Large, ex rel. S.L., a minor v. Astrue

Filing 32

Memorandum Opinion and Order. Signed by the Honorable Iain D. Johnston on 6/6/2013:Electronic notice(yxp, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
WESTERN DIVISION
ROBERT LARGE ex rel., S.L., a minor,
Plaintiff-Claimant,
v.
CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Acting
Commissioner of Social Security,
Defendant-Respondent.

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No. 12 C 50101
Iain D. Johnston
Magistrate Judge

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Robert Large, on behalf of his minor daughter S.L. (“Claimant”), brings this action under
42 U.S.C. § 405(g), seeking reversal or remand of the decision by Respondent Carolyn W.
Colvin1, Acting Commissioner of Social Security (“Commissioner”), denying Claimant’s
application for supplemental security income (“SSI”) benefits. This matter is before the Court on
Claimant’s motion for summary judgment [Dkt. # 18].
Claimant argues that the Commissioner’s decision denying her application for SSI should
be reversed or remanded for further proceedings because the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”)
failed to make required credibility determinations, and provided a deficient functional
equivalence determination regarding her ability to acquire and use information. For the reasons
set forth more fully below, Claimant’s motion for summary judgment [Dkt. # 18] is granted in
part. The Commissioner’s decision is reversed, and this matter is remanded to the Social Security

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On February 14, 2013, Carolyn W. Colvin became Acting Commissioner of Social
Security. Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 25, Carolyn W. Colvin is
automatically substituted as the Defendant in this suit. Pursuant to the last sentence of section
205(g) of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), no further action is required to continue
this suit.

Administration (“SSA”) for further proceedings consistent with this Memorandum Opinion and
Order. On the present record, this Court declines to remand with an order to award benefits.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Procedural History
Claimant filed an application for SSI benefits on December 15, 2008, alleging a disability
onset date of September 1, 2007, due to attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (“ADHD”). R.20,
111. The SSA denied the application on March 4, 2009. R.60. Claimant filed a request for
reconsideration on April 3, 2009. R.61. That request was denied June 18, 2009. Id. Claimant
filed a timely written request for a hearing on July 19, 2009. R.78. The ALJ conducted a video
hearing on April 21, 2010. R.35. Claimant and her parents attended the hearing, and Claimant’s
father was the only witness who testified. Id. Claimant was 7 years old at the time of the hearing.
R.44. All parties agreed that she was too young to testify. R.57. Claimant’s mother chose not to
testify and waited outside of the hearing room with Claimant. Id.
On August 20, 2010, the ALJ issued a decision denying the claim for benefits. R.17-29.
Claimant filed a timely request to review the ALJ’s decision on September 17, 2010. R.12. The
Appeals Council denied review on January 18, 2012, making the ALJ’s decision the final
decision of the Commissioner. R.1. Claimant subsequently filed this appeal pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 405(g). Claimant’s objections to the ALJ’s decision are limited to his findings in the
domain of acquiring and using information and the impact of those findings on her disability
status. Accordingly, the Court will focus on the facts in the record related to those findings.
B. Hearing Testimony - Claimant’s Father, Robert Large
Mr. Large testified that Claimant was 7 years old and in second grade at the time of the

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hearing. R.44. He told the ALJ that Claimant had been prescribed Clonidine to help her sleep,
and Concerta to control her ADHD. R.45,46,380. Mr. Large gave Claimant Clonidine at night
and stated that sometimes it worked well and sometimes it did not. R.45. He also gave Claimant
18 mg of Concerta in the morning to treat her ADHD, but did not think it made much of a
difference. R.46,49,380. He further testified that Claimant cannot stay focused on one thing for
very long and does not follow directions. R.51,52. Claimant can not sit still and play a board
game at home. R.55. Claimant also gets in trouble at school for moving around, not sitting still,
not paying attention, and trying to give other children answers. R.52,55. However, Claimant has
not been suspended from school. R.52,55. When Mr. Large met with Claimant’s teachers, they
told him that Claimant was struggling academically. R.46.
C. School Records
Claimant attends Erie Elementary School in Erie, Illinois. R.185. She has received early
intervention support from the school’s Response to Intervention team since preschool. Id. The
school completed a special education evaluation and developed an Individual Education Plan
(“IEP”) for Claimant in November 2008, when she was in kindergarten. R.192. At that time,
Claimant had been diagnosed with ADHD, and her teachers and parents decided to put her in a
special education program immediately. R.188. Claimant’s math skills were progressing, but her
sentence reading and writing skills were below grade level. Id. Claimant’s teachers reported that
she had focusing difficulties and was impulsive. Id. She could not pay attention during classroom
instruction, whole group, small group, or independent seatwork. Id.
The record includes five teacher questionnaires that were filled out between 2008 and
2010 by Claimant’s kindergarten through second grade teachers, and a school psychologist.

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Every teacher and the psychologist noted that Claimant had problems functioning in the domain
of acquiring and using information. The questionnaires contained 10 categories in the domain of
acquiring and using information, and asked the teachers to rank Claimant’s functioning in each
category on a scale of 1 through 5. 1 indicated “no problem”; 2 indicated “a slight problem”; 3
indicated “an obvious problem”; 4 indicated “a serious problem”; and 5 indicated a “very serious
problem.” The questionnaire filled out by the school psychologist in May 2008 indicated a very
serious problem in the category of “expressing ideas in written form,” and obvious problems in
the remaining 9 categories. R.122.
The questionnaire filled out by Claimant’s kindergarten teacher indicated very serious
problems in 2 categories; serious problems in 3 categories; obvious problems in 4 categories and
a slight problem in the category of “understanding and participating in class discussions.” R.132.
The questionnaire filled out by Claimant’s first grade teacher in January 2009, indicated very
serious problems in 4 categories; serious problems in 3 categories, and obvious problems in the
remaining three categories. R.174. That teacher further noted that Claimant needed constant
assistance and that writing down thoughts on paper was a real struggle. Id. Claimant also had a
hard time listening to and comprehending stories and directions. Id. The teacher noted that
Claimant spent one to one and a half hours a day in a special education resource room. Id. A
questionnaire filled out by the same teacher in March 2009, indicated very serious problems in 1
category; serious problems in 5 categories; and obvious problems in the remaining 4 categories.
R.223. The teacher noted that Claimant easily forgot instructions, got out of her seat for no
reason and was easily distracted. Id. Claimant also could not concentrate long enough to
calculate simple math problems and if she calculated the answer she forgot it before she could

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write it down. Id.
Claimant’s first grade special education teacher filled out a questionnaire in April 2009.
R.232. She noted very serious problems in 5 categories and serious problems in the other 5
categories. Id. That teacher noted that Claimant needed constant redirection to task and had
difficulty being attentive with computer games. Id. In May 2010, Claimant’s second grade and
special education teachers jointly filled out a questionnaire indicating that Claimant had very
serious problems in the category of “reading and comprehending written material”; serious
problems in 6 categories; obvious problems 2 categories and a slight problem in the category of
“comprehending oral instructions.” R.275. Those teachers also noted that Claimant completed
her seat work in a resource room for “redirection/reteaching and prompts to stay on task.” Id.
The teachers also indicated that reading and math instruction for third grade would be with the
special education teacher. Id.
Claimant had another IEP conference in April 2010. R.282-96. Claimant’s teachers and
parents decided that for third grade, Claimant’s special education time would increase from 28%
percent of the day to 49% of the day. R.290. The only time Claimant would not be using special
education resources was for physical education, music, art, guidance, and computers. R.290. She
was to be placed in a “self-contained” classroom for her core classes - math, reading, and
English. Id. She was also scheduled to receive speech and language services for 40 minutes per
week. Id. Claimant’s IEP also called for testing accommodations and the use of assistive devices
in all subjects. R.287-88.
D. Medical Evidence
When Claimant was in first grade, she was referred to Sinnissippi Centers for a clinical

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assessment due to concerns with her academic progress and behavioral issues. On October 13,
2009, Claimant and her father met with Dr. Muhammad Azhar, a psychologist at Sinnissippi
Centers. Dr. Azhar completed a Psychiatric Evaluation and diagnosed Claimant with ADHD,
separation anxiety disorder, learning disorders in reading and mathematics, and assigned her a
Global Assessment of Functioning score of 50. R.380. He prescribed her Concerta to treat her
ADHD and Clonidine for her sleep issues. R.380.
Two state agency psychologists reviewed Claimant’s file and provided opinions as to her
functional abilities. Dr. Taylor reviewed Claimant’s file in March 2009 and opined that she did
not meet, medically equal, or functionally equal a listed impairment. R.310. Specifically, he
found that Claimant had marked limitations in the domain of attending and completing tasks;
less than marked limitations in the domains of acquiring and using information, interacting and
relating with others, caring for yourself, and health and physical well-being; and no limitations in
moving about and manipulating objects. R.312-315. In support of his finding that Claimant had
less than marked limitations in acquiring and using information, Dr. Taylor noted that
Claimant’s “teacher notes that [she] has obvious to very serious problems in this area with a need
for constant assistance due to difficulty staying on task.” R.312. He also noted that Claimant
spent 450 minutes per week in a special education resource classroom. Id.
Dr. Heinrich reviewed Claimant’s file in June 2009 and also opined that she did not meet,
medically equal, or functionally equal a listed impairment. R.344. Specifically, he found that
Claimant had marked limitations in attending and completing tasks; less than marked limitations
in acquiring and using information, interacting and relating with others, and caring for yourself;
and no limitations in moving about and manipulating objects and health and physical well-being.

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R.345-347. In support of his finding that Claimant had less than marked limitations in acquiring
and using information, Dr. Heinrich opined that Claimant’s “learning difficulties arise more from
attention problems than cognitive deficits.” R.346. He also opined that Claimant was making
progress with her current ADHD treatment and that her mother’s statements were credible.
R.349.
E. The ALJ’s Decision - August 20, 2010
After a hearing and review of the medical evidence, the ALJ determined Claimant was
not disabled and denied her application for SSI benfits. R.17-29. The ALJ evaluated Claimant’s
application under the requisite three-step sequential evaluation process to determine whether she
was disabled. R.18. The ALJ noted that Claimant was school-age when she filed her application
for benefits and at the time of the hearing. R.20. At step one, the ALJ found that Claimant had
not engaged in substantial gainful activity since December 15, 2008, the application date. R.20.
At step two, the ALJ determined Claimant had the following severe impairments: ADHD,
separation anxiety disorder, rule out learning disorder, and speech delay. Id. At step three, the
ALJ concluded that Claimant did not have an impairment or combination of impairments that
met or medically equaled one of the listed impairments in 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1.
R.20. In support of this finding, the ALJ stated that he “considered the criteria set forth in
sections 112.06 (Anxiety Disorders) and 112.11 (Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorders).” Id.
The ALJ also stated that he relied upon the conclusions of the non-examining state agency
medical consultants to infer this result. Id.
The ALJ also found that Claimant did not have an impairment or combination of
impairments that functionally equaled listings 20 C.F.R. 416.924(d) or 416.926(a). R.28. In the

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six relevant functional equivalence domains, the ALJ found that Claimant had a marked
limitation with respect to attending to and completing tasks. R.25. In the domains of acquiring
and using information; interacting and relating with others; and caring for yourself, the ALJ
found that Claimant had less than marked limitations. R. 23,25,27. In the remaining two
domains, moving about and manipulating objects and health and physical well-being, the ALJ
found that Claimant had no limitations. R.26,28. Because the ALJ found that Claimant only had
marked limitations in one domain and had either less than marked or no limitations in the
remaining five domains, the ALJ found that she was not disabled, as defined by the SSA, as of
December 15, 2008. R.28.
In finding that Claimant had less than marked limitations in acquiring and using
information, the ALJ noted that Claimant’s teachers noted “significant problems with her ability
to learn.” R.21. But the ALJ concluded that those problems resulted “primarily from her ADHD
symptoms, including distractibility, impulsivity, restlessness, and failure to complete tasks.” Id.
The ALJ also noted that several teacher questionnaires were submitted before Claimant began
taking Concerta to treat her ADHD in October 2009. R.22.
The ALJ acknowledged that Claimant’s teachers had “remarked upon very serious
problems in learning and acquiring information,” and that she rarely completed homework. R.24.
He also noted that Claimant would require intensified special education support with the addition
of self-contained math, English and reading to her existing special education resource room
support and speech therapy. R.24. The ALJ assigned information provided by Claimant’s parents
minimal weight because he believed that they were not well-positioned to offer dispassionate
insight into the claimant’s functioning. R.22. The ALJ assigned substantial weight to the

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opinions of the agency’s non-examining medical consultants, Dr. Taylor and Dr. Heinrich. R.22.
II. LEGAL STANDARD
A. Standard of Review
The “findings of the Commissioner of Social Security as to any fact, if supported by
substantial evidence, shall be conclusive.” 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). A decision by an ALJ becomes
the Commissioner’s final decision if the Appeals Counsel denies a request for review. Sims v.
Apfel, 530 U.S. 103, 106-07, 120 S.Ct. 2080, 147 L.Ed.2d 80 (2000). Under such circumstances,
the district court reviews the decision of the ALJ. Id. Judicial review is limited to determining
whether the decision is supported by substantial evidence in the record and whether the ALJ
applied the correct legal standards in reaching his decision. Schoenfeld v. Apfel, 237 F.3d 788,
792 (7th Cir. 2001).
Substantial evidence is “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion.” Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401, 91 S.Ct. 1420, 28
L.Ed.2d 842 (1971). A “mere scintilla” of evidence is not enough. Scott v. Barnhart, 297 F.3d
589, 593 (7th Cir. 2002). Even when there is adequate evidence in the record to support the
decision, the findings will not be upheld if the ALJ does not “build an accurate and logical
bridge from the evidence to the conclusion.” Berger v. Astrue, 516 F.3d 539, 544 (7th Cir. 2008).
If the Commissioner’s decision lacks evidentiary support or adequate discussion of the issues, it
cannot stand. Villano v. Astrue, 556 F.3d 558, 562 (7th Cir. 2009).
Though the standard of review is deferential, the reviewing court must “conduct a critical
review of the evidence” before affirming the Commissioner’s decision. Eichstadt v. Astrue, 534
F.3d 663, 665 (7th Cir. 2008). The reviewing court may not, however, “displace the ALJ’s

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judgment by reconsidering facts or evidence, or by making independent credibility
determinations.” Elder v. Astrue, 529 F.3d 408, 413 (7th Cir. 2008). Thus, judicial review is
limited to determining whether the ALJ applied the correct legal standards and whether there is
substantial evidence to support the findings. Nelms v. Astrue, 553 F.3d 1093, 1097 (7th Cir.
2009). The reviewing court may enter a judgment “affirming, modifying, or reversing the
decision of the [Commissioner], with or without remanding the cause for a rehearing.” 42 U.S.C.
§ 405(g).
B. Disability Standard for a Child
A child is disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act if the child is not
engaged in substantial gainful activity and “has a medically determinable physical or mental
impairment or combination of impairments that causes marked or severe functional limitations,
and that can be expected to cause death or that has lasted and can be expected to last for a
continuous period of not less than 12 months.” 20 C.F.R. § 416.903. The ALJ applies a threestep sequential evaluation to determine whether an individual under the age of 18 is disabled. 20
C.F.R. § 416.924(a). Under this process, the ALJ must inquire, in the following order, whether:
(1) Claimant is engaged in substantial gainful activity; (2) Claimant has a medically
determinable impairment that is “severe” or a combination of impairments that is “severe”; and
(3) Claimant has an impairment or combination of impairments that meets or medically equals
the criteria of a listing, or that functionally equals the listing. Id.
To functionally equal a listing, the impairment must cause a “marked” limitation in two
domains of functioning or an “extreme” limitation in one domain of functioning. 20 C.F.R. §
416.926a(a). The domains of functioning are: (1) Acquiring and Using Information; (2)

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Attending and Completing Tasks; (3) Interacting and Relating with Others; (4) Moving About
and Manipulating Objects; (5) Caring for Yourself; and (6) Health and Physical Well-Being. 20
C.F.R. § 416.926a(b)(1)(i)-(vi). A “marked” limitation occurs when the impairment interferes
with Claimant’s ability to independently initiate, sustain, or complete activities. 20 C.F.R. §
416.926(e)(2)(i). An “extreme” limitation occurs when the impairment interferes very seriously
with claimant’s ability to independently initiate, sustain or complete activities. 20 C.F.R. §
416.926a(e)(3)(i).
III. DISCUSSION
Claimant’s objections to the ALJ’s decision are limited to his finding that Claimant had
less than marked limitations in the domain of acquiring and using information, and the analysis
and evidentiary support for that finding. Claimant argues that the ALJ erred in finding that she
had less than marked limitations in the domain of acquiring and using information, and that the
record supports a finding of marked limitations in that domain. Alternatively, Respondent argues
that the ALJ’s finding is supported by substantial evidence in the record as a whole. Both parties
concede that Claimant has marked limitations in the domain of attending to and completing tasks
and do not take issue with the ALJ’s findings as to the remaining four domains. Accordingly,
this Court’s analysis is limited to the record evidence, testimony, and the ALJ’s findings related
to Claimant’s ability to acquire and use information.
Claimant raises the following issues: (1) the ALJ failed to make a proper credibility
determination regarding Claimant’s parents’ statements as to her abilities in the domain of
acquiring and using information; (2) the ALJ failed to address evidence contrary to his finding
that Claimant had a less than marked limitation in the domain of acquiring and using

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information; (3) the ALJ failed to adequately explain that finding; and (4) the ALJ failed to
properly weigh relevant teacher questionnaires pursuant to SSR 06-3p.
A. Credibility
Because the ALJ is in the best position to observe witnesses, an ALJ’s credibility finding
will not be overturned as long as it has some support in the record. Dixon v. Massanari, 270 F.3d
1171, 1178-1179 (7th Cir. 2001). Although the ALJ is not required to explain every factor in
making a credibility determination, his opinion “must contain specific reasons for the finding on
credibility, supported by the evidence in the record, and must be sufficiently specific to make
clear to the individual and to any subsequent reviewers the weight the adjudicator gave to the
individual’s statement and reasons for the weight.” Brindisi v. Barnhart, 315 F.3d 783, 787-88
(7th Cir. 2003).
As stated above, the ALJ assigned information provided by Claimant’s parents minimal
weight because he found that they were not well-positioned to offer dispassionate insight into the
claimant’s functioning. R.22. However, in questioning the credibility of Claimant’s parents, the
ALJ did not address the factors for determining credibility outlined in SSR 96-7.
SSR 96-7p provides that an ALJ must consider certain factors when evaluating
credibility. Those factors include the Claimant’s treatment history, daily activities and
symptoms. The ALJ’s stated reasons for giving statements from Claimant’s parents minimal
weight related to Mr. Large’s criminal record, a DCFS investigation unrelated to Claimant, a
perceived chaotic family life and questionable parenting styles. R.22. Those facts have little if
any relation to Claimant’s parents’ ability to provide truthful information on Claimant’s ADHD
condition. Accordingly, this case is remanded so that the ALJ can analyze the credibility of

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Claimant’s parents in terms of their ability to truthfully testify as to Claimant’s ADHD
condition. The credibility determination should not be based solely on their criminal records or
parenting style.
Moreover, and critically, the credibility findings must be based on accurate facts and
considerations. Notably, the ALJ specifically discredited the father’s testimony that the
medication Dr. Azar prescribed and that SL took did not make “any difference” with SL. In
discrediting the father’s testimony in this regard, the ALJ stated the following: “In point of fact,
as of February 2010, contrary to his hearing testimony, the claimant’s father acknowledged . . .
that the medication improved his daughter’s concentration.” R.22 Unfortunately, the ALJ
incorrectly attributed that statement to the father, when, in point of fact, SL made that statement.
Therefore, a major basis for not crediting the father’s testimony was erroneous.
Additionally, Respondent’s brief improperly attempted to bolster the ALJ’s finding that
the father’s testimony was not credible on allegations not relied upon by the ALJ. Indeed, the
brief contains at least three assertions that were not cited by the ALJ as a basis for discrediting
the father’s testimony. Those efforts to bolster the ALJ’s credibility determination are
unavailing. Parker v. Astrue, 597 F.3d 920, 922 (7th Cir. 2010).
B. Limitations in Acquiring and Using Information
“Acquiring and using information refers to how well a child acquires or learns
information and how well [she] uses the information [she] has learned.” Hopgood ex rel. L.G. v.
Astrue, 578 F.3d 696, 699 (7th Cir. 2009)(citing C.F.R. § 416.926a(g)). A school-age child,
between the ages of 6 and 12, should be able to learn to read, write, and do math, and discuss
history and science. 20 C.F.R. § 416.926a(g)(2)(iv). She should also be able to use those skills in

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academic situations to demonstrate what she has learned. Id. For instance, she should be able to
produce oral and written projects, solve math problems, and take tests. Id. She should also be
able to apply those skills to daily living situations at home and in the community. Id.
Several aspects of the ALJ’s analysis of this domain appear deficient. The Seventh
Circuit has held that “the ALJ must consider ‘all relevant evidence’ and may not analyze only
that information supporting the ALJ’s final conclusion.” Godbey v. Apfel, 238 F.3d 803, 808 (7th
Cir. 2000)(citing Clifford v. Apfel, 227 F.3d 863, 871 (7th Cir. 2000). Although the ALJ is not
required to articulate his reasons for rejecting every piece of evidence, he must at least minimally
discuss evidence that contradicts the Commissioner’s position. Id. In this case, the ALJ did not
explain why he did not credit portions of the record that were favorable to Claimant. See
Hopgood, 578 F.3d at 700; Murphy v. Astrue, 496 F.3d 630, 634-35 (7th Cir. 2007).
As stated above, the ALJ gave substantial weight to the opinions of the non-examining
agency consultants, Dr. Taylor and Dr. Heinrich. Both doctors opined in March and June 2009,
respectively, that Claimant had less than marked limitations in the domain of acquiring and using
information. However, those opinions were formed without the benefit of Claimant’s April 2010
IEP conference report, or her most recent teacher questionnaire from May 2010. The 2010 IEP
indicated that in third grade, Claimant required a dramatic increase in special education services.
Additionally, the May 2010 teacher questionnaire highlighted Claimant’s continuing problems in
the domain of acquiring and using information. In his decision, the ALJ did not address the
extent to which, if at all, this additional information would have impacted the opinions of Dr.
Taylor or Dr. Heinrich. On remanded, the ALJ should consider whether the opinions of the
agency consultants are still entitled to substantial weight in light of the new information

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provided in the 2010 IEP conference report and teacher questionnaire.
On remand, the ALJ should also provide more analysis and explanation as to why he did
not credit the findings that Claimant had serious and very serious problems in acquiring and
using information outlined in her teacher questionnaires. See Giles ex. rel. Giles v. Astrue, 183
F.3d 483, 488 (7th Cir. 2007). In his decision, the ALJ mentioned that Claimant’s teachers have
“noted significant problems with her ability to learn” and “remarked upon very serious problems
in learning and acquiring information.” R.21, 24. However, he concluded that those problems
“result primarily from her ADHD symptoms, including distractibility, impulsivity, restlessness,
and failure to complete tasks.” R.21. SSR 09-2p provides that an ALJ “should analyze and
evaluate relevant evidence for consistency, and resolve any inconsistencies that need to be
resolved.” Claimant’s documented limitations mirrored the indicators for limitations in the
domain of “acquiring and using information.” Those indicators include poor grades, inconsistent
academic performance, receipt of special education services, speech/language services, and
testing accommodations. See SSR 09-3p. On remand, the ALJ should better explain why this
evidence does not support a finding of a marked limitations in the domain of “acquiring and
using information.”
The ALJ should also better explain, given the context, why Claimant’s promotion to third
grade supports a finding of less than marked limitations in “acquiring and using information.”
The ALJ appears to have given substantial weight to the fact that Claimant was promoted to third
grade. Even with the promotion, Claimant was still a half to a whole grade level behind her peers
in all core subjects. She also was not performing well enough to receive letter grades, and the
number of special education hours she needed doubled from second to third grade. In third grade,

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Claimant also needed new and additional classroom accommodations, more generous testing
allowances, and had to be completely removed to a self-contained classroom for math, reading
and English. On these facts, the ALJ did not build a logical bridge to his conclusion that
Claimant has less than marked limitations in acquiring and using information. See Young v.
Barnhart, 362 F.3d 995, 1002 (7th Cir. 2004).
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, Claimant’s motion for summary judgment is granted in
part. This case is remanded to the Social Security Administration for further proceedings
consistent with the Memorandum Opinion and Order.
It is so ordered.

_____________________________
U.S. Magistrate Judge

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