Panaro et al v. United Airlines, Inc.

Filing 19

MEMORANDUM: The motion to dismiss (Doc. 8) will be GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. Defendants motion to transfer pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1404(a) will be GRANTED, and the motion to dismiss under Rules 12(b)(2) & 12(b)(6) will be DENIED. The Court will TRANSFER the case to the Northern District of Illinois. An Order shall enter.Signed by District Judge Curtis L Collier on 9/25/24. (ABF) [Transferred from Tennessee Eastern on 9/25/2024.]

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
AT WINCHESTER
JACKIE PANARO, et al.,
Plaintiffs,
v.
UNITED AIRLINES, INC.,
Defendant.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

4:23-CV-45
Judge Curtis L. Collier

MEMORANDUM
Before the Court is a motion by Defendant, United Airlines, Inc., to dismiss or, in the
alternative, to transfer venue. (Doc. 8.) Defendant moves to dismiss for lack of personal
jurisdiction under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2) and failure to state a claim under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). (Id.) Alternatively, Defendant moves to transfer
venue under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) to the Northern District of Illinois. (Id.) Plaintiffs, Jackie
Panaro and Matthew Robbin, filed a response in opposition (Doc. 14), and Defendant replied.
(Doc. 15.)
For the following reasons, the Court will GRANT Defendant’s motion (Doc. 8) IN
PART and TRANSFER this matter to the United States District Court for the Northern District
of Illinois.
I.

BACKGROUND
On September 27, 2023, Plaintiffs filed suit against Defendant in the Circuit Court of

Franklin County, Tennessee for the Twelfth Judicial District. (Doc. 1-1.) The case arises from
challenges to Defendant’s COVID-19 vaccination-mandate policy, which required its employees

to be vaccinated against COVID-19. (Id. ¶ 13.) Plaintiffs, who were employed as a flight
attendant and a pilot respectively, (id. ¶¶ 22, 31), sought religious exemptions (id. ¶¶ 24, 34).
Plaintiffs allege that in response, Defendant placed them on unpaid and unprotected leave of
absence. (Id. ¶¶ 28, 38.) Plaintiffs bring causes of action under Tennessee Code Annotated §§
14-1-101 et seq. and for common law assault, alleging a “pattern of discriminatory,
unconstitutional, and illegal behavior against employees who required religious or medical
exemptions from [Defendant’s] COVID-19 vaccination mandate policy.” (Id. ¶ 1.)
Defendant subsequently removed the case to this Court on November 6, 2023. (Doc 1.)
On December 1, 2023, Defendant filed a motion to dismiss or in the alternative, transfer venue of
Plaintiffs’ case. (Doc. 8.) Plaintiffs responded to Defendant’s motion on January 5, 2024. (Doc.
14.) Defendant replied to Plaintiffs’ response on January 18, 2024. (Doc. 15.) This matter is
now ripe for review.
II.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
Defendant’s motion to dismiss raises a threshold issue of personal jurisdiction. (Doc. 8.)

Defendant alternatively asks the Court to consider transfer of venue. (Id.) Although threshold
jurisdictional questions are typically resolved before questions of venue, “when there is a sound
prudential justification for doing so, . . . a court may reverse the normal order of considering
personal jurisdiction and venue.” Leroy v. Great W. United Corp., 443 U.S. 173, 180 (1979).
Because a transfer of venue to the Northern District of Illinois would render the personal
jurisdiction issue moot, the Court will first consider the question of venue.
The standard for a change of venue in removal cases is found in 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a):
“For the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice, a district court may

2

transfer any civil action to any other district or division where it might have been brought.”1 The
transfer statute exists “to prevent the waste of time, energy and money and to protect litigants,
witnesses and the public against unnecessary inconvenience and expense.” Van Dusen v.
Barrack, 376 U.S. 612, 616 (1964) (quotations omitted). The district court has broad discretion
in considering a motion to transfer under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). Reese v. CNH America LLC, 574
F.3d 315, 320 (6th Cir. 2009).
Section 1404(a) first requires defendants to show the case could have originally been
brought in the proposed transferee district. 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a); see, e.g., Boys v. Mass. Mut.
Life Ins. Co., No. 2:12–CV–445, 2013 WL 3834010, at *2 (E.D. Tenn. July 24, 2013). Once the
Court has determined the case could have been brought in the transferee district, “a district court
should consider the private interests of the parties, including their convenience and the
convenience of potential witnesses, as well as other public-interest concerns, such as systemic
integrity and fairness, which come under the rubric of ‘interests of justice.’” Moore v. Rohm &
Haas Co., 446 F.3d 643, 647 n. 1 (6th Cir. 2006) (quoting Moses v. Bus. Card Exp., Inc., 929
F.2d 1131, 1137 (6th Cir. 1991)). Specifically, district courts consider: the convenience of the
parties and witnesses; the accessibility of evidence; the availability of process to make reluctant
witnesses testify; the costs of obtaining willing witnesses; the practical problems of trying the
case most expeditiously and inexpensively; and the interests of justice. Reese, 574 F.3d at 320
(quotations and citations omitted). Analysis under Section 1404(a) is intended to be flexible and
individualized. See Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 29–30 (1988).

1

Because Defendant properly removed the action to this Court, Defendant must rely on
28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) and cannot seek to dismiss or transfer this matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
1406(a). Floyd v. Swift Transp. Corp., No. 3:06-CV-69, 2006 WL 2548337, at *2 (E.D. Tenn.
Aug. 31, 2006).
3

Under such a motion, “[t]he defendant bears the burden of proving that there is an
alternative venue that is proper and that the convenience of the parties and witnesses, and the
interest of justice, warrant transfer.” KANL, LLC v. Savage Sports Corp., No. 3:13-cv-265-TAVCCS, 2014 WL 1745443, at *2 (E.D. Tenn. Apr. 30, 2014). The plaintiff’s choice of forum
should only be disturbed if the balance of interests is strongly in favor of the defendant. Reese,
574 F.3d at 320.
III.

DISCUSSION
Under Section 1404(a), the Court must first determine whether the action could have

been brought in the forum to which transfer is requested. Here, Defendant asserts, and Plaintiff
does not dispute, this action could have been properly brought in the Northern District of Illinois.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b). Defendant resides in the Northern District of Illinois. (Doc. 9 at 15.)
Further, a substantial part of the events giving rise to Plaintiffs’ claims occurred in the Northern
District of Illinois, as Defendant developed and implemented its COVID-19 vaccination policy at
Defendant’s principal place of business in Chicago, Illinois. (Id. at 16.)
The second inquiry is whether the civil action should have been brought in the forum to
which transfer is requested. The Court considers the factors relevant to transfer under Section
1404(a) in turn below.
A.

Weight Afforded to Plaintiffs’ Selection of Forum

In this case, Plaintiffs primarily argue Defendant is “beholden to” Plaintiffs’ choice of
forum. (Doc. 14 at 12.) The Court is mindful of the general need to give substantial deference
to plaintiff’s choice of forum, see, e.g., Smith v. Kyphon, Inc., 578 F. Supp. 2d 954, 962 (M.D.
Tenn. 2008), but that choice is not so weighty as to counterbalance all the other factors.

See

Reese, 574 F.3d at 320. Moreover, Plaintiffs’ choice of forum is given less deference here

4

because “none of the conduct complained of occurred in the forum selected.” See Maberry v.
Nuclear Fuel Servs., Inc., No. 3:13-CV-499, 2013 WL 5560318, at *2–4 (E.D. Tenn. Oct. 7,
2013). The COVID-19 policy at issue was implemented in Chicago, Illinois (Doc. 9 at 16), and
Plaintiffs’ bases of operation were in Cleveland, Ohio and Arlington, Virginia respectively.
(Doc. 9-1, ¶¶ 7–8, 10–11.) It appears the only connection to Tennessee is Plaintiffs’ current
residences. (Doc. 1-1, ¶¶ 6–7.)

Plaintiffs’ choice of forum can also be given less deference

because the chosen forum was the Circuit Court of Franklin County, not this Court. See
Maberry, 2013 WL 5560318, at *4 (noting a plaintiff’s choice of forum is entitled to somewhat
less weight when the case is removed to federal court because plaintiff’s forum choice no longer
applies). Regardless, each of the remaining relevant factors is either neutral or leans toward
transferring venue to the Northern District of Illinois.
B.

Convenience of the Parties, Witnesses, and Access to Evidence

The Court next considers the convenience of witnesses and access to evidence.
Defendant’s argument is simple: transfer of venue is proper because most of the relevant
documents and witnesses are located in Chicago, Illinois, the location of Defendant’s
headquarters. (Doc. 9 at 19–20.) “All the witnesses who will testify regarding the complainedof policies and the employment decisions specific to Plaintiffs work in the Northern District of
Illinois.” (Doc. 15 at 11.) The relevant documents and physical evidence are located there as
well. (Doc. 9 at 20.)
In response, Plaintiffs argue “a transfer would merely shift any inconvenience to
Plaintiffs as Plaintiffs live in the Eastern District of Tennessee.” (Doc. 14 at 12.) While the
Court recognizes transfer to Illinois will inconvenience Plaintiffs, Plaintiffs appear to be the only
witnesses with evidence who reside in Tennessee. (See id.) The bulk of decisions, documents,
and witnesses remain at Defendant’s headquarters. (Doc. 15 at 10–11.) Thus, given the lack of

5

ties to Tennessee, and the locus of operative facts and “the center of gravity” of this case being in
Illinois, these factors favor transfer. See Sacklow, 377 F. Supp. 3d at 880.
C.

Ability to Apply State Law

Plaintiffs also argue transfer is inappropriate because “courts that are familiar with
Tennessee state law are undoubtedly better equipped to analyze these claims, particularly in
regards to novel issues of first impressions as to applicable statute of limitations pursuant to
Tenn. Code Ann. § 14-1-101 et seq.” (Doc. 14 at 13.) Federal courts routinely and skillfully
consider these types of tort claims. While Tennessee courts have not established the statute of
limitations under Tennessee Code Annotated §§ 14-1-101 et seq. specifically, Tennessee courts
have clearly established the statute of limitations for common law statutory discharge in
violation of public policy, to which Plaintiffs contend the statute is most analogous. (Doc. 14 at
4.) The courts of the Northern District of Illinois are no less capable of applying the laws of
Tennessee. See Sacklow, 377 F. Supp. 3d at 879. This factor is therefore neutral.
D.

Trial Efficiency and the Interests of Justice

The Court must also consider “those public-interest factors of systemic integrity and
fairness that, in addition to private concerns, come under the heading of ‘the interest of justice.’”
Langley v. Prudential Mortg. Capital Co., LLC, 546 F.3d 365, 370 (6th Cir. 2008). This
consideration traditionally relates to “the efficient administration of the court system.” Sacklow,
377 F. Supp. 3d at 881. “To permit a situation in which two cases involving precisely the same
issues are simultaneously pending in different [d]istrict [c]ourts leads to the wastefulness of time,
energy and money that § 1404(a) was designed to prevent.” Continental Grain Co. v.
The-FBL-585, 364 U.S. 19, 26 (1960).
There are many cases involving challenges to the same COVID-19 policies and practices
as those challenged in this case that have been filed in or transferred to the Northern District of

6

Illinois for adjudication. See Wickstrom v. Air Line Pilots Ass’n, Int’l, No. 22-cv315, 2023 WL
3103836, at *5 (W.D. Tex. April 25, 2023) (transferring case to the Northern District of Illinois
where it is currently pending as civil action No. 23-cv-02631); Hassett v. United Airlines, Inc.,
No. 23-cv-0960-P, at *Dkt. 34 (W.D. Tex. Oct. 5, 2023) (transferring case to the Northern
District of Illinois where it is currently pending as No. 23-cv-14592); Oka v. United Airlines,
Inc., No. 2:23-cv-00135, ECF No. 1 (E.D. Ky. Oct. 3, 2023) (transferring case to the Northern
District of Illinois where it is currently pending as No. 23-cv-15793); Caraffa v. United Airlines,
Inc., No. 1:23-cv-01800, ECF No. 1 (N.D. Ohio Sept. 15, 2023) (transferring case to the
Northern District of Illinois where it is now pending as No. 23-cv-00989); Engstrom et al v. Air
Lines Pilots Ass’n, Int’l et al, No. 6:22-cv-02130, ECF No. 23 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 7, 2023)
(transferring case to the Northern District of Illinois where it is currently pending as No. 23-cv00989; McCladdie v. United Airlines, Inc, et al., No. 24 CV 4385, 2024 WL 4041327, at *1
(N.D. Ill. Sept. 4, 2024) (case dismissed); Anderson v. United Airlines, Inc., No. 23-C-989, 2023
WL 5721594 (N.D. Ill. Sep. 5, 2023) (case dismissed); and Ellis v. United Airlines, Inc., No. 23cv-123, Dkts. 30, 36 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 18, 2023) (case dismissed).
The general “interests of justice” and the practical problems of trying the case most
expeditiously and inexpensively substantially weigh in favor of transfer. See Reese, 574 F.3d at
320.

Considering there are many cases pending in the Northern District of Illinois which

involve precisely the same issues here, denying the transfer of venue would lead to the
“wastefulness of time, energy and money that § 1404(a) was designed to prevent.”

See

Continental Grain Co., 364 U.S. at 26. Transfer will enable “the efficient administration of the
court system” by avoiding duplicative and inconsistent rulings. See Sacklow, 377 F. Supp. 3d at
881.

7

IV.

CONCLUSION
Upon review of the Section 1404(a) factors, the Court finds Defendant has met its burden

of showing transfer is warranted. See Reese, 574 F.3d at 320. In light of the convenience and
efficiency to be gained by transferring this action to the forum in which the events giving rise to
the complaint took place, where the relevant documents and majority of witnesses exist, and
where the bulk of related cases lie, the Court concludes it is in the interests of justice to transfer
venue to the Northern District of Illinois. The Court need not address the remaining issues raised
by Plaintiffs.
For the foregoing reasons, the motion to dismiss (Doc. 8) will be GRANTED IN PART
and DENIED IN PART. Defendant’s motion to transfer pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) will be
GRANTED, and the motion to dismiss under Rules 12(b)(2) & 12(b)(6) will be DENIED. The
Court will TRANSFER the case to the Northern District of Illinois.
An Order shall enter.
/s/___________________________
CURTIS L. COLLIER
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

8