Johnson v. First Student, Inc.

Filing 32

ORDER signed by the Honorable Philip G. Reinhard on 10/16/2018: For the reasons stated below, defendant's motion 15 to dismiss Count I of the complaint is granted. [see STATEMENT] Electronic notice (kms)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
WESTERN DIVISION
Deanna Johnson,
Plaintiff,
vs.
First Student, Inc.,
Defendant.

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Case No. 18 C 50061

Judge Philip G. Reinhard

ORDER
For the reasons stated below, defendant’s motion [15] to dismiss Count I of the complaint
is granted.
STATEMENT
Plaintiff, Deanna S. Johnson, a citizen of Illinois, brings this action against defendant,
First Student, Inc., a Delaware corporation, with its principal place of business in Ohio. The
amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. Jurisdiction is proper pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332
(a)(1). Count I of the complaint alleges direct negligence by the defendant and Count II alleges
defendant is vicariously liable for the negligence of its employee, Brian Vandevelde (“Brian”).
Defendant was the owner of a school bus driven by Brian that collided in Illinois with a vehicle
driven by plaintiff. Defendant moves [15] to dismiss Count I for failure to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
Count I alleges defendant was negligent in that it inadequately trained its drivers; or
inadequately supervised its drivers; or assigned unqualified people to train and supervise its
drivers; or did not properly evaluate Brian’s on-the-job performance as a school bus driver. In
Count II, plaintiff alleges Brian was negligent in that he did not keep a safe and proper lookout;
or failed to yield to oncoming traffic; or entered an intersection when it was not safe; or left a
stop sign when it was not safe; or drove too fast for conditions; or did not apply the brakes in a
timely manner.
Defendant admits Brian was its employee, that he was driving the bus in the scope of his
employment at the time of the collision, and, therefore, under respondeat superior, it is liable for
any negligence on Brian’s part in causing the collision and plaintiff’s injuries. Defendant argues
that, because it has admitted its responsibility for Brian’s conduct under a respondeat superior
theory, it cannot be held liable under Illinois law on the direct negligence theories advanced by
plaintiff.
1

This court has previously found in a vehicle collision case that, under Illinois law, claims
of failure to train and supervise an employee must be dismissed as duplicative and unnecessary
once the employer admits that any negligence on the part of its employee can be imputed to the
employer under a respondeat superior theory. C.R. England. Inc. v. Abdi, No, 17 cv 50152, Dkt.
# 39 (Aug. 28, 2017); see also, Meyer v. A & A Logistics, Inc., No. 13 cv 0225, 2014 WL
3687313, *3-4 (N.D. Ill. July 24, 2014) (dismissing negligent training and supervision claims
under Illinois law where employer admitted employee’s negligence was imputable to employer
under respondeat superior theory). The rationale for this finding is that an employer’s liability
under these theories “because it is predicated initially on, and therefore is entirely derivative of,
the negligence of the employee, cannot exceed the liability of the employee.” Gant v. L.U.
Transport, Inc., 770 N.E.2d 1155, 1159 (Ill. App. 2002). To allow a case to proceed on these
derivative theories, once the employer has admitted its liability under a respondeat superior
theory, “would allow a jury to assess or apportion a principal’s liability twice. The fault of one
party cannot be assessed twice, regardless of the adoption of comparative negligence.” Id., at
1160.
Plaintiff argues Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Terracon Consultants, Inc., 13 N.E.3d 834
(Ill. App. 2014) requires a different result but it is distinguishable because there respondeat
superior had not been conceded. The court in Terracon, stated: “Terracon has not conceded
responsibility under a theory of respondeat superior, and indeed we have held that Terracon has
no liability under the theory of respondeat superior. Thus, the negligent-training claim is not
duplicative and unnecessary, and allowing it to stand will create no danger of a judge or jury
assessing or apportioning Terracon’s alleged liability twice.” Terracon, 13 N.E.3d at 840.
Terracon, in fact, distinguished Gant, precisely because the Gant employer had conceded
responsibility under a respondeat superior theory. Terracon stated “what the Gant court
recognized was that when an employer has conceded responsibility, under the theory of
respondeat superior, for an employee’s negligence, the employer cannot also be held responsible
under a separate theory of negligent entrustment, because under those circumstances, the cause
of action for negligent entrustment is duplicative and unnecessary and allowing it to stand would
allow the trier of fact to assess or apportion a principal’s liability twice.” Id. (quotation marks
and citation omitted). Here, respondeat superior responsibility is conceded leaving the danger of
double assessment or apportionment of defendant’s liability alive if the alternative theories of
defendant’s liability are allowed to remain.
Plaintiff also cites Roppo v. Travelers Companies, 100 F. Supp.3d 636 (N.D. Ill. 2015).
It likewise is distinguishable because it does not involve an employer conceding responsibility
under a theory of respondeat superior.
Plaintiff argues Gant is not instructive in this matter because it is a negligent hiring and
retention case not a negligent training and supervision case. But this court in C.R. England. Inc.
v. Abdi and the court in Meyer v. A & A Logistics, Inc (both noted above), have applied the
Gant reasoning to negligent training and supervision cases. There is no meaningful distinction
among these types of claims when it comes to the reason to bar them from proceeding where the
employer has conceded responsibility under a theory of respondeat superior.
2

In its brief, plaintiff argues defendant is responsible for enforcing the Federal Motor
Carrier Safety Regulations applicable to bus driver training and supervision and that violation of
such regulations can be considered by a jury in assessing negligence. However, this is simply an
alternative basis for establishing negligent training and supervision. It does not change the
rationale for precluding those claims from proceeding where the employer has conceded
responsibility under a theory of respondeat superior.
For the foregoing reasons, defendant’s motion [15] to dismiss Count I of the complaint is
granted.
Date: 10/16/2018

ENTER:
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United States District Court Judge
Electronic Notices.

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