Smith v. Duncan

Filing 8

ORDER-WRITTEN Opinion entered by the Honorable Philip G. Reinhard on 1/27/2017: For the following reasons, petitioner's 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition 1 ; 3 is denied. The court declines to issue a certificate of appealability. The matter is terminated. [see STATEMENT-OPINION] Signed by the Honorable Philip G. Reinhard on 1/27/2017. Mailed notice (kms)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
WESTERN DIVISION
Vincent E. Smith, (R11677),
Petitioner,
v.
Steven Duncan, Warden,
Respondent.

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Case No. 16 C 50180

Judge Philip G. Reinhard

ORDER
For the following reasons, petitioner’s 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition [1]; [3] is denied. The court
declines to issue a certificate of appealability. The matter is terminated.
STATEMENT - OPINION
On June 10, 2016, petitioner Vincent E. Smith, a prisoner confined at the Lawrence
Correctional Center, filed this pro se habeas corpus action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 challenging
his 2011 home invasion, armed robbery, armed violence, and unlawful restraint convictions from
the Twenty-Second Judicial Circuit Court, McHenry County, Illinois. See [1]; [3].
The evidence at trial was that petitioner had broken into a home with an accomplice, who
attacked a victim before stealing the victim’s money. Both of the men wore ski masks, although at
least defendant’s mask had large holes allowing for some amount of his face to be seen. Four
eyewitnesses to the crime, three of whom knew defendant previously, testified that he was one of
the masked men. Three of the witnesses positively identified him during a photo line up, while one
stated at the line up that she was almost sure, although not absolutely sure, that it was him.
Petitioner raised an alibi defense, namely that he was drinking at a bar the night in question. The
bar owner and bartender testified that he was drinking at the bar the night in question, but also
testified that he closed his tab several hours before the events of the crime occurred. Petitioner’s
girlfriend testified that she picked him up at closing time and took him home. In rebuttal, the
prosecution introduced a recorded conversation where the girlfriend asked petitioner what she
should tell investigators about the night of the crimes. The prosecution also presented a recording
of a phone call to petitioner from an unknown person. The unknown person related a newspaper
article about the home invasion, and petitioner replied “How was that when – when we was
masked?” See [6-9] at 26.
Notably, the prosecution had advised the court that it intended to proffer the recorded
conversation of the girlfriend during its case-in-chief, but because defendant indicated that he was
going to introduce the girlfriend’s testimony regardless, the prosecution was allowed to present the
recorded conversation in rebuttal. With regard to the other recorded conversation introduced in
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rebuttal, defendant objected that it should have been presented during the case-in-chief, but his
objection was overruled. As such, the evidence shows that the prosecution was willing and able to
introduce both recorded conversations, at a minimum the conversation with the girlfriend, regardless
of whether defendant presented an alibi defense.
Following his conviction, petitioner filed a direct appeal, and the judgment was affirmed.
He did not file a PLA with the Illinois Supreme Court. He later filed a pro se postconviction
petition, arguing that his trial counsel was ineffective for presenting an unreasonable alibi defense.
His petition was denied, the Illinois Appellate Court affirmed, and a PLA to the Illinois Supreme
Court was denied.
In the instant petition, petitioner raises a single claim of ineffective assistance of trial
counsel, namely counsel’s decision to present an alibi defense, which he contends prejudiced him
because it opened the door to the prosecution proffering additional evidence of guilt in rebuttal.
Respondent has answered the petition [5], and petitioner has filed a reply [7]. This matter is now
ripe for the court’s review.
Pursuant to the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), the
decision under review is the Illinois Appellate Court’s ruling in petitioner’s 725 ILCS 5/122-1
postconviction petition, “the last state court that substantively adjudicated [petitioner’s] claim.” See
Alston v. Smith, 840 F.3d 363, 367 (7th Cir. 2016). Under AEDPA, a reviewing court may only
grant habeas relief if the state court’s adjudication of the claim:
(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable
application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court
of the United States; or
(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the
facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.
Julian v. Bartley, 495 F.3d 487, 492 (7th Cir. 2007). When assessing the first prong:
A state court decision contradicts clearly established law if it applies a legal court
unreasonably applies Supreme Court precedent if it identifies the correct legal rule
but applies it in a way that is objectively unreasonable.
Rodriguez v. Gossett, 842 F.3d 531, 537 (7th Cir. 2016). When assessing the second prong, “[i]n
assessing the reasonableness of the state court's decision, the federal court assumes that the state
courts' factual determinations are correct unless the defendant rebuts them with clear and convincing
evidence.” Julian, 495 F.3d at 492.
As noted, petitioner raises a claim of ineffective assistance under Strickland v. Washington,
466 U.S. 668 (1984). The standards for such a claim are well established in the Seventh Circuit:
In Strickland, the Supreme Court established a two-part test for adjudicating
ineffective assistance of counsel claims that requires a petitioner to show (1) that
counsel’s performance was deficient, and (2) that the deficiency prejudiced his
defense. To establish deficiency, the petitioner must show that counsel's
representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. To demonstrate
prejudice, the petitioner must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for
counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been
different.
Rodriguez, 842 F.3d at 537-38 (internal quotations omitted). “Under AEDPA, the bar for
establishing that a state court's application of the Strickland standard was ‘unreasonable’ is a high
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one. When § 2254(d) applies, the question is not whether counsel’s actions were reasonable. The
question is whether there is any reasonable argument that counsel satisfied Strickland’s deferential
standard.” Makiel v. Butler, 782 F.3d 882, 897 (7th Cir. 2015) (internal quotations omitted).
Here, the Illinois Appellate Court found that “defendant did not present the gist of a claim
that trial counsel was ineffective, as defendant has not established that he was arguably prejudiced.”
[6-9] at 25. First, the court noted that the state would have introduced at least the statement with the
girlfriend regardless of whether defendant presented an alibi defense. Next, the court found that the
four eyewitnesses who testified that he was one of the masked men were more than sufficient to find
him guilty of the crime. Finally, the court noted that “defendant has not pointed to anything that
contradicts the State’s case against him. Rather, he claims only that, had his trial counsel not
presented an alibi, the jury arguably would have found him not guilty.” [6-9] at 31. The court
rejected this argument, concluding that “[w]e fail to see how that could have happened. Under either
scenario, whether counsel presented defendant’s alibi or not, the fact remains that four people
identified defendant as one of the masked men. Without evidence contradicting the eyewitnesses’
testimony, we find [defendant’s argument] unpersuasive.” Id.
This court finds that the Illinois Appellate Court’s did not “contradict clearly established
law” or “unreasonably apply Supreme Court precedent” because it applied the correct Strickland
standard and did not apply it in a way that was “objectively unreasonable.” Rodriguez, 842 F.3d at
537. To the contrary, the court correctly noted that much, perhaps all, of the rebuttal evidence
defendant points to would have been introduced regardless of the alibi. Moreover, the absence of
an alibi defense would have left essentially unchallenged the four eyewitnesses who testified that
defendant was one of the masked men. For the foregoing reasons, defendant’s § 2254 petition must
fail.
While petitioner attempted to raise the issue of ineffective assistance of counsel in his § 2254
petition, the court finds his collateral claim is without merit and does not find that “reasonable jurists
could debate whether . . . the petition should have been resolved in a different matter[.]” Id. Thus,
because there is no substantial constitutional question for appeal, the court declines to issue a
certificate of appealability. The matter is terminated.

Date: 1/27/2017

ENTER:

United States District Court Judge
Notices mailed by Judicial Staff. (LC)

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