Burton v. Noble et al
Filing
54
WRITTEN Opinion entered by the Honorable Frederick J. Kapala on 8/29/2011: Defendants' motions for summary judgment 40 45 are granted. This case is closed.[For further details see order.]Docketing mailed notice(jat, )
Order Form (01/2005)
United States District Court, Northern District of Illinois
Name of Assigned Judge
or Magistrate Judge
Frederick J. Kapala
CASE NUMBER
09 C 50068
CASE
TITLE
Sitting Judge if Other
than Assigned Judge
DATE
8/29/2011
Burton vs. Noble, et al.
DOCKET ENTRY TEXT:
Defendants’ motions for summary judgment [40] [45] are granted. This case is closed.
O[ For further details see text below.]
Docketing to mail notices.
STATEMENT
Plaintiff, Scott Burton, filed an amended complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against defendants, Boone
County Sheriff Duane Wirth and Winnebago County Sheriff Richard Meyers,1 complaining about the medical
treatment he received for a skin condition while he was a pre-trial detainee in the Boone County Jail and the
Winnebago County Jail. Currently before the court are motions for summary judgment filed by defendants. For
the reasons that follow, the court grants both motions.
Plaintiff was initially appointed counsel to represent him in this matter, but counsel subsequently moved
to withdraw, asserting that he “cannot with justification sign the particular Complaint and allegations put forth
by the Plaintiff.” The court agrees with counsel’s assessment of the case. While there is no refuting that plaintiff
suffered from a skin rash, later diagnosed as scabies or possibly contact dermatitis, while housed at the Boone
County and Winnebago County Jails, there is simply no basis to hold defendants liable in this case.2 Plaintiff
does not specify whether he is suing these defendants in their individual or official capacities, but his claim fails
under either option. To the extent he is suing defendants in their individual capacities, there is no evidence that
these Sheriffs were personally involved in the medical treatment that was given to plaintiff. See Payne for Hicks
v. Churchich, 161 F.3d 1030, 1039 (7th Cir. 1998) (stating the long-settled rule that “[s]ection 1983 creates a
cause of action based on personal liability and predicated upon fault; thus, liability does not attach unless the
individual defendant caused or participated in a constitutional deprivation” (quotation marks omitted)). Thus,
there is no basis to impose individual liability.
A suit against the Sheriffs in their official capacities would not fare any better. “In order to prevail on
an official capacity suit against the sheriff, the plaintiffs must show that an official policy or custom caused the
injury.” Perkins v. Lawson, 312 F.3d 872, 875 (7th Cir. 2002). To do so, plaintiff “must point to either an
express policy which caused the injury, a widespread practice that is so well-settled as to amount to a policy, or
that the sheriff had the final policymaking authority for the decisions regarding the medical treatment [plaintiff]
received.” Id. Even if plaintiff could establish a constitutional violation with respect to his medical treatment,
which would be difficult since plaintiff admits that medical personnel at the two jails attempted to treat his skin
condition, there is no evidence that the alleged injury was caused by a policy, practice, or custom of denying
medical care to inmates.3
09 C 50068 Burton vs. Noble, et al.
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STATEMENT
Because plaintiff cannot establish that defendants were personally involved in his medical treatment or
that the alleged misdiagnosis of his condition and inadequate treatment was the result of an official policy or
custom, plaintiff cannot prevail on his § 1983 claim. Accordingly, defendants’ motions for summary judgment
are granted.
1. Plaintiff improperly listed this defendant as “Dick Meyer” in his amended complaint.
2. It also appears that, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 20(a)(2), defendants are not
properly joined in this action.
3. The closest plaintiff comes to showing a pattern or practice of deliberate indifference to medical
needs is in his response to defendant Meyers’ Local Rule 56.1 statement of material facts.
Specifically, in response to paragraph 29, plaintiff asserts that he had “heard of more cases of
Mercer breaking out throughout the jail because of the way that it was getting cleaned.” Even if this
was true and Meyers was aware of this shortcoming, one isolated incident is not enough to establish
a pattern or practice of deliberate indifference. See City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808,
823-24 (1985).
09 C 50068 Burton vs. Noble, et al.
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