Osterberg v. University of Illinois College of Medicine et al
Filing
130
MEMORANDUM Opinion and Order; Defendants motion for summary judgment 115 is granted. Civil case terminated. Signed by the Honorable Iain D. Johnston on 6/27/2022: (yxp, )
Case: 3:18-cv-50082 Document #: 130 Filed: 06/27/22 Page 1 of 17 PageID #:2208
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
WESTERN DIVISION
John Richard Osterberg,
Plaintiff,
Case No. 3:18-cv-50082
v.
Honorable Iain D. Johnston
Sarah Meyers, Marcia Sanders,
Gretchen Johnson, Valerie Lewis,
Connie Wells, and Jane Does I-V,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff John Richard Osterberg brings this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
for alleged violations of his right to constitutionally adequate medical care under
the Fourteenth Amendment. As Defendants, he names several nurses at the
Winnebago County Jail in Rockford, Illinois, where he was a pretrial detainee.
Before the Court is Defendants motion for summary judgment. For the reasons
explained in detail below, that motion [115] is granted.
I.
Background
In June 2017, Plaintiff John Osterberg suffered a serious injury to his right
ankle, which was treated at SwedishAmerican Hospital Center-Belvidere. As a
result of the injury, Osterberg underwent a surgical procedure, wherein surgical
screws, a lock, and a plate were inserted into his ankle. After the surgery, he was
prescribed a walking boot and a pain medication commonly known as Norco.
Neither the pain medication nor the walking boot were intended to be long-term
1
Case: 3:18-cv-50082 Document #: 130 Filed: 06/27/22 Page 2 of 17 PageID #:2209
prescriptions, however. On August 24, 2017, Osterberg requested a refill of Norco.
The refill was granted but he was told it would be the final refill. Medical records
dated September 20, 2017, note that the Norco pain medication had, at that point,
been discontinued. Those same records indicate that Osterberg was transitioned out
of the walking boot (known as a controlled ankle movement, or CAM Boot) on his
right ankle and was instead given an ASO Brace, which is similar to an ankle wrap
with Velcro straps.
On October 20, 2017, Osterberg was detained at the Winnebago County Jail
as a pretrial detainee. After his conviction, Osterberg was transferred to the Illinois
Department of Corrections on September 19, 2018, to begin serving his sentence.
The basis for this action is Osterberg’s contention that, during his pretrial detention
at the Winnebago County Jail, he received constitutionally inadequate medical care.
The Jail’s medical services are provided by the University of Illinois College of
Medicine in Rockford, Illinois. Defendants Valerie Lewis, Connie Wells, Sarah
Meyers, Marcia Sanders, and Gretchen Johnson were all nurses working at the Jail
during the relevant time.
On October 21, 2017, the day after Osterberg began his pretrial detention, he
filed a medical request complaining about pain in his back and ankle. Two days
later, on October 23, 2017, Nurse Johnson examined Osterberg, who reported pain
in his ankle rating as an eight out of ten. Nurse Johnson did not believe the pain
was unusual and did not warrant a doctor visit; given the recency of Osterberg’s
surgery, some pain would be expected. So, she prescribed him Tylenol, instructed
2
Case: 3:18-cv-50082 Document #: 130 Filed: 06/27/22 Page 3 of 17 PageID #:2210
him to take cool showers and drink plenty of fluids, and told him to return if the
pain persisted. She also noted that he was undergoing outside physical therapy to
rehabilitate the ankle. Dkt. 116-6, at 5; Dkt. 116-12, ¶¶ 6–7. The decision to offer
Osterberg Tylenol to treat his pain was done according to standing medical provider
orders for pain. Dkt. 124, ¶ 15.
A day later, on October 24, 2017, Osterberg filed a medical grievance
complaining about pain and asking for his ankle brace. In response, the medical
staff seemed confused. Osterberg had not been wearing the walking boot during
intake at the Jail. Instead, he was wearing the ASO ankle brace. In response to the
medical staff’s apparent confusion, Osterberg confirmed on October 24 that he was
referring to a brace prescribed by Doctor Jeffery Earhart, the surgeon who had
performed his ankle surgery. Four days later, Nurse Connie Wells entered a
response to Osterberg’s answer thanking him for the information. That same day,
Osterberg was given the ASO brace, Dkt. 116-14, ¶ 10, though the decision to return
the brace may have been made by corrections staff.
Independent of Osterberg’s interaction with Nurse Wells, he filed a medical
grievance on October 27, the day before he was given his brace. In that grievance,
he again asked to be given his brace because he was experiencing pain and swelling.
Nurse Lewis responded that he should fill out a medical request instead. Nurse
Lewis responded in this way because a medical request and a grievance are
different. The medical request is used to ask for treatment, and so they are
responded to more quickly.
3
Case: 3:18-cv-50082 Document #: 130 Filed: 06/27/22 Page 4 of 17 PageID #:2211
On October 28, 2017, the same day Osterberg was given the ASO brace back,
he fell out of his bunk and was sent to SwedishAmerican Hospital as a result.
Osterberg believed he fell because he didn’t have the brace to stabilize his ankle. At
the hospital, he was examined by Doctor Daniel Eggeman, who ordered labs, spine
and ankle x-rays, a brain CT, and an EKG. Dr. Eggeman then discharged Osterberg
back to the Jail without ordering any pain medication, orthopedic treatment, or
physical therapy. He did, however, note that Osterberg should follow up with a
provider within one to two days.
On November 21, 2017, Osterberg filed another medical request complaining
about back pain and numbness in his right leg. The next day, Nurse Sarah Meyers
examined him. 1 He again reported pain at a level of eight out of ten, but showed no
swelling, deformity, discoloration, limited range of motion, or other objective signs
of pain. As a result of this examination, Nurse Meyers ordered Osterberg 400
milligrams of ibuprofen, which she did pursuant to standing medical provider
orders. Meyers noted that she was able to assess Osterberg’s range of motion by
observing him walking around the pod. She had witnessed him walking frequently
during medical pass and had never seen him exhibit any signs of pain or limping.
She testified, “I remember him being a walker,” and shortly thereafter that “I never
recall seeing him limp ever.” Dkt. 116-11, at 78. Furthermore, she observed that his
blood pressure was normal, which she found odd because extreme pain would
Osterberg notes that no one ever responded to his November 21, 2017, medical request.
But regardless of whether anyone entered a written response in the system, he was
examined by Nurse Meyers the next day.
1
4
Case: 3:18-cv-50082 Document #: 130 Filed: 06/27/22 Page 5 of 17 PageID #:2212
typically cause an elevated blood pressure. Id. at 75. From this, Meyers did not
believe Osterberg’s report of severe pain was consistent with the objective evidence.
Nor did Meyers believe Osterberg needed further evaluation from a physician. 2 Id.
at 75, 79.
On February 7, 2018, Osterberg filed a medical grievance. He explained that
he was still experiencing pain after his fall. He also referred to what he called “a
burning sensational pain going down my right leg.” Dkt. 116-6, at 25. In the
grievance, he further noted that although he had seen the nursing staff, he wanted
to be examined by a physician. Id. In response to the grievance, Nurse Marcia
Sanders examined Osterberg on February 12, 2018. During the examination, Nurse
Sanders noted that Osterberg complained of right leg numbness and tingling if he
sat or laid down too long. She also noted that Osterberg denied being in pain during
the examination, though he had reported being in pain when he filled out the
medical grievance that led to the examination. Compare Dkt. 116-10, at 88, with
Dkt. 116-6, at 22. Nevertheless, the parties agree that “[i]ntermittent leg numbness
and tingling is not unusual for a man Mr. Osterberg’s age, and alone is not an
emergent or urgent condition.” Dkt. 124, ¶ 33. Nurse Sanders then checked
Osterberg’s vitals, which were all normal. Based on those normal vital signs, she
concluded that Osterberg was not in any severe pain or distress, was not suffering
Osterberg was scheduled to see an orthopedic doctor on November 22, 2017. The nursing
staff cancelled that visit, however, because Osterberg had a court date that conflicted with
the orthopedic visit. For reasons not made clear by the evidence, the visit was not
rescheduled.
2
5
Case: 3:18-cv-50082 Document #: 130 Filed: 06/27/22 Page 6 of 17 PageID #:2213
from an emergent condition, and did not require a referral to a physician or nurse
practitioner.
Two days after the examination by Nurse Sanders, on February 14, 2018,
Osterberg filed another medical grievance asking to see a physician. Nurse Sanders
responded on February 16, 2018. She asked him generally what problem he was
experiencing so she would know how to handle the grievance. The same day that
Nurse Sanders responded to Osterberg, he filed another grievance complaining
about back pain radiating down his right leg. Two days later, on February 18, 2018,
Nurse Meyers examined Osterberg in response to the February 16 grievance.
During the examination, Osterberg explained that walking helped alleviate the pain
from his back. He further explained, however, that his back pain had reached a ten
out of ten level of pain, though he did not report any pain in his ankle.
Nevertheless, Nurse Meyers did not see any obvious signs of distress in his
movement. He didn’t appear to have difficulty walking, and he showed no signs of
swelling, redness, or bruising. He again had normal vital signs, which Nurse
Meyers saw as inconsistent with someone experiencing extreme pain. Thus, Nurse
Meyers offered him additional ibuprofen for another three days. In response,
Osterberg was significantly unhappy. He became unruly and raised his voice
enough that a correctional officer stood next to Nurse Meyers just in case. Osterberg
then refused the ibuprofen and demanded to see a doctor. Based on this response,
6
Case: 3:18-cv-50082 Document #: 130 Filed: 06/27/22 Page 7 of 17 PageID #:2214
Nurse Meyers sent Osterberg’s chart to Nurse Practitioner Tricia Corrigan for an
additional review. 3
On February 20, 2018, two days after Osterberg became upset with Nurse
Meyers, Nurse Practitioner Corrigan reviewed Osterberg’s records and asked that
he be placed on her clinic list because he had been asking to see a provider. 4
Nevertheless, Corrigan did not believe, based on her review of his records, that
Osterberg was at risk from any serious medical issues. As a nurse practitioner,
Corrigan is able to prescribe medication, order physical therapy, refer patients to
specialists, and recommend assistive devices if those treatment options are
warranted. Dkt. 116-5, ¶ 3. For reasons not explained by the evidence, Osterberg
was not seen by Nurse Practitioner Corrigan until September even though Nurse
Sherry White initialed next to Corrigan’s order. Osterberg was originally scheduled
to see Corrigan on September 10, 2018, but Osterberg had a conflict on that day and
instead saw Corrigan on September 11, 2018. Id. ¶¶ 19. Notwithstanding the delay
in scheduling Osterberg for a clinical visit with Corrigan, he didn’t file any more
complaints about his back, leg, or ankle during the interim time.
At the September 11, 2018, examination, Osterberg reported chronic lower
back and right leg pain, as well as chronic numbness and tingling in the right
Although nurse practitioners are not medical doctors, they have “at least a master’s
degree in nursing and advanced education in the primary care of particular groups of
clients.” They are thus “capable of independent practice in a variety of settings.” Nurse
Practitioner, Stedman’s Medical Dictionary (28th ed. 2006). Furthermore, the term
“provider” includes nurse practitioners. Provider, Stedman’s Medical Dictionary (28th ed.
2006) (“A term used by managed care organizations, referring to anyone rendering medical
care, including physicians, nurse practitioners, physician assistants, and others.”).
4 Nurse Practitioner Tricia Corrigan is not a defendant in this action.
3
7
Case: 3:18-cv-50082 Document #: 130 Filed: 06/27/22 Page 8 of 17 PageID #:2215
lateral foot. Although his range of motion was normal in his left foot, it was more
limited in his right foot, and he experienced some pain in his range of motion. He
further presented with normal vitals, including no deformity, swelling, or
discoloration and a steady gait. Corrigan prescribed Naproxen for fourteen days,
referred him to physical therapy, and instructed him to continue using the brace.
Nevertheless, based on her review of Osterberg’s earlier records, Corrigan did not
believe Osterberg’s condition had deteriorated at all.
Notwithstanding the above timeline, Osterberg filed suit in this Court on
March 5, 2018. Dkt. 1. After the Court recruited counsel to represent him,
Osterberg’s counsel filed the operative second-amended complaint on July 27, 2018.
Dkt. 11.
II.
Analysis
On summary judgment, the movant has the burden of establishing that no
genuine dispute of material fact exists and that it is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Facts are material if they might affect the
outcome of the suit. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). No
genuine dispute exists as to those material facts if the court would be required to
grant a Rule 50 motion at trial. Id. at 250–51. In analyzing the evidence, the court
must construe all facts and reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party.
Rickher v. Home Depot, Inc., 525 F.3d 661, 664 (7th Cir. 2008). Furthermore, to
establish a genuine dispute of a material fact, the nonmoving party must present
more than a mere scintilla of evidence. Johnson v. Advocate Health & Hosps. Corp.,
8
Case: 3:18-cv-50082 Document #: 130 Filed: 06/27/22 Page 9 of 17 PageID #:2216
892 F.3d 887, 894 (7th Cir. 2017). Indeed, even if some evidence favors the
nonmovant, the court must grant the moving party’s motion for summary judgment
if no reasonable jury could find in favor of the nonmovant. Harris N.A. v. Hershey,
711 F.3d 794, 798 (7th Cir. 2013).
a. Due Process—Objective Unreasonableness
Because Osterberg was a pretrial detainee during his time incarcerated at
the Winnebago County Jail, his claim for constitutionally inadequate medical care
arises under the Fourteenth Amendment, rather than the Eighth Amendment.
Miranda v. County of Lake, 900 F.3d 335, 352 (7th Cir. 2018). Under the Fourteenth
Amendment, a plaintiff’s claim of constitutionally inadequate medical care is
subject only to the objective unreasonableness inquiry, rather than the Eighth
Amendment’s deliberate indifference test. Id. In other words, a pretrial detainee
need not prove that the defendant was subjectively aware that her actions were
unreasonable. McCann v. Ogle Cty., 909 F.3d 881, 886 (7th Cir. 2018). Rather, the
plaintiff must show that the defendant acted purposely, knowingly, or recklessly
when they considered the consequences of their actions. Id. This means that the
defendants must have been aware their actions would be harmful, or at least
strongly suspect as much. Pittman v. City of Madison, 970 F.3d 823, 828 (7th Cir.
2020).
Next, the plaintiff must be able to establish that the defendant’s conduct was
objectively unreasonable—without regard to the defendant’s subjective
understanding. Id. As the Supreme Court noted in Kingsley v. Hendrickson, conduct
9
Case: 3:18-cv-50082 Document #: 130 Filed: 06/27/22 Page 10 of 17 PageID #:2217
is objectively unreasonable when it “is not rationally related to a legitimate
governmental objective or . . . is excessive in relation to that purpose.” 576 U.S. 389,
398 (2015); see also Hardeman v. Curran, 933 F.3d 816, 827 (7th Cir. 2019) (Sykes,
J., concurring). Furthermore, in determining whether the defendants' actions were
objectively unreasonable, courts must consider the totality of the circumstances.
Mays v. Dart, 974 F.3d 810, 820 (7th Cir. 2020).
Additionally, all plaintiffs bringing individual capacity suits under § 1983
must establish a causal connection between the defendant’s personal actions and
the harm complained of. Estate of Perry v. Wenzel, 872 F.3d 439, 459 (7th Cir. 2017)
(“Individual liability pursuant to § 1983 ‘requires personal involvement in the
alleged constitutional deprivation.’” (quoting Colbert v. City of Chicago, 851 F.3d
649, 657 (7th Cir. 2017))). So, it is important to remain cognizant of the difference in
roles between a nurse and a medical provider. As the Seventh Circuit recently
reiterated, “a nurse can, and indeed must, defer to a treating physician’s
instructions,” though they cannot be “blind or unthinking.” Reck v. Wexford Health
Sources, Inc., 27 F.4th 473, 485 (7th Cir. 2022). Though that case addressed a
deliberate indifference claim under the Eighth Amendment, even under the
Fourteenth Amendment, a plaintiff must be able to show that the nurse’s conduct
was more than merely negligent, or even grossly negligent. McCann, 909 F.3d at
886.
In McCann, the defendant nurse had administered the lethal dose of
methadone that ultimately led to the pretrial detainee’s death. Nevertheless, the
10
Case: 3:18-cv-50082 Document #: 130 Filed: 06/27/22 Page 11 of 17 PageID #:2218
Seventh Circuit explained that the estate had not produced any evidence that she
purposely, knowingly, or recklessly administered that lethal dose because she had
done so in accordance with a doctor’s orders. Id. at 886–87. Furthermore, the court
held that the estate failed to produce evidence showing that her actions were
objectively unreasonable. On the contrary, she relied on a physician to determine
the proper dosage, and the totality of the circumstances showed that she diligently
cared for McCann within the confines of her role as a nurse, including frequently
checking his status, bandaging his wounds, serving him meals, and bathing him. Id.
887.
b. Nurse Defendants
In Counts VI through X, Osterberg sues five individual nurses that were
involved in some capacity in his care or his medical requests and grievances. None
of the evidence in the record, however, is sufficient to establish the first element of
the Fourteenth Amendment objective unreasonableness test against any of these
nurses. 5 To begin, it is important to explain that the undisputed evidence shows
that Osterberg’s pain medication was discontinued before he arrived at the
Winnebago County Jail. Osterberg attempted to dispute this in his response to
Defendants’ Local Rule 56.1 statement of facts, but the evidence he cited is the
same evidence the Defendants cited. That evidence, the medical records, clearly
lists the Norco pain medication (in its medical name) under the discontinued
Osterberg’s argument in response often assumes the standard is deliberate indifference.
As the Court has explained, the standard under the Fourteenth Amendment is objective
unreasonableness.
5
11
Case: 3:18-cv-50082 Document #: 130 Filed: 06/27/22 Page 12 of 17 PageID #:2219
section. Dkt. 116-4, at 3. The records further explain that Osterberg was no longer
on any pain medication, and that the walking boot was removed during that visit.
Furthermore, the only medication that he was documented to be taking was a once
daily aspirin. Id. So, shortly before he was detained at the Jail, his physician had
determined that he no longer needed the Norco pain medication and instead had
him take an over-the-counter medication similar to what Defendants offered him
after his detention began.
Osterberg’s argument furthermore lumps together the nurses, essentially
assuming that if their actions as a whole violated the Constitution, then the nurses
could all be held liable. But Osterberg must show how each Defendant was
personally involved in any constitutional injury. Minix v. Canarecci, 597 F.3d 824,
833 (7th Cir. 2010). Nevertheless, the objective unreasonable test analyzes the
totality of the circumstances. Mays, 974 F.3d 820. But even assuming each nurse
was aware of the interactions Osterberg had with every other nurse (for example, by
reviewing his records), the evidence still fails to establish that any nurse was aware
of, or strongly suspected, that their conduct would be harmful. Pittman, 970 F.3d at
828.
On the contrary, the evidence establishes that the nurses merely disbelieved
Osterberg’s complaints of pain because those complaints were simply not consistent
with the objective medical evidence. He did not present with any outward
indications of pain, and his vital signs, including his blood pressure, were not
consistent with someone experiencing severe pain. Furthermore, their decisions to
12
Case: 3:18-cv-50082 Document #: 130 Filed: 06/27/22 Page 13 of 17 PageID #:2220
prescribe ibuprofen were undisputedly done in accordance with medical provider
standing orders. And nurses are entitled to defer to the professional judgments of
medical providers unless such deference is done blindly and unthinkingly. Reck, 27
F.4th at 485. At bottom, Osterberg’s contention is that he should have been referred
to a medical provider sooner. But the nurses did not believe he needed to be referred
to a provider, and nothing suggests they strongly suspected this declination would
be harmful.
Regarding Nurse Meyers, Osterberg contends that she failed to refer him to a
medical provider even though she didn’t perform an examination. That contention is
completely unsupported by any evidence in the record. On the contrary, the
undisputed evidence establishes that she based her decision on objective medical
evidence, including a normal blood pressure, which she expected would be high if
Osterberg was suffering from severe pain. The same can be said of Nurse Sanders.
Osterberg similarly did not outwardly present with any evidence of pain when he
visited with Nurse Sanders. And Nurse Sanders eventually referred him to a
medical provider in response to his suddenly becoming irate. That provider, Nurse
Practitioner Corrigan didn’t think Osterberg’s issues were emergent, but
nonetheless asked to examine him. Though that examination was inexplicably
delayed, the evidence does not support the contention that the delay had anything
to do with any Defendant. On the contrary, a nonparty nurse acknowledged
Corrigan’s order, and Corrigan herself is also not a party to this action.
13
Case: 3:18-cv-50082 Document #: 130 Filed: 06/27/22 Page 14 of 17 PageID #:2221
The only evidence in the record regarding Nurse Johnson is that she
interacted with him when he was first detained at the Jail. He reported pain in his
ankle, but this did not seem unusual to her because of the recency of his surgery.
So, she offered him Tylenol. That decision was done pursuant to standing provider
orders, which she was entitled to defer to. Considering the totality of the
circumstances, the Court notes that little time had passed since Osterberg had seen
Dr. Earhart, who discontinued the pain medication and only offered him a very
similar over the over-the-counter medication.
The only involvement Osterberg points to regarding Nurse Lewis is that she
responded to a medical grievance by instructing him that he should instead file a
medical request. Osterberg doesn’t attempt to show that Nurse Lewis’ response was
wrong. Nor does Nurse Lewis appear to have ever been directly involved in
Osterberg’s medical care. There’s simply no evidence that any of her actions were
unreasonable or that she strongly suspected that any action she took would lead to
a harmful result. There’s even less evidence concerning Nurse Wells. Her only
involvement was that she responded to one of Osterberg’s medical grievances by
asking for more information regarding the ASO brace. Osterberg then responded
with the information of the prescribing doctor. Osterberg does not explain in any
way how her actions were wrongful, other than summarily lumping her together
with the other Defendants.
To be sure, stubbornly persisting with ineffective treatment, rather than
seeking a referral can amount to constitutionally inadequate care. Goodloe v. Sood,
14
Case: 3:18-cv-50082 Document #: 130 Filed: 06/27/22 Page 15 of 17 PageID #:2222
947 F.3d 1026, 1031 (7th Cir. 2020). But the evidence fails to establish that these
Defendants doggedly pursued a course of treatment they knew wasn’t working. On
the contrary, the evidence merely establishes that some Defendants had no
involvement and others simply did not believe Osterberg’s reports of severe pain.
They based their disbelief on his subjective reports of pain being inconsistent with
the objective medical evidence. And even if that belief was ill-advised, Osterberg’s
constitutional claims require a showing beyond negligence. McCann, 909 F.3d at
886. Furthermore, their decisions to offer ibuprofen were undisputedly in line with
standing medical provider orders to which they lawfully deferred. Because that
deference was not done blindly, and instead was done consistent with their
interpretation of the objective medical evidence, they are entitled to judgment as a
matter of law. Reck, 27 F.4th at 485.
c. Jane Does I-V
Defendants argue that the Court should grant summary judgment to
Defendants Jane Doe I through V because, after the aid of discovery, Osterberg has
failed to identify them. Defendants contend that the time has passed to add them to
this suit, and even if an amendment were possible, any resulting claim against
those Defendants would be time barred. Osterberg has not responded to this
argument. Indeed, discovery has closed and Osterberg has had four years to identify
the unnamed defendants. Furthermore, the statute of limitations for § 1983 actions
in Illinois is two years. Rosado v. Gonzalez, 832 F.3d 714, 716 (7th Cir. 2016). Any
new defendants at this point would have a clear statute of limitations defense.
15
Case: 3:18-cv-50082 Document #: 130 Filed: 06/27/22 Page 16 of 17 PageID #:2223
Contrary to Defendants argument, however, the Seventh Circuit has explained that
district courts should dismiss unnamed and unknown defendants in this situation,
rather than granting summary judgment. Williams v. Rodriguez, 509 F.3d 392, 402
(7th Cir. 2007) (“Due to Williams’s failure to identify this defendant and the lack of
any record that this individual was served with process, the district court’s grant of
summary judgment for this unknown and unnamed defendant is modified to
dismiss this defendant from the case.”). Thus, the Court dismisses Jane Does I-V
from this case.
d. Injunctive Relief
In the second-amended complaint, Osterberg seeks injunctive relief
compelling Defendants to refer him to an outside specialist and to prescribe him
stronger pain medication. Dkt. 11, ¶ 126. As Defendants note, Osterberg is no
longer a pretrial detainee at the Winnebago County Jail. Indeed, he does not reside
there at all. On September 19, 2018, he was transferred to the custody of the Illinois
Department of Corrections to begin serving his sentence. Because Osterberg is no
longer in the Jail’s custody, his prayer for injunctive relief is moot. Loertscher v.
Anderson, 893 F.3d 386, 394–96 (7th Cir. 2018); Ford v. County of Winnebago, No.
3:19-cv-50056, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10469, at *13 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 20, 2022);
Bernard v. Scott, 501 F. Supp. 3d 611, 629–30 (N.D. Ill. 2020). Though his prayer for
relief might not be moot if he is likely to be transferred back to the Jail, Higgason v.
Farley, 83 F.3d 807, 811 (7th Cir. 1996), Osterberg has not responded to
Defendants’ mootness argument and the record is void of any evidence to establish
16
Case: 3:18-cv-50082 Document #: 130 Filed: 06/27/22 Page 17 of 17 PageID #:2224
that he is likely to return. Thus, the Court dismisses Osterberg’s claims for
injunctive relief.
III.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, Defendants motion for summary judgment [115] is
granted. Civil case terminated.
Date: June 27, 2022
___________________________
Honorable Iain D. Johnston
United States District Judge
17
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?