Saucedo v. Illinois Dept. of Corrections et al

Filing 62

ORDER: The magistrate judges report and recommendation 60 is accepted. Plaintiffs objections are overruled. This case is closed. Signed by the Honorable Frederick J. Kapala on 5/25/2017:mailed notice(pg, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
Rigoberto Saucedo,
Plaintiff,
v.
Illinois Department of Corrections, et al.,
Defendants.

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Case No: 15 C 50136

Judge Frederick J. Kapala

ORDER
The magistrate judge’s report and recommendation [60] is accepted. Plaintiff’s objections are
overruled. This case is closed.
STATEMENT
Before the court is a report and recommendation from the magistrate judge that this court
dismiss plaintiff’s amended complaint for failure to exhaust his administrative remedies.
Defendants, several employees of the Illinois Department of Corrections and Wexford Health
Services, Inc., assert that plaintiff did not exhaust properly because (1) his grievance failed to
identify or describe any of the defendants he listed in his complaint, except Officer Manzano; and
(2) he failed to adequately identify the medical treatment or misconduct at issue. The magistrate
judge conducted a Pavey hearing and found that while plaintiff properly filed his grievance, he did
not identify the claims alleged in his complaint. Thereafter, on April 25, 2017, plaintiff filed
objections reiterating the same arguments he made at his Pavey hearing. Plaintiff contends that he
properly exhausted his administrative remedies even though he did not identify defendants in his
grievance because he was unable to obtain defendants’ identities at the time without being severely
disciplined.
Pursuant to Rule 72(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the district court must
“determine de novo any part of the magistrate judge’s disposition that has been properly objected
to.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3). The Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”) requires a prisoner to
properly exhaust his administrative remedies before filing an action concerning prison conditions.
See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) (“No action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under
section 1983 of this title, or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other
correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.”); Pavey v.
Conley, 544 F.3d 739, 742 (7th Cir. 2008) (providing that the district court can rule on an exhaustion
defense before allowing the case to proceed to discovery). “Failure to exhaust is an affirmative
defense that a defendant has the burden of proving.” King v. McCarty, 781 F.3d 889, 893 (7th Cir.
2015). “Courts analyze a prisoner’s exhaustion under the preponderance of the evidence standard.”

Lloyd v. Dart, No. 14 C 69, 2016 WL 232422, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 20, 2016).
“The purpose of the exhaustion requirement is to ensure that prisons have a fair opportunity
to correct their own errors through the grievance process.” Pyles v. Nwaobasi, 829 F.3d 860, 867
(7th Cir. 2016). Therefore, in order to properly exhaust administrative remedies, a prisoner must
“us[e] all steps that the agency holds out, and do[] so properly (so that the agency addresses the
issues on the merits).” Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 90 (2006) (emphasis omitted). The Seventh
Circuit has “taken a strict compliance approach to exhaustion.” Dole v. Chandler, 438 F.3d 804, 809
(7th Cir. 2006); see also King, 781 F.3d at 893 (“The exhaustion requirement is strict. A prisoner
must comply with the specific procedures and deadlines established by the prison’s policy.”). “[A]
prisoner who does not properly take each step within the administrative process has failed to exhaust
state remedies, and thus is foreclosed by § 1997e(a) from litigating.” Pozo v. McCaughtry, 286 F.3d
1022, 1024 (7th Cir. 2002).
“State law determines the administrative remedies that a state prisoner must exhaust for
PLRA purposes.” Pyles, 829 F.3d at 864. Therefore, plaintiff’s grievance is governed by Illinois
Administrative Code tit. 20 § 504.800 et seq. Pursuant to regulations, which plaintiff acknowledged
reading and signing as part of an orientation manual he received,
[t]he grievance shall contain factual details regarding each aspect of the offender’s
complaint, including what happened, when, where and the name of each person who
is the subject of or who is otherwise involved in the complaint. This provision does
not preclude an offender from filing a grievance when the names of individuals are
not known, but the offender must include as much descriptive information about the
individual as possible.
Id. at 540.810(c). In addition to the orientation manual explaining the grievance process, the
grievance form that plaintiff filled out specifically indicated that the summary of grievance was to
include information regarding “a description of what happened, when and where it happened, and
the name or identifying information for each person involved.”
In this case, plaintiff filed a two-page grievance concerning the events which occurred on
April 17, 2013. Plaintiff described in detail the events that took place earlier in the day and that he
was struck by lightning as he walked back from the dining hall. He also explained that he suffered
from blurred vision and dizziness and was taken to the Health Care Unit. However, in his two-page
grievance, plaintiff failed to identify by name or offer a description of any health care personnel. In
fact, plaintiff only mentioned the Health Care Unit when he noted that he “was given asprin and it
. . . had no effect on my pain and I feel helpless because the Health Care Unit said that they could
not help me in any other way.” Turning to Illinois Department of Corrections defendants, plaintiff
only identified Officer Manzano by name and did not describe or mention any other officers or staff
members. Therefore, on the face of the grievance plaintiff did not properly describe or identify any
person involved.
At his Pavey hearing, plaintiff argued that he did not identify any individuals in his grievance
other than Officer Manzano because he did not know who they were. Plaintiff testified that he was
not allowed to question the medical staff about their identities and their name tags were not visible.
He also testified that he did not know the names of administrative personnel or officers that were
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involved in the incident. Plaintiff reiterates these arguments in his objections to the magistrate
judge’s recommendation and further asserts that the prison has a policy geared to insulate its
employees by making it almost impossible, without punishment, to obtain names of officers and
medical personnel. Plaintiff argues that defendants should not benefit from these policies and
procedures and be allowed to argue in a Pavey hearing that plaintiff did not adequately identify the
defendants that were involved.
Plaintiff cites general and distinguishable authority for the proposition that an inmate “must
exhaust only those administrative remedies that are available to him,” Lewis v. Washington, 300
F.3d 829, 833 (7th Cir. 2002), and that “[p]rison authorities cannot immunize themselves from suit
by establishing procedures that in practice are not available because they are impossible to comply
with or simply do not exist,” King, 781 F.3d at 893. Plaintiff’s argument is unpersuasive. Assuming
plaintiff’s allegations are correct and the prison’s policies made it difficult for him to obtain the
names of the individuals involved, the PLRA does not require names. The PLRA only requires a
detailed description of the individuals involved, which plaintiff failed to provide. See Roberts v.
Neal, 745 F.3d 232, 235–36 (7th Cir. 2014) (explaining that the PLRA does not require a grievant
to know the name of the prison employee whom he’s complaining about but must include “as much
descriptive information about the individual as possible”). In the interest of fairness, the court also
takes into consideration that plaintiff was in pain and disoriented from the lightning strike, however,
despite his injuries plaintiff was able to recall the day’s events and describe them in detail in his
grievance. Therefore, defendants have established by a preponderance of the evidence that plaintiff
did not adequately describe the individuals involved in his grievance.
Turning to Officer Manzano, plaintiff did identify him by name but only as a witness,
“witness=Officer Manzano,” without providing any other information as to Officer Manzano’s
involvement. The PLRA requires that the grievance include a description of the individual’s
involvement in the incident so that the institution can be put on notice of the problem it needs to
correct. Simply identifying Officer Manzano as a witness without more, plaintiff failed to alert the
institution of a problem. Therefore, defendants have met their burden as to Officer Manzano and
are entitled to dismissal.
Next, at his Pavey hearing plaintiff argued that he did not receive adequate medical treatment
for his injury. The magistrate judge found that plaintiff’s grievance did not properly alert the prison
officials to the alleged lack of medical treatment. According to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
72(b) a party that disagrees with a magistrate judge’s report and recommendation on a dispositive
motion must file “written, specific objections” to the report. Johnson v. Zema Sys. Corp., 170 F.3d
734, 739 (7th Cir. 1999). A district court judge “shall make a de novo determination of those
portions of the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is
made.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 673 (1980). “If no objection
or only partial objection is made, the district court judge reviews those unobjected portions for clear
error.” Johnson, 170 F.3d at 739. Plaintiff does not specifically object to the magistrate judge’s
recommendation that his grievance did not address the lack of medical treatment he received in his
objections to the magistrate judge’s report. Plaintiff only made a brief reference when (1) he
summarized defendants’ argument stating that defendants contend that plaintiff, “failed to identify
or describe the defendants or the medical treatment and conduct he is now complaining about,” and
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(2) that he testified in his Pavey hearing as to his “limited treatment which he believed to be a
concussion protocol.” Therefore, the court will review the magistrate judge’s recommendation using
the clearly erroneous standard as to plaintiff’s medical claims.
Plaintiff’s grievance does not exhaust his claims as to inadequate medical care. In his
complaint, plaintiff alleges that defendants were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical
condition, where they knowingly delayed treatment and diagnosis by failing to provide specialist
outside care not available at the institution. Plaintiff alleges that this care would have alleviated his
severe headaches, numbness in his hands and fingers, and cognitive impairments that contribute to
severe pain and a diminished quality of life. However, plaintiff did not address these concerns in
his grievance. He simply mentioned that the asprin he received did not alleviate his pain but made
no mention that he requested and was denied outside care or the opinion of a medical specialist.
Instead, plaintiff’s grievance focused on the negligence of the administration and requested
compensation. Additionally, plaintiff did not specify that his grievance was about “medical
treatment” as he was required to do and failed to file a separate grievance detailing his dissatisfaction
with his medical care. See Waldrop v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc., 646 F. App’x 486, 490 (7th
Cir. 2016) (explaining that inmate failed to exhaust his administrative remedies because he did not
file separate grievances for each complaint as required, where the inmate complained that several
defendants did not timely review his grievances, whereas other defendants were deliberately
indifferent). Therefore, plaintiff did not properly exhaust his administrative remedies with respect
to his claims alleging failure to adequately treat and diagnose his medical condition.
Based on the aforementioned, the court accepts the magistrate judge’s recommendation and
dismisses plaintiff’s amended complaint for failure to exhaust. This case is closed.
Date: 5/25/2017

ENTER:
_________________________
FREDERICK J. KAPALA
District Judge

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