Barnes v. Altizer et al

Filing 6

ORDER : The court denies plaintiff's motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis 4 for "fraud" and summarily dismisses the complaint with prejudice in view of plaintiff's failure to advise the court that he is barred from f iling suit until he has paid outstanding fees. The case is terminated. The court directs the Clerk of Court to enter final judgment. Plaintiff's motion for attorney representation 3 is denied as moot. Having brought this action, plaintiff nev ertheless remains obligated to pay the full filing fee. Before pursuing any future litigation, plaintiff must pay any outstanding fees. The court authorizes and orders the trust fund officer at plaintiff's place of incarceration to begin making monthly deductions in accordance with this order until the $400 filing fee is paid in full. The court directs the Clerk of Court to mail a copy of this order to the trust fund office at the Dixon Correctional Center. [See STATEMENT] Signed by the Honorable Philip G. Reinhard on 1/23/2018. Mailed notice (jp, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
WESTERN DIVISION
Ryan J. Barnes (R-44872),
Plaintiff,
V.

Officer Altizer, et al.,
Defendants.

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Case No. 18 CV 50014

Judge Philip G. Reinhard

ORDER
The court denies plaintiff’s motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis [4] for “fraud” and
summarily dismisses the complaint with prejudice in view of plaintiff’s failure to advise the court that he is
barred from filing suit until he has paid outstanding fees. The case is terminated. The court directs the
Clerk of Court to enter final judgment. Plaintiff’s motion for attorney representation [3] is denied as moot.
Having brought this action, plaintiff nevertheless remains obligated to pay the full filing fee. Before
pursuing any future litigation, plaintiff must pay any outstanding fees. The court authorizes and orders the
trust fund officer at plaintiff’s place of incarceration to begin making monthly deductions in accordance
with this order until the $400 filing fee is paid in full. The court directs the Clerk of Court to mail a copy of
this order to the trust fund office at the Dixon Correctional Center.
STATEMENT
Plaintiff Ryan Barnes, an Illinois state prisoner, has brought this pro se civil rights action pursuant
to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff seems to claim that defendants, officials at the Dixon Correctional Center,
violated the constitutional rights of a fellow inmate by acting with deliberate indifference to his serious
mental health needs. Plaintiff evidently blames correctional officials for failing to prevent the other
prisoner’s suicide. Currently before the court is plaintiff’s application to proceed in forma pauperis. For
the reasons discussed in this order, the motion is denied.
A review of plaintiff’s litigation history reveals that he is currently prohibited from seeking leave to
proceed in forma pauperis due to outstanding filing fees. In connection with at least two of plaintiff’s prior
lawsuits in the Northern District, the courts admonished him that failure to pay accrued filing fees would
preclude his proceeding in forma pauperis in future cases. See Barnes v. Illinois, No. 10 CV 0762 (N.D.
Ill.) [10], Order of June 1, 2010 (Kennelly, J.); Barnes v. Kaupas, No. 11 CV 1041 (N.D. Ill.) [10], Order of
March 31, 2011 (Pallmeyer, J.).
Following those two warnings, the court denied plaintiff leave to proceed in forma pauperis in his
next case. See Barnes v. Taylor, Case No. 11 CV 3976 (N.D. Ill.) [7], Order of June 22, 2011 (Pallmeyer,
J.). The court held that plaintiff was “prohibited from seeking leave to proceed in forma pauperis until he
pays the $700 in back fees to the Clerk of Court….” Id., p. 2. The court gave plaintiff the opportunity
either to (1) pay the filing fees in his three then-most recent cases, or (2) show cause why he could not pay
the fees immediately. Id. The court ultimately dismissed that case when plaintiff failed to pay the $350

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filing fee. See [8], Order of August 1, 2011 (Pallmeyer, J.). The court finds no order lifting the filing
bar—or even requesting leave to resume filing lawsuits in the Northern District.
The court’s Fiscal Department reflects no payments whatsoever in any of plaintiff’s cases in the
ensuing six and a half years. In fact, in at least two of plaintiff’s earlier cases in this district, the courts
seem to have neglected to order the collection of filing fees. See, e.g., Barnes v. Kaupas, Case No. 10 CV
1184 (N.D. Ill.); and Barnes v. Will County, Case No. 14 CV 2275 (N.D. Ill.). But as plaintiff has been
advised time and again, he remains obligated to pay the full filing fees in all of his cases, irrespective of
their dismissal. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1) (“[I]f a prisoner brings a civil action … the prisoner shall be
required to pay the full amount of a filing fee”); Taylor v. Brown, 787 F.3d 851, 858 n.8 (7th Cir. 2015)
(same); Durr v. Cty. of Cook, No. 17 CV 50015, 2017 WL 1545642, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 28, 2017)
(Kapala, J.) (same). Plaintiff cannot reasonably claim ignorance of this requirement given repeated court
admonishments concerning payment requirements.
Notwithstanding his knowledge that he is ineligible for in forma pauperis status, plaintiff has
sought leave to proceed in forma pauperis in this matter, and without disclosing the filing bar to this court.
Consequently, this suit must be dismissed both for nonpayment and as a sanction for misconduct. See
Ammons v. Gerlinger, 547 F.3d 724, 725 (7th Cir. 2008) (“Plaintiffs who attempt to deceive federal judges,
and evade their obligation to pay all required fees and costs, cannot expect favorable treatment....”) (citing
Campbell v. Clarke, 481 F.3d 967, 969 (7th Cir. 2007)); see also Sloan v. Lesza, 181 F.3d 857, 858-59 (7th
Cir. 1999) (“fraud” on the court must “lead to immediate termination of the suit”). Moreover, because the
courts have already warned plaintiff about the filing bar, this court need not give him extra time either to
pay the statutory filing fee or to establish his indigence. Sloan, 181 F.3d at 859.
The court’s general approach, which would be to determine a prisoner’s responsibility for
nonpayment before dismissing the case, see Thomas v. Butts, 745 F.3d 309, 312-13 (7th Cir. 2014), is not
appropriate under the circumstances of this case. Plaintiff’s IFP application reflects multiple purchases at
the prison commissary. “Prisoners who insist on both filing []suits and spending their income as fast as
they receive it” will find court options closed to them. Lewis v. Sullivan, 279 F.3d 526, 530-31 (7th Cir.
2002); see also Merritte v. Templeton, 493 F. App’x 782, 784-85 (7th Cir. 2012) (affirming district court’s
denial of IFP status where plaintiff elected to spend his income in the prison canteen rather than on the filing
fee) (citing Roller v. Gunn, 107 F.3d 227, 233 (4th Cir. 1997) (“If a prisoner determines that his funds are
better spent on other items rather than filing a civil rights suit, he has demonstrated an implied evaluation of
that suit that the courts should be entitled to honor”) (internal quotation marks omitted)). Having filed at
least eleven lawsuits, plaintiff should have been paying 100% of his income to the courts. Bruce v.
Samuels, 136 S. Ct. 627, 632 (2016). Plaintiff cannot ignore his payment obligations and then seek IFP
status, particularly after receiving warnings about his commitments.
For the foregoing reasons, the court denies plaintiff’s application for leave to proceed in forma
pauperis and summarily dismisses the complaint with prejudice for “fraud.” The case is terminated. The
court directs the Clerk of Court to enter final judgment. But again, having brought this action, plaintiff
remains obligated to pay the full $400 filing fee. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). Before pursuing any future
litigation, plaintiff must pay any outstanding fees. To that end, the court authorizes plaintiff’s trust fund
officer to begin collecting—and remitting to the Clerk of Court—twenty percent of any money plaintiff
receives for each calendar month during which he receives $10.00 or more, until the $400 filing fee is paid
in full. The court directs the Clerk of Court to ensure that a copy of this order is mailed to each facility
where plaintiff is housed until the filing fee has been paid in full. All payments shall be sent to the Clerk of
Court, United States District Court, 219 South Dearborn Street, Chicago, Illinois 60604, attn: Cashier’s
Desk, 20th Floor, and shall clearly identify plaintiff’s name and the case number assigned to this case.

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In view of the dismissal of this case for fraud and for nonpayment, the court has no occasion to
consider such questions as whether plaintiff has standing to sue and/or whether this lawsuit is legally
frivolous, as that standard is discussed in Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 32 (1992), and Lee v. Clinton,
209 F.3d 1025, 1026 (7th Cir. 2000); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009); Edwards v.
Snyder, 478 F.3d 827, 829 (7th Cir. 2007).
If plaintiff wishes to appeal, he must file a notice of appeal with this court within thirty days of the
entry of judgment. See FED. R. APP. P. 4(a)(1). If plaintiff appeals, he will be liable for the $505.00
appellate filing fee regardless of the appeal’s outcome. See Evans v. Ill. Dep’t of Corr., 150 F.3d 810, 812
(7th Cir. 1998). If the Court of Appeals should find the appeal to be non-meritorious, plaintiff could be
assessed a “strike” under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). If a prisoner accumulates three “strikes” because three
federal cases or appeals have been dismissed as frivolous or malicious, or for failure to state a claim, the
prisoner may not file suit in federal court without pre-paying the filing fee unless he or she is in imminent
danger of serious physical injury. Id. If plaintiff seeks leave to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal, he
must file a motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis in this court. See FED. R. APP. P. 24(a)(1).
Plaintiff need not file a motion to reconsider this court’s ruling to preserve his appellate rights.
However, if plaintiff wishes the court to reconsider its judgment, he may file a motion under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 59(e) or 60(b). Any Rule 59(e) motion must be filed within 28 days of the entry of this
judgment. See FED. R. CIV. P. 59(e). The time to file a motion pursuant to Rule 59(e) cannot be extended.
See FED. R. CIV. P. 6(b)(2). A timely Rule 59(e) motion suspends the deadline for filing an appeal until the
Rule 59(e) motion is ruled upon. See FED. R. APP. P. 4(a)(4)(A)(iv). Any Rule 60(b) motion must be
filed within a reasonable time and, if seeking relief under Rule 60(b)(1), (2), or (3), must be filed no more
than one year after entry of the judgment or order. See FED. R. CIV. P. 60(c)(1). The time to file a Rule
60(b) motion cannot be extended. See FED. R. CIV. P. 6(b)(2). A Rule 60(b) motion suspends the
deadline for filing an appeal until the Rule 60(b) motion is ruled upon only if the motion is filed within 28
days of the entry of judgment. See FED. R. APP. P. 4(a)(4)(A)(vi).
Date: 1/23/2018

ENTER:

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United States District Court Judge
Docketing to Mail Notices. (LC)

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