DiGacomo v. City Of Belvidere et al
Filing
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ORDER-WRITTEN Opinion entered by the Honorable Philip G. Reinhard on 9/7/2017: For the reasons stated below, defendant's motion 8 to dismiss is granted in part and denied in part. The motion is granted as to the false arrest claim in Count I but denied as to the unreasonable detention claim in Count I, and therefore, the request to decline the exercise of supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims is also denied. [see STATEMENT-OPINION] Signed by the Honorable Philip G. Reinhard on 9/7/2017. Electronic notice (kms)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
WESTERN DIVISION
Vincenzo DiGiacomo,
Plaintiff,
vs.
City of Belvidere, et al.,
Defendant.
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Case No. 17 C 50115
Judge Philip G. Reinhard
ORDER
For the reasons stated below, defendant’s motion [8] to dismiss is granted in part and
denied in part. The motion is granted as to the false arrest claim in Count I but denied as to the
unreasonable detention claim in Count I, and therefore, the request to decline the exercise of
supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims is also denied.
STATEMENT-OPINION
Plaintiff, Vincenzo DiGiacomo, brings this action against defendants, City of Belvidere
and Officer Chris Washburn asserting a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for a violation of the
Fourth Amendment (Count I) and state law claims for malicious prosecution (Count II),
respondeat superior (Count III) and indemnification (Count IV). Jurisdiction is proper under 28
U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1367. Defendants move [8] to dismiss Count I for failure to state a claim
upon which relief can be granted, Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), and to decline to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims.
The following facts are taken from plaintiff’s complaint. Plaintiff was driving on his way
home from work on September 24, 2015 at about 11:45pm. Plaintiff was driving the speed limit
and remained in his lane of travel. Washburn began to follow him. Plaintiff stopped at a stop
light and his front tires crossed the white stop line in the roadway. Washburn stopped plaintiff,
requested and received plaintiff’s driver’s license and proof of insurance, ran this information
and it came back clear. Washburn then ordered plaintiff out of his vehicle and accused him of
drinking. Plaintiff had not been drinking. Washburn did not smell any alcohol on plaintiff.
Washburn ordered plaintiff to take a field sobriety test which he passed. Washburn then accused
plaintiff of taking drugs. Plaintiff had not consumed any drugs. Washburn arrested plaintiff for
driving under the influence (“DUI”). Plaintiff took a breathalyzer which yielded a result of .000
BAC. Plaintiff was then transported to Swedish American Hospital for collection of blood and
urine for lab testing. The lab result showed there were no drugs in plaintiff’s system. Plaintiff
was charged with DUI. On June 1, 2016, the DUI case was nolle prossed. Plaintiff asserts the
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DUI was without probable cause or legal justification and that his arrest and continued seizure
violated plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable seizures.
In their motion to dismiss, defendants argue plaintiff pled guilty to one of the charges
(improper lane usage) which was the initial basis for plaintiff’s arrest.1 Defendants contend that
the plea of guilty on the improper lane usage charge bars plaintiff’s claim that there was no
probable cause for his arrest and that the existence of probable cause defeats plaintiff’s Fourth
Amendment claim.
Plaintiff does not dispute that he pled guilty to improper lane usage (and thus does not
claim false arrest) but contends he was still unlawfully detained on the false DUI charge.
Plaintiff contends he was detained overnight (first in police custody and then in the Boone
County Jail) solely because of the false DUI charge. He was brought to the police station for the
breathalyzer, taken in police custody to the hospital for blood and urine tests and jailed overnight
and required to post bond on the DUI charge solely because of the false DUI charge. Plaintiff
states in his brief: “Had Defendant-Officer Washburn lodged only the charge for which he had
probable cause (i.e. improper lane usage) Plaintiff in all likelihood would have been given a
ticket and been allowed to go home.”
“If an officer has probable cause to believe that an individual has committed even a very
minor criminal offense in his presence, he may, without violating the Fourth Amendment, arrest
the offender.” Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 354 (2001). Where probable cause
exists that a person committed any crime, a false arrest claim is precluded even if the person was
arrested on additional or different charges for which there was no probable cause. Holmes v.
Village of Hoffman Estates, 511 F.3d 673, 682 (7th Cir. 2007) (“An arrested individual is no
more seized when he is arrested on three grounds rather than one.”) Therefore, as plaintiff
acknowledges, he has no claim for false arrest as he is not disputing probable cause existed for
the improper lane usage charge.
Rather than disputing his arrest, plaintiff asserts that the part of his detention occasioned
by the pursuit of the DUI charge against him without probable cause violated the Fourth
Amendment. At some point, after the traffic stop and before he posted bail the next morning, he
argues he went from being lawfully arrested for improper lane usage to unlawfully detained on a
U.S.
, 137 S.Ct. 911
baseless DUI charge. Plaintiff contends Manuel v. City of Joilet,
(2017) allows him to pursue this claim.
Manuel dealt with whether the plaintiff could bring a Fourth Amendment claim (rather
than being limited to a due process claim as the Court of Appeals had held) to challenge the
legality of his 48-day pretrial detention where he alleged a judge relied on fabricated evidence to
find probable cause that he had committed a crime. Manuel was a passenger in a car the police
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He was also charged with disregarding a traffic control device per the state court record
supplied by defendants with their motion.
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pulled over for the driver’s failure to use a turn signal. The police searched Manuel and found a
bottle of pills. They field-tested the pills and the test came back negative. Despite the negative
result, they arrested Manuel and took him to the police station. There, a technician again tested
the pills and again got a negative result. However, the technician lied in his report claiming one
of the pills was positive for the probable presence of ecstasy. One of the police officers wrote in
his report that he knew the pills to be ecstasy. Manuel was brought before a judge later that day
who based on the complaint supported exclusively by the police department’s fabrications sent
Manuel to the county jail to await trial. Eventually, he was released after the charges were
dismissed after the Illinois police laboratory issued a report that the pills contained no controlled
substances.
The issue resolved in Manuel was whether the plaintiff could bring a Fourth Amendment
claim for unlawful pretrial confinement for confinement occurring after the start of “legal
process” in a criminal case – that is, “after the judge’s determination of probable cause.” Manuel,
137 S.Ct. at 914. The Supreme Court held such a Fourth Amendment claim could be brought
both for Manuel’s wrongful arrest and for his wrongful detention after the judge’s determination
of probable cause. Manuel was not limited to a due process claim for his confinement after the
judge’s decision to detain him.
Manuel is distinguishable from the case at hand in a couple respects. Manuel was only
arrested for one crime – possession of a controlled substance – for which there was no probable
cause because the only evidence was fabricated by the police. Here, plaintiff was charged with
three violations and he does not dispute there was probable cause for arrest on one of those
charges – improper lane usage. Manuel was detained for 48 days because a judge, relying on the
complaint based on the fabricated evidence, ordered him detained. Here, plaintiff bonded out
after being held overnight. No judicial probable cause determination was made. Beyond
confirming that the Fourth Amendment is applicable to determining whether plaintiff has stated a
claim, Manuel is of limited value in deciding the motion to dismiss.2
To avoid dismissal under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), a complaint must state a claim to relief
that is plausible on its face. Jackson v. Blitt & Gaines, P.C., 833 F.3d 860, 862 (7th Cir. 2016).
The complaint is construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff with all well-pleaded facts
accepted as true and all possible inferences drawn in plaintiff’s favor. Id. “An excessive length
of detention may be sufficient to violate the reasonableness requirement of the Fourth
Amendment.” Chortek v. City of Milwaukee, 356 F.3d 740, 746 (7th Cir. 2004). Where, as here,
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Both parties observe, along with Justice Alito’s dissent in Manuel, that Manuel did not
decide whether a claim for malicious prosecution may be brought under the Fourth Amendment.
This issue was among those remanded to the Court of Appeals. Defendant argues current circuit
precedent, therefore, requires dismissal of Count I as an improperly brought malicious
prosecution Fourth Amendment claim. However, while plaintiff asserts a state-law malicious
prosecution claim in Count II, his Count I Fourth Amendment claim goes to the
unreasonableness of his detention not to malicious prosecution.
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the police did not plan to bring plaintiff before a magistrate for a probable-cause hearing,
whether a detention is reasonable or not depends on “how much time passes between arrest and
release, in relation to the reasons for detention.” Portis v. City of Chicago, 613 F.3d 702, 704-05
(7th Cir. 2010). “Examples of unreasonable delay are delays for the purpose of gathering
additional evidence to justify the arrest, a delay motivated by ill will against the arrested
individual, or delay for delay’s sake.” Chortek, 356 F.3d at 746, quoting, County of Riverside v.
McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 56 (1991). “Needless delay, or delay for delay’s sake – or worse,
delay deliberately created so that the process becomes the punishment – violates the fourth
amendment.” Portis, 613 F.3d at 705. Reasonableness of a length of detention is typically a
question for the trier-of-fact. Chortek, 356 F.3d at 747, and “not only the length of a given
detention but also the reasons why release was deferred.” must be examined. Portis, 613 F.3d at
705.
Defendant’s motion to dismiss must be denied as to plaintiff’s unreasonable detention
claim. The complaint alleges a plausible claim plaintiff’s detention was unreasonable. He
alleges facts which, if taken as true, could lead a factfinder to conclude it was unreasonable to
draw out his detention with the trip to the hospital for drug testing and to hold him overnight
until he bonded out. While, at later stages in this case, plaintiff will have the burden of proof
that his detention was excessive in light of its length and the reasons defendant may offer for it,
at this motion to dismiss stage he need not prove anything. The facts alleged are sufficient to
survive the motion to dismiss.
Defendants argue that the reasoning in this court’s August 10, 2011 opinion in Hertz v.
Village of Prairie Grove, 11 C 50107, applies as well to this case and suggests dismissal is in
order. In Hertz, the plaintiff had been arrested for overtaking on the right and DUI, charged with
both offenses, pled guilty to overtaking on the right and the DUI was nolle prossed as part of a
plea agreement. The plaintiff did not dispute the existence of probable cause for the illegal
overtaking charge so the false arrest claim was negated. The court also dismissed a state
malicious prosecution claim for the DUI charge because the nolle prossing of the DUI charge as
part of a negotiated plea is not a termination in favor of the plaintiff. Without a termination of
the charge in favor of the plaintiff, a malicious prosecution action may not proceed under Illinois
law.
However, here the state court record supplied by defendants shows that on June 1, 2016
the DUI charge was nolle prossed “pursuant to lab results.” One month later, plaintiff pled
guilty to improper lane usage and a charge of disregarding a traffic control device was dismissed
as part of a negotiated plea. The nolle prossing of the DUI appears to be unrelated to the
negotiated plea so the factual situation in Hertz is significantly different from the factual
situation here. Also, what was dismissed in Hertz was a state malicious prosecution claim.
Here, the motion to dismiss goes not to a state malicious prosecution claim but to a Fourth
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Amendment unreasonable detention claim.3 Therefore, Hertz is distinguishable and does not
support dismissal of the Fourth Amendment claim.
For the foregoing reasons, defendant’s motion [8] to dismiss is granted in part and denied
in part. The motion is granted as to the false arrest claim in Count I but denied as to the
unreasonable detention claim in Count I, and therefore, the request to decline the exercise of
supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims is also denied.
Date: 9/07/2017
ENTER:
_____________________________________
United States District Court Judge
Electronic Notices. (LC)
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While both this case and Hertz involved Fourth Amendment false arrest claims,
plaintiff has conceded here that he cannot succeed on a false arrest claim.
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