Coronet Village properties
in her Amended Complaint (Am. Compl. ¶ 13), and absent a direct contradiction in a formal
adjudication or public record—which Defendants have not identified—the court accepts these
allegations as true.
4

5

Plaintiff filed a memorandum in opposition to Defendants’ motion to dismiss, elaborating
on the allegations introduced in the Amended Complaint and providing a more detailed timeline
of Plaintiff’s alleged injuries. (See Pl’s Opp’n).
LEGAL STANDARD
A complaint must set forth a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the
pleader is entitled to relief.” FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2). A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) tests
the sufficiency of the complaint “by arguing that it fails to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted.” Firestone Fin. Corp. v. Meyer, 796 F.3d 822, 825 (7th Cir. 2015). To survive such a
motion, a complaint must “contain sufficient factual matter . . . to ‘state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.’ ” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads
factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable
for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Applying this standard, the court must accept
the factual allegations in the complaint as true and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the
plaintiff. Kubiak v. City of Chicago, 810 F.3d 476, 480-81 (7th Cir. 2016). “Conclusory allegations
merely reciting the elements of the claim are not entitled to this presumption of truth.” McCauley v.
City of Chicago, 671 F.3d 611, 616 (7th Cir. 2011) (citing Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 681). While a
complaint “may not be amended by the briefs in opposition to a motion to dismiss,” Thomason v.
Nachtrieb, 888 F.2d 1202, 1205 (7th Cir. 1989), facts stated in an opposition brief “may be
considered when evaluating the sufficiency of a complaint so long as they are consistent with the
allegations of the complaint.” Gutierrez v. Peters, 111 F.3d 1364, 1367 n.2 (7th Cir. 1997) (citing
Dausch v. Rykse, 52 F.3d 1425, 1428 n.3 (7th Cir. 1994)) (other citations omitted). Additionally,
as Plaintiff has appeared pro se in this matter, the court will construe the complaint liberally and
hold it to a “less stringent standard than pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Cesal v. Moats, 851 F.3d
714, 720 (7th Cir. 2017).

6

Because “a complaint need not anticipate and overcome affirmative defenses, such as the
statute of limitations,” a statute-of-limitations defense is rarely resolved at the motion-to-dismiss
stage. Amin Ijbara Equity Corp. v. Village of Oak Lawn, 860 F.3d 489, 492 (7th Cir. 2017). “As
long as there is a conceivable set of facts, consistent with the complaint, that would defeat a
statute-of-limitations defense, questions of timeliness are left for summary judgment (or ultimately
trial), at which point the district court may determine compliance with the statute of limitations
based on a more complete factual record.” Sidney Hillman Health Ctr. of Rochester v. Abbott
Lab’ys, Inc., 782 F.3d 922, 928 (7th Cir. 2015).

Dismissal on limitations grounds may be

warranted, however, where “the plaintiff pleads himself out of court by alleging facts sufficient to
establish the complaint’s tardiness.” Cancer Found., Inc. v. Cerberus Cap. Mgmt., LP, 559 F.3d
671, 674–75 (7th Cir. 2009).
DISCUSSION
I.

Statute of Limitations
The time for filing a § 1983 claim is determined by “the statute of limitations for personal-

injury claims in the state where the plaintiff’s injury occurred.” Neita v. City of Chicago, 830 F.3d
494, 498 (7th Cir. 2016). This is the case regardless of whether the conduct being challenged
sounds in a different state law offense, such as conversion or trespass. See Malone v. Ryan,
47 Fed. Appx. 410, 411 (7th Cir. 2002) (“[A]ll § 1983 claims filed in Illinois are subject to [the
statute of limitations in Illinois personal injury law] . . . . The applicable statute of limitations is
not . . . determined by searching for the most analogous state-law claim.”). Thus, for claims
arising in Illinois, the statute of limitations for claims under Section 1983 is two years, the state
statute of limitations for a claim of personal injury. Brown v. Dart, 876 F.3d 939, 940 (7th Cir.
2017) (citing 735 ILCS 5/13-202). The same rule applies for Section 1985 claims. See Ross v.
Illinois, 48 F. App’x 200, 202 (7th Cir. 2002). The statute for limitations for claims brought under
§ 1986 is one year. 42 U.S.C. § 1986.

7

The date that a federal civil rights cause of action accrues for the purposes of statute of
limitations is determined by federal law. Gekas v. Vasiliades, 814 F.3d 890, 894 (7th Cir. 2016).
“A claim brought under the Fourteenth Amendment for deprivation of property without due process
accrues when the injury is ‘complete,’ which is when the actual deprivation occurs.” Scott v.
Chicago Police Dep’t, No. 14 C 6657, 2015 WL 394360, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 29, 2015), aff’d sub
nom. Scott v. City of Chicago, 619 Fed .Appx. 548 (7th Cir. 2015). Where the plaintiff does not
discover the violation immediately, however, the federal “discovery rule” applies. Cada v. Baxter
Healthcare Corp., 920 F.2d 446, 450 (7th Cir. 1990) (“The rule that postpones the beginning of
the limitations period from the date when the plaintiff is wronged to the date when he discovers
he has been injured is the ‘discovery rule’ of federal common law, which is read into statutes of
limitations in federal-question cases (even when those statutes of limitations are borrowed from
state law)[.]”). In other terms, “the clock on federal civil rights claims begins to run when the
plaintiff becomes aware of his injury.” Ross, 48 F. App’x at 202 (citing Bishop v. Gainer, 272 F.3d
1009, 1014 (7th Cir.2001)).
Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint, read liberally and in light of the explanations provided in
her opposition brief, alleges three discrete events giving rise to an injury: a dumping of debris
discovered on April 6, 2021; a partial demolition discovered on April 15, 2021; and dumping and
partial demolition discovered on May 13, 2021. Additionally, the complaint alleges a conspiracy
to violate Plaintiff’s constitutional rights under § 1985 and § 1986 that was allegedly formed at
some point prior to these events.
A.

April 6, 2021 and April 15, 2021 Injuries

Plaintiff has alleged that she discovered that Defendants had dumped debris on her
property on April 6, 2021. Any cause of action arising from those actions accrued on that date,
meaning that Plaintiff had until April 6, 2023 to file a claim under § 1983 or § 1985, and until April
6, 2022 to file an action under § 1986. Similarly, Plaintiff alleges that she discovered a partial
demolition of her property on April 15, 2021. Thus, she had until April 15, 2023 to file an action
8

under §§ 1983 and 1985, and until April 15, 2022 to file an action under Section 1986. Because
Plaintiff did not file any action until April 18, 2023, her claims arising from the April 6, 2021 and
April 15, 2021 incidents fall outside the statute of limitations period.
Plaintiff has argued that these claims are nevertheless timely under three theories: the
continuing violation theory (Pl.’s Opp’n at 8-9), equitable estoppel (id. at 9), and equitable tolling
(id. at 10). As explained below, none of Plaintiff’s arguments is persuasive.
First, the continuing violation doctrine delays the accrual of a claim “until a series of
wrongful acts blossoms into an injury on which suit can be brought.” Limestone Dev. Corp. v.
Village of Lemont., 520 F.3d 797 (7th Cir. 2008). The doctrine “allows a Plaintiff to reach back to
the beginning of a violation and recover for all damages even if that beginning lies outside of the
limitations period.” Limestone Dev. Corp. v. Village of Lemont, 473 F. Supp. 2d 858, 875 (N.D.
Ill. 2007), aff’d sub nom. id. (citing Heard v. Sheahan, 253 F.3d 316, 319 (7th Cir.2001)). The
doctrine may apply “when the earlier violation may be recognizable as actionable only in light of
later events.” Pitts v. City of Kankakee, 267 F.3d 592, 595 (7th Cir.2001). The continuing violation
doctrine does not delay the accrual of claims arising from discrete acts that are independently
actionable, however. See Limestone Dev. Corp., 520 F.3d at 801 (“The statute of limitations
begins to run upon injury . . . and is not tolled by subsequent injuries . . . . [The continuing
violation doctrine] is thus a doctrine not about a continuing, but about a cumulative, violation.”)
Here, while Plaintiff has alleged a series of actions by Defendants’ employees in dumping
debris and commencing demolition on her properties, the allegations also demonstrate that the
Defendants’ conduct took place in discrete steps. As Plaintiff has claimed that the act of entering
her property and dumping debris rises to the level of a constitutional violation (see Am. Compl.
¶ 12), both the dumping on April 6, 2021 and the demolition on April 15, 2021 would have been
immediately actionable under her theory. Therefore, the continuing violation doctrine does not
delay the date of accrual for these claims.

9

Second, Plaintiff raises the argument of equitable estoppel. Generally, equitable estoppel
allows an otherwise time-barred claim to proceed where the delay in filing was caused by a
defendant’s improper acts. See Shropshear v. Corp. Couns. of City of Chicago, 275 F.3d 593,
595 (7th Cir. 2001) (“[T]he doctrine of equitable estoppel comes into play if the defendant takes
active steps to prevent the plaintiff from suing in time, as by promising not to plead the statute of
limitations.”). Because equitable estoppel applies to tolling, its applicability in federal civil rights
action is a question that, unlike accrual, is determined by state law. Heard, 253 F.3d at 317 (“The
statute of limitations for suits under section 1983 is supplied by state law—not only the limitations
period but also the tolling rules.”) (citations omitted). For suits in Illinois, the Seventh Circuit has
recognized Illinois’ fraudulent concealment statute as the applicable rule for determining whether
equitable estoppel applies in a case such as this one. See Shropshear, 275 F.3d at 597 (7th Cir.
2001). Under this statute, “if a person liable to an action fraudulently conceals the cause of such
action from the knowledge of the person entitled thereto,” the statute of limitations is tolled to five
years from the date of accrual. See 735 ILCS 5/13–215 (West). Under Illinois law, “equitable
estoppel is available only when the defendant has used misrepresentations or concealment—
rather than threats of reprisal—to prevent the plaintiff from suing.” Hollander v. Brown, 457 F.3d
688 (7th Cir. 2006) (citing Parks v. Kownacki, 193 Ill.2d 164, 737 N.E.2d 287 (Ill. 2000)). Courts
apply this doctrine “if the defendant takes active steps to prevent the plaintiff from suing in time,
as by promising not to plead the statute of limitations.” Cada, 920 F.2d at 450-51.
Plaintiff here has made no allegations that would support an equitable estoppel argument.
Plaintiff claims that Defendants delayed in responding to her numerous attempts to contact the
Mayor and city officials (see Pl.’s Opp’n at 3), but the pleadings do not identify a single material
fact actively concealed or misrepresented by Defendants that delayed Plaintiff’s ability to
commence a lawsuit. Indeed, Plaintiff herself has alleged that as early as May 17, 2021, she
warned Defendants that their actions “would leave [her] no other choice than to take legal action
against the City.” (See id.) That warning confirms that although the City’s actions allegedly
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harmed her inability to stop demolition, they did not impede her ability to initiate a lawsuit against
the City.
Lastly, Plaintiff has argued that equitable tolling applies. Generally, in contrast to equitable
estoppel, equitable tolling “permits a plaintiff to avoid the bar of the statute of limitations if despite
all due diligence he is unable to obtain vital information bearing on the existence of his claim”
even absent “wrongful—or any—effort by the defendant to prevent the plaintiff from suing.” Cada,
920 F.2d at 451. Like equitable estoppel, equitable tolling refers to the tolling of the statute of
limitations, and Illinois law determines its application here. Notably, “it remains unsettled whether
the doctrine exists in Illinois.” Clark v. City of Braidwood, 318 F.3d 764, 767 (7th Cir. 2003); see
also Hollander, 457 F.3d at 693 n.3 (discussing how Illinois law uses equitable tolling and
equitable estoppel interchangeably).
Even assuming equitable tolling is available to Plaintiff, the doctrine would not apply to
these facts. Equitable tolling requires a showing that, even with the exercise of due diligence, a
Plaintiff lacks the ability to obtain vital information on the existence of a claim. As Plaintiff’s
pleadings here make clear, the basis of her claims was the alleged dumping and demolition of
her property without proper notice or basis in law. The existence of her claim was thus evident
and obvious from the moment that she observed the “huge tree trunks,” “debris,” and partial
demolitions of her property. In short, Plaintiff has not made any showing in her pleadings that she
was in fact delayed in discovering the existence of her claim.
B.

May 13, 2021 Injuries

Plaintiff has also alleged, however, that she discovered a new round of dumping and
demolition on May 13, 2021. Those allegations stand in a different position for the purposes of
the statute of limitations. Plaintiff had until May 13, 2023 to file an action under Section 1983 for
these injuries. Her claims about Defendants’ May 13, 2021 conduct were timely as of April 18,
2023, the date of filing the original complaint.

11

Defendants’ challenges to this conclusion fail. First, Defendants suggest that the proper
filing date for the statute of limitations is June 13, 2023, the date of the filing of the Amended
Complaint, which would place the events of May 13, 2021 outside the timely period. (Defs.’ Mot.
to Dismiss at 4). But it is settled law that an amended pleading relates back to an original pleading
when “the amendment asserts a claim or defense that arose out of the conduct, transaction, or
occurrence set out—or attempted to be set out—in the original pleading.” FED. R. CIV. PRO.
15(c)(1)(B). Plaintiff’s claims as outlined in the Amended Complaint, relating to damages from
dumping and demolition on the Coronet Village properties, clearly relate back to the original filing
outlining one instance of such conduct. (See Compl. at 2). Indeed, the only date provided in the
initial complaint is the discovery of damage to the properties on May 13, 2021. (Id.) Thus,
Plaintiff’s original filing date—April 18, 2023—is the relevant date, rendering claims arising on
May 13, 2021 timely filed
Second, Defendants contend that the court must ignore Plaintiff’s allegations arising from
May 13, 2021 because “none of the dates after April 6, 2021, are pleaded in Plaintiff’s Complaint.”
(Defs.’ Reply [29], 2). This is not literally true—Plaintiff’s original complaint explicitly describes a
demolition discovered on May 13, 2021. (See Compl. [1] at 2). But Defendants are correct that
Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint does not mention May 13, 2021, and that Plaintiff only mentions
this date again in her opposition brief. As explained above, however, the court may consider facts
introduced in an opposition brief “when evaluating the sufficiency of a complaint so long as they
are consistent with the allegations of the complaint.” Gutierrez, 111 F.3d at 1367 n.2 (citations
omitted). Here, Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint alleges that “on or about April 6, 2021 [sic] thru
present” Defendants caused damage to her property. (Am. Compl. ¶ 15) (emphasis added). The
more specific dates she identifies in her opposition brief, including the reference to May 13, 2021,
are consistent with the date range provided in the Amended Complaint.
Lastly, Defendants contend that Plaintiff’s reference to demolition to her property on
May 13, 2021 is inapposite because it refers to a property at 15411 Oakley Avenue, which Plaintiff
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does not own. (Defs.’ Reply at 2). Defendants refer to the language in Plaintiff’s handwritten
timeline where she details the following entry for May 13, 2021: “Plaintiff noticed new debris and
side wall collapsed on property next to 15411 Oakley Avenue, Harvey.” (Ex. E to Pl.’s Opp’n).
Defendants read this statement as describing damage not to the “property next to 15411 Oakley
Avenue, Harvey,” but rather to “15411 Oakley Avenue” itself. Reading the allegations in the light
most favorable to Plaintiff, however, as required at this stage, she has plausibly alleged damage
to a sidewall on a property “next to” 15411 Oakley Avenue—property that she owns—not to 15411
Oakley Avenue itself.

Furthermore, the entry is corroborated by descriptions in Plaintiff’s

memorandum in opposition (“[o]n or about May 13, 2021 . . . Plaintiff arrived at her property to
notice there had been new debris dumped, and the side wall had collapsed and there was debris
inside of my home”) and by the description in the original Complaint itself that state in no uncertain
terms that the damage discovered on May 13, 2021 was to Plaintiff’s own property. (See Pl.’s
Opp’n [23] at 2; Compl. at 2). Plaintiff has unambiguously alleged damage on May 13, 2021 to
her own property.
C.

Conspiracy Claims

As the court is dismissing Plaintiff’s claims under §§ 1985 and 1986 for reasons discussed
below, see infra p. 21, it does not determine the timeliness of such claims.
II.

Plausibility of Section 1983 Claims
Defendants have urged that Plaintiff’s factual allegations do not state a claim under

§ 1983. To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must plead facts sufficient to show that “the
plaintiff was deprived of a right secured by the Constitution or federal law, by a person acting
under color of law.” Thurman v. Village of Homewood, 446 F.3d 682, 687 (7th Cir. 2006). An
action is taken “under color of law” when it involves the misuse of a power “possessed by virtue
of state law and made possible only because the wrongdoer is clothed with the authority of state
law.” Walker v. Taylorville Corr. Ctr., 129 F.3d 410, 413 (7th Cir.1997) (quoting West v. Atkins,
487 U.S. 42, 49, (1988)). Claims under § 1983 can be brought both against individual municipal
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officers and against municipalities directly. See Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165-66
(1985). A municipality acts “under the color of law” in violation of § 1983 when “action pursuant
to official municipal policy of some nature cause[s] a constitutional tort.” Monell v. New York City
Dept. of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 691, (1978).
Plaintiff in this case has brought claims under § 1983 against the City of Harvey as well
as against the Mayor, Christopher Clark, in both his official and individual capacity. (See Am.
Compl. at 5-6). As Defendants rightly note, an action against a municipal officer acting in official
capacity is equivalent to—and thus duplicative of—to a claim against the municipality itself.
Graham, 473 U.S. at 165-166 (“Official-capacity suits, in contrast, “ ‘generally represent only
another way of pleading an action against an entity of which an officer is an agent.’ “) (quoting
Monell, 436 U.S. at 690 n. 55). In effect, Plaintiff has two theories of liability, a Monell claim
against the City of Harvey and an individual-capacity claim against Clark. A preliminary question
for any § 1983 claim is whether Plaintiff has actually suffered a constitutional injury. First Midwest
Bank Guardian of Est. of LaPorta v. City of Chicago, 988 F.3d 978 (7th Cir. 2021) (“[P]laintiff must
initially prove that he was deprived of a federal right. That’s the first step in every § 1983 claim,
including a claim against a municipality under Monell.”). Thus, the court considers whether
Plaintiff (1) has sufficiently alleged that she suffered a constitutional injury, (2) has an actionable
claim against the City under Monell, and (3) has an actionable claim against Clark in his individual
capacity.
A.

Deprivation of Federal Right

Plaintiff appears, albeit inconsistently, to ground her civil rights claims in takings (see Am.
Compl. ¶ 19) and procedural due process (see Am. Compl. ¶ 18) under the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment.
A takings claim arises when “the government has physically taken property for itself or
someone else—by whatever means—or has instead restricted a property owner’s ability to use
his own property.” Cedar Point Nursery v. Hassid, 594 U.S. 139, 149 (2021). “[T]he Court has
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long treated government-authorized physical invasions as takings requiring just compensation.”
Id. Plaintiff has alleged that Defendants caused or otherwise sanctioned City employees to
trespass and perform partial demolitions on her property. On its face, these allegations present
a facial claim of a physical taking in the form of a physical invasion of Plaintiff’s properties and
restriction on Plaintiff’s ability to use the partially demolished properties. Moreover, as the
Supreme Court explained in Knick v. Township of Scott, Plaintiff need not have sought
compensation under state law before pursuing a takings claim under § 1983. See 588 U.S. 180,
194 (2019) (overruling Williamson Cnty. Reg’l Plan. Comm’n v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City,
473 U.S. 172 (1985)).
Plaintiff’s allegations that Defendants commenced demolition of her property without
notice also gives rise to a procedural due process violation. It is self-evident that “the Constitution
requires some kind of a hearing before the State deprives a person of . . . property.” Zinermon v.
Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 127 (1990). Even where real property is deemed to be a nuisance or
hazardous, “[t]he protection that the federal Constitution offers to property owners is notice and
an opportunity for a hearing at which the structure’s condition can be ascertained based on factual
presentations.” Willow Way, LLC v. Village of Lyons, 83 F.4th 655, 656 (7th Cir. 2023); see also
14 A.L.R.2d 73 § 2 (“To destroy [a property] when it is not harmful in its nature or condition is to
deprive the owner of it without due process of law and to deny him the equal protection of the
laws.”) (collecting cases). Plaintiff alleges that City employees deprived her of her property and
violated her due process rights by dumping debris on her property and commencing the
demolition of her properties without prior notice or an opportunity to be heard. At this stage there
is no basis to conclude that the properties in Coronet Village were a public nuisance, or that the
City sought to demolish the properties on the basis that they were abandoned or hazardous. Cf.
Choate v. Lemmings, No. 07-CV-206-JHP, 2007 WL 3046499 (E.D. Okla. Oct. 17, 2007)
(dismissing § 1983 claim under 12(b)(6) where complaint alleged the City demolished building for
being a public hazard and complaint did not claim that property was not a hazard).
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In their Motion to Dismiss, Defendants do not appear to contest that, as alleged, Plaintiff
has suffered a deprivation of property. Rather, Defendants claim that Plaintiff’s claims do not rise
to the level of a due process violation because the Amended Complaint only alleges negligence.
(Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss at 5).

Defendants note entries in Plaintiff’s Original and Amended

Complaint using language that sounds in negligent, rather than deliberate, conduct.

(Id.).

Defendants are correct that negligent conduct cannot serve as the basis for a due process
violation, see Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 331 (1986), and that Plaintiff’s allegations at
times use language that sounds in negligence. (See e.g., Am. Comp. ¶ 16 (“City of Harvey and
Clark [sic] known or should have known that they did not have any rights to Plaintiff’s properties
or land.”). The more obvious reading of the Amended Complaint, however, is that the conduct
she is challenging was deliberate. (See, e.g., Am. Compl. ¶ 9 (“The defendant Christopher
Clark . . . deliberately violated Plaintiff’s constitutional rights to due process . . . .”) (“Defendants
caused Plaintiff to be injured by demolishing her estate . . . while knowing that the properties did
not belong to the City . . . .”), ¶ 19 (“Defendants vandalized and destroyed for the purpose in
furtherance of the conspiracy . . . to deprive Plaintiff of the value of her property . . . .”). This
language suggests that the alleged conduct was deliberate and purposeful. Indeed, it is hard to
conceive of dumping and demolition as being accidental or negligent (as opposed to purposeful)
acts.
Defendants have further argued that no due process violation can be claimed here
because Plaintiff has not alleged that the state failed to provide an adequate post-deprivation
remedy. (Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss at 10). Indeed, it is settled law under the Supreme Court’s
decision in Parratt v. Taylor that a Plaintiff cannot claim a deprivation of property under § 1983 for
a “random and unauthorized act by a state employee” unless there is a showing of the absence
of a “meaningful postdeprivation” remedy. 451 U.S. 527, 541 (1981), overruled on other grounds
Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986); see also Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 533 (1984)
(extending Parratt to intentional deprivations of property by state employees).
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As a preliminary matter, Parratt does not apply to claims brought under Monell against
municipalities directly, so this argument would not eliminate Plaintiff’s claims against the City.
Wilson v. Town of Clayton, 839 F.2d 375, 380 (7th Cir. 1988) (“[A] complaint asserting municipal
liability under Monell by definition states a claim to which Parratt is inapposite.”).

Thus,

Defendants’ argument under Parratt could apply only to Plaintiff’s claims against Clark acting in
his personal capacity. But her allegations are not consistent with a theory that demolition of her
property was the product of a whim of a city official. A fair reading is that Plaintiff has alleged a
deliberate plan by the Mayor and the City to unlawfully damage her property, evidently with the
goal of redevelopment. In Luster v. Village of Ashmore, the Seventh Circuit considered a similar
allegation that a defendant village, “as part of its plan to establish a municipal park, deliberately
deprived [plaintiff] of his property interest and attempted to remove him without prior notice and
an opportunity to be heard.” 76 F.4th 535, 537-38 (7th Cir. 2023). There, the court reasoned that
Parratt did not apply because “[p]re-deprivation notice and hearings are not impractical, and
therefore fall outside the narrow Parratt exception, for deliberate, planned deprivations of
property.” Id. Because, as alleged, Defendants engaged in a deliberate, planned deprivation
rather than a random act, the court finds Luster applicable and concludes that Plaintiff was not
required to plead that state post-deprivation procedures were inadequate.
B.

Monell Claims Against City of Harvey

To succeed on a Monell claim against a municipality for causing the deprivation of federal
rights, “a plaintiff must ultimately prove three elements: (1) an action pursuant to a municipal
policy; (2) culpability, meaning that policymakers were deliberately indifferent to a known risk that
the policy would lead to constitutional violations, and (3) causation, meaning the municipal action
was the ‘moving force’ behind the constitutional injury.” Hall v. City of Chicago, 953 F.3d 945, 950
(7th Cir. 2020) (quoting Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 404 (1997)); see also
Glisson v. Indiana Department of Corrections, 849 F.3d 372, 379 (7th Cir. 2017). To establish
that an action is taken pursuant to a municipal policy under the first element, Plaintiff must be able
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to identify either “(1) an express policy that causes a constitutional deprivation when enforced; (2)
a widespread practice that is so permanent and well-settled that it constitutes a custom or
practice; or (3) an allegation that the constitutional injury was caused by a person with final
policymaking authority.” Spiegel v. McClintic, 916 F.3d 611, 617 (7th Cir. 2019) (quotation marks
omitted); see also Thomas v. Cook County Sheriff’s Dep’t, 604 F.3d 293, 303 (7th Cir. 2010)
(citing Monell, 436 U.S. at 690).
Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s Monell claim fails at the first element. (Defs.’ Mot. to
Dismiss at 7-8). As they correctly observe, Plaintiff does not explain the legal grounds of her
Monell claim beyond summarily asserting that her injury was the result of an ambiguous “custom
and practice” to avoid providing her with just compensation (Am. Compl. ¶ 11), and that Mayor
Clark was the City’s “final policy maker.” (Id. ¶ 10). Defendants contend that these allegations
alone are insufficient to serve as the basis for a Monell claim, even under the 12(b)(6) standard.
The court need not split hairs at this stage of the litigation, however, as to whether Plaintiff
has precisely pleaded one specific theory (of the first element) of Monell liability. See Alioto v.
Town of Lisbon, 651 F.3d 715, 721 (7th Cir. 2011) (“[W]e have stated repeatedly (and frequently)
that a complaint need not plead legal theories, which can be learned during discovery.”). “It is
factual allegations, not legal theories, that must be pleaded in a complaint.”

Whitaker v.

Milwaukee County, 772 F.3d 802, 808 (7th Cir. 2014). Even if it is not fully clear from Plaintiff’s
complaint formalistically which Monell theory her claims fit into, her factual allegations cannot be
read to suggest anything other than an “official policy”—of some sort—caused her constitutional
injuries. See Monell, 436 U.S. at 691. Plaintiff has alleged that the actions depriving her of her
property were taken as part of a deliberate scheme by the City and the Mayor to circumvent
eminent domain procedures and redevelop the Coronet Village area without compensating or
notifying property owners. (See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 9, 19; see also Pl’s Opp’n at 11). Reading her
pro se allegations liberally and assuming their truth, one of the following inferences must follow:
(1) Mayor Clark was acting as a final policymaker for the City in executing the City’s
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redevelopment plan in a manner violating Plaintiff’s rights; (2) the City Council as final policymaker
ratified Mayor Clark’s actions by failing to cease the demolition despite Plaintiff’s repeated
appeals, or (3) the City adopted the plan to circumvent eminent domain as a matter of official
policy. Each of these conclusions would give rise to Monell liability under a final policymaker,
ratification, or official policy theory, respectively, and Defendants have not proffered a plausible
alternative reading.

At the very least, Plaintiff has pleaded a “series of acts violative of

constitutional rights” that “raise an inference of municipal policy.” Powe v. City of Chicago, 664
F.2d 639, 651 (7th Cir. 1981). 5 Such an inference is sufficient to get Plaintiff past the pleading
stage.
That leaves the remaining elements of Monell liability—culpability and causation. For a
municipality to be “culpable” of a violation of constitutional rights, it must be shown that the
policymakers “were deliberately indifferent to a known risk that the policy would lead to
constitutional violations.” Hall, 953 F.3d at 950. As discussed above, Plaintiff’s pleadings can
only be read to allege a deliberate deprivation of her rights. See supra p. 16. Whether this
deliberate deprivation is ultimately attributable to Mayor Clark acting as a final policymaker, or to
the City Council in adopting a policy to circumvent eminent domain, Plaintiff has sufficiently
claimed that her injury was not the result of merely negligent or unwitting conduct. Causation is
similarly well-established by Plaintiff’s pleadings, as she has claimed that the trespass and

Defendants cite a smattering of cases in which courts have found that plaintiffs
failed to sufficiently plead final policymaker liability under Monell. (See Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss at
9-10). Without delving into the facts of each case, the key distinction between Plaintiff’s
allegations and the claims in Defendants’ cited cases is that Plaintiff’s allegations do not describe
isolated incidences of a wrongful termination, arrest, or officer misconduct—she alleges a series
of conduct violating her rights pursuant to municipal redevelopment plan that was carried out over
years. With claims involving isolated incidences of officer misconduct, there is a natural concern
that plaintiffs are merely attempting to hold municipalities liable under a respondeat superior
theory disallowed under Monell. See Strauss v. City of Chicago, 760 F.2d 765, 770 (7th Cir. 1985)
(“[A] municipality can be held liable only for its regular procedures, not for the isolated independent
tort of an individual employee . . . .”). In contrast, a plaintiff who alleges “a pattern or series of
acts violative of constitutional rights will in many cases raise an inference of municipal policy.”
Powe, F.2d at 651. Plaintiff’s allegations fit into this latter category.
5

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demolition of her property was a direct result of Defendants’ authorizing City employees to do so.
(See Am. Compl. ¶ 15). The alleged policy adopted by the Mayor and City was clearly the “moving
force” behind Plaintiff’s injury. Further discovery is sure to shed light on whether Plaintiff can in
fact demonstrate that the City policymakers were aware of her property interest in the Coronet
Village properties, and may indeed show, as Defendants contend, that the City was merely
negligent in believing that Plaintiff’s properties were “abandoned.” For now, however, Defendants
motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s Monell claims is denied.
C.

Claim Against Clark in Individual Capacity

A § 1983 claim against a municipal officer in his personal capacity is subject to fewer
elements than a claim against the municipality itself. See Graham, 473 U.S. at 166 (“[T]o establish
personal liability in a § 1983 action, it is enough to show that the official, acting under color of
state law, caused the deprivation of a federal right . . . . More is required in an official-capacity
action.”). To recover against an individual for the deprivation of a constitutional right, a plaintiff
must show that the individual is “personally responsible” for the deprivation. Childress v. Walker,
787 F.3d 433, 439 (7th Cir. 2015). An individual is personally responsible for a constitutional
deprivation if they “act[ ] or fail[ ] to act with a deliberate or reckless disregard of plaintiff’s
constitutional rights” or “if the conduct causing the constitutional deprivation occurs at her direction
or with her knowledge or consent.” Smith v. Rowe, 761 F.2d 360, 369 (7th Cir. 1985). Thus, even
if an official does not personally carry out an offending event, he may be liable under § 1983 if he
“know[s] about the conduct and facilitate[s] it, condone[s] it, or turn[s] a blind eye.” Gentry v.
Duckworth, 65 F.3d 555, 561 (7th Cir. 1995) (quoting Jones v. City of Chicago, 856 F.2d 985, 992
(7th Cir. 1988)).
Here, Plaintiff has pleaded enough facts to create a plausible claim that the alleged
demolition and dumping of debris on her property occurred under the knowledge, condonation,
and facilitation of Mayor Clark. Plaintiff has claimed that Mayor Clark had personal knowledge
that the Coronet Village properties belonged to Plaintiff, as he had sat in her dining room at some
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point prior to the demolition (Am. Compl. ¶ 17) and, knowing that she claimed ownership to the
relevant properties, “caused employees to illegally trespass onto Plaintiff’s property and illegally
dump debris and . . . causing demolition.” (Id. ¶ 15). The Amended Complaint further claims that
Mayor Clark “deliberately violated Plaintiff’s constitutional rights to due process by depriving her
of her property.” (Id. ¶ 8). Indeed, it was Mayor Clark, Plaintiff asserts, who filed the Resolution
with the County Recorder in the first place, just before the dumping and demolition began. (Pl’s
Opp’n at 5).
Plaintiff has pleaded facts that provide a plausible basis for finding that Mayor Clark was
aware that the Coronet Village properties belonged to Plaintiff, that he caused City employees to
trespass and commence demolition on the properties, and that he either facilitated this continuing
demolition or turned a blind eye to the conduct. The motion to dismiss claims against Mayor Clark
is denied.
III.

Section 1985 and Section 1986 Claims
To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1985 for a conspiracy to deprive a plaintiff of her

constitutional rights, a plaintiff must allege “(1) a conspiracy; (2) for the purpose of depriving,
either directly or indirectly, any person or class of persons of the equal protection of the laws or
of equal privileges and immunities under the laws; and (3) an act in furtherance of the conspiracy;
(4) whereby a person is either injured in his person or property or deprived of any right or privilege
of a citizen of the United States.” Roach v. City of Evansville, 111 F.3d 544, 547 (7th Cir. 1997)
(citations omitted). As Defendants observe, to meet the second element of a § 1985 claim, the
claim “must be predicated on ‘some racial, or perhaps otherwise class-based, invidiously
discriminatory animus behind the conspirators’ actions.’ “ Id. (quoting Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403
U.S. 88, 102 (1971)).
Here, Plaintiff has not attempted to plead that she is part of a protected class, or that the
conspiracy to deprive her property was based on racial or class-based animus. Absent such
allegations, the claim under § 1985 must be dismissed without prejudice. Because a finding of a
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§ 1985 conspiracy is a prerequisite to finding of a § 1986 claim, see Williams v. St. Joseph Hosp.,
629 F.2d 448, 452 (7th Cir. 1980), Plaintiff’s § 1986 claim is also dismissed without prejudice.
IV.

State Law Claims
Defendants seek to dismiss Plaintiff’s state law conversion claim (Count III) as duplicative

of Plaintiff’s civil rights claims. (Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss at 12). Defendants argue that because the
conversion claim is based on the same alleged deprivation, the Count must be dismissed. (Id.)
Defendants further argue that state law conversion claims cannot serve as a basis for a civil rights
action. (Id.)
The court reads Counts III and IV differently. As the titles of the Counts (Conversion and
Trespass to Land) reflect, these are state law claims—not civil rights actions—that the Plaintiff
has brought under this court’s supplemental jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367. (See Pl.’s
Opp’n at 7-8 (stating that state claims are being brought under “pendent” jurisdiction, which was
codified as supplemental jurisdiction in § 1367)). As such, the fact that they are based on the
same factual predicate as the Plaintiff’s civil rights claims is precisely what gives this court
jurisdiction to hear the claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367. Barrow v. Blouin, cited by Defendants, is
inapplicable here. In Barrow, the plaintiff brought two claims under the Fourth Amendment—
unreasonable seizure and false arrest—against a police officer, arising from the same arrest. 38
F. Supp. 3d. 916, 919 (N.D. Ill. 2014). Finding that the two Fourth Amendment claims “involve[d]
the same operative facts and same injury, and that require proof of essentially the same elements”
and because “a Fourth Amendment false arrest claim, as opposed to a Fourth Amendment
unreasonable seizure claim, is the appropriate claim for [plaintiff] to assert,” the court dismissed
the unreasonable seizure claim as duplicative. Id. at 920. In contrast, Plaintiff’s state law claims
do not require proof of “essentially the same elements” as her federal civil rights claims, as her
claims for conversion and trespass do not require any proof of acting “under color of law” or that

22

action was taken pursuant to an official policy or custom. 6 Indeed, federal courts routinely
entertain state law claims arising from the same facts as federal civil rights claims, under
supplemental jurisdiction. See, e.g., Gates v. Towery, 456 F. Supp. 2d 953 (N.D. Ill. 2006), aff’d
sub nom. Gates v. City of Chicago, 623 F.3d 389 (7th Cir. 2010) (allowing plaintiffs to proceed
with claims under due process and state law conversion and replevin), Armstrong v. City of
Calumet City, 22-CV-03462, 2022 WL 17404489 at *3 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 2, 2022) (finding plaintiff
stated a claim under both § 1983 and state law conversion and trespass); see also Kimbrough v.
O’Neil, 523 F.2d 1057, 1059 (7th Cir. 1975), on reh’g, 545 F.2d 1059 (7th Cir. 1976) (finding that
trial court abused discretion by declining to exercise pendent jurisdiction over state law conversion
claim arising from same facts as § 1983 claim). Defendants’ motion to dismiss the state law
claims, on these grounds, is denied.
CONCLUSION
The motion to dismiss [12] is granted in part and denied in part. Plaintiff’s claims arising
from Defendant’s conduct occurring on April 6, 2021 and April 15, 2021, are barred by the statute
of limitations; those claims are dismissed with prejudice. Her claims under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1985
and 1986 are dismissed without prejudice. Plaintiff’s claims against Christopher Clark in his
official capacity are dismissed as redundant.

Her claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against

Christopher Clark in his personal capacity for the actions occurring on or after May 13, 2021, and
her Monell claim against the City of Harvey survive this motion, as do her state law claims in
Counts III and IV.

ENTER:

Dated: September 24, 2024

_________________________________________
REBECCA R. PALLMEYER
United States District Judge

See Dial v. City of O’Fallon, 81 Ill. 2d 548, 553-54, 411 N.E.2d 217, 220 (1980)
(describing elements of trespass to land under Illinois law), Weisberger v. Weisberger, 2011
IL App (1st) 101557, ¶ 45, 954 N.E.2d 282, 289 (2011) (describing elements of conversion under
Illinois law).
6

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