Booker v. O'Conner et al

Filing 4

ORDER : The plaintiff's motion for leave to file in forma pauperis 3 is granted. The court waives the initial partial filing fee and orders the trust fund officer at the plaintiff's place of incarceration to continue making monthly dedu ctions in accordance with this order. However, the complaint 1 is summarily dismissed on initial review pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A for failure to state a claim. The case is terminated. 1 . The clerk is directed to mail a copy of this orde r to the trust fund officer at the Menard Correctional Center. This dismissal counts as one of the plaintiffs three allotted dismissals under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). [See STATEMENT] Signed by the Honorable Philip G. Reinhard on 3/26/2015. Mailed notice (jp, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
WESTERN DIVISION
Willie James Booker (#B-61837),
Plaintiff,
v.
Margie O’Conner, et al.,
Defendants.

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Case No. 3:15 CV 50052

Judge Philip G. Reinhard

ORDER
The plaintiff’s motion for leave to file in forma pauperis [3] is granted. The court waives
the initial partial filing fee and orders the trust fund officer at the plaintiff’s place of incarceration
to continue making monthly deductions in accordance with this order. However, the complaint [1]
is summarily dismissed on initial review pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A for failure to state a claim.
The case is terminated. [1]. The clerk is directed to mail a copy of this order to the trust fund officer
at the Menard Correctional Center. This dismissal counts as one of the plaintiff’s three allotted
dismissals under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).
STATEMENT
The plaintiff, an Illinois state prisoner, has brought this pro se civil rights action pursuant to
42 U.S.C. § 1983. The plaintiff claims that his 1994 conviction for aggravated criminal sexual
assault is invalid due to infirmities in the Illinois Constitution, and that defendants, Winnebago
County Assistant State’s Attorney Margie O’Conner, Judge Ronald L. Pirrello, and Governor Bruce
Rauner, should have taken steps to prevent or invalidate his conviction. Currently, plaintiff is
incarcerated due to a 2003 conviction for first degree murder and aggravated battery with a firearm,
for which he is serving consecutive terms of imprisonment of 36 years and 22 years, respectively.
He is no longer in custody or on parole with regard to the 1994 aggravated criminal sexual assault
conviction he challenges here.
The court finds that the plaintiff is unable to prepay the filing fee. Based on the trust fund
officer’s certification that the plaintiff has a trust fund balance of -$334.17, the court waives the
initial filing fee pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4). Moving forward, the trust fund officer at the
plaintiff’s place of confinement is directed to collect monthly payments from the plaintiff’s trust fund
account in the amount of 20% of the preceding month’s income credited to the account. Monthly
payments shall be forwarded to the clerk of court each time the account balance exceeds $10 until
the full $350 filing fee is paid. Separate deductions and payments shall be made with respect to each
action or appeal filed by the plaintiff. All payments shall be sent to the Clerk, United States District

Court, 219 S. Dearborn St., Chicago, Illinois 60604, attn: Cashier’s Desk, 20th Floor, and shall
clearly identify the plaintiff’s name and this case number.
However, under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the court is required to dismiss a suit brought by a
prisoner at any time if the court determines that it is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim on
which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such
relief. Here, even accepting the plaintiff’s factual allegations as true, the court finds that the
complaint fails to state a claim as a matter of law.
While the four-count complaint is not a model of pleading, as best as the court can determine
the plaintiff challenges his 1994 sexual assault conviction due to various infirmities in the Illinois
Constitution. Without addressing the merits of plaintiff’s individual claims, each contains a
fundamental flaw in that the plaintiff asks this court for injunctive relief that would have the effect
of invalidating his conviction. Such relief would require this court to review the state-court
judgment in his case, and would run afoul of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. See Exxon Mobil Corp.
v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 283–84 (2005); Dist. of Columbia Ct. of Appeals v.
Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 482–83 (1983); Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 415–16 (1923).
Under Rooker-Feldman, the lower federal courts lack jurisdiction to review state court judgments,
except in certain limited circumstances, including when a petitioner seeks habeas relief pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 2254. See Nelson v. Campbell, 541 U.S. 637, 643 (2004) (claims for injunctive relief
challenging a state conviction “fall within the ‘core’ of habeas corpus and are thus not cognizable
when brought pursuant to § 1983 ”); Sides v. City of Champaign, 496 F.3d 820, (7th Cir. 2007) (“We
are not authorized to afford relief ‘where a party in effect seeks to take an appeal of an unfavorable
state-court decision to a lower federal court.’”); Hadley v. Quinn, 524 Fed. App’x 290, 293 (7th Cir.
2013) (holding that plaintiff’s claim that he had been incarcerated on an invalid conviction was
barred by Rooker-Feldman where the plaintiff was no longer in custody on his conviction and could
not seek habeas relief). Moreover, § 2254 relief is unavailable to plaintiff both because he is no
longer in custody on his sexual assault conviction, see id., and because “[a] court cannot on its own
convert a § 1983 suit to one under § 2254[.]” Lacy v. Indiana, 564 Fed. Appx. 844, 845 (7th Cir.
May 7, 2014); see also Copus v. City of Edgerton, 96 F.3d 1038, 1039 (7th Cir. 1996). Thus, the
court has no jurisdiction to grant the relief plaintiff seeks and his claims fail as a matter of law.1

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The court also notes that the complaint explicitly names Judge Pirrello, O’Connor, and
Governor Rauner only in their official capacities. Because plaintiff’s allegations cannot be
construed as “an ongoing violation of federal law and seek[ing] relief properly characterized as
prospective,” the claims must fail on this basis as well. See Council 31 of the American
Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees, AFL-CIO v. Quinn, 680 F.3d 875, 882
(7th Cir. 2012). To the extent the complaint can be construed to confer personal liability, the
court notes that Judge Pirrello is immune from a § 1983 suit for actions taken while he presided
over the plaintiff’s criminal case. Brokaw v. Mercer County, 235 F.3d 1000, 1015 (7th Cir.
2000). Similar immunity applies to prosecutors, like O’Conner, for actions undertaken in
initiating a prosecution or presenting the state’s case. Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976).
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For the foregoing reasons, this suit [1] is dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted. The plaintiff is warned that after Booker v. City of Rockford, No. 03 C 50066
(N.D. Ill.), and Booker v. Mitchell, 10-cv-312-DRH (S.D. Ill.), this is his third case in which the
complaint has been dismissed as frivolous, malicious, or failing to state a claim. The plaintiff is
warned that in the future, he may not file suit in federal court without prepaying the filing fee unless
he is in imminent danger of serious physical injury. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).
If the plaintiff wishes to appeal this dismissal, he may file a notice of appeal with this court
within thirty days of the entry of judgment. Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1)(A). A motion for leave to appeal
in forma pauperis should set forth the issues the plaintiff plans to present on appeal. See Fed. R.
App. P. 24(a)(1)(C). If the plaintiff does choose to appeal, he will be liable for the $505 appellate
filing fee irrespective of the outcome of the appeal. Evans v. Illinois Dept. of Corrections, 150 F.3d
810, 812 (7th Cir. 1998). Furthermore, if the appeal is found to be non-meritorious, the plaintiff may
also accumulate another “strike.”
Date:3/26/2015

ENTER:

United States District Court Judge

Docketing to Mail Notices. (SP)

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