Randle v. Rock Falls Police Dept. et al

Filing 43

WRITTEN Opinion entered by the Honorable Frederick J. Kapala on 12/19/2011: Defendants' motions to dismiss 28 31 are granted. Counts I through IV are dismissed with prejudice as to the Sterling and Rock Falls Police Departments, and as to I PRB, IDOC, and the parole agent defendants in their official capacities. As to the remaining defendants, Counts I through IV are dismissed without prejudice. The court will relinquish jurisdiction over the supplemental state law claims. This case is closed. [For further details see order.]Electronic notice(jat, )

Order Form (01/2005)

United States District Court, Northern District of Illinois
Name of Assigned Judge
or Magistrate Judge

Frederick J. Kapala

CASE NUMBER

10 C 50123

CASE
TITLE

Sitting Judge if Other
than Assigned Judge

DATE

12/19/2011

Randall v. City of Rock Falls, et al.

DOCKET ENTRY TEXT:

Defendants’ motions to dismiss [28] [31] are granted. Counts I through IV are dismissed with prejudice as to the
Sterling and Rock Falls Police Departments, and as to IPRB, IDOC, and the parole agent defendants in their
official capacities. As to the remaining defendants, Counts I through IV are dismissed without prejudice. The
court will relinquish jurisdiction over the supplemental state law claims. This case is closed.

O[ For further details see text below.]

Docketing to mail notices.

STATEMENT
Plaintiff, Willie Randle, has filed a civil rights lawsuit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against various state
and municipal defendants in connection with his arrest on March 18, 2009. Presently before the court are
defendants’ motions to dismiss the first amended complaint. For the following reasons, the motions are granted.
I. FACTS
In his first amended complaint, plaintiff names the City of Rock Falls; the Rock Falls Police Department;
the City of Sterling; the Sterling Police Department; the Illinois Prisoner Review Board (IPRB); the Illinois
Department of Corrections (IDOC); Parole Agents Sturch, Phillips, and Iler; and Sterling Police Lieutenant
Morgan. All defendants are sued in their individual and official capacities. Plaintiff alleges that defendants
conspired to violate his constitutional rights when the Rock Falls Police Department provided false information
that plaintiff, who was serving a term of mandatory supervised release at the time, was in unlawful possession of
a weapon. This information led to plaintiff’s March 18, 2009 arrest and his being charged with unlawful
possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver.
The amended complaint contains eight counts, each seeking relief against all defendants. Count I is a §
1983 claim for false arrest in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Count II is a § 1983 claim for deliberate
indifference in violation of the Eighth Amendment. Count III is a § 1983 claim for deprivation of Fourteenth
Amendment equal protection. Count IV is a § 1983 claim for deprivation of Fourteenth Amendment due process.
Counts V through VIII are state-law claims for wrongful imprisonment, negligence, intentional infliction of
emotional distress, and conspiracy.
II. ANALYSIS
Defendants have filed motions to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and
12(b)(6), collectively arguing that (1) plaintiff’s federal claims are barred under Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477
(1994); (2) IPRB, IDOC, and the parole agent defendants in their official capacities are immune from suit under
10 C 50123 Randall v. City of Rock Falls, et al.

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STATEMENT
the Eleventh Amendment; (3) the police departments are not suable entities and must be dismissed from this suit;
(4) plaintiff fails to state a Monell claim against the City of Sterling; (5) plaintiff has failed to state a claim for
conspiracy; and (6) plaintiff’s state law claims are bared by the one-year statute of limitations with respect to the
municipal defendants. The court finds that defendants’ first three arguments have merit and are dispositive with
respect to this court’s jurisdiction over all the claims. Consequently, this court need not address the balance of
defendants’ arguments.
First, as noted in this court’s order of May 28, 2010, police departments are not suable entities under §
1983. See Chan v. Wodnicki, 123 F.3d 1005, 1007 (7th Cir. 1997); see also Best v. City of Portland, 554 F.3d
698 n.1 (7th Cir. 2009). Thus, Counts I through IV are dismissed with prejudice as to the Sterling and Rock Falls
Police Departments.
Second, states and their agencies are not ‘persons’ subject to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Will v. Mich.
Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989); Johnson v. Ill. Supreme Court, 165 F.3d 1140, 1141 (7th Cir. 1999).
Also, while Congress can abrogate state sovereign immunity, § 1983 does not abrogate the Eleventh Amendment
immunity of a state and its agencies from suit in federal court. See Meadows v. Ind., 854 F.2d 1068, 1070 n.3 (7th
Cir. 1988). Claims against state employees in their official capacities are deemed, of course, to be claims against
a state for Eleventh Amendment purposes. See Ky. v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165–66 (1985); Garcia v. City of
Chi., 24 F.3d 966, 969 (7th Cir. 1994). Thus, Counts I through IV are dismissed with prejudice as to IPRB, IDOC,
and the parole agent defendants in their official capacities.
Third, defendants argue that because success on plaintiff’s federal claims would be inconsistent with a
conviction on the charge pending against plaintiff in state court, these claims are barred by Heck. The court
agrees. Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims alleged in Counts I through IV are based on allegations that plaintiff was
unlawfully detained and arrested and that his residence was searched without probable cause. Plaintiff also alleges
that, as a result, he was charged with unlawful possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver.
Plaintiff’s claims for damages due to the alleged unlawful detention, arrest, and search, if successful, would be
inconsistent with a potential conviction on the charge pending against him in Whiteside County. See Snodderly
v. R.U.F.F. Drug Enforcement Task Force, 239 F.3d 892, 898 n.8 (7th Cir. 2001) (“[W]e have interpreted Heck
as barring damage claims which, if successful, would necessarily imply the invalidity of a potential conviction
on a pending criminal charge.”); see also Smith v. Holtz, 87 F.3d 108, 113 (3d Cir. 1996) (“If [a claim for civil
damages] could proceed while criminal proceedings are ongoing, there would be a potential for inconsistent
determinations in the civil and criminal cases and the criminal defendant would be able to collaterally attack the
prosecution in a civil suit.”). Therefore, as to the remaining defendants, Counts I through IV will be dismissed
without prejudice. If at some point in the future, plaintiff is acquitted on the drug charge arising out his March
18, 2009 arrest or a resulting conviction is, “reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared
invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into question by a federal court’s
issuance of a writ of habeas corpus,” Heck, 512 U.S. at 486-87, he may then file a new lawsuit.
III. CONCLUSION
Because plaintiff has not stated a federal claim upon which relief can be granted, defendants’ motion to
dismiss Counts I through IV is granted. These claims are dismissed with prejudice as to the Sterling and Rock
Falls Police Departments, and as to IPRB, IDOC, and the parole agent defendants in their official capacities. As
to the remaining defendants, Counts I through IV are dismissed without prejudice. The court will relinquish
jurisdiction over the remaining supplemental state law claims rather than resolve them on the merits. See 28
U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3); Williams v. Rodriguez, 509 F.3d 392, 404 (7th Cir. 2007). The court expresses no opinion
as to the merit of plaintiff’s state law claims and they are dismissed without prejudice to plaintiff proceeding with
them in state court.

10 C 50123 Randall v. City of Rock Falls, et al.

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