Thomas v. Seal-Rite Door, Inc.

Filing 29

OPINION AND ORDER. The Court grants in part and denies in part Seal-Rite's motion to dismiss 15 . The Court dismisses the hostile work environment claim (Count III) without prejudice. Signed by the Honorable Sara L. Ellis on 9/30/2020. Mailed notice(rj, )

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION
DANIN THOMAS,

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Plaintiff,
v.
SEAL-RITE DOOR, INC.,
Defendant.

No. 19 C 50199
Judge Sara L. Ellis

OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff Danin Thomas, an African American man, filed this lawsuit against Defendant
Seal-Rite Door, Inc (“Seal-Rite”) after Seal-Rite terminated his employment on December 12,
2018. Thomas brings claims for racial discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 (“Title VII”), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.; hostile work environment in violation of
Title VII; and retaliation for the exercise of his rights in violation of Title VII. Seal-Rite moves
to dismiss Thomas’ complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). The Court
finds that Thomas cannot pursue any claims based on conduct that occurred over 300 days before
he filed his second EEOC charge or that arise from allegations included in his first EEOC
charge. Because Thomas has not alleged any conduct related to his hostile work environment
claim that occurred within this 300-day period, the Court dismisses that claim. But because
Thomas has sufficiently alleged timely racial discrimination and retaliation claims, the Court
allows these claims to proceed to discovery.

BACKGROUND 1
Thomas worked for Seal-Rite, an asphalt maintenance services business, as a prefinish
technician from September 19, 2016 to December 12, 2018. During his employment, Thomas
observed management make derogatory statements to him and other employees of similar
ethnicity. Specifically, on or about August 4, 2017, Seal-Rite’s General Manager, Scott Glass,
approached Thomas and asked him, “How do you people get your hair like that?” Doc. 1 ¶ 12.
Another Seal-Rite employee, Bruce Landenburg, heard the comment and told Glass he could not
make such statements because they violate Human Resources protocol. Glass responded, “Yeah,
but he knows what I’m talking about.” Id. ¶ 13. Several days later, on August 8, 2017, Thomas
overheard Glass tell another employee, Khalid Pryor, that “he would not hire [AfricanAmerican] women because they are too ghetto and loud.” Id. ¶ 14. Thomas chose not to
confront Glass about his comments and instead contacted Seal-Rite’s Vice President, Shawn
Richard, via email to request that Seal-Rite conduct a formal Human Resources investigation.
Thomas believes that Seal-Rite did not conduct a Human Resources investigation into Glass’
comments.
On August 9, 2017, Glass instructed all Seal-Rite employees to carry identification to
assist Seal-Rite in facilitating mandatory random drug testing. One employee, Alex, informed

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The facts in the background section are taken from Thomas’ complaint and the exhibits attached thereto
and are presumed true for the purpose of resolving Seal-Rite’s motion to dismiss. See Virnich v.
Vorwald, 664 F.3d 206, 212 (7th Cir. 2011); Local 15, Int’l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, AFL-CIO v. Exelon
Corp., 495 F.3d 779, 782 (7th Cir. 2007). A court normally cannot consider extrinsic evidence without
converting a motion to dismiss into one for summary judgment. Hecker v. Deere & Co., 556 F.3d 575,
582–83 (7th Cir. 2009). Where a document is referenced in the complaint and central to Thomas’ claims,
however, the Court may consider it in ruling on the motion to dismiss. Id. Thomas did not attach his
2017 EEOC charge to the complaint, which Seal-Rite submitted as an exhibit to the motion to dismiss.
The Court takes this charge into account because it must consider the allegations in the charges to
determine the timeliness and proper scope of Thomas’ claims and because Thomas discusses the 2017
EEOC charge in his complaint. See Davis v. Central Can Co., No. 05 C 1563, 2006 WL 2255895, at *4
(N.D. Ill. Aug. 4, 2006) (collecting cases).

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Glass that he only had identification from Mexico, to which Glass responded, “Yeah, you’re
probably illegal.” Id. ¶ 17. Alex and multiple other employees told Glass he could not make
such comments. Thomas also approached Glass and requested that he stop making racially
discriminatory statements. Glass became defensive and denied his actions, but he later agreed
not to make such statements again. That same day, Thomas requested that his immediate
supervisor, Nick Vyborni, schedule a meeting with Seal-Rite managers to discuss Glass’
derogatory statements. Vyborni acknowledged the request and scheduled a meeting. Although
Thomas thought he requested a formal Human Resources investigation, again, no Human
Resources charge came out of the request. Thomas also filed a charge of discrimination with the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) that day (the “2017 EEOC charge”). In
the 2017 EEOC charge, Thomas claimed racial discrimination and retaliation based on
management’s continued discriminatory comments and threats to his employment after he
complained of discrimination. The EEOC issued Thomas a right to sue letter with respect to his
2017 EEOC charge on December 15, 2017.
On October 9, 2017, Seal-Rite supervisor John Utley approached Thomas to discuss the
status of the 2017 EEOC charge. Thomas requested that Utley not ask him about the ongoing
racial discrimination claims, to which Utley responded, “Yeah that’s right, you just keep pushing
that broom n****r.” Id. ¶ 23. Thomas reported Utley’s comments to Vyborni and Richard.
Richard questioned Utley, who admitted he made the comments. Utley received a warning from
Seal-Rite without any formal suspension. On or about October 23, 2017, Thomas expressed
frustration to Richard that Utley had only received a warning, but Richard indicated that SealRite had no plans to escalate the warning. Thomas considered this an acknowledgment that
Seal-Rite had concluded its investigation into his allegations of racial discrimination and would

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not take any additional steps to prevent a hostile work environment or retaliation. As a result,
from October 23, 2017 through January 22, 2018, Thomas actively avoided unnecessary
interactions with coworkers and supervisors.
On January 22, 2018, Thomas slipped on an oil leak while at work and injured his right
shoulder. After Thomas notified Vyborni about the accident, an ambulance took Thomas to the
emergency room. Thomas met with a physician at Swedish American Hospital who ordered him
not to lift more than twenty pounds. Thomas told Vyborni he needed to take medical leave
because of the injury and provided him with medical documentation. Vyborni informed Thomas
that Seal-Rite would provide 120 days of paid leave, which Thomas understood to also include
Seal-Rite’s assistance in filing for Family Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”) benefits.
From January 22, 2018 through May 30, 2018, Thomas recuperated at home, believing
that Seal-Rite was processing his FMLA paperwork. However, on May 30, 2018, Seal-Rite’s
Human Resources representative, Nate Reynolds, informed Thomas that his FMLA
documentation had not been filed and that he needed to return to work to avoid termination.
That same day, Thomas updated Vyborni about his shoulder injury and the doctor’s restriction
that he not lift more than twenty pounds. Vyborni stated that Seal-Rite could accommodate this
restriction and that Thomas should return to work on June 1, 2018.
Nonetheless, upon Thomas’ return, Vyborni immediately instructed him to begin lifting
nearly 200 pounds of concrete and composite doors in the most physically demanding position at
Seal-Rite. Thomas complied with the instruction against the orders of his physician, which
further exacerbated his injury. But he did not immediately complain to his supervisors or Human
Resources because he feared further disciplinary action or losing his position.

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On or about June 15, 2018, Thomas learned from a co-worker, Jonathan Diaz, that, upon
Diaz’s hiring, management warned him to “stay clear” of Thomas because Thomas was a
“trouble maker.” Id. ¶ 35. A few days later, Diaz received a warning after management
observed him speaking with Thomas.
Around June 25, 2018, Thomas received documentation indicating that Seal-Rite
supervisor John McCalister was a registered sex offender. Thomas reported this information to
Vyborni. Vyborni told Thomas not to discuss the issue and informed McCalister of Thomas’
report. McCalister subsequently began issuing Thomas disciplinary actions. Specifically,
Thomas received written discipline from McCalister on June 30, 2018, for not promptly
returning to work within one minute after the warehouse alarm signaled the end of a break
period. McCalister also issued Thomas written discipline on July 15, 2018, claiming Thomas
returned from Seal-Rite’s break room without authorization. McCalister further issued Thomas
written discipline on August 1, 2018, claiming Thomas did not punch out for his scheduled lunch
break. Finally, McCalister issued Thomas written discipline on August 15, 2018, claiming
Thomas took an unauthorized break. Thomas had not received any other disciplinary actions or
negative performance reviews during his time at Seal-Rite.
On or about December 11, 2018, Thomas was accused of assaulting Vyborni by shooting
an industrial strength staple gun at him. Management called Thomas into its office and informed
him of his termination as a result of the accusation. Thomas filed for unemployment upon his
termination, which Seal-Rite contested and won. Thomas then appealed the unemployment
claim to the Illinois Department of Employment Security based upon a security recording of the
incident. Thomas later obtained unemployment benefits.

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Thomas filed a charge with the Illinois Department of Human Rights, cross-filed with the
EEOC, on March 11, 2019 (the “2019 EEOC charge”). In the 2019 EEOC charge, Thomas
alleged that Seal-Rite discriminated against him based on his race and retaliated against him for
engaging in protected activity. The EEOC issued a right to sue letter with respect to the 2019
EEOC charge on March 21, 2019.
LEGAL STANDARD
A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) challenges the sufficiency of the complaint, not
its merits. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6); Gibson v. City of Chicago, 910 F.2d 1510, 1520 (7th Cir.
1990). In considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the Court accepts as true all wellpleaded facts in the plaintiff’s complaint and draws all reasonable inferences from those facts in
the plaintiff’s favor. AnchorBank, FSB v. Hofer, 649 F.3d 610, 614 (7th Cir. 2011). To survive
a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the complaint must not only provide the defendant with fair notice of a
claim’s basis but must also be facially plausible. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009);
see also Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). “A claim has facial plausibility
when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference
that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
ANALYSIS
I.

Timeliness of Claims
First, the Court addresses Seal-Rite’s argument that certain of Thomas’ claims are time-

barred. Specifically, Seal-Rite argues that Thomas cannot base his claims on any alleged
discriminatory or retaliatory conduct predating September 12, 2018, 180 days before he filed the
2019 EEOC charge. Additionally, Seal-Rite contends that because Thomas did not file suit
within ninety days of receiving the December 15, 2017 right to sue letter with respect to his 2017

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EEOC charge, he cannot pursue claims based on conduct included in that charge. Thomas fails
to meaningfully respond to Seal-Rite’s arguments, only asserting, without any legal support, that
he did not file suit after receiving the right to sue letter regarding the 2017 EEOC charge because
he feared retaliation in the form of workplace harassment and termination. The Court
nonetheless examines Seal-Rite’s two timeliness arguments.
A.

300-Day Time Limit for EEOC Charge

First, Seal-Rite argues that the Court should not consider any conduct arising more than
180 days before Thomas filed his 2019 EEOC charge, which, according to Seal-Rite, means that
he can only proceed on his claims with respect to his termination. In a deferral state, like
Illinois, however, a plaintiff has a 300-day window to file an EEOC charge concerning an
alleged unlawful employment practice for a Title VII claim based on those practices to be
actionable. Bass v. Joliet Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 86, 746 F.3d 835, 839 (7th Cir. 2014) (“If a
plaintiff does not file a charge concerning a discrete act within the 300-day window, her claim is
time-barred and she may not recover.”); Roney v. Ill. Dep’t of Transp., 474 F.3d 455, 460 (7th
Cir. 2007) (“A charge of employment discrimination must be filed with EEOC within 300 days
of the alleged unlawful employment practice.”). Retaliation and discrimination claims depend
on discrete acts, with each adverse employment action starting a new filing clock. Nat’l R.R.
Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 113 (2002). Given that Thomas filed his 2019 EEOC
charge on March 11, 2019, he may only recover for discrete alleged unlawful employment
practices occurring after May 15, 2018, rather than September 12, 2018. His termination
undoubtedly fits within this window. To the extent Thomas also contends that the discipline he
received from McCalister between June 30, 2018 and August 15, 2018 amounted to retaliation,
these actions also fall within the 300-day window.

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But the Court cannot find that Thomas complied with the 300-day filing requirement with
respect to his hostile work environment claim. For hostile work environment claims, the Court
may consider the entirety of an employer’s behavior to assess the plausibility of the claims as
long as one contributing act took place within the statutory period. Id. at 105, 115–17 (“A
hostile work environment claim is composed of a series of separate acts that collectively
constitute one ‘unlawful employment practice.’ . . . Provided that an act contributing to the claim
occurs within the filing period, the entire time period of the hostile environment may be
considered by a court for the purposes of determining liability.” (citation omitted)). While
Thomas’ 2019 EEOC charge makes a vague reference to harassment, that charge and his
complaint do not include any suggestion that he experienced race-based harassment after May
15, 2018. He cannot use his termination or the imposition of discipline between June and August
2018 as contributing acts to his hostile work environment claim; his termination and discipline
are instead discrete adverse employment actions. See Novotny v. Plexus Corp., No. 13-cv05881, 2017 WL 1093161, at *6 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 23, 2017) (the plaintiff’s termination did not
contribute to hostile work environment claim so as to make it timely); Wallin v. THC-Chicago,
Inc., 2004 WL 2535283, at *7 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 23, 2004) (“[H]er firing was not an act creating a
hostile environment but was (allegedly) an example of disparate treatment between her and the
male doctor. It therefore is not part of the same hostile environment claim.”). And Thomas does
not include allegations to allow for the inference that his race contributed to Seal-Rite’s
treatment of his injury or the warnings it gave his coworkers about his troublemaker status so as
to allow these actions to act as the hook to make his hostile work environment claim timely.
Indeed, Thomas’ response to Seal-Rite’s argument only highlights the 2017 discriminatory
comments, suggesting that he cannot point to an act falling within the statutory time period that

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would make his hostile work environment claim timely. Therefore, the Court finds that Thomas
cannot proceed on his hostile work environment claim based on the current allegations of the
complaint. 2 Thomas can, however, use any time-barred allegations as background evidence in
support of his timely-filed retaliatory and discriminatory termination claims. Morgan, 536 U.S.
at 113 (Title VII does not “bar an employee from using the prior acts as background evidence in
support of a timely claim.”); Malin v. Hospira, Inc., 762 F.3d 552, 561 (7th Cir. 2014) (events
that occurred 300 days before the plaintiff submitted her EEOC charge could be used as
circumstantial evidence of retaliation).
B.

Ninety-Day Right to Sue Time Limit

The Court also addresses Seal-Rite’s alternative argument that Thomas’ failure to file suit
within ninety days of receiving a right to sue letter with respect to his 2017 EEOC charge bars
him from pursuing any claims based on conduct raised in that charge. A Title VII plaintiff “may
bring only those claims that were included in her EEOC charge, or that are ‘like or reasonably
related to the allegations of the charge and growing out of such allegations.’” Geldon v. S.
Milwaukee Sch. Dist., 414 F.3d 817, 819 (7th Cir. 2005) (quoting McKenzie v. Ill. Dep’t of
Transp., 92 F.3d 473, 481 (7th Cir. 1996)). A plaintiff has ninety days from receipt of a right to
sue letter from the EEOC to file a Title VII lawsuit. Houston v. Sidley & Austin, 185 F.3d 837,
838–39 (7th Cir. 1999) (“Under . . . Title VII, a plaintiff must file her suit within 90 days from
the date the EEOC gives notice of the right to sue.”). When a plaintiff files multiple complaints
with the EEOC, he generally cannot reallege discriminatory acts from an earlier EEOC charge to
evade compliance with the ninety-day period for filing a complaint. Freeman v. Travelers Cos.,
63 F. Supp. 3d 867, 872 (N.D. Ill. 2014) (“To allow a plaintiff to re-allege an earlier EEOC

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Because the Court finds that Thomas has not alleged a timely hostile work environment claim, it does
not address Seal-Rite’s argument that the complaint does not sufficiently state such a claim.

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charge in a subsequent EEOC charge would render the 90-day time limit for filing lawsuits
meaningless, because it would allow the plaintiff to evade [the filing requirement] simply by
seeking additional Notices of Right to Sue whenever he pleased.” (alteration in original) (quoting
Vitello v. Liturgy Training Publ’ns, 932 F. Supp. 1093, 1098 (N.D. Ill. 1996))); Johnson v.
Chicago Bd. of Educ., No. 05 C 4294, 2007 WL 317030, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 31, 2007) (“[O]nce
the 90-day period expires, a court is precluded from adjudicating any allegations contained in a
previous charge.”).
Thomas does not dispute that he did not file suit within ninety days of receiving the right
to sue letter related to the 2017 EEOC charge. He instead argues that he did not do so because
he feared further retaliation. Under certain circumstances, equitable tolling or equitable estoppel
may allow a plaintiff to proceed on a time-barred claim. Hentosh v. Herman M. Finch Univ. of
Health Scis./The Chicago Med. Sch., 167 F.3d 1170, 1174 (7th Cir. 1999). Equitable tolling
“permits a plaintiff to avoid the bar of the statute of limitations if despite all due diligence he is
unable to obtain vital information bearing on the existence of his claim.” Cada v. Baxter
Healthcare Corp., 920 F.2d 446, 451 (7th Cir. 1990). Equitable tolling plays no role here given
that Thomas had the information needed when he filed the 2017 EEOC charge. “The doctrine of
equitable estoppel, when invoked as a defense to the statute of limitations, requires the plaintiff
to show that the defendant took steps deliberately to prevent the plaintiff from bringing a timely
suit, whether by concealing the existence of the plaintiff's claim or by promising not to plead the
statute of limitations.” Beckel v. Wal-Mart Assocs., Inc., 301 F.3d 621, 622 (7th Cir. 2002). The
Seventh Circuit has refused to recognize fear of retaliation as grounds for equitable estoppel. See
id. at 624 (“[A] threat to retaliate is not a basis for equitable estoppel.”). Accordingly, Thomas’

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failure to file suit within ninety days of receiving the right to sue letter with respect to his 2017
EEOC charge also precludes him from proceeding on any allegations raised in that charge.
II.

Racial Discrimination Claim (Count I)
Turning to the sufficiency of Thomas’ allegations, Seal-Rite argues that Thomas has not

sufficiently pleaded facts in his complaint to sustain a plausible inference of a racially
discriminatory motive behind his termination. However, Seal-Rite requests too much from
Thomas at the pleading stage; “[e]mployers are familiar with discrimination claims and know
how to investigate them, so little information is required to put the employer on notice of these
claims.” Carlson v. CSX Transp., Inc., 758 F.3d 819, 827 (7th Cir. 2014).
At this stage, Thomas must only allege that “the employer instituted a (specific) adverse
employment action against [him] on the basis of” his race. Tamayo v. Blagojevich, 526 F.3d
1074, 1084 (7th Cir. 2008). Thomas has alleged just this—that Seal-Rite terminated him
because of his race. See EEOC v. Concentra Health Servs., Inc., 496 F.3d 773, 781 (7th Cir.
2007) (in emphasizing the simplicity required in pleading a racial discrimination claim, citing
with approval an allegation that “I was turned down for a job because of my race” (quoting
Bennett v. Schmidt, 153 F.3d 516, 518 (7th Cir. 1998))). Seal-Rite argues that Thomas has
nonetheless pleaded himself out of court by relying on remote and isolated comments. See
Fleishman v. Cont’l Cas. Co., 698 F.3d 598, 605 (7th Cir. 2012) (“[I]solated comments are not
probative of discrimination unless they are ‘contemporaneous with the discharge or causally
related to the discharge decision-making process.’” (quoting Gleason v. Mesirow Fin., Inc., 118
F.3d 1134, 1140 (7th Cir. 1997))). But the length of time between such comments and Thomas’
termination does not provide a basis for dismissal at the pleading stage and instead remains a

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question for discovery and summary judgment. 3 See Carlson, 758 F.3d at 827 (a plaintiff can
satisfy the pleading requirements for a discrimination claim by alleging the adverse action and
attributing that action to discrimination based on a protected characteristic, with nothing more
required). Therefore, the Court allows Thomas to proceed on his racial discrimination claim
with respect to his termination.
III.

Retaliation Claim (Count III)
At the pleading stage, a Title VII retaliation claim requires only that the plaintiff “allege

that she engaged in a statutorily protected activity and was subjected to adverse employment
action as a result.” Carlson, 758 F.3d at 828 (quoting Luevano v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 722
F.3d 1014, 1029 (7th Cir. 2013)). Similar to its argument with respect to the discrimination
claim, Seal-Rite argues that Thomas failed to sufficiently plead a causal connection between the
alleged protected activity and his termination to support his retaliation claim. 4
Thomas alleges he engaged in protected activities when, among other things, he filed an
EEOC charge on September 6, 2017, he reported his conversation with Utley on October 9,
2017, and he reported McCalister’s sex offender status. 5 See Northington v. H & M Int’l, 712
F.3d 1062, 1065 (7th Cir. 2013) (“An employee engages in a protected activity by either:
(1) filing a charge, testifying, assisting or participating in any manner in an investigation,
3

Indeed, the cases on which Seal-Rite relies to argue that isolated comments do not suffice to establish
causation were decided at the summary judgment phase.
4

Thomas also clarifies in his response that his retaliation claim encompasses the disciplinary actions
McCalister imposed on him between June and August 2018. Although Seal-Rite did not address this
aspect of Thomas’ claim, the Court finds the complaint sufficiently provides notice of such a theory. See
Hatmaker v. Mem’l Med. Ctr., 619 F.3d 741, 743 (7th Cir. 2010).
5

The Court questions whether Thomas’ report of McCalister’s sex offender status qualifies as protected
activity, but because Seal-Rite did not challenge the sufficiency of Thomas’ allegations of a protected
activity until its reply brief, the Court does not find it necessary to address the issue here. See Dexia
Crédit Local v. Rogan, 629 F.3d 612, 625 (7th Cir. 2010) (“[A]rguments raised for the first time in a reply
brief are waived.”).

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proceeding or hearing under Title VII . . . or (2) opposing an unlawful employment practice.”).
Thomas has also pleaded that he suffered adverse actions when McCalister imposed discipline
on him and Seal-Rite terminated him on December 12, 2018. See Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry.
Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 68 (2006) (for retaliation purposes, an action is materially adverse if it
would have “dissuaded a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of
discrimination” (citation omitted)); Castro v. DeVry Univ., Inc., 786 F.3d 559, 564 (7th Cir.
2015) (“A termination is of course a materially adverse employment action.”).
Reprising its argument concerning Thomas’ discrimination claim, Seal-Rite argues that
the length of time between the protected activity and Thomas’ termination is too attenuated to
sustain a plausible claim of retaliation. But the Seventh Circuit has cautioned against drawing
any “bright-line timing rule . . . to decide whether a retaliation claim is plausible,” Carlson, 758
F.3d at 829, allowing a plaintiff to rely on “other circumstantial evidence to support her claim”
when the causal connection between the protected activity and adverse employment action is
weak, Malin, 762 F.3d at 560. Seal-Rite’s argument about the timing of Thomas’ termination
goes to the “strength of [his] case” but does not require dismissal. See Stark v. Foxx, No. 14-cv148-jdp, 2015 WL 1321587, at *4–5 (W.D. Wis. Mar. 24, 2015) (allowing complaint to proceed
despite four-year time interval between protected activity and adverse employment action, noting
that defendant’s arguments went to the “strength” of the plaintiff’s case). Drawing all reasonable
inferences in Thomas’ favor at this stage, he has sufficiently pleaded a retaliation claim by
alleging his protected activity caused his termination. He also has sufficiently pleaded that his
complaint about McCalister’s sex offender status prompted McCalister to impose various
disciplinary actions on him, which began shortly after McCalister learned of Thomas’ report.
Therefore, Thomas may proceed to discovery on his retaliation claims.

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CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court grants in part and denies in part Seal-Rite’s motion
to dismiss [15]. The Court dismisses the hostile work environment claim (Count III) without
prejudice.

Dated: September 30, 2020

______________________
SARA L. ELLIS
United States District Judge

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