Funches v. Jones et al

Filing 55

WRITTEN Opinion entered by the Honorable Philip G. Reinhard on 6/13/2012: For the reasons stated below, the court grants in part and denies in part defendants' motion to dismiss.[For further details see text below.] Signed by the Honorable Philip G. Reinhard on 6/13/2012:Notice mailed by Judicial Staff notice(pg, )

Order Form (01/2005)

United States District Court, Northern District of Illinois
Name of Assigned Judge
or Magistrate Judge

Philip G. Reinhard

CASE NUMBER

11 C 50055

CASE
TITLE

Sitting Judge if Other
than Assigned Judge

DATE

6/13/2012

Perez Funches (#N-64546) vs. Larry Jones, et al.

DOCKET ENTRY TEXT:

For the reasons stated below, the court grants in part and denies in part defendants’ motion to dismiss.

O[ For further details see text below.]

Notices mailed by Judicial staff.

STATEMENT - OPINION
Plaintiff, Perez Funches, filed, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Illinois law, a three-count amended
complaint against defendants, Larry Jones, a chaplain at the Dixon Correctional Center (DCC), Curtis
O’Neal, an assistant warden at the DCC, Nedra Chandler, the warden at the DCC, and Michael Randle, the
director of the Illinois Department of Corrections. Count I alleges that plaintiff was denied his freedom of
religion under the First Amendment. Count II alleges a violation of the Religious Land Use and
Institutionalized Persons Act, 42 U.S.C. § § 2000cc-1. Count III alleges a violation of the Illinois Religious
Freedom Restoration Act, 775 ILCS 35/1 et seq.
All defendants have moved, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), to dismiss all claims as barred by the
doctrine of issue preclusion (collateral estoppel) because plaintiff previously litigated the same claims in the
United States District Court for the Southern District of Illinois which resulted in a jury verdict in favor of the
defendants in that case. Randle also seeks dismissal because, based on the allegations, he was not personally
involved in any of the claimed improper conduct.
A dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is required if the facts pleaded fail to describe a claim that is
plausible on its face. London v. RBS Citizens, N.A., 600 F. 3d 742, 745 (7th Cir. 2010). When considering
the validity of a complaint, a court may take judicial notice of matters of public record. Brown v. Kraft Foods
Global, Inc., 2011 WL 3477087, * 2 (E.D. Wisc. Aug. 9, 2011). Thus, while an affirmative defense such as
issue preclusion will often require reference to matters outside the pleadings, if it relies on matters of which a
court may take judicial notice, such as a prior court record, it may be disposed of under Rule 12(b)(6) without
converting the motion to one for summary judgment. Southland Management Corp. v. RSUI Indemnity Co.,
2012 WL 274019, * 1 (E.D. Wisc. Jan. 31, 2012).
The doctrine of issue preclusion, or collateral estoppel, is narrower than that of res judicata. Matrix
IV, Inc. v. American National Bank and Trust Co. of Chicago, 649 F. 3d 539, 547 (7th Cir. 2011). For issue
preclusion to apply it must be shown that: (1) the issue sought to be precluded is the same as that involved in
the prior litigation; (2) the issue has been actually litigated; (3) the determination of the issue was essential to
11C50055 Perez Funches (#N-64546) vs. Larry Jones, et al.

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STATEMENT - OPINION
the final judgment; and (4) the party against whom estoppel is invoked was fully represented in the prior
action. Matrix IV, Inc., 649 F. 3d at 547.
Here, defendants contend that the same claims in this case were previously rejected by a jury in the
prior case. This argument fails under the first element of issue preclusion. First of all, plaintiff’s prior claim
was based solely on the First Amendment. That alone prevents application of issue preclusion to the two
statutory claims alleged in this case.
Additionally, as to the First Amendment claim, there has been no showing on this record by
defendants that the First Amendment claim in the prior case is the same as the one in this case. The mere fact
that both claims depend upon a denial of religious freedom under the First Amendment is not enough by
itself. While the jury in the earlier case apparently found that no violation occurred under the facts of that
case, there is simply no way the court can conclude on the record provided that the nature and extent of the
alleged violation here is coextensive with what happened in the prior case. It is not enough to merely assert
that both cases involve an alleged denial of religious freedom in a prison context. Defendants having failed to
establish that the First Amendment issue here is the same as that resolved in the prior case, the court denies
the motion to dismiss based on issue preclusion.
That leaves Randle’s motion to dismiss based on a lack of personal involvement. A defendant must
be personally involved with a § 1983 violation to be liable for damages. Johnson v. Randle, 2012 WL
1964996, * 9 (S.D. Ill. May 31, 2012). In other words, the defendant must have caused or participated in the
alleged constitutional violation. Johnson, at * 9. In the context of a prison grievance, a defendant must have
done more than merely review and approve a grievance decision to have been personally involved. Johnson,
at * 9. A defendant who reviews a complaint is not liable for the underlying, complained-of behavior simply
because he reads and dismisses it. Johnson, at * 9 (citing Burks v. Raemisch, 555 F. 3d 592, 595 (7th Cir.
2009). Further, a defendant is entitled to delegate decisions to his staff without being liable for each of their
decisions. Johnson, at * 9.
In this case, the amended complaint merely alleges as to Randle that he “directed and authorized his
signature” thereby “concurring with the recommendation to deny plaintiff’s grievance.” There are no other
direct allegations pertaining to Randle’s participation in any of the claimed violations. This allegation is
insufficient to show personal involvement and, therefore, Randle is entitled to be dismissed as a defendant.
For the foregoing reasons, the court denies the motion to dismiss to the extent it is based on issue
preclusion on this record and grants the motion to dismiss as to Randle to the extent it is based on a lack of
personal involvement.

11C50055 Perez Funches (#N-64546) vs. Larry Jones, et al.

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