Streight v. U.s. Bank National Association et al

Filing 6

WRITTEN Opinion entered by the Honorable Frederick J. Kapala on 8/25/2011: The complaint is dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) (ii) and plaintiff's motions to proceed IFP 3 , for TRO 4 , and for discovery 5 are denied as moot. This case is closed. [For further details see order.]Docketing mailed notice(jat, )

Order Form (01/2005)

United States District Court, Northern District of Illinois
Name of Assigned Judge
or Magistrate Judge

Frederick J. Kapala

CASE NUMBER

11 C 50240

CASE
TITLE

Sitting Judge if Other
than Assigned Judge

DATE

8/25/2011

Streight vs. U.S. Bank, N.A.

DOCKET ENTRY TEXT:

The complaint is dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) (ii) and plaintiff’s motions to proceed IFP [3],
for TRO [4], and for discovery [5] are denied as moot. This case is closed.

O[ For further details see text below.]

Docketing to mail notices.

STATEMENT
Pro se plaintiff, Roger Streight, has filed a complaint against defendant, U.S. Bank N.A., alleging that
defendant has wrongfully petitioned the Circuit Court for the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit, Winnebago County,
Illinois for a judgment of foreclosure on his property. Plaintiff claims that defendant lacks standing to do so and
that defendant violated the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1692a et seq. Plaintiff seeks to
proceed in forma pauperis (IFP) and has requested a temporary restraining order (TRO) preventing the state court
from entering a judgment of forecosure. The case comes before the court for initial review in light of plaintiff’s
application to proceed IFP. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) (providing that the court shall deny an IFP motion
as facially invalid at any time if the court determines that the action “fails to state a claim on which relief may
be granted.”)
In this case, the court is unable to grant the requested relief because, under the Younger abstention
doctrine, federal courts are prevented from enjoining pending state proceedings absent extraordinary
circumstances. See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971); Freeeats.com, Inc. v. Indiana, 502 F.3d 590, 595 (7th
Cir. 2007). “[T]he normal thing to do when federal courts are asked to enjoin pending proceedings in state courts
is not to issue such injunctions” Younger, 401 U.S. at 45. Younger abstention is warranted where (1) state
proceedings are ongoing; (2) the proceedings implicate important state interests; and (3) the state proceedings
present an adequate opportunity to raise constitutional challenges. Trust & Inv. Advisers, Inc. v. Hogsett, 43 F.3d
290, 295 (7th Cir. 1994). These requirements are met here. First, plaintiffs’ pleadings show that defendant has
initiated foreclosure proceedings against him in state court. Second, any relief that could be granted by this court
would directly impact Illinois’ interest in protecting the authority of its judicial system and its interests in the
disposition of its real property. Were this court to make the determinations requested, it would in essence be
substituting itself for the Illinois courts. See Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 609 (1975). Finally, the
third prong is met as Illinois courts are an adequate forum for resolution of plaintiffs’ claims because standing
is a matter of state law and both state and federal courts have concurrent jurisdiction over FDCPA claims. See
15 U.S.C. § 1692k(d); see also General Auto Service Station LLC v. City of Chi., 319 F.3d 902, 904 (7th Cir.
2003) (stating that abstention generally proper in cases in which party has opportunity to raise constitutional
11 C 50240 Streight vs. U.S. Bank, N.A.

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STATEMENT
arguments in state court).
Accordingly, the court will abstain from exercising jurisdiction over plaintiff’s claims and his request for
a TRO, which can be raised before the state court. See Gray v. Pagano, 287 F. App’x 155, 157-58 (3d Cir. 2008)
(affirming district court’s abstention under Younger where state-court foreclosure action was pending and “[a]ny
relief that could be granted by the district court would directly impact the state’s interest in protecting the
authority of its judicial system”); see also Burke v. Donovan, No. 1:08-CV-263, 2009 WL 5214325, at *4 (D. Vt.
Dec. 29, 2009) (entering § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) dismissal of a claim that it abstained from hearing pursuant to
Younger). Therefore, this case is dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).

11 C 50240 Streight vs. U.S. Bank, N.A.

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