Johansson v. O'Malley
Filing
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MEMORANDUM Opinion and Order: Signed by the Honorable M. David Weisman on 10/24/2024. Mailed notice (ao, )
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION
SEAN ERIK J.,
Plaintiff,
v.
MARTIN O’MALLEY,
Commissioner of Social Security,
Defendant.
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No. 24 C 0061
Magistrate Judge M. David Weisman
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Sean Erik J. appeals the Commissioner’s decision denying his application for Social
Security benefits. For the reasons set forth below, the Court affirms the Commissioner’s decision.
Background
On November 18, 2020, plaintiff applied for benefits, alleging a disability onset date of
November 18, 2020. (R. 87-88.) His application was denied initially, on reconsideration, and after
a hearing. (R. 17-32, 87-115.) The Appeals Council denied review (R. 1-4), leaving the ALJ’s
decision as the final decision of the Commissioner reviewable by this Court pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
§ 405(g). See Villano v. Astrue, 556 F.3d 558, 561-62 (7th Cir. 2009).
Discussion
The Court reviews the ALJ’s decision deferentially, affirming if it is supported by
“[s]ubstantial evidence,” i.e., “‘such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion.’” Gedatus v. Saul, 994 F.3d 893, 900 (7th Cir. 2021) (quoting
Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971)). “[W]hatever the meaning of ‘substantial’ in
other contexts, the threshold for such evidentiary sufficiency is not high.” Biestek v. Berryhill, 587
U.S. 97, 102-03 (2019).
Under the Social Security Act, disability is defined as the “inability to engage in any
substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment
which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a
continuous period of not less than 12 months.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). The regulations prescribe
a five-part, sequential test for determining whether a claimant is disabled. See 20 C.F.R. §§
404.1520(a), 416.920(a). The Commissioner must consider whether: (1) the claimant has
performed any substantial gainful activity during the period for which he claims disability; (2) the
claimant has a severe impairment or combination of impairments; (3) the claimant’s impairment
meets or equals any listed impairment; (4) the claimant retains the residual functional capacity
(“RFC”) to perform his past relevant work; and (5) the claimant is able to perform any other work
existing in significant numbers in the national economy. Id.; see Zurawski v. Halter, 245 F.3d 881,
885 (7th Cir. 2001).
At step one, the ALJ found that plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful activity
since the application date. (R. 19.) At step two, the ALJ found that plaintiff has the severe
impairments of degenerative disc disease of the lumbar spine, generalized anxiety disorder, opioid
use disorder, benzodiazepine dependence, delusional disorder, and chronic pain disorder. (R. 20.)
At step three, the ALJ found that plaintiff does not have an impairment or combination of
impairments that meets or equals a listed impairment. (Id.) At step four, the ALJ found that plaintiff
cannot perform any past relevant work but has the RFC to perform light work with certain
exceptions. (R. 22, 30.) At step five, the ALJ found that, jobs exist in significant numbers in the
national economy that plaintiff can perform, and thus he is not disabled. (R. 31-32.)
Plaintiff contends that “it is virtually impossible to discern” how the ALJ arrived at the
conclusion that he is only moderately limited in interacting with others. (ECF 14 at 10.) The Court
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disagrees. The ALJ cited the evidence on which she relied and explained how she weighed it to
reach her conclusion:
. . . . On April 10, 2022, Dr. Mohney concluded that the claimant has mild
limitation interacting with others (Exhibit 3A). On August 27, 2022, Dr. GalassiHudspeth also concluded that the claimant has mild limitation interacting with
others (Exhibit 5A). This assessment is partially persuasive because the claimant
indicated that he is generally able to get along with others although he has difficulty
with authority (Exhibit 4E). Additionally, the numerous evaluations of the claimant
indicated that he exhibits cooperative behavior and normal mood and affect
(Exhibits 7F/106; 9F/9; 10F/64; 11F/123; 12F/13; 13F/5, 47; 15F/141; 16F/10;
31F/4, 10; 32F/6). However, the claimant has also been verbally abusive and
threatening when he has overused his medication and is requesting early medication
refills (Exhibits 5F/2, 22, 28; 7F/210). Therefore, based upon the record as a whole,
the claimant will be considered to have moderate limitations interacting with others.
(R. 21.) Plaintiff’s contention that the ALJ’s assessment “makes little sense” (ECF 14 at 10) is just
an invitation for the Court to reweigh the evidence, which we cannot do. See Gedatus, 994 F.3d at
900 (“We will not reweigh the evidence, resolve debatable evidentiary conflicts, determine
credibility, or substitute our judgment for the ALJ’s determination so long as substantial evidence
supports it.”).
The same is true for plaintiff’s challenge to the moderate limitation in concentrating,
persisting, or maintaining pace that the ALJ found him to have:
With regard to concentrating, persisting or maintaining pace, the claimant has a
moderate limitation. On April 10, 2022, Dr. Mohney concluded that the claimant
has moderate limitation with regard to concentrating, persisting or maintaining pace
(Exhibit 3A). On August 27, 2022, Dr. Galassi-Hudspeth also concluded that the
claimant has moderate limitation with regard to concentrating, persisting, or
maintaining pace (Exhibit 5A). These assessments are persuasive because they are
consistent with the record as a whole. The claimant indicated in his function report
that he is able to watch television, play video games, and complete tasks (Exhibit
4E). Additionally, the numerous evaluations of the claimant do not mention
distractibility and indicate normal attention and concentration and intact memory
(Exhibits 12F/14; 31F/10; 32F/6). Therefore, the claimant does not exhibit marked
limitation with regard to concentrating, persisting, or maintaining pace.
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(R. 21.) Plaintiff argues that, in making this determination, the ALJ should have credited his
testimony about his limited abilities and should have also considered an October 2021 psychiatric
evaluation in which plaintiff was noted to have a constricted affect and was diagnosed with
paranoia and anxiety. (See R. 3969-70.) The former argument is a request that we reweigh the
evidence, which as noted above, we cannot do. See Gedatus, 994 F.3d at 900. The latter argument
assumes that plaintiff’s diagnoses and affect negatively impact his ability to concentrate, persist,
and maintain pace. But the psychiatric evaluation does not say that and plaintiff points to no
evidence that does. Absent such evidence, the ALJ’s failure to address this evaluation in analyzing
plaintiff’s ability to concentrate, persist, and maintain pace is not error.
Plaintiff also argues that the ALJ discounted the severity of his psychiatric symptoms. But
the ALJ thoroughly addressed plaintiff’s mental health records, including those from his four-day
psychiatric hospitalization in August 2021, in which plaintiff reported having suicidal ideations,
olfactory hallucinations, and delusions of a “meth addict living in [his] attic and under [his] bed”
(R. 24-25; see R. 3694-95.) However, she also said the record showed that plaintiff improved
significantly after the hospitalization. (R. 25-26 (citing R. 3696 (8/30/21 hospital discharge notes
stating that plaintiff denied having suicidal ideations, his delusional ideation was improving, he
had fair insight and judgment and good mood and affect), R. 3969 (10/14/21 notes of psychiatric
evaluation by Dr. Segalite saying, plaintiff feels better, keeps busy, denies suicidal ideation, has
linear thought process, and “OK” mood)).) Moreover, the ALJ noted that despite the reported
severity of his symptoms, plaintiff did not seek “significant psychiatric treatment or counseling.”
(R. 24.) Thus, the record refutes plaintiff’s contention that the ALJ ignored his psychiatric
symptoms.
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Plaintiff also contends that the ALJ wrongly concluded that his mental impairments “had
little to no impact on his work-related functioning.” (ECF 14 at 12.) But the RFC contains nonexertional limitations, including limitations to “simple, direct, and concrete” interaction with
supervisors and “brief and superficial interaction with the public.” (R. 22.) Moreover, plaintiff
does not posit limitations that he contends should have been included in the RFC. Rather, he
asserts—without citing any evidence—that “it is difficult to imagine that he would be capable of
sustaining even the simplest tasks in a full-time work environment.” (ECF 14 at 12.) Plaintiff’s
unsupported supposition is not a basis for disturbing the RFC.
Plaintiff’s next argument is that the ALJ failed to perform a DAA [drug addiction or
alcoholism] analysis. Under the regulations, if an ALJ determines that a claimant has a medically
determinable impairment of DAA and that it together with his other impairments renders him
disabled, then the ALJ must determine whether the claimant would continue to be disabled if he
stopped using drugs or alcohol; “that is, whether DAA is ‘material’ to the finding that the claimant
is disabled. S.S.R. 13-2p, 2013 WL 621536, at *2 (S.S.A. Feb. 20, 2013). It is true that the ALJ
did not perform a DAA analysis, but her failure to do so was not error. As the regulation states, a
DAA analysis is required only if the ALJ determines that a claimant’s DAA impairment together
with his other impairments renders him disabled. See id. In this case, the ALJ found plaintiff to
have a DAA impairment (R. 20) but she did not find that it together with his other impairments
rendered him disabled. (R. 20-31.) Thus, no DAA analysis was required.
Plaintiff further argues that the ALJ improperly discounted his physical impairments and
allegations of physical pain. The ALJ noted plaintiff’s testimony that he spends most of the day in
bed, has back pain, uses a cane to walk, frequently uses the bathroom because of IBS, and cannot
stand for long periods of time due to venous insufficiency. (R. 23.) She also noted, however, that
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plaintiff said he can attend to his personal needs, do laundry, clean his room, drive, walk his dog,
shop in stores, play video games, and get along with peers. (Id.) Further, the ALJ said plaintiff’s
medical records do not indicate that he has difficulty with prolonged standing or walking, uses a
cane, needs to use the bathroom frequently, has any significant lumbar spine disease,
radiculopathy, or tenderness of the lumbar or cervical spine, or trouble ambulating. (R. 23-28.) The
ALJ also said the records showed that plaintiff had a procedure to address his vein problems and
repeatedly asked for opioids and benzodiazepines when he sought medical treatment. (Id.) Thus,
the ALJ did not factor in the effects his physical impairments have on his ability to sustain fulltime work because she did not find that there were any. (R. 23 -24 (summarizing plaintiff’s alleged
physical limitations and treatment, noting that the plaintiff has not required follow-up treatments
due to physical improvement, and then outlining the record to support her conclusion that “the
extensive medical records show a pattern of drug-seeking behavior); R. 28 (“[A]s of October 2022,
the claimant continued to be resistant to being weaned off opioids and has not followed up with
counseling to get help to get off opioids. Nonetheless, throughout 2022, the claimant consistently
exhibited normal physical examinations, intact coordination, good strength in all the extremities,
no significant tenderness of the lumbar spine, and a normal gait”)).
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Conclusion
For the reasons set forth above, the Court denies plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment
[14], grants the Commissioner’s motion for summary judgment [17], affirms the Commissioner’s
decision, and terminates this case.
SO ORDERED.
ENTERED: October 24, 2024
M. David Weisman
United States Magistrate Judge
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