Martinez v. Majhea et al.

Filing 138

MEMORANDUM Opinion and Order; Defendants' motion to dismiss 114 is granted in part and denied in part. Defendant Drs. Wahl and Davida are dismissed without prejudice to rejoin them if discovery reveals their personal involvement, so long as t he amendment occurs before any case management deadline. In the meantime, this action will continue against Cathy Smith, Dr. Chamberlain, and Wexford Health Sources, Inc., as well as the other defendants that did not move for dismissal. See the attached order for full details. Signed by the Honorable Iain D. Johnston on 4/20/2021: (yxp, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
WESTERN DIVISION
Martin Martinez,
Plaintiff,

Case No. 3:18-cv-50164

v.

Honorable Iain D. Johnston

Wexford Health Services, Inc., Cathy
Smith, Dr. Tim Chamberlain, Amber
Allen, Dr. Jill Wahl, Dr. Arthur Davida,
Correctional Officer Tyler Horner,
Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
The purpose of a motion to dismiss is to test the sufficiency of the complaint,
not to determine whether a plaintiff will win the case. Here, Martinez, through
recruited counsel, clears this hurdle as to some defendants and not others.
Therefore, Defendants' motion to dismiss [114] is denied in part and granted in
part. Whether Martinez’s remaining claims will survive a summary judgment
motion is left for another day.
*

*

*

On October 21, 2020, Plaintiff Martin Martinez filed a third-amended
complaint suing Wexford Health Sources, Inc. (“Wexford”), Amber Allen, Cathy
Smith, Dr. Tim Chamberlain, Dr. Jill Wahl, Dr. Arthur Davida, and Correctional
Officer Tyler Horner. Dkt. 111.
Wexford is a private corporation that has contracted with the Illinois
Department of Corrections to provide its inmates with medical care. Id. ¶ 14. Cathy
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Smith was the individual responsible for scheduling, coordinating, and managing
offsite medical procedures. This included inmate transportation. Id. ¶ 15. Dr. Tim
Chamberlain was a Wexford-employed physician that was heavily involved in
Martinez’s medical care during his incarceration. Id. ¶ 16. Dr. Jill Wahl and Dr.
Arthur Davida were also Wexford-employed physicians. Id. ¶¶ 18–19.
Martinez alleges that these Defendants violated his Eighth Amendment
rights and conspired to violate the same. Defendants Amber Allen and Tyler Horner
filed an answer to the third-amended complaint. Dkt. 123. Defendants Wexford, Dr.
Tim Chamberlain, Dr. Jill Wahl, Dr. Arthur Davida, and Cathy Smith filed the
instant motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for
failure to state claim. Dkt. 114.
I.

Allegations
A. Knee Issue
Plaintiff Martin Martinez was incarcerated with the Illinois Department of

Corrections at the Dixon Correctional Center in 2007. He was then released in
October 2018. Dkt. 111, ¶ 1. In 2009, during this incarceration, Martinez injured his
knee, requiring surgery. Id. ¶¶ 2, 23. That surgery occurred in April 2011, but
Martinez continued to suffer from knee pain even after the surgery. Id. ¶¶ 23–24. A
few months later, in December 2011, Martinez’s orthopedic surgeon recommended
he return for additional treatment if his pain was not resolved through physical
therapy. The pain did not improve. Id. ¶ 25. The alleged timeline is a bit confusing.
But the reasonable inference is that Martinez’s specialist recommended a follow-up

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visit. Still, follow-up care was delayed until September 2012, and even then,
Martinez was not sent to the requesting physician. Id.
The physician that Martinez saw in September 2012 referred him to another
physician and recommended that this be done within three or four weeks. Id. ¶ 26.
That did not happen. Instead, Martinez was not afforded the recommended care for
five months—on April 8, 2013. Id. At that time, Martinez was examined by Dr.
Chmell, who recommended an MRI, which would be followed up with a post-MRI
examination. Id. ¶ 27. Despite Dr. Chmell’s assessment and recommended
treatment, Martinez was not afforded the MRI for another six months, in October
2013. Id. ¶ 28. Even then, Martinez was not provided the results of the MRI until
March 2014, almost a year after the MRI was ordered. Id. On review of the MRI, Dr.
Chmell explained that Martinez might require a knee replacement surgery, but in
the meantime, the best course of action was physical therapy, a cortisone injection,
and a follow-up examination in six months. Id.
Six months came and went with no follow-up examination. Martinez was not
afforded his examination with Dr. Chmell until June 22, 2015, fifteen months after
the last visit and nine months later than Dr. Chmell had ordered. Id. ¶ 29. During
this delayed visit, Dr. Chmell examined Martinez’s knee and recommended another
surgery. He scheduled that surgery for September 22, 2015 and advised that
Martinez needed to return within thirty days of surgery for a pre-surgical
assessment. Id. ¶ 29. Again, that did not happen. For some reason, Martinez was

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not transported to the appointment. Id. ¶ 30. Because he missed the pre-surgical
assessment, the surgery had to be postponed.
Because of the delay, his pre-surgical assessment did not occur until October
26, 2015. The surgery then was scheduled for December 29, 2015, and another presurgical assessment was required within the thirty-day window. Id. ¶ 31. Again,
that did not happen. This series of events continued; Martinez was again scheduled
for surgery, this time on June 21, 2016, with another pre-surgical visit required. Id.
¶ 32. Though the pain persisted, so did the delays; these dates were again missed.
Id. ¶ 34. Martinez alleges that he asked about the surgery schedule multiple times
between December 2015 and July 2016. Each time, he was “advised that it was in
process and that appointments were being made, despite surgery being scheduled
on three prior occasions and Defendants’ failure to follow the recommendations” of
Martinez’s specialty physicians. Id. ¶ 35. For reasons not known to the Court,
Defendants’ wrote Martinez a disciplinary ticket when he continued asking for a
written explanation why they repeatedly failed to transport him to these
recommended medical appointments. Id.
Finally, Martinez was afforded his pre-surgical visit and received the
recommended surgery on August 18, 2016; nearly a year after the originally
scheduled date. Id. ¶ 37. Throughout this delay, Martinez continued to suffer pain
in his knee. Still, the medical team failed to adjust his medication to deal with the
pain.

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Unfortunately for Martinez, the pain continued after his surgery. And he was
not afforded a post-operative follow-up examination until two months after the
surgery—on November 14, 2016. There, the specialist gave Martinez a cortisone
injection and recommended a follow-up examination in three months. Id. ¶ 39. But,
again, that did not happen. And, again, Martinez was not afforded the follow-up
examination until October 30, 2017—eight and a half months late. Id. ¶ 40.
B. Wrist Issues
Martinez also alleges delayed treatment for his wrist injury. In May 2015, he
allegedly complained of pain in his wrist, which he asserted was due to the use of
black box handcuffs. Id. ¶ 42. In response, he was given an x-ray, which he contends
“revealed he suffered from a medical condition that warranted further work up and
treatment.” Id. Still, Dr. Chamberlain limited that treatment to an ACE wrap. 1 Id.
¶ 43. Martinez alleges that he next asked for treatment of his wrists in February
2016, but that Dr. Chamberlain asserted that he had not evaluated Martinez’s
wrists and referred him to sick call. That is a little confusing given the allegation
that Dr. Chamberlain previously treated with an ACE wrap. Id. ¶ 44.
Regardless, Martinez asserts that Dr. Chamberlain was concerned about a
potential nerve issue with Martinez’s wrists in May 2016. Dr. Chamberlain then
decided to delay treatment, however, until the knee could be surgically repaired. Id.
¶ 45. Martinez contends that this delay subjected him to unnecessary pain and
disability (including swelling and numbness, id. ¶ 46). Martinez again complained
An ACE wrap is an elastic bandage, which uses stretchable material to provide localized
compression. Elastic bandage, Stedman’s Medical Dictionary (2014 ed.).
1

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of wrist pain in October 2016 and again asked why his treatment had been delayed.
He was then prescribed physical therapy for the wrist injury on March 27, 2017. Id.
¶ 47. But that physical therapy did not resolve the problem. Id. ¶¶ 49–50. About
three months later, Martinez was referred to a neurologist, because of a suspected
nerve injury (consistent with Dr. Chamberlain’s opinion from thirteen months
before). Id. ¶ 50.
Still, that referral did not take place for another ten months. Id. ¶ 51. At that
time, the neurologist recommended a nerve conduction study. But that study was
delayed another four months. Id. ¶ 52. It revealed that Martinez suffered from
carpal tunnel syndrome in both wrists. Id. ¶ 53. Despite this diagnosis, Martinez
contends that he was not provided “definitive treatment” for the carpal tunnel. Id. ¶
54.
Although Martinez has since been released from custody, he brings this suit
to recover for alleges violations of his constitutional rights under the Eighth
Amendment. Before the Court is a motion to dismiss his claims against Wexford
Health Sources, Dr. Tim Chamberlain, Dr. Jill Wahl, Dr. Arthur Davida, and Cathy
Smith. Dkt. 114.
II.

Analysis
To defeat a motion to dismiss, the plaintiff must have alleged facts sufficient

to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). This means that a plaintiff’s well-pleaded factual
allegations must allow “the court to draw the reasonable inference that the

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defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 566 U.S. 622, 678
(2009). The Court accepts as true all of the plaintiff’s well-pleaded allegations and
views them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Landmark Am. Ins. Co. v.
Deerfield Constr., Inc., 933 F.3d 806, 809 (7th Cir. 2019).
The burden of persuasion on a motion to dismiss rests with the defendant.
Reyes v. City of Chicago, 585 F. Supp. 2d 1010, 1017 (N.D. Ill. 2008) (“On a motion
to dismiss, defendants have the burden of demonstrating the legal insufficiency of
the complaint – not the plaintiffs or the court.”). And although a plaintiff must raise
the plausible inference of liability, Rule 8 does not require him to plead facts that he
cannot know without discovery. Runnion v. Girl Scouts of Greater Chi. & Nw. Ind.,
768 F.3d 510, 529 (7th Cir. 2015).
A. Group Pleading and Personal Involvement
As an initial matter, Defendants argue that Martinez has engaged in
impermissible group pleading. Dkt. 114, at 5. But that argument is too broad.
Group pleading is permissible is some circumstances, and not in others. In other
words, engaging in group pleading is not per se improper. Sibley v. Dart, No. 17-cv6298, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26195, at *12 (N.D. Ill. 2019) (“But at the motion to
dismiss stage, Plaintiff’s group pleading—although not ideal—is not prohibited.”);
see also Bailey v. Mansfield Indep. Sch. Dist., 425 F. Supp. 3d 696, 713 (N.D. Tex.
2019) (“Although Defendants correctly note that Bailey, at times, lumps Defendants
together as a group, read in the context of her other allegations, the instances of

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group pleading have not prevented the court from discerning which defendants are
allegedly responsible for which allegedly unlawful acts.”).
Rather, the underlying analysis is whether the complaint, as a whole, creates
the plausible inference that each defendant is liable for the act complained of. If any
group pleadings, taken along with any individual pleadings, create such a plausible
inference, then the complaint is sufficient and survives a motion to dismiss. On the
other hand, if the group allegations, combined with any individual allegations and
reasonable inferences, fail to put a specific defendant on notice as to their alleged
personal involvement in the injury, the Court must grant that defendant’s motion to
dismiss. Bank of Am., N.A. v. Knight, 725 F.3d 815, 818 (7th Cir. 2013) (“Each
defendant is entitled to know what he or she did that is asserted to be wrongful. A
complaint based on a theory of collective responsibility must be dismissed. That is
true even for allegations of conspiracy.”); see also Minix v. Canarecci, 597 F.3d. 824,
833 (7th Cir. 2010) (discussing the personal involvement requirement). Critically,
although Martinez engages in some group pleadings against some defendants, there
are no defendants who have solely been lumped into an undifferentiated amalgam
of “defendants”.
In the present case, Martinez’s allegations are sufficient as to some
defendants and not as to others.
As to Drs. Jill Wahl and Arthur Davida, the Court finds insufficient
allegations to put them on notice. Martinez alleges that Dr. Wahl was employed by
Wexford and provided medical care to him. Dkt. 111, ¶ 18. He alleges that she was

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aware of his conditions and failed to provide treatment. He alleges the same against
Dr. Davida. Id. ¶ 19. That is it. Martinez fails to include any further factual
allegations that could support his other conclusory allegations. Without more, the
Court is left to speculate whether these doctors are liable for anything. The
complaint paints a picture in which Dr. Chamberlain is the primary Wexford
physician treating Martinez. Nothing in the complaint raises the inference that Drs.
Wahl or Davida were responsible for treating any of the relevant conditions 2 or that
they did. Therefore, the Court grants the motion to dismiss Drs. Wahl and Davida
for failure to allege that they were personally involved in any constitutional injury.
The allegations as to Dr. Chamberlain and Cathy Smith, however, are
sufficient to place them on notice as to their alleged involvement in any
constitutional injury, if one indeed occurred. Martinez alleges that Smith was
“responsible for scheduling, coordinating, and ensuring the completion of medical
procedures outside of IDOC facilities and . . . for coordinating offsite transportation
of inmates for medical treatment, including surgeries prescribed by surgeons.” Id. ¶
15. Although these allegations will have to be proven at a later stage, they are
enough for now. Her alleged job responsibilities go to the heart of Martinez’s
complaint and are, therefore, sufficient to place her on notice of her involvement in
his purported injury.

Although Martinez does allege that Drs. Wahl and Davida were responsible for his
medical care to some degree, he never alleges that they examined him for any of the
medical conditions that are relevant to this suit.

2

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The same is true of Dr. Chamberlain. Unlike Drs. Wahl and Davida, who
Martinez merely alleges were aware of his conditions and neglected to intervene, he
alleges that Dr. Chamberlain purposely delayed the wrist treatment. Id. ¶ 16, 43–
46, 50, 84. Although these allegations that specifically mention Dr. Chamberlain are
mostly concerned with his wrist injury, they provide a reasonable inference that Dr.
Chamberlain was the main Wexford physician responsible for Martinez’s care. That
may not be proven in discovery, but for now, it is enough to place Dr. Chamberlain
on notice of his plausibly alleged personal involvement in the constitutional injury,
if one occurred. To be sure, the allegations specific to Dr. Chamberlain are sparse,
but combined with the group pleadings and the reasonable inferences, they are
enough.
B. Eighth Amendment Deliberate Indifference
The Eighth Amendment does not provide a remedy for medical malpractice.
Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976) (“Medical malpractice does not become a
constitutional violation merely because the victim is a prisoner.”). But the Eighth
Amendment does allow for recovery when a prison medical professional’s decision is
such a substantial department from the norm that he or she cannot be said to have
exercised legitimate professional judgment. Eagen v. Dempsey, 987 F.3d 667, 683
(7th Cir. 2021); Donald v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc., 982 F.3d 451, 458 (7th Cir.
2020). A substantial departure of this type might rise to an inference of
punishment, which is the focus of the Eighth Amendment. See Farmer v. Brennan,
511 U.S. 825, 836-38 (1994); see also Petties v. Carter, 836 F.3d 722, 728 (7th Cir.

10

2016) (“But blatant disregard for medical standards could support a finding of mere
medical malpractice, or it could rise to the level of deliberate indifference,
depending on the circumstances.”).
Federal courts ask (1) whether the inmate suffered from a serious medical
need, and (2) whether the defendant demonstrated a sufficiently culpable state of
mind by exercising deliberate indifference toward that serious medical need. Perry
v. Sims, No. 19-1497, 2021 U.S. App. LEXIS 6165, at *8 (7th Cir. Mar. 3, 2021). This
is not an easy task. The deliberate indifference standard requires an allegation that
defendant’s conduct manifested a serious lack of concern for the plaintiff inmate’s
welfare. Rosario v. Brawn, 670 F.3d 816, 821–22 (7th Cir. 2012). This is a subjective
inquiry: a plaintiff will eventually have to prove that a defendant knew of the risk of
harm and disregarded it. Id.
Here, Martinez includes Wexford Health Sources as a defendant in his § 1983
action. When plaintiffs proceed against a private corporation under Monell v. Dep’t
of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, (1978), they must allege that the private corporation’s
policy, practice, or custom was the direct cause or moving force behind the
constitutional injury. Woodward v. Corr. Med. Servs., 368 F.3d 917, 927 (7th Cir.
2004). Both a constitutional injury and causation are required. First Midwest Bank
v. Chicago, No. 18-3049, 2021 U.S. App. LEXIS 5227, at *13-14, 21-22 (7th Cir. Feb.
23, 2021). Monell claims come in three forms: (1) the defendant employs an express
policy that causes the constitutional injury, (2) the defendant has established a
widespread practice that is so well settled that it constitutes a custom or usage, or

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(3) the defendant has final policymaking authority and has caused the
constitutional injury. McCormick v. City of Chi., 230 F.3d 319, 324 (7th Cir. 2000).
As is often the case, Martinez proceeds under the second option.
Martinez need not prove such a widespread practice at this point. Instead, he
must allege facts that raise the plausible inference that such a widespread practice
does exist and that it was the moving force behind the constitutional injury. See Bell
Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007); see also Hamilton v. Oswego Cmty.
Unit Sch. Dist. 308, No. 20 C 0292, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 36408, at *27 (N.D. Ill.
Feb. 26, 2021) (“The existence of another lawsuit is not enough to state a claim that
a defendant maintains a widespread practice. Plaintiffs point to one other case, but
one other case is not enough.”); Sanders v. Chi. Transit Auth., No. 19-cv-04656,
2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 161701, *23–24 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 3, 2020) (requiring more than
a bare allegation that a custom existed).
First, Martinez has stated an Eighth Amendment claim against the
remaining individual defendants—Dr. Chamberlain and Cathy Smith. As stated
above, this claim requires an allegation of deliberate indifference to a serious
medical condition. Martinez has alleged multiple. Defendants do not challenge the
serious nature of his knee condition. But they do contend that his wrist injury was
not serious—though in a single and uncited sentence. Dkt. 114, at 7. Martinez’s
alleged wrist injury, however, was not a simple sprain or bruise. He alleges
continued swelling, numbness, and nerve damage. That is an objectively serious

12

concern, especially when faced with the continued likelihood that the injury would
be worsened by being handcuffed. 3
For the deliberate indifference part of the test, Martinez mostly does not
allege that he was denied treatment, and he does not have to. He alleges that
Defendants’ manifested deliberate indifference through their continual delays of his
treatment. No doubt, the factual allegations are riddled with lengthy and
unexplained delays. Time after time, Martinez’s medical conditions were scheduled
for treatment and then not timely treated. He consistently complained of pain. And
even though his specialty physicians recommended treatment, Martinez was denied
that treatment on the timeline recommended by his specialists. Martinez’s
allegations describe delays at every stage in the medical treatment process. Some of
these delays were months; at times, he waited more than a year.
If Martinez complained of a single, short delay, then that might not be
enough to state a claim for deliberate indifference. See, e.g., Redmon v. Doehling,
751 F. App’x 900, 904 (7h Cir. 2018); Berry v. Bunnell, 39 F.3d 1056, 1059 (9h Cir.
1994) (minor delays with no harm do not constitute deliberate indifference); Crouch
v. Spaulding, 16 CV 1435, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12459, at *7-8 (N.D.N.Y. Jan. 24,
2019) (delays of minutes insufficient to show deliberate indifference). But he alleges
much more.

Unnecessary pain and suffering alone may be sufficiently serious for the purpose of an
Eighth Amendment claim, even where it does not amount to “torture” or “lingering death.”
Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103 (1976)).
3

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Although Martinez’s complaint does not make clear exactly which doctor he
saw on every occasion, he alleges sufficient involvement by Dr. Chamberlain to
show that Dr. Chamberlain was aware of Martinez’s various conditions and his pain
from dealing with those conditions. And he alleges enough involvement by Dr.
Chamberlain in the treatment of those conditions to raise the inference that Dr.
Chamberlain was deliberately indifferent to those conditions. If Dr. Chamberlain
took Martinez’s conditions seriously, these continual and lengthy delays would
likely not have occurred, at least under these factual allegations. Although the
Court states no opinion as to the truth of these allegations, the Court holds that
they are enough to raise the plausible inference of liability on the part of Dr.
Chamberlain.
Unlike with the other two doctors, Martinez alleges specific instances in
which Dr. Chamberlain examined him. Although these allegations are minimal and
are mostly related to the wrist, they are enough to raise the inference that Dr.
Chamberlain was personally involved in Martinez’s treatment. That, combined with
the continued failure to ensure his knee was timely treated as recommended by the
specialists, is enough to state a claim for deliberate indifference to Martinez’s knee
condition—though barely.
The allegations are also enough to state a claim for deliberate indifference to
Martinez’s wrist injury. The initial delay in treating the wrist could be justified and
explained by the existence of Martinez’s knee injury: Dr. Chamberlain reasonably
wanted to remove the use of a cane before performing surgery on the limb that must

14

operate the cane. If that was the end of the story, then Martinez would have failed
to state a claim. But after almost two years of pain and suffering, Dr. Chamberlain
treated the wrist with physical therapy. If that was the only treatment given, then
waiting for the knee surgery seems less explainable. And that treatment did not fix
the problem.
In June 2017, Martinez was referred to a neurologist for the wrist injury,
thirteen months after Dr. Chamberlain first suspected a nerve issue. But even with
that referral, Martinez was not afforded that consultation for another ten months.
Thus, the significant and continued delays in treatment were not limited to the
knee injury. The delays caused Martinez to continue suffering pain from both his
knee and wrist injuries. That is enough to state a claim. 4
These allegations are also enough to state a claim against Cathy Smith. The
third-amended complaint alleges that she “was responsible for scheduling,
coordinating, and ensuring the completion of medical procedures outside of IDOC
facilities and she was responsible for coordinating offsite transportation of inmates
for medical treatment, including surgeries prescribed by surgeons.” Dkt. 111, ¶ 15.
This goes to the heart of Martinez’s claims. Because his claims are rooted in delays
and failures to transport him to outside appointments, Cathy Smith’s job
responsibilities raise the plausible inference that she is liable for Martinez’s

Defendants also contend that the use of black box handcuffs is not actionable under §
1983. Dkt. 114, at 6. That argument misses the point. Martinez does not sue for the general
use of such handcuffs. He sues for the use of those handcuffs at a time when he had carpal
tunnel syndrome. In other words, he does not challenge the use of black box handcuffs on
the whole, he contends that the continued use of such handcuffs when they exacerbate a
medical problem constitutes deliberate indifference.

4

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constitutional injury. Although Dr. Chamberlain may have been responsible for
ensuring the proper treatment of his patient, Cathy Smith was plausibly
responsible for coordinating and managing that treatment.
Second, Martinez has stated a Monell claim against Wexford Health Sources.
Contrary to Wexford’s contention, Martinez’s allegations are more than merely
conclusory. As a foundation to his allegations, Martinez incorporates a consent
decree from another court in this District. 5 Dkt. 111, ¶ 77. “In October 2018 the
Court-appointed medical experts prepared a report of their findings of Wexford’s
compliance with minimal constitutional standards of adequacy for the period of
2014 to 2018, the relevant time period in Plaintiff’s complaint.” Id. That report
included issues with the process of accessing specialty care. It noted a lack of
adequate tracking of the timeliness of such care—and further noted that Wexford’s
failures often result in “a barrier to timely care” and that such delays “has harmed
patients.” Id. ¶ 78. Furthermore, “[p]atients are not consistently referred for
specialty care when it is warranted,” which the medical experts felt was “a problem
of hiring unqualified physicians and . . . of the utilization process itself.” Id.

In reply, Defendants argue that the Court should not consider the allegations regarding
the consent decree. They contend that the report is irrelevant and routinely barred as
evidence by other courts. Notably, the court opinion they cite to was at the summary
judgment stage. There, the court explained that the report did not qualify for judicial
notice. Diaz v. Chandler, No. 3:14-cv-50047, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 35450, at *39–40 (N.D.
Ill. Mar. 18, 2016). To begin, this case is not at the summary judgment stage, and the Court
is not determining whether to take judicial notice of the report. At this point, the references
to the report are nothing more than allegations. Further, provided counsel engages in a
reasonable inquiry, there is nothing inherently wrong in relying on hearsay to state a
claim. Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b); Lewis v. City of Chicago, 235 F. Supp. 3d 1029, 1031 (N.D. Ill.
2016).

5

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Effectively, what Martinez alleges is that his circumstances are but one
example of a larger problem with the medical services Wexford provides Illinois
inmates. He does not do this in conclusory fashion. His allegations regarding the
consent order give substantial reasons why his claims of a widespread custom are
plausible. Although the Court states no opinion on the merits of Martinez’s claims,
his allegations are enough to raise the plausible inference that Wexford maintains a
widespread custom that directly causes constitutional harm to the inmates in its
care and that Martinez was one of those inmates. 6
C. Conspiracy
Martinez also brings a claim of conspiracy to deprive his constitutional rights
against the various individual defendants. Dkt. 111, at 18. Such a claim is
actionable when defendants agree to deprive the plaintiff of his constitutional rights
and then take overt acts in furtherance of that deprivation. Daugherty v.
Harrington, 906 F.3d 606, 612 (7th Cir. 2018). But those overt acts must have
actually deprived the plaintiff of his or her constitutional rights. Beaman v.
Freesmeyer, 776 F.3d 500, 510 (7th Cir. 2015). Of course, at the pleading stage, a
plaintiff need only allege facts creating the plausible inference that the defendants
are liable.

With that said, Martinez has only stated a Monell claim related to his time at Dixon
Correctional Center. If he means to state a Monell claim regarding how care is provided
across prison facilities, he has failed to do so. He has not alleged that he was ever
transferred between facilities, and thus, any such claim would have nothing to do with him.
The Monell claim that survives is specifically that the delays in his treatment are
attributable to a widespread custom within Wexford at Dixon Correctional Center that
results in untimely treatment of inmate medical needs to a degree that manifests deliberate
indifference.

6

17

Defendants argue that Martinez’s conspiracy allegations are “nothing more
than rote, unadorned, and formulaic recitations of the elements of a claim for
conspiracy.” Dkt. 114, at 13. Not so. To state a claim for conspiracy, a plaintiff need
only identify the parties to the alleged conspiracy, their purpose, and the
approximate date of the conspiracy. Miller v. Fisher, 219 F. App’x 529, 533 (7th Cir.
2007) (“But Miller did not have to provide facts to support his conspiracy claim,
other than to identify the parties, purpose, and approximate date of the
conspiracy.”); Walker v. Thompson, 288 F.3d 1005, 1007 (7th Cir. 2002).
Martinez has done that. He alleged that the individual defendants acted in a
conspiracy to delay his medical care, and he laid out the dates of those delays. Given
that he has cited to a consent decree that describes a culture of widespread delay
and inadequate treatment, his conspiracy allegations at least state a claim against
Dr. Chamberlain and Cathy Smith. But as stated above, Martinez has not alleged
personal involvement by Drs. Wahl and Davida. That lack of sufficient allegations
extends to any claim against them for conspiracy.
III.

Conclusion

For the reasons explained above, Defendants’ motion to dismiss [114] is
granted in part and denied in part. Defendant Drs. Wahl and Davida are dismissed
without prejudice to rejoin them if discovery reveals their personal involvement, so
long as the amendment occurs before any case management deadline. In the
meantime, this action will continue against Cathy Smith, Dr. Chamberlain, and

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Wexford Health Sources, Inc., as well as the other defendants that did not move for
dismissal.
Date: April 20, 2021
___________________________
Honorable Iain D. Johnston
United States District Judge
Northern District of Illinois
Western Division

19