Smith v. O'Malley
Filing
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ENTER MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER. Signed by the Honorable Daniel P. McLaughlin on 1/28/2025: Mailed notice (maf)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION
WILLIE S., 1
Plaintiff,
v.
MICHELLE KING, Acting
Commissioner of Social Security, 2
Defendant.
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No. 24 C 222
Magistrate Judge
Daniel P. McLaughlin
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
This action was brought under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) to review the final decision
of the Commissioner of Social Security denying Plaintiff Willie S.’s claim for
Disability Insurance Benefits (“DIB”). The parties have consented to the jurisdiction
of the United States Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). For the
reasons that follow, Plaintiff’s motion to reverse the Commissioner’s decision [12] is
denied, and the Commissioner’s cross-motion for summary judgment [19] is
granted.
In accordance with Internal Operating Procedure 22 – Privacy in Social Security
Opinions, the Court refers to Plaintiff only by his first name and the first initial of his last
name.
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Michelle King has been substituted for her predecessor pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 25(d).
2
BACKGROUND
I.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On June 14, 2021, Plaintiff filed a claim for DIB, alleging disability since July
1, 2000. The claim was denied initially and upon reconsideration, after which
Plaintiff timely requested a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”). A
telephonic hearing was held on June 22, 2023, and all participants attended the
hearing by telephone. Plaintiff appeared and testified at the hearing and was
represented by counsel. A vocational expert (“VE”) also testified. Plaintiff amended
his alleged onset date to July 1, 2020.
On August 21, 2023, the ALJ denied Plaintiff’s claim for benefits, finding him
not disabled under the Social Security Act. The Social Security Administration
Appeals Council then denied Plaintiff’s request for review, leaving the ALJ’s
decision as the final decision of the Commissioner and, therefore, reviewable by the
District Court under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). See Haynes v. Barnhart, 416 F.3d 621, 626
(7th Cir. 2005).
II.
ALJ DECISION
Plaintiff’s claim was analyzed in accordance with the five-step sequential
evaluation process established under the Social Security Act. See 20 C.F.R. §
404.1520(a)(4). The ALJ found at step one that Plaintiff had not engaged in
substantial gainful activity since his amended alleged onset date of July 1, 2020. At
step two, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff had the following severe impairments:
chronic systolic congestive heart failure (CHF) status-post aortic valve replacement;
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obesity; and possible hypersensitivity pneumonitis with old lung scarring. The ALJ
concluded at step three that Plaintiff’s impairments, alone or in combination, do not
meet or medically equal any listed impairments.
Before step four, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff retained the residual
functional capacity (“RFC”) to perform light work with the following additional
limitations: can occasionally stoop, kneel, crouch, crawl, and climb ramps and
stairs, but can never climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds; can have no work around
unprotected heights or unprotected dangerous moving machinery; and can have no
concentrated exposure to dusts, fumes, gases, poor ventilation, extreme cold,
extreme heat, humidity, or vibrations such as vibrating tools or work surfaces. At
step four, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff would be unable to perform his past
relevant work as a conveyor belt monitor, picker, or material handler. However, at
step five, based upon the VE’s testimony and Plaintiff’s age, education, work
experience, and RFC, the ALJ found that Plaintiff can perform jobs existing in
significant numbers in the national economy, leading to a finding that he is not
disabled under the Social Security Act.
DISCUSSION
I.
ALJ LEGAL STANDARD
Under the Social Security Act, a person is disabled if he has an “inability to
engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable
physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which
has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than twelve
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months.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(a). In order to determine whether a plaintiff is
disabled, the ALJ considers the following five questions in order: (1) Is the plaintiff
presently unemployed? (2) Does the plaintiff have a severe impairment? (3) Does
the impairment meet or medically equal one of a list of specific impairments
enumerated in the regulations? (4) Is the plaintiff unable to perform his former
occupation? and (5) Is the plaintiff unable to perform any other work? 20 C.F.R. §
416.920(a)(4).
An affirmative answer at either step three or step five leads to a finding that
the plaintiff is disabled. Young v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 957 F.2d 386,
389 (7th Cir. 1992). A negative answer at any step, other than at step three,
precludes a finding of disability. Id. The plaintiff bears the burden of proof at steps
one to four. Id. Once the plaintiff shows an inability to perform past work, the
burden then shifts to the Commissioner to show the plaintiff’s ability to engage in
other work existing in significant numbers in the national economy. Id.
II.
JUDICIAL REVIEW
Section 405(g) provides in relevant part that “[t]he findings of the
Commissioner of Social Security as to any fact, if supported by substantial evidence,
shall be conclusive.” 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Judicial review of the ALJ’s decision is thus
limited to determining whether the ALJ’s findings are supported by substantial
evidence or based upon legal error. Clifford v. Apfel, 227 F.3d 863, 869 (7th Cir.
2000); Stevenson v. Chater, 105 F.3d 1151, 1153 (7th Cir. 1997). Substantial
evidence is “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate
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to support a conclusion.” Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971); Skinner v.
Astrue, 478 F.3d 836, 841 (7th Cir. 2007). An ALJ’s decision should be affirmed even
in the absence of overwhelming evidence in support: “whatever the meaning of
‘substantial’ in other contexts, the threshold for such evidentiary sufficiency is not
high. Substantial evidence is . . . ‘more than a mere scintilla.’ . . . It means – and
means only – ‘such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion.’” Biestek v. Berryhill, 139 S. Ct. 1148, 1154, (2019)
(citations omitted).
The Seventh Circuit has made clear that ALJs are “subject to only the most
minimal of articulation requirements” and “need not address every piece or category
of evidence identified by a claimant, fully summarize the record, or cite support for
every proposition or chain of reasoning.” Warnell v. O’Malley, 97 F.4th 1050, 105354 (7th Cir. 2024) (citations omitted). All that is required is that “ALJs provide an
explanation for how the evidence leads to their conclusions that is sufficient to allow
. . . a reviewing court[] to assess the validity of the agency’s ultimate findings and
afford [the appellant] meaningful judicial review.” Id. at 1054 (citations and
internal quotations omitted). Where conflicting evidence would allow reasonable
minds to differ, the responsibility for determining whether a plaintiff is disabled
falls upon the Commissioner, not the court. See Herr v. Sullivan, 912 F.2d 178, 181
(7th Cir. 1990). This Court may not substitute its judgment for that of the
Commissioner by reevaluating facts, reweighing evidence, resolving conflicts in
evidence, or deciding questions of credibility. Skinner, 478 F.3d at 841; see also
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Elder v. Astrue, 529 F.3d 408, 413 (7th Cir. 2008) (holding that the ALJ’s decision
must be affirmed even if “‘reasonable minds could differ’” as long as “the decision is
adequately supported”) (citation omitted).
III.
ANALYSIS
In seeking to reverse the Commissioner’s decision, Plaintiff argues that an
updated medical expert review was necessary. More specifically, Plaintiff contends
that an updated medical expert review was required to determine “what restrictions
his lung impairment causes and whether it singly or in combination with his other
impairments meets or equals listing 3.02.” ([12] at 5.) Pertinent to that argument,
the ALJ assessed Listing 3.02 as follows in her decision:
Specifically, regarding Listing 3.02, upon pulmonary function testing
twice, in May and November 2022, his FEV1 was well above 1.60, his
FVC was well above 1.70, and DLCO was well above 11.5 each time.
There is no evidence in file that he had impairment of gas exchange to
meet the Listing requirement. Moreover, he did not require three
respiratory hospitalizations within a 12-month period of at least 30 days
apart with each hospitalization lasting at least 48 hours.
(R. 34 (citations omitted).)
The Court finds Plaintiff’s arguments concerning Listing 3.02 unavailing.
“[P]er the regulations, a simple statement that a claimant's impairments do not
medically equal a listing generally ‘constitutes sufficient articulation.’” Alejandrina
A. v. Kijakazi, No. 20-CV-4089, 2023 WL 2539239, at *9 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 16, 2023)
(citations omitted). Here, per the analysis quoted above, the ALJ met the minimal
articulation requirements in determining Listing 3.02 was not met or equaled.
Plaintiff contends that error occurred because the State agency consultants
“neglected to evaluate Plaintiff’s lung disease adequately” and “failed to consider
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whether [his] impairments meet or equal a listing.” ([21] at 3-4.) This argument
fails because ALJs – not medical experts – are “responsible for deciding the ultimate
legal question whether a listing is met or equaled.” Dawn M. v. O'Malley, No. 22 C
4424, 2024 WL 3580610, at *2 (N.D. Ill. July 16, 2024) (citation omitted). In
evaluating whether an individual’s impairment meets or medically equals a listing,
ALJs “at the hearings level may ask for and consider evidence from medical experts
(ME) about the individual's impairment(s), such as the nature and severity of the
impairment(s).” Jiri K. v. Kijakazi, No. 20 C 7621, 2022 WL 2704058, at *4 (N.D. Ill.
July 12, 2022) (citations omitted, emphasis in original). “And if an ALJ determines
that the evidence does not reasonably support a finding of medical equivalence, the
ALJ can find that the claimant does not equal the listing without obtaining
evidence from a medical expert.” Id. (citations omitted). In this case, the ALJ
reasonably determined that Listing 3.02 was not met or equaled, and she was not
required to obtain an updated medical expert review concerning the listing.
More generally, an ALJ must only seek an additional medical opinion if there
is potentially decisive evidence that postdates the State agency consultant’s opinion.
The pertinent question is whether the new information “changed the picture” to an
extent that the ALJ erred by continuing to rely on a medical opinion not based on
the entirety of the record. See Stage v. Colvin, 812 F.3d 1121, 1125 (7th Cir. 2016);
see also Massaglia v. Saul, 805 F. App’x 406, 410 (7th Cir. 2020) (“An ALJ may rely
on a reviewing physician’s assessment unless later evidence containing new,
significant medical diagnoses ‘changed the picture so much’ that it reasonably could
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have changed the reviewing physician’s opinion.”) (citation omitted). In this case,
Plaintiff points to certain test results from November 2022 concerning his lung
issues, specifically, a CT scan, a CTA scan, and a PFT. ([12] at 7.) However, these
results showed a mild lung condition and mild dependent changes at the lung base.
(R. 39.) Furthermore, the testing “returned improved results since testing six
months earlier.” (Id.) Under the circumstances, the Court finds that the additional
medical records Plaintiff points to did not “change the picture” to an extent that
would require an updated medical expert review.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the points of error raised by Plaintiff are not well
taken. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s motion to reverse the Commissioner’s decision [12] is
denied, and the Commissioner’s cross-motion for summary judgment [19] is
granted.
SO ORDERED.
ENTERED:
DATE:
________________________________
HON. DANIEL P. McLAUGHLIN
United States Magistrate Judge
January 28, 2025
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