Romero v. The Village of Alsip et al
Filing
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MOTION by Defendants Alsip Police Officer V. Gonzalez, Alsip Police Officer T. Jusino, The Village of Alsip for judgment on the Pleadings (Neyland, Lawrence)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION
Javier Romero,
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Plaintiff,
v.
The Village of Alsip, and Alsip
Police Officers T. Jusino, and
V. Gonzalez,
Defendants.
Case No. 24-CV-2175
DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR JUDMGENT ON THE PLEADINGS
Defendants Tyler Jusino, Vincent Gonzalez, and the Village of Alsip, by and through one
of their attorneys, Lance E. Neyland, request that this court enter judgment on the pleadings in
their favor and against Plaintiff Javier Romero pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c).
In support thereof, Defendants state as follows:
INTRODUCTION
On March 15, 2024, Plaintiff, Javier Romero, filed the instant complaint alleging that the
Defendants violated his rights under the Fourth Amendment and Illinois State law when they
stopped him, detained him, and handcuffed him on January 26, 2024. (Dkt. 1).
According to Plaintiff, he was legally in a parking lot when the Defendant officers seized
him by displaying their handguns, ordered him out of his vehicle and immediately handcuffed
him. (Dkt. 1, ¶¶ 7-10). Plaintiff claims that Defendants “used an unnecessary and unreasonable
amount of force” when handcuffing him. (Dkt. 1, ¶ 11). Plaintiff asserts that these actions
violated his rights under Illinois State Law and the Fourth Amendment because the Defendants
took these actions with “no legal cause.” (Dkt. 1, ¶ 12). As a result, Plaintiff brings claims
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pursuant to § 1983 for an unlawful seizure (Count I) and excessive force (Count II). Plaintiff also
brings Illinois State Law claims for False Arrest (Count III) and Indemnification (Count IV 1).
On May 10, 2024, Defendants answered the Complaint and asserted affirmative defenses.
(Dkt. 11). In their answer and affirmative defenses, Defendants assert, generally, that they
stopped and detained Plaintiff because his vehicle, wardrobe, and physical description matched
that of a suspect for whom the Defendants were searching based on a 9-1-1 call reporting that the
suspect had brandished a firearm at another person in the area where Plaintiff was located. (See
generally Dkt. 11). Defendants further assert that they did not use any force other than the
minimal force necessary to secure Plaintiff into handcuffs, and that they released Plaintiff from
their custody as soon as they became aware that Plaintiff was not the suspect in question. (Id.).
Based on the above information, Defendants denied Plaintiff’s allegations of wrongdoing and
asserted several affirmative defenses, including qualified immunity. (Dkt. 11).
A ruling on the issue of qualified immunity should be made early in the proceedings “so
that the costs and expenses of trial are avoided where the defense is dispositive.” Marshall v.
Fries, 2019 WL 4062549 *2 (N.D. Ill. 8/28/19) (citing Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 200-01
(2001)).
Defendants qualified immunity defense is dispositive to all of the issues in this case and
can be determined based on the pleadings and the documents referenced therein. As such, this
Court should grant judgment in favor of the Defendants on the pleadings.
LEGAL STANDARD
The court evaluates a Rule 12(c) motion under “the same standard as a Rule 12(b)(6)
motion.” McMillan v. Collection Prof’ls, Inc., 455 F.3d 754, 757 n. 1 (7th Cir. 2006). To
Plaintiff’s indemnification Count is labelled as an additional Count III in his complaint, but is more properly
labelled as Count IV.
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survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a complaint must contain “sufficient factual matter to state a
claim for relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
The defense of qualified immunity is a question of law to be decided by the Court.
Maltby v. Winston, 36 F.3d 548, 554 (7th Cir. 1994). “[Q]ualified immunity is an affirmative
defense, [and] the plaintiff has the burden of defeating it once defendants raise it.” Archer v.
Chisholm, 870 F.3d 603, 613 (7th Cir. 2017). “[T]he proper vehicle for dismissal based on an
affirmative defense is a Rule 12(c) motion for judgment on the pleadings.” Scott v. City of
Kewanee, 2014 WL 1302025, at *5 (C.D. Ill. 2014) (citing Carr v. Tillery, 591 F.3d 909, 912-13
(7th Cir. 2010) and McCready v. eBay, Inc., 453 F.3d 882, 892 n.2 (7th Cir. 2006)).
ARGUMENT
I.
Defendants are entitled to Qualified Immunity for Plaintiff’s Federal Claims
Qualified immunity “protects government officials from liability for civil damages
insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of
which a reasonable person would have known.” Pearson v. Callagan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009)
(internal quotations omitted).
“Qualified immunity balances two important interests—the need to hold public officials
accountable when they exercise power irresponsibly and the need to shield the officials from
harassment, distraction, and liability when they perform their duties reasonably.” Id. The
qualified immunity defense “provides ample room for mistaken judgments and protects all but
the plainly incompetent and those who knowingly violate the law.” Green v. Newport, 868 F.3d
629, 633 (7th Cir. 2017). An official is protected by qualified immunity unless the plaintiff shows
“(1) that the official violated a statutory or constitutional right, and (2) that the right was clearly
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established at the time of the challenged conduct. Kemp v. Liebel, 877 F.3d 346, 350-51 (7th Cir.
2017) (quoting Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 735 (2011)).
To defeat a qualified immunity defense, the burden is on the Plaintiff to demonstrate that
the alleged violation of his rights was “clearly established.” Kemp, 877 F.3d at 351. To be clearly
established, “the rights contours must be sufficiently clear that every reasonable official would
have understood what he is doing violates that right. Id. (internal quotations omitted). “The
crucial question is whether the official acted reasonably in the particular circumstances that he or
she faced.” Id.
The first step in the qualified immunity inquiry is to define the right allegedly violated
with “the appropriate level of specificity.” Id. “The Supreme Court has repeatedly told courts not
to define clearly established law at a high level of generality.” Id. (internal quotations and
citations omitted). And “the Seventh Circuit has long held that the test of immunity should be
whether the law was clear in relation to the specific facts confronting the public official when he
acted.” Id. (internal quotations and citations omitted). As applied here, Defendants are entitled to
qualified immunity for Plaintiff’s brings Fourth Amendment claims for unlawful seizure (Count
I) and excessive force (Count II).
A. Defendants did not violate any of Plaintiff’s clearly established Constitutional
rights when they stopped and detained him.
Count I of Plaintiff’s complaint alleges that the officers committed an unlawful seizure
“in violation of Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment rights.” (Dkt. 1, ¶ 23). Plaintiff alleges that the
seizure began when the officers “order[ed] Plaintiff out of his vehicle while displaying their
handguns” and then “immediately placed [Plaintiff] in handcuffs.” (Dkt. 1, ¶¶ 8, 10).
In answering, Defendants admitted, generally, that they displayed their firearms when
Plaintiff exited the vehicle and that they placed him into handcuffs. (Dkt. 11, ¶¶ 8, 10). In further
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answering, Defendants referred to 9-1-1 audio, surveillance video, and an incident report and
asserted that they detained Plaintiff because his vehicle, license plate, clothing, and physical
appearance matched that of an armed crime suspect for whom they were searching for in the
area. (See, Dkt. 11, Exh. A-D; and Dkt. 11, Affirmative Defenses ¶¶ 1-19).
Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity under these circumstances. While there is,
generally, a constitutional right to be free from being detained by the police without probable
cause, there is no clear case precedent that has held it is unconstitutional for police officers to
stop and detain a subject that the officers reasonably believe is a crime suspect while the officers
investigate whether or not the subject is the crime suspect for whom the officers in question are
searching. In fact, precedent specifically establishes the opposite.
A pretrial detention is a “seizure” under the Fourth Amendment and is justified only if
there is “probable cause” to believe that the detainee has committed a crime. Young v. City of
Chicago, 987 F.3d 641, 644 (7th Cir. 2021); Lewis v. City of Chicago, 914 F.3d 472, 477 (7th Cir.
2019) (citing Manuel v. City of Joliet (Manuel I), 137 S. Ct. 911, 918 (2017)).
“[P]robable cause is a common-sense inquiry requiring only a probability of criminal
activity; it exists whenever an officer or a court has enough information to warrant a prudent
person to believe criminal conduct has occurred.” Whitlock v. Brown, 596 F.3d 406, 411 (7th Cir.
2010) (citing Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 244 n.13 (1983)). This “is not a high bar.” District
of Columbia v. Wesby, 138 S. Ct. 577, 586 (2018). It is “assessed objectively” based on “the
conclusions that the arresting officer reasonably might have drawn from the information known
to him.” Holmes v. Village of Hoffman Estates, 511 F.3d 673, 679 (7th Cir. 2007).
Probable cause to arrest does not demand certainty, but, rather, deals in
probabilities. Abbott v. Sangamon Cnty., Ill., 705 F.3d 706, 714 (7th Cir. 2013) (citing Illinois v.
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Gates, 462 U.S. at 231). The probable cause inquiry is an objective one, because an officer's
“subjective state of mind and beliefs are irrelevant.” Id. (citing Whren v. United States, 517 U.S.
806, 813 (1996)). Thus, courts look to the officer's knowledge at the time of the arrest and
determine whether those facts and circumstances amount to probable cause from the standpoint
of an “objectively reasonable police officer.” Id. (quoting Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366,
371 (2003)). “[P]robable cause depends not on the facts as an omniscient observer would
perceive them, but on the facts as they would have appeared to a reasonable person in the
position of the arresting officer – seeing what he saw, hearing what he heard.” Carmichael v.
Village of Palatine, 605 F.3d 451, 457 (7th Cir. 2010) [emphasis added]. It is a “fluid concept
based on common-sense interpretations of reasonable police officers as to the totality of the
circumstances at the time of arrest.” United States v. Shields, 789 F.3d 733, 746 (7th Cir. 2015).
An officer has probable cause to arrest if, “at the time of the arrest, the ‘facts and
circumstances within the officer’s knowledge...are sufficient to warrant a prudent person, or one
of reasonable caution, in believing, in the circumstances shown, that the suspect has committed,
is committing, or is about to commit an offense.’” Wagner v. Washington County, 493 F.3d 833,
836 (7th Cir. 2007). Generally, probable cause can be based on a single witness, “unless the
officer has a reason to question the witness’ account.” Reynolds v. Jamison, 488 F.3d 756, 765
(7th Cir. 2007). Probable cause is a “‘practical, nontechnical conception that affords the best
compromise between the interests of individual liberty and effective law enforcement.” United
States v. Mounts, 248 F.3d 712, 715 (7th Cir. 2001) (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. at 231).
Existence of probable cause is an absolute defense to a claim for false arrest brought
pursuant to 42 U.S.C §1983. Stokes v. Board of Education of the City of Chicago, 599 F.3d 617,
622 (7th Cir. 2010).
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Here, the audio of the 9-1-1 call as well as the incident report attached to the Defendants’
answer and affirmative defenses establish that the officers were responding to a report of a
person brandishing a gun and threatening the 9-1-1 caller. (See Dkt. 11, Exhibit A and B).
Specifically, the report and audio establish that the officers were dispatched to this area with a
“quick description of a black Hyundai vehicle with an IL Registration of DP37505.” (Dkt. 11,
Exh. A and B). The driver of the vehicle “reportedly pointed a firearm at another driver” and
was “attempting to block the [caller’s car] in at the Speedway gas station located at the
intersection of 127th St and S. Pulaski Rd.” (Id.). Dispatch also informed the officers that the
suspect driver was a “male Hispanic wearing a black hoodie.” (Id.). Upon arrival to the
intersections of 127th St. and S. Pulaski Rd., the officers witnessed two cars, one being a “black
SUV” enter a gas station parking lot “at a high rate of speed.” (Dkt. 11, Exh. B). This initial
encounter is also captured on the video exhibits attached to Defendants’ answer. (Dkt. 11, Exh.
C at 6:53:30-6:54:00). The officers then “pulled into the parking lot to investigate further.” (Dkt.
11, Exh. B). At that point, the officers watched the SUV pull into a parking spot and observed “a
partial IL Registration of DP.” (Id.). The officers further observed that the driver of the SUV
“was a male Hispanic, wearing a black hoodie and a black coat.” (Id.). 2 Once again, this initial
encounter is captured on the video exhibit. (Dkt. 11, Exh. D at 6:54:01-6:54:05). It’s at that point
that the officers drew weapons and ordered Plaintiff to raise his hands, to which Plaintiff
complied. As is discussed in more detail infra, the officers then handcuffed Plaintiff while they
ran his license plate. (Dkt. 11, Exh. D at 6:54:06-6:55:00). Once the plate came back and the
officers realized that they had detained the wrong person, Plaintiff was released. (Dkt. 11, Exh.
Defendants recognize that an incident report is not sworn testimony. However, Plaintiff cannot reasonably dispute
that he is an Hispanic male, that he was wearing a dark hoodie and coat, and that he was driving an SUV with a
partial license plate of DP at the time of this incident.
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B and D). Plaintiff was never formally placed under arrest or charged with any offense, and was
never placed in a police car. (Dkt. 11, Exh. D at 6:55:00-7:08:00).
These actions do not constitute an unreasonable seizure—otherwise known as false
arrest—as the officers had probable cause to detain Plaintiff based on the information available
to the officers at the time, and the case law supports Defendants’ qualified immunity defense.
Terry v. Ohio, and the decades of precedent that follows, establishes that an officer is
justified in stopping and detaining a person to investigate a crime, especially when the officer
reasonably suspects that the person is armed. See, e.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 24 (1968)
(“When an officer is justified in believing that the individual whose suspicious behavior he is
investigating at close range is armed and presently dangerous to the officer or to others, it would
appear to be clearly unreasonable to deny the officer the power to take necessary measures to
determine whether the person is in fact carrying a weapon and to neutralize the threat of physical
harm.”). Here, where the Officers were acting on a report that a suspect was armed with a gun
and had been threatening another person with that gun, there is no question that it would be
reasonable for the officers to stop and briefly detain the suspect in handcuffs to investigate.
As is now known, Plaintiff was not the suspect for whom the police were searching. 3
Even so, case law establishes that the officers’ actions were not unreasonable.
For example, in Hill v. California, police officers arrested a person that matched the
physical description of a robbery suspect and was found at the suspect’s apartment. Hill v.
California, 401 U.S. 797, 799 (1971). At the time that the officers made the arrest, the person
informed the officers that he was not the suspect, and even produced identification showing that
he had a different name than the suspect. Id. The officers “were unimpressed and proceeded to
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The officers later arrested the correct suspect.
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search” the area for evidence of the robbery and arrested the plaintiff. Id. The Court held that the
officers’ actions, although “quite wrong as it turned out,” did not violate the Fourth Amendment
because “when the police have probable cause to arrest one party, and when they reasonably
mistake a second party for the first party, then the arrest of the second party is a valid arrest” as
“sufficient probability, not certainty, is the touchstone of reasonableness under the Fourth
Amendment and on the record before us the officers’ mistake was understandable and the arrest
a reasonable response to the situation facing them at the time.” Id. at 802, 804; see also Tibbs v.
City of Chicago, 469 F.3d 661, 664 (7th Cir. 2006) (a police officer did not subject a plaintiff to
false arrest when the officer mistakenly arrested the plaintiff for an outstanding warrant that was
for a different person with a similar name and a matching physical description.).
Courts have held that mistaken arrests do not violate the Fourth Amendment even in
more obvious situations. In Johnson v. Miller, police officers twice arrested the plaintiff, “a fivefoot-five white [female]” when the description of the suspect was “a black female, five foot
seven and weighing 172 pounds[.]” Johnson v. Miller, 680 F.2d 39, 40 (7th Cir.1982). The court
acknowledged that the officers “perhaps [acted] carelessly” when they failed to notice the
discrepancy. However, that “is not enough to bring Section 1983 into play.” Id. at 42. If it were,
“many a criminal will slip away while the officer anxiously compares the description…and
radios back any discrepancies to his headquarters for instructions.” Id. at 41.
As applied here, the officers were responding to a report of a suspect brandishing a gun.
Plaintiff was located in the area of the report, Plaintiff was driving a car that matched the general
description and had a license plate partially matching the suspect’s car, Plaintiff generally
matched the physical description of the suspect, and the Plaintiff was wearing similar clothes as
the suspect. No reasonable person could find that the officers falsely arrested Plaintiff under
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these circumstances. Certainly, where the case law establishes that “when the police have
probable cause to arrest one party, and when they reasonably mistake a second party for the first
party, then the arrest of the second party is a valid arrest”—Hill, 401 U.S. at 802—there is no
clearly established law to support a claim that detaining Plaintiff in this way violated his clearly
established constitutional rights. The Officers are entitled to qualified immunity for this claim.
B. Defendants did not violate any of Plaintiff’s clearly established Constitutional
rights when they handcuffed him.
Plaintiff’s excessive force claim in Count II of his complaint is based on his allegation
that he was injured while being handcuffed. (Dkt. 1, ¶¶11, 26). Plaintiff asserts that the
Defendants used “unnecessary and unreasonable physical force” while handcuffing him. (Id.).
However, Plaintiff provides no specifics regarding what was “unnecessary and unreasonable”
about the Defendants’ actions. In answering, Defendants admit they handcuffed Plaintiff, but
deny they used any excessive force when doing so. (Dkt. 11, ¶¶ 10, 11, 26). In further answering,
Defendants refer to surveillance video that shows Officer Jusino handcuffing Plaintiff and assert
that the video shows only that Officer Jusino grabbed Plaintiff’s wrists and placed them into
handcuffs and does not indicate that any excessive force occurred. (Dkt. 11, Exh. D, affirmative
defenses, ¶¶ 1-19).
Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity under these circumstances. While there is a
constitutional right to be free from unnecessary and unreasonable physical force, there is no clear
case precedent that has held it is unconstitutionally excessive force for officers to grab a person’s
wrists to place them in handcuffs. In fact, precedent specifically establishes the opposite.
A plaintiff’s claim that officers used excessive force during an arrest is evaluated under
the Fourth Amendment’s reasonableness standard. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989);
Stainback v. Dixon, 569 F.3d 767, 771 (7th Cir. 2009). An officer “has the right to use some
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degree of physical force or threat of force to effectuate the arrest.” Stainback, 569 F.3d at 772.
Assessing the reasonableness of the force “requires a careful balancing of the nature and quality
of the intrusion on the individual’s Fourth Amendment interests against the countervailing
governmental interests at stake.” Graham, 490 U.S. at 396. (internal citations and quotations
omitted). Courts look to the circumstances surrounding the arrest, including “the severity of the
crime at issue, whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or
others, and whether he is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade by flight.” Id.
The court “must view these facts as they would have appeared to a reasonable officer at
the scene” and “must recognize that officers often need to make split-second judgments based on
rapidly developing events.” Stainback, 569 F.3d at 772. “In this respect [the Seventh Circuit’s]
cases indicate that an officer may not knowingly use handcuffs in a way that will inflict
unnecessary pain or injury on an individual who presents little or no risk of flight or threat of
injury.” Id.
An officer’s knowledge that the act of handcuffing “unnecessarily will harm a particular
individual will depend on the circumstances of the arrest.” Id. “In some cases, the fact that an act
will cause pain or injury will be clear from the nature of the act itself.” Id. In others, “it may
become clear to an arresting officer that, although a particular action would not ordinarily harm
an arrestee, the action would nevertheless cause pain or injury to the particular individual.” Id.
“For example, an officer’s otherwise reasonable conduct may be objectively unreasonable when
the officer knows of an arrestee’s medical problems.” Id. “However, a reasonable officer cannot
be expected to accommodate an injury that is not apparent or that otherwise has not been made
known to him.” Id. at 773.
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Here, the video attached to Defendants’ answer captures the entirety of Plaintiff being
handcuffed. (See Dkt. 11, Facts Common to all Affirmative Defenses ¶ 10; Exh. D at 6:54:066:55:00). As the video clearly shows, Plaintiff placed his hands behind his head, went down to
his knees, and the officers then approached him and Officer Jusino placed Plaintiff into
handcuffs by taking hold of Plaintiff’s right arm and bringing it behind his back, then taking hold
of Plaintiff’s left arm and bringing it behind his back, and then securing both of Plaintiff’s wrists
into handcuffs. (Exh. D, at 6:54:06-6:55:00). Officer Jusino then assisted Plaintiff in standing up
and they walked to the front of Plaintiff’s vehicle. (Dkt. 11, Facts Common to all Affirmative
Defenses ¶ 11; Exh. D at 6:55:00-6:55:24). The officer did not, at any point, use any force during
this encounter other than the minimal force that was necessary to secure Plaintiff’s arms behind
his back and into handcuffs and the case law supports Defendants’ qualified immunity defense.
For example, in Stainback, officers placed the plaintiff in handcuffs by grabbing his arms
and putting them behind his back and into handcuffs. Stainback, 569 F.3d at 769. The officers
did so despite the plaintiff telling them not to do so because he might get hurt. Id. After the
plaintiff was handcuffed, he was placed in a police car where he “complained that the handcuffs
were hurting his shoulders and asked the Officers to remove them.” Id. The officers ignored his
request and the plaintiff remained in handcuffs for approximately fifteen to twenty minutes. Id.
As a result, the plaintiff “suffered two torn rotator cuffs, which required surgery and medical
treatment.” Id.
Despite the plaintiff’s complaints and injury, the Seventh Circuit held that “the Officer’s
actions were reasonable under the circumstances” and did not constitute excessive force. Id. at
773. The Court reasoned that, although the plaintiff “said that he did not want to be handcuffed
because he thought it might hurt” and “complained generally about pain after he was
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handcuffed,” the “generalized complaints, without any elaboration regarding a preexisting injury
or other infirmity, would not have placed a reasonable officer on notice that [the plaintiff] would
be injured by those actions.” Id.
In Day v. Wooten, officers detained and handcuffed a plaintiff suspected of shoplifting
and running from arrest on foot. Day v. Wooten, 947 F.3d 453, 456 (7th Cir. 2020). When the
officers apprehended the plaintiff, who was visibly obese and out of breath, they grabbed his
hands and placed them behind his back in handcuffs. Id. The plaintiff told the officers at that
time that he was having trouble breathing. Id. at 456-57. While trying to sit the plaintiff up, the
officers noticed he was having trouble staying upright and had defecated himself. Id. at 457.
Eventually, the officers called paramedics and the paramedics evaluated the plaintiff while he
remained in handcuffs. Id. At some point during the encounter, officers added a second pair of
handcuffs. Id. After being in handcuffs for approximately 43 minutes, the plaintiff became
unresponsive and died. Id. at 457-58. After the plaintiff was deceased, an autopsy confirmed that
he had an underlying heart condition that may have been exacerbated by the handcuffs. Id.
Plaintiff’s family filed a complaint for excessive force based on the handcuffing, and, on appeal,
the Seventh Circuit determined that the officers were entitled to qualified immunity. See
generally, Id.
In determining that the officers were entitled to qualified immunity, the Day Court,
relying in part on Stainback, reasoned that because the plaintiff did not complain that the
handcuffs restricted his breathing and did not inform the officers that he had an underlying heart
condition, the Plaintiff’s “right to be free from an officer’s knowing use of handcuffs in a way
that would inflict unnecessary pain or injury was not violated.” Day, 947 F.3d at 462 (internal
quotations omitted). The Court held that there is “no Seventh Circuit precedent clearly
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establishing…the right of an out-of-breath arrestee to not have his hands cuffed behind his back
after he complains of difficulty breathing[.]” Id. at 463. As such, it was “not clearly established
that the officers’ conduct violated [the deceased’s] rights” and the Court granted the officers
qualified immunity. Id. at 463-64. See also Gibson v. Picou, 101 Fed. Appx. 154, 157 (7th Cir.
2004) (unpublished) (“without an ‘indication that an arrest was effectuated in an unusual or
improper manner,’ an excessive force claim that handcuffs were applied too tightly ‘has no
possible merit.’”) (quoting and citing Braun v. Badwin, 346 F.3d 761, 763 (7th Cir. 2003)).
Applying this precedent to the case at hand, Plaintiff makes nothing more than a
generalized complaint that the officers used “unnecessary and unreasonable” force and does not,
at any point, assert that he informed the officers that he had any preexisting infirmity such that he
was particularly susceptible to injury from being handcuffed. (Dkt. 1, ¶¶ 11, 26). In fact, Plaintiff
does not even claim that he sought medical treatment or specify his injury in any way other than
that the handcuffing “resulted in physical injury.” (Dkt. 1, ¶ 26).
Under these circumstances, no reasonable person could find that the officers committed
excessive force when handcuffing Plaintiff, and there is no clearly established law to support any
claim that handcuffing Plaintiff violated any of Plaintiff’s clearly established constitutional
rights. The Officers are entitled to qualified immunity for this claim.
II.
Plaintiff’s State Law claims cannot survive where his Federal claims fail.
Plaintiff brings Illinois State law claims for False Arrest (Count III) and indemnification
(Count IV). These state law claims must be dismissed where the Federal claims fail.
Although a False Arrest claim under Illinois State Law is technically its own claim
separate from a claim for unlawful seizure under the Fourth Amendment, “[t]he existence of
probable cause also defeats a false-arrest claim under Illinois law” and courts routinely “analyze
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these claims together.” Braun v. Village of Palatine, 56 F.4th 542, 548 (7th Cir. 2022), reh’g
denied, No. 20-3227, 2023 WL 2188741 (7th Cir. Feb. 23, 2023); see also McBride v. Grice, 576
F.3d 703, 706 (7th Cir. 2009) (“under Illinois law a plaintiff claiming an illegal arrest bears the
burden of establishing the absence of probable cause.”).
Plaintiff’s indemnification claim under 745 ILCS 10/9-102 must also be dismissed, as
this claim cannot survive where there is no underlying Illinois State Law claim. See, e.g. Baden
v. City of Wheaton, No. 09 C 3015, 2010 WL 4931852, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 24, 2010), aff’d, 420
Fed. Appx. 628 (7th Cir. 2011) (unpublished) (“Plaintiff’s state-law indemnification claim
against the City [] must be dismissed because it is contingent on the success of her other claims,
all of which fail.”); Alesia v. Rhee, No. 19 C 7576, 2020 WL 10459739, at *3 (N.D. Ill. June 10,
2020) (“given that all other claims have been dismissed, [Plaintiff’s] indemnification claim
against the City must also fail.”); Heidelberg v. Manias, 503 F. Supp. 3d 758, 798 (C.D. Ill.
2020) (“indemnification claims brought against [public entities] should be dismissed to the
extent that the state law claims against the individual Defendants have been dismissed.”).
CONCLUSION
WHEREFORE, for all of the reasons in this motion, this Court should grant Defendants
judgment in their favor on the pleadings and for any further relief this court deems appropriate.
Respectfully submitted,
VILLAGE OF ALSIP, TYLER JUSINO, VINCENT GONZALEZ
By:
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s/Lance E. Neyland
One of Defendants’ Attorneys
Lance E. Neyland, #6331171
IFMK Law, Ltd.
650 Dundee Road, Suite 475
Northbrook, Illinois 60062
T: (847) 291-0200
E: lneyland@ifmklaw.com
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