Edens v. O'Brien et al

Filing 89

ORDER, WRITTEN Opinion entered by the Honorable Philip G. Reinhard on 2/19/2015: For the reasons below, defendants' motion to dismiss count III 68 is granted. Signed by the Honorable Philip G. Reinhard on 2/19/2015:mailed notice(pg, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
WESTERN DIVISION
James R. Edens (N-60262) ,
Plaintiff,
v.
John O’Brien, D.D.S., et al.,
Defendants.

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14 C 50056

Judge Philip G. Reinhard

ORDER
For the reasons below, defendants’ motion to dismiss count III [68] is granted.
STATEMENT - OPINION
Plaintiff, James R. Edens, an inmate at Dixon Correctional Center, brings this civil rights
case pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In his second amended complaint, plaintiff asserts six claims
under the Eighth Amendment. All of plaintiff’s claims relate to his inability to obtain partial
dentures while incarcerated. Plaintiff contends a number of defendants are liable for deliberate
indifference and failing to provide adequate medical care. See [64]. He names John O’Brien, the
Dental Department Supervisor at Dixon Correctional Center (“Dixon”), John Crisham, a dentist at
Dixon, Tina O’Brien, a dental assistant at Dixon, Wexford Health Services, the corporation that
handles medical care at Dixon, Louis Shicker, the Medical Director at Dixon and Nedra Chandler,
the former Warden at Dixon, as defendants.
Count I of the second amended complaint asserts a claim against defendants John O’Brien,
Tina O’Brien, and John Crisham. In count I, plaintiff alleges the aforementioned defendants are
liable because they failed to provide plaintiff medically necessary partial dentures at the expense of
the State. Count II of the second amended complaint is asserted against Wexford Health Services
(“Wexford”). In count II, plaintiff claims Wexford has an unconstitutional policy of not providing
medically necessary dentures to inmates. Count III is also asserted against Wexford and is labeled
as a “respondeat superior” claim. In count III, plaintiff claims that Wexford is liable for the acts of
its employees (John O’Brien, John Crisham, and Tina O’Brien). Count IV is asserted against
defendant Shicker in his individual capacity. In count IV, plaintiff alleges that defendant Shicker
was aware of plaintiff’s serious medical need and failed to provide adequate medical care. Count
V is an individual capacity claim against defendant Chandler. In count V, plaintiff alleges that
defendant Chandler was apprised of plaintiff’s medical condition and failed to address his pleas for
medical attention. Count VI is asserted against all defendants in their official capacities. In count
VI, plaintiff seeks injunctive relief and asks the court to arrange for plaintiff to receive partial
dentures at the State’s expense.
1

All defendants have answered the complaint. Defendant Wexford has answered the
complaint with respect to counts II and VI, but has filed a motion to dismiss count III, plaintiff’s
respondeat superior claim. See [68]. In its motion to dismiss, Wexford argues that controlling
precedent does not allow for respondeat superior claims in Section 1983 claims.
“To survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12 (b)(6), the complaint must state a claim to
relief that is plausible on its face. A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual
content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged.” Yeftich v. Navistar, 722 F.3d 911, 915 (7th Cir. 2013) (internal quotation
marks and citations omitted). “Where a complaint pleads facts that are merely consistent with a
defendant’s liability, it stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of entitlement to
relief.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). In cases such as these, the inference of
liability is only “speculative.” Id.
Wexford contends that count III must be dismissed because Section 1983 does not provide
for respondeat superior claims. Plaintiff, on the other hand, argues that recent precedent suggests
that such claims should be permissible. He cites a handful of recent cases from this District, as
support. However, the court finds none of plaintiff’s support persuasive.
Plaintiff principally relies upon the Seventh Circuit’s recent decision in Shields v. Illinois
Dept. Of Corrections, 746 F.3d 782 (7th Cir. 2014). He contends the Shields court questioned the
Seventh Circuit’s prior decision Iskander v. Village of Forest Park, 690 F.2d 126 (7th Cir. 1982),
and suggested that respondeat superior claims should be permissible in Section 1983 actions. (In
Iskander, the Seventh Circuit expressly held that “a private corporation is not vicariously liable
under § 1983 for its employees’ deprivations of others’ civil rights.” Id. at 128.).
Despite plaintiff’s suggestions to the contrary, the Seventh Circuit never overruled Iskander.
Instead, in Shields the Seventh Circuit merely pondered whether “a new approach [was] needed [to
determine] whether corporations should be insulated from respondeat superior liability under §
1983.” Shields, 746 F.3d 795. In the end, the Seventh Circuit was clear that the law of this circuit
“still extends Monell (and prevents respondeat superior liability) from municipalities to private
corporations.” Id. at 796. (citations omitted).
Nevertheless, plaintiff argues that his respondeat superior claim should survive dismissal.
He cites a plethora of cases decided subsequent to Shields as support. See [81] at 6 (citing Jacobs
v. Ill. Dep’t of Corr., No. 14-CV-00283-JPG, 2014 WL 1257910 (S.D. Ill. Mar. 27, 2014); Liebich
v. Hardy, No. 11-C-5624, 2014 WL 1395957 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 10, 2014); Barrow v. Wexford Health
Services, No. 14-CV-00800-NJR, 2014 WL 5032279 (S.D. Ill. Oct. 8, 2014); Morland v. Ghosh,
No.12-CV-0500, 2014 WL 7204830 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 15, 2014). However, even as plaintiff admits,
none of these cases have overruled Iskander. Indeed, in all of the cases mentioned above the
plaintiff’s Section 1983 respondeat superior claim was not be permissible. See e.g., Morland, 2014
WL 1395957 at *1-2 (noting that a plaintiff’s respondeat superior claim could not survive because
“respondeat superior liability does not apply to private corporations under Section 1983.”).
2

This court is no different than the ones mentioned above. It must follow existing precedent.
See Reiser v. Residential Funding Corp., 380 F.3d 1027, 1029 (7th Cir. 2004) (“[D]ecisions of a
superior court are authoritative on inferior courts. Just as the court of appeals must follow decisions
of the Supreme Court whether or not we agree with them, so district judges must follow the
decisions of this court whether or not they agree.”) (citations omitted). The Seventh Circuit has not
overruled Iskander and the law of this circuit is that private corporations cannot be liable pursuant
to Section 1983 under a respondeat superior theory. Shields, 746 F.3d 796. As such, plaintiff cannot
proceed with his claim that Wexford is liable for the actions of its employees and Wexford’s motion
to dismiss count III [68] is granted.
For the reasons above, defendants’ motion to dismiss count III [68] is granted.

Date: 2/19/2015

ENTER:

United States District Court Judge
Electronic Notices. (LC)

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