Edens v. O'Brien et al

Filing 184

ORDER-WRITTEN Opinion entered by the Honorable Philip G. Reinhard on 12/12/2016: For the following reasons, plaintiff's motion for a rehearing 169 is denied. [see STATEMENT-OPINION] Signed by the Honorable Philip G. Reinhard on 12/12/2016. Mailed notice (kms)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
WESTERN DIVISION
James R. Edens,
Plaintiff,
vs.
John O'Brien, et al.,
Defendants.

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Case No. 14 CV 50056

Judge Philip G. Reinhard

ORDER
For the following reasons, plaintiff’s motion for a rehearing [169] is denied.
STATEMENT-OPINION
On August 9, 2016, this court granted the defendants’ motions for summary judgment on
the grounds that plaintiff failed to properly exhaust administrative remedies. See [165].
Currently before the court is plaintiff’s motion for a rehearing [169], in which he contends that a
rehearing is necessary. Plaintiff points out that this court’s decision was based in part on the fact
that plaintiff failed to acknowledge the ARB’s request for additional information from him,
either by indicating his position that no additional information was required or by attempting to
supply the information by re-submitting his grievance to obtain the information. Plaintiff now
points to a previously unacknowledged aspect of the ARB’s request for additional information,
in which ARB officer Sarah Johnson handwrote that plaintiff should submit the information “if
within timeframe.” See [169] at 2, 6. Because plaintiff was no longer within the timeframe for
submitting his original grievance, he contends that he was strictly complying with the ARB’s
request, which was contingent upon having to submit the information only if it had been
submitted within the relevant timeframe, which it had not. As such, according to plaintiff, by
remaining silent he was in effect complying with the ARB’s instructions, and it thereafter failed
to act.
Plaintiff’s motion was filed within 28 days of the court’s judgment, and as such it must
be construed under Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e). See Kiswani v. Phoenix Sec. Agency, Inc., 584 F.3d
741, 742-43 (7th Cir. 2009). “A Rule 59(e) motion will be successful only where the movant
clearly establishes: (1) that the court committed a manifest error of law or fact, or (2) that newly
discovered evidence precluded entry of judgment.” Cincinnati Life Ins. Co. v. Beyrer, 722 F.3d
939, 954 (7th Cir. 2013) (internal quotations omitted). Here, plaintiff points to the ARB’s
handwritten notes on the ARB response, which plaintiff did not discuss in opposing defendants’
motion for summary judgment. That the handwritten notes changed the nature of whether
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additional information was required is a new argument that could have been raised in the original
summary judgment proceedings, but was not. “Reconsideration is not an appropriate forum for
rehashing previously rejected arguments or arguing matters that could have been heard during
the pendency of the previous motion.” Caisse Nationale de Credit Agricole v. CBI Indus., Inc.,
90 F.3d 1264, 1270 (7th Cir. 1996). Plaintiff’s argument is thus not appropriate under Rule
59(e). See id.; Bally Exp. Corp. v. Balicar, Ltd., 804 F.2d 398, 404 (7th Cir. 1986) (“[A] motion
for reconsideration is an improper vehicle to introduce evidence previously available or to tender
new legal theories.”).
In addition to plaintiff’s failure to exhaust, and as an alternative basis, the court also
declines to grant plaintiff’s motion because summary judgment is justified for all defendants
regardless. Although the court did not address the merits of plaintiff’s claims because his failure
to exhaust was a threshold and sufficient inquiry, the court finds that plaintiff has not raised a
genuine issue of material fact as to whether defendants Tina O’Brien , Dr. O’Brien, Dr. Crisham,
Wexford, Dr. Louis Shicker, and Warden Chandler were deliberately indifferent to his medical
needs. The crux of plaintiff’s argument was that he was entitled to free dentures and the various
defendants failed to provide them to him. However, the undisputed facts establish that none of
the defendants acted with deliberate indifference.
First, Tina O’Brien is a dental assistant, and there is no genuine issue of fact that she had
the authority to provide plaintiff with his requested relief of free dentures, or impeded his ability
to obtain them given that Dr. Crisham and Dr. O’Brien were aware of plaintiff’s desire for new
dentures. At best, Ms. O’Brien simply informed plaintiff of the prison’s policies regarding
payment for new dentures, which does not amount to deliberate indifference.
Dr. O’Brien’s actions also did not amount to deliberate indifferent. The undisputed facts
showed that he offered to refurbish plaintiff’s dentures, and when plaintiff indicated that he had
lost his dentures, he was informed that the dentures could be replaced at the labaratory’s
fabrication cost of $250. Moreover, Dr. O’Brien did not conclude that dentures were clinically
necessary for plaintiff and plaintiff has not proffered any evidence or expert testimony to raise a
genuine issue of fact as to whether Dr. O’Brien’s medical judgment was “blatantly
inappropriate” as to amount to deliberate indifference.” Perez v. Fenoglio, 792 F.3d 768, 777
(7th Cir. 2015). The analysis is the same with Dr. Crisham, who also found that replacement
dentures were not medically necessary for plaintiff, at least as of the last day of treatment on
April 26, 2013, the last day Dr. Crisham had personal involvement in plaintiff’s care.
The analysis for Wexford leads to the same result. At the very least, whether its policy of
requiring inmates to pay for replacement dentures would amount to deliberate indifference in the
case of an inmate for whom replacement dentures were found to be medically necessary, in this
case the only expert testimony was that dentures were not a medical necessity for plaintiff. As
such, Wexford’s policies did not lead to an unconstitutional deprivation for plaintiff.
Dr. Louis Shicker, the Medical Director for the IDOC, received a letter from plaintiff
complaining about dental treatment and sent a response indicating that the dentist would make an
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assessment as to his clinical needs. Warden Chandler’s only personal involvement was based on
a single conversation with plaintiff, in which she also deferred to his medical providers’ clinical
judgment. Based on the undisputed facts, the court agrees with defendants that Dr. Shicker and
Warden Chandler were entitled to show deference to plaintiff’s medical providers and were not
deliberately indifferent. See McGee v. Adams, 721 F.3d 474, 483 (7th Cir. 2013). Moreover,
because the court finds that the care itself was not deliberately indifferent, these defendants were
not the cause of a constitutional deprivation.
For the foregoing reasons, plaintiff’s motion for a rehearing [169] is denied.
Date: 12/12/2016

ENTER:

United States District Court Judge

Electronic Notices. (LC)

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