Hall v. Sterling Park District et al

Filing 145

MEMORANDUM Opinion and Order Signed by the Honorable P. Michael Mahoney on 3/28/2012:(pg, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
WESTERN DIVISION
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PHILLIP HALL,
Plaintiff,
vs.
STERLING PARK DISTRICT,
Defendants.

Case No. 08 C 50116

Magistrate Judge
P. Michael Mahoney

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
I.

INTRODUCTION
This matter is before the court based on the parties’ joint consent to the exercise of

jurisdiction by a Magistrate Judge. On August 4, 2009, Judge Reinhard transferred this case to
the Magistrate Judge for all further proceedings. The court granted in part, and denied in part,
Defendant’s motion for summary judgment on May 4, 2011. After some additional fact
discovery, this case was set for a final pretrial conference. The parties submitted a proposed
final pretrial order to the court on March 7, 2012. In conjunction with the final pretrial order, the
parties each submitted motions in limine to the court. Plaintiff submitted two motions, and
Defendants have submitted four. The motions are fully briefed, and the court will now rule.
II.

BACKGROUND
Plaintiff, Phillip Hall, filed two lawsuits against Defendant, Sterling Park

District, that were consolidated by the court. The first complaint, filed on June 24, 2008,
contained four counts alleging violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 USC § 207, the

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Illinois Minimum Wage Law, 820 ILCS § 105/3-4, and the Illinois Wage Payment Collection
Act (“IWPCA”), 802ILCS § 115/2, and seeks back pay for overtime worked and compensation
for unused vacation time. Plaintiff subsequently filed a two-count complaint on July 7, 2009 that
seeks damages and equitable relief to redress alleged violations of the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq. (“ADEA”). The court consolidated the cases in their
entirety on October 7, 2009.
On September 30, 2010, Defendant filed a motion for summary judgment as to all counts
in Plaintiff’s complaints. The court granted in part and denied in part Defendant’s motion in a
Memorandum Opinion and Order on May 4, 2011. Based on the court’s decision, Plaintiff’s
claims for uncompensated accrued vacation time under the IWPCA and for violations of the
ADEA remained viable.
Plaintiff was hired as the Director of Golf Operations at the Emerald Hill Golf and
Learning Center (hereinafter referred to as “Emerald Hill”) around May 1, 1994. At the time,
Plaintiff was 42 years old. Emerald Hill was a facility owned and operated by Defendant,
Sterling Park District. The Park District is governed by a publicly elected five-member Board of
Commissioners (“the Board”). Plaintiff’s duties included oversight of Emerald Hill and its
affiliated clubhouse, golf shop, restaurant, and banquet facilities. He supervised up to four fulltime employees, and more than 30 total employees. Plaintiff’s supervisor was Larry Schuldt
(“Schuldt”), who was the Executive Director of the Park District.
Plaintiff’s employment agreement was based on three-year contracts that would
automatically renew unless either party notified the other within 90 days of the end of a stated
term. Plaintiff’s contract renewed on a number of occasions, and Plaintiff alleges he received

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positive reviews during his first ten years of employment with Defendant. In November of 2005,
Schuldt apparently decided not to renew Plaintiff’s contract because of uncertainty about the
direction the Park District was taking with regard to Emerald Hill. On November 18, 2005,
Schuldt informed Plaintiff that he would be retained as an at-will employee and would receive a
$1,000 per year (approximately 1%) raise. Plaintiff previously received three percent raises, and
alleges that other employees received three percent raises during this time period. Schuldt
reasoned that the one percent raise was based on his view that Plaintiff was performing well in
only one of the three areas of his job.
After denying Plaintiff’s written grievance regarding the non-renewal of his contract, the
Board decided on January 16, 2006 to eliminate the positions of Director of Golf Operations and
Assistant Golf Course Superintendent. The eliminated positions were replaced with the newly
created positions of Golf Course Superintendent and Golf Operations Manager. Plaintiff was
offered the opportunity to apply for the Golf Course Superintendent job, and did so, but he was
not granted an interview. Aaron Heaton, a 23 year-old employee, was ultimately selected to fill
the position without having submitted an application or being interviewed. Another 22-year-old
employee, C.J. Wade (“Wade”) was chosen for the position of Golf Operations Manager.
Plaintiff was officially terminated in a letter dated March 23, 2006. The termination letter
alluded to Plaintiff’s performance, attitude, and inability to maintain respectful communications
with his supervisor.
III.

DISCUSSION
The motions in limine filed by both parties relate to whether certain evidence should be

admitted at trial. Generally, relevant evidence is admissible unless a statute or rule provides

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otherwise. Fed. R. Evid. 402. “Relevant evidence means evidence having any tendency to make
the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable
or less probable than it would be without the evidence.” Fed. R. Evid. 401. “Although relevant,
evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of
unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue
delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.” Fed. R. Evid. 403.
Evidence should only be excluded through a motion in limine if it is clearly inadmissible
for any purpose. Hawthorne Partners v. AT&T Techs., Inc., 831 F.Supp. 1398, 1400 (N.D. Ill.
1993). Generally, pre-trial motions to exclude evidence are disfavored. Cox v. Prime Fin.
Mortgage Corp., No. 05 C 4814, 2006 WL 1049948, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 20, 2006). The
preferred practice is for courts to defer evidentiary rulings until trial so the court can properly
resolve questions of foundation, relevance, and prejudice. Telewizja Polska USA, Inc. v.
Echostar Satellite Corp., No. 02 C 3293, 2005 WL 289967, at * 1 (N.D.Ill. Feb.4, 2005).
However, a motion in limine may serve to focus the issues of a trial where they properly exclude
information that would be inadmissible, clearly prejudicial, or may serve to confuse issues and
mislead the jury.
A.

Defendant’s Motions in Limine
1.

Defendant’s Motion to Bar IMRF Documents and Damages

Defendant moves for an order barring at trial any testimony, evidence, or argument
regarding documents from the Illinois Municipal Retirement Fund (“IMRF”), the amount of
Plaintiff’s alleged reduced IMRF pension benefit damages, or, in the alternative, barring a
calculation of Plaintiff’s alleged IMRF pension benefit damages based on his salary of $69,868.

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Plaintiff wants to show at trial that his damages include the difference in IMRF pension benefits
he would have received had he not been terminated by Defendant. Plaintiff identified certain
exhibits that support his lost benefits claim, including an IMRF benefit plan booklet, an IMRF
benefit statement, IMRF enrollment forms, and IMRF designation of beneficiary forms.
Defendant believes the proposed IMRF evidence from Plaintiff is inadmissible hearsay
under Rule 802 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. Defendant also notes that Plaintiff has not
identified an expert to testify as to the IMRF damage calculations, and that Rule 701 limits lay
opinion testimony to opinions or inferences that are based on a witnesses’ personal knowledge
and not based on other technical or specialized knowledge. Fed. R. Evid. 701.
Hearsay is a statement made outside a current trial or hearing that is being offered in to
evidence to prove the truth of a matter asserted. Fed. R. Evid. 801 (c). A statement may include
oral or written assertions, including documents. Fed. R. Evid. 801(a). Plaintiff believes that the
IMRF documents constitute hearsay statements because they were created by someone else–an
IMRF employee–and are being offered to show the truth of the assertion that Plaintiff would
have received a certain amount in pension benefits. Plaintiff argues that the documents are
standard business records kept by the Defendant in the normal course of business. They were
produced by the Defendant and show the regularly kept records of benefits owed to Defendant’s
employees. The court finds that the documents appear to fall under the “business records”
exception found in Rule 803(6). Fed. R. Evid. 803(6). The records appear to have been
produced by IMRF personnel, and kept by Defendant as a matter of course to keep track of the
benefits owed to its employees. The evidence will not be excluded prior to trial based on
Defendant’s hearsay objection.

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Defendant’s stronger challenge to the IMRF evidence is that Plaintiff makes incorrect
assumptions regarding the amount he would have been owed had his contract not been
terminated. This challenge to Plaintiff’s proposed evidence is two-pronged: (1) that Plaintiff’s
projections about his potential salary and future pension withdrawals were incorrect, and
therefore skew his calculations; and (2) an expert knowledgeable in the technical process for
calculating benefits under the IMRF would be required to testify under Rule 701.
As to the accuracy of Plaintiff’s calculations, the Defendant theorizes that Plaintiff’s
position was eliminated and replaced by a new one with a salary of $55,000. The only way
Plaintiff could have been retained as an employee would have been to obtain the $55,000 per
year job, a fact that renders Plaintiff’s IMRF calculations unreliable. The Defendant also argues
that Plaintiff elected to begin receiving his benefits before he was eligible, which led to him
receiving a reduced monthly amount and further complicates the benefits calculation. Plaintiff’s
theory on IMRF damages is based on his belief that Defendant’s act of eliminating his position
and re-creating a new one was all inextricably linked with the discriminatory motive that led to
Plaintiff’s termination. The same is true for Plaintiff’s decision to receive his benefits early and
at a reduced rate; he would not have made this choice if he had not been fired. These competing
theories are more appropriately decided at trial. The jury will be appropriately instructed that it
is Plaintiff’s burden to prove his damages, and Defendant will have the opportunity to challenge
the evidence and assumptions made by Plaintiff.
The court is however persuaded that the IMRF calculations in this case are not an
appropriate subject for lay witness testimony under Rule 701. It is clear that the parties have
diverging theories regarding the benefits Plaintiff would have been entitled to had his

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employment with Defendant continued. The court finds that calculations about how the differing
theories would affect the IMRF benefits require a technical or specialized knowledge. Were the
Plaintiff and Defendant to present competing lay witnesses to present calculations before the
jury, the risk of confusion or misleading information would be increased. The court finds that
expert testimony on the subject of Plaintiff’s claims of damages is likely to aid the jury, and
would not prejudice the parties’ abilities to present their theories.
For the foregoing reasons, Defendant’s first motion in limine is denied. Plaintiff is given
leave to add an expert witness to testify regarding Plaintiff’s IMRF damages by April 6, 2012.
The parties are given to April 27, 2012 to depose Plaintiff’s witness. Defendant has until May
18, 2012 to disclose its own expert witness regarding IMRF damages, and the parties are given
until June 8, 2012 to depose Defendant’s expert witness.
2.

Defendant’s Motion to Bar Alleged Comments About Age

Defendant’s second motion in limine seeks to bar at trial any testimony, evidence, or
argument regarding alleged comments made by Schuldt or Doug Jacobs (“Jacobs”) about the
ages of Plaintiff and two other employees. Defendant alludes to nine specific statements, or
types of statements, that it believes should be excluded from trial. Defendant argues that the
statements are inadmissible hearsay, irrelevant, or would unfairly prejudice Defendant and
confuse the jury. The statements were made at different times, and by two different individuals.
Some were directed at Plaintiff and some were directed at other employees. The court finds it
helpful to discuss the statements in three categories: (a) remarks made by a non-decisionmaker
(Jacobs) about someone other than Plaintiff; (b) remarks made by the decisionmaker (Schuldt)
about someone other than Plaintiff; and (c) remarks made by the decisionmaker about Plaintiff.

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Plaintiff alleges that Jacobs made a statement in 2004 that Wayne Pettorini, an employee
of the Park District at the time, could not keep up with the crew because he was too “slow”. As
an initial matter, it is not clear that this statement shows animosity toward age. To the extent the
comment has any probative value as to the question of whether Plaintiff was discriminated
against by the Defendant, that value is outweighed by the potential for it to cause confusion or
prejudice against the Defendant. Most notably, the statement was not made by a
decisionmaker–namely, Schuldt. To the extent it was made by another executive in the presence
of Schuldt, there is no evidence indicating that it was probative of Schuldt’s reasoning for
terminating Plaintiff. See Weinert v. Village of Lamont Police Dept., 09 C 6889, 2012 WL
698352, at *5-6 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 1, 2012) (citing La Montagne v. American Convenience
Products, Inc., 750 F.2d 1405 (7th Cir.1984)). Reference to this statement could sidetrack the
jury by raising questions about the meaning of a comment by a non-decisionmaker regarding
someone other than the Plaintiff. The court grants Defendant’s motion to exclude the Jacobs
statement.
Plaintiff alleges that the following statements were made by Schuldt in reference to
employees other than Plaintiff:
(1) Schuldt to Richard Clark (former employee) in 20021: “Well,
what’s an old guy like that doing still working here”; and
(2) Schuldt about Wayne Pettorini (former employee) in 2004: “I’m
not going to give him a wage increase for the coming year just
because of his age.”

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The parties dispute when this comment took place. Plaintiff testified it was in 2004.
Defendants believe it was in 2002 based on Clark’s own testimony by affidavit that he began
experiencing health problems and had to leave his job around October of 2002. The court
accepts Clark’s account from his sworn affidavit.
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Defendant believes these statements are inadmissible hearsay to which no exceptions apply.
Defendant also argues that the statements are stray remarks that are not proximate in time and do
not tend to show animosity toward age. Plaintiff believes the statements are relevant as
background evidence of Schuldt’s intent. See West v. Ortho McNeil Pharm. Corp., 405 F.3d 578
(7th Cir. 2005). Behavior toward or comments directed at other employees in a protected group
can serve as circumstantial evidence from which a jury might infer intentional discrimination.
Hemsworth v. Quotesmith.com, Inc., 476 F.3d 487, 491 (7th Cir. 2007). However, there must be
a nexus between the alleged discriminatory remarks and the adverse employment decision. Fuka
v. Thomson Consumer Elecs., 82 F.3d 1397, 1403 (7th Cir. 1996). The parties assign differing
meanings to these statements, and therefore disagree as to whether the statements may help form
a mosaic of circumstantial evidence.
The court will consider the context of the comments, and balance Plaintiff’s right to
present indirect evidence of discrimination with Defendant’s concerns about putting misleading
or potentially prejudicial stray remarks before the jury. Gage v. Metropolitan Water
Reclamation Dist. of Greater Chicago, 365 F.Supp.2d 919, 931 (N.D. Ill. 2005). Certainly it is
not appropriate to allow Plaintiff to present evidence of any comment about age made by Schuldt
to any person over an open-ended period of time as tending to show a discriminatory motive
toward Plaintiff. The questions before the jury should remain focused on whether age was a
factor in Plaintiff’s termination, and not on whether Schultd sometimes made age-related
remarks. See Gage, 365 F.Supp.2d at 931.
Based upon the circumstances, the Schuldt comment about Richard Clark should be
excluded from trial. Plaintiff’s pleadings and summary judgment arguments have identified a
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period beginning in 2003, after Plaintiff turned 50, as the time in which he began to notice that
Schuldt’s “previously favorable perception of Hall was changing because of Hall’s age.” (Pl.’s
Resp. to Def’s 2nd Mot. in Limine, Dkt. No. 129, ¶5.) Clark resigned due to health problems in
late 2002, and stated that he never felt discriminated against based on age. The court finds it
unlikely that this comment would be relevant under Rule 401, and any argument as to relevance
is outweighed by the likelihood for confusion or prejudice.
The court also finds that the Pettorini comment should be excluded based upon its
context and the probability that it would cause confusion. The parties each present plausible
arguments as to the meaning of the statement. Plaintiff believes it pointedly shows age-related
animus. Defendant will argue it shows the opposite–that Schuldt specifically refused to consider
age in making an employment decision. Presenting this remark as evidence to the jury would
inevitably lead to arguments about the comment’s context, relevance, and intent. In light of the
ambiguous nature of the comment, and the fact that it was not directed at Plaintiff, the court finds
that could unnecessarily prolong the trial and distract the jury’s focus from the questions they
will be charged with answering.
The next set of comments are general allegations by two former employees of Defendant,
Pat Dunphy and Sandra Wolf Dunn, that Schuldt referred to Plaintiff as an “old fart” or “old
man” on six to eight occasions. The alleged comments are not tied to a specific time, place, or
setting. Both Dunphy and Dunn were terminated in 2005, and the parties believe the remarks
took place between 2002 and 2005. The court will not exclude the remarks through a motion in
limine. The court will be in a better position to weigh the relevance against the potential for
prejudice, as well as the foundation and the context of the remarks at trial. The court also finds

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that the statements do not appear to be hearsay under Rule 801(c). The remarks are not likely to
be offered for the truth of the matter asserted, but rather to show the mental state of the declarant.
See Gage, 365 F.Supp.2d at 930. Again, this is a decision better reserved for trial.
The remaining five comments are all remarks that Plaintiff alleges Schuldt made about
Plaintiff. They are described as follows:
(1) Schuldt during a staff meeting in 2003 or 2004: “Well, I might
have worked here the longest, but I’m not the oldest”;
(2) Schuldt during a staff meeting in February or March of 2004 on
the topic of setting senior citizen rates: “Well, because you’re the
closest one here, let’s ask the person who is closest to that age or
nearest to that category”;
(3) Schuldt during a staff meeting in February or March of 2004:
“We would like to talk to the elder statesman”;
(4) Schuldt during a golf outing after a nice golf shot by Plaintiff:
“How does an old fellow like you do that?”; and
(5) Schuldt during an annual review meeting after Plaintiff made a
comment about not wanting to end up like Schuldt’s father, “65 years
old and digging ditches”: “Well, we have to be careful because you
old farts have age laws.”
Because the comments were made by a decisionmaker about Plaintiff, and took place during the
time period in which Plaintiff alleges Schuldt’s treatment of him began to change, the court finds
there to be a sufficient nexus between the remarks and Plaintiff’s termination. Like the
comments about Pettorini, the parties dispute the intent of the above comments. Regardless of
intent, the fact that Schuldt brought up Plaintiff’s age repeatedly is sufficient to raise a question
of fact as to whether age was a factor in the decision to terminate Plaintiff. Id. Likewise, the
comments are not being offered for the truth of the matter asserted, but instead as circumstantial
evidence of Schuldt’s motive or mental state. The court will not strike the statements as hearsay
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at this point. Plaintiff’s motion is denied as it relates to alleged comments Schuldt made about
Plaintiff’s age.
3.

Defendant’s Motion to Bar Evidence or Arguments Regarding the Terminations
of Other Employees

Defendant’s third motion in limine seeks to bar evidence or arguments regarding other
employees that Plaintiff believes were terminated because of their age. Specifically, Plaintiff
alleges that age was a factor in Defendant’s decisions to terminate Wolf, Dunphy, Pettorini, and
Clark. Behavior toward other employees in the protected group may be circumstantial evidence
that would support an inference of discrimination. Zafar v. Foley Lardner, 552 F.3d 520, 529
(7th Cir. 2008). “Whether evidence of other acts of discrimination is relevant to an individual
ADEA case is fact based and depends on many factors, including how closely related the
evidence is to the plaintiff’s circumstances and theory of the case.” Sprint/United Mgmt. Co. v.
Mendelsohn, 552 U.S. 379, 388, 128 S.Ct. 1140, 170 L.Ed. 2d 1 (2008). Defendant argues that
each separation of employment alluded to by Plaintiff had unique circumstances that had nothing
to do with the employees’ ages.
Pettorini and Clark each submitted affidavits indicating that they do not believe they
were discriminated against based on age. Pettorini voluntarily retired in 2006, after Plaintiff was
terminated, and states that Plaintiff is wrong regarding the allegations of discrimination against
him. Clark voluntarily retired in 2002 due to health issues, and also disclaims the allegations of
discrimination. Wolf stated in her deposition that she believes she was terminated for a reason
other than age. She was 46 years old at the time of her termination, and was replaced by
someone of the same age. Dunphy was terminated following an investigation into $12,000 of

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missing inventory that he could not account for. Dunphy had very recently turned 40 years old
when he was terminated.
The court finds there to be no administrative findings, judicial findings, accusations, or
direct testimony regarding age discrimination against employees other than Plaintiff. The
situations appear too attenuated to be relevant to Plaintiff’s claims. Allowing Plaintiff to
introduce evidence as to other employees would inevitably lead to a series of mini-trials that
would distract the jury and unnecessarily prolong the trial. For the foregoing reasons,
Defendant’s third motion in limine is granted. Plaintiff is prohibited from introducing evidence
or argument at trial that Wolf, Dunphy, Pettorini, or Clark were terminated or discriminated
against based on age.
4.

Defendant’s Motion to Bar Evidence Regarding Defendant’s Ability to Pay For
Membership in PDRMA

Defendant is a member of the Park District Risk Management Agency (“PDRMA”) risk
pool. Defendant has the ability to raise funds to pay for a potential judgment in this case, and
those funds may be available through its participation in the PDRMA risk pool. Courts usually
exclude evidence of indemnification “out of a fear that it will encourage a jury to inflate its
damages award” because it knows the government or some other entity is footing the bill.
Lawson v. Trowbridge, 153 F.3d 368, 379 (7th Cir. 1998).
Plaintiff argues that the evidence regarding Defendant’s membership in the PDRMA is
relevant insofar as Defendant’s stated nondiscriminatory reason for terminating Plaintiff was the
need for reorganization due to financial constraints. In Lawson, the individual defendants gave
the impression that they would be personally liable for damages. Lawson, 153 F.3d at 379.

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Their attorney questioned the individual defendants about their personal assets, and asked the
jury during closing arguments to consider the financial situation of the defendants prior to
determining an award. Id. The Seventh Circuit held that the trial court erred by refusing to
allow the plaintiff in Lawson to rebut the individuals defendants’ testimony with evidence of
indemnification. Id.
The court is not persuaded that the Lawson decision is applicable to this case. However,
certain principles from the case inform the court’s decision. It is also how the evidence has any
tendency to make any fact of consequence in this case any more or less probable. Fed. R. Evid.
401. At the same time, the Defendant will not be allowed to present evidence or argue in front of
the jury about its financial ability to pay a judgment. Defendant’s motion is granted, and both
parties are prohibited from presenting evidence, testimony, or argument before the jury regarding
Defendant’s ability to pay any judgment as determined by the jury.
A.

Plaintiff’s Motions in Limine
1.

Plaintiff’s Motion to Bar Determinations by the Illinois Department of Labor and
the U.S. EEOC

Prior to filing his suits Plaintiff filed claims with the Illinois Department of Labor
(“IDOL”) and the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”). Both agencies
performed investigations and ultimately dismissed the claims at the administrative level.
Plaintiff now seeks to exclude from evidence or arguments any investigations and determinations
made by the IDOL and EEOC.
The jury is charged with reviewing Plaintiff’s case de novo. Tulloss v. Near North
Montessori School, Inc., 776 F.2d 150, 152 (7th Cir. 1985). The materials from the IDOL and

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EEOC would not assist the jury where there has been no indication that the materials could
provide any information that would not otherwise be available to the parties and the jury. See
Young v. James Green Management, Inc., 327 F.3d 616, 624-24 (7th Cir. 2003). When
evaluating whether to allow evidence of a prior administrative decision in the context of a jury
trial, it is important that the court use its discretion to avoid the risks of prejudice. Tulloss, 776
F.2d at 153 n.2.
The court sees no reason to admit the results or investigation files from Plaintiff’s EEOC
and IDOL claims, and finds that they could serve to confuse or prejudice the jury. Defendant did
not respond to Plaintiff’s motion, and have given no indication as to why the EEOC and IDOL
evidence would be relevant. Therefore, Plaintiff’s first motion in limine is granted.
2.

Plaintiff’s Motion to Bar Evidence Regarding Overtime Claims Dismissed on
Summary Judgment

The court partially granted Defendant’s motion for summary judgment on May 4, 2011.
The court dismissed some of Plaintiff’s claims, including his claim that he was entitled to
overtime pay because Defendant mis-classified him as an exempt employee. The court finds that
any evidence, testimony, or argument relating to Plaintiff’s claims that were dismissed at
summary judgment is not relevant to the remaining claims before the jury. The information
would only serve to confuse the jury and prolong the trial by delving into matters that do not
relate to Plaintiff’s surviving claims. Defendant has expressed no objection to Plaintiff’s motion.
Therefore, Plaintiff’s second motion in limine is granted.

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IV.

CONCLUSION
Defendant’s first motion in limine is denied. Plaintiff is given leave to add an expert

witness to testify regarding Plaintiff’s IMRF damages by April 6, 2012. The parties are given to
April 27, 2012 to depose Plaintiff’s expert witness. Defendant has until May 18, 2012 to
disclose its own expert witness regarding IMRF damages, and the parties are given until June 8,
2012 to depose Defendant’s expert witness. Defendant’s second motion in limine is granted, in
part. Defendant’s third and fourth motions in limine are granted. Plaintiff’s first and second
motions in limine are granted.

ENTER:

__________________________________________
P. MICHAEL MAHONEY, MAGISTRATE JUDGE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DATE: March 28, 2012

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