Blanchard v. Manzano et al

Filing 100

MEMORANDUM Opinion and Order: Defendants' motion for summary judgment 70 is granted. The Clerk is directed to enter final judgment. Plaintiff's motion for attorney representation 90 is denied as moot. If Plaintiff wishes to appeal, he m ust file a notice of appeal with this Court within thirty days of the entry of judgment. See Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1).2 If Plaintiff appeals, he will be liable for the $605.00 appellate filing fee regardless of the appeal's outcome. See Evan s v. Ill. Dep't of Corr., 150 F.3d 810, 812 (7th Cir. 1998). If the appeal is found to be non-meritorious, Plaintiff could be assessed a "strike" under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). See the attached order. Signed by the Honorable Iain D. Johnston on 8/28/2024: Mailed notice (yxp, )

THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
Antonio Blanchard (M-03227),
Plaintiff,
v.
A. Manzano, et al.,
Defendants.

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Case No. 22 C 50123
Hon. Iain D. Johnston

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff, Antonio Blanchard, presently an inmate at Menard Correctional Center, brought
this suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that he was subjected to retaliation in the form of a
discipline report issued at Dixon Correctional Center on February 27, 2021. Defendants Manzano,
Castanedo, and Skrzypinski have moved for summary judgment (Dkt. 70), arguing that Plaintiff
was issued the disciplinary report due to his involvement in a fight with another inmate on February
1, 2021, not for First Amendment protected speech, qualified immunity, and that Defendant
Manzano was not involved in the issuance of the disciplinary report underlying the retaliation
claim. Because the record provides no evidence of retaliation, the motion for summary judgment
is granted. Plaintiff’s motion for attorney representation (Dkt. 90) is denied as moot.
BACKGROUND
I.

Northern District of Illinois Local Rule 56.1
Local Rule 56.1 governs the procedures for filing and responding to motions for summary

judgment in this court. The rule is intended “to aid the district court, ‘which does not have the
advantage of the parties’ familiarity with the record and often cannot afford to spend the time
combing the record to locate the relevant information,’ in determining whether a trial is necessary.”
Delapaz v. Richardson, 634 F.3d 895, 899 (7th Cir. 2011) (internal citation omitted.) Local Rule

56.1(a) requires the moving party to provide a statement of material facts that complies with Local
Rule 56.1(d). LR 56.1(a)(2). Local Rule 56.1(d) requires that “[e]ach asserted fact must be
supported by citation to the specific evidentiary material, including the specific page number, that
supports it. The court may disregard any asserted fact that is not supported with such a citation.”
LR 56.1(d)(2).
The opposing party must then respond to the movant’s proposed statements of fact.
Schrott v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 403 F.3d 940, 944 (7th Cir. 2005); LR 56.1(e). In the case
of any disagreement, “a party must cite specific evidentiary material that controverts the fact and
must concisely explain how the cited material controverts the asserted fact. Asserted facts may be
deemed admitted if not controverted with specific citations to evidentiary material.”

LR

56.1(e)(3). “[M]ere disagreement with the movant’s asserted facts is inadequate if made without
reference to specific supporting material.” Smith v. Lamz, 321 F.3d 680, 683 (7th Cir. 2003).
Because Plaintiff is proceeding pro se, Defendants served him with a “Notice to Pro Se
Litigant Opposing Motion for Summary Judgment” as required by Local Rule 56.2. (Dkt. 73.)
Plaintiff submitted a memorandum supporting his response to the motion for summary judgment
(Dkt. 84.) Plaintiff’s memorandum includes a reiteration of Defendants’ statement of facts with
notations of: “object” “disagree” or “agree” to Defendants’ statements of fact (within the response,
not submitted as a separate document specifically dedicated to responding to the L.R. 56.1 (N.D.
Ill.) statement) and is not supported by exhibits or citations to the record (Dkt. 84).
Plaintiff also submitted a document entitled “Evidentiary Material of Exhibits of Facts in
Dispute” that the Court construes as a statement of additional facts (Dkt. 86.) Plaintiff submitted
another document, consisting of documents, supporting his statements of additional fact. (Dkt.

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89.) Defendants responded to the statement of additional facts (Dkt. 91), objecting to, disputing,
and admitting the statements, with citations to Plaintiff’s documentary submission (Dkt. 89.)
Although the Court liberally construes Plaintiff’s submissions, several of his factual
statements are irrelevant, argumentative, consist of legal conclusions, or consist of Plaintiff
pointing to grievances or other documents without explaining the significance of these documents
or quibbling about details in the documents that do not effectively dispute the contents of the
document. For instance, Plaintiff’s additional statements of fact that Defendants rested their entire
investigation of the underlying February 1, 2021, fight on the internal affairs report of February 2,
2021, but that the report is unsigned and that it states that the investigation was of an “Assault to
an Offender.” (See Dkt. 91, ¶¶ 3,4). As such, Plaintiff has not properly controverted any alleged
statement of fact or created a dispute of fact. Guy v. Lara, Case No. 98 C 3741, 2000 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 13590, *14 (N.D. Ill. September 11, 2000) (Guzman, J.); see also Parra v. Neal, 614 F.3d
635, 636 (7th Cir. 2010); Rao v. BP Prods. N. Am., Inc., 589 F.3d 389, 393 (7th Cir. 2009).
Because Plaintiff is proceeding pro se, the Court has considered his factual assertions, but only to
the extent he has pointed to evidence in the record or could properly testify himself about the
matters asserted. See Rivera v. Guevara, 319 F. Supp. 3d 1004, 1018 (N.D. Ill. 2018) (court may
disregard any part of factual statement or response that consists of legal arguments or conclusions).
The Court will consider Plaintiff’s response to Defendants’ L.R. 56.1 (N.D. Ill.) statement
and his statement of additional facts only to the extent they are supported by the record or to the
extent they contain information about which Plaintiff could properly testify. Lamz, 321 F.3d at
683 (7th Cir. 2003); see also James v. Hale, 959 F.3d 307, 315 (7th Cir. 2020) (citing Fed. R. Civ.
P. 56(c)(4)); Sistrunk v. Khan, 931 F. Supp. 2d 849, 854 (N.D. Ill. 2013); Fed. R. Evid. 602. The
Court will not look beyond any cited material, however. See Johnson v. Cambridge Indus., Inc.,

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325 F.3d 892, 898 (7th Cir. 2003) (“[D]istrict courts . . . are not required to scour every inch of the
record for evidence that is potentially relevant to the summary judgment motion before them.”).
The Court is mindful that failure to strictly comply with Local Rule 56.1, or indeed to
respond at all to a motion for summary judgment, does not automatically warrant judgment in
favor of the moving party. Raymond v. Ameritech Corp., 442 F.3d 600, 608 (7th Cir. 2006)
(moving party has “ultimate burden of persuasion” to show entitlement to judgment as a matter of
law). The Court will apply these standards in evaluating the evidence.
II.

Relevant Facts 1
Plaintiff Antonio Blanchard is an individual in custody of the Illinois Department of

Corrections. (Defs. SOF, Dkt. 71, ¶ 1.) The events giving rise to his Complaint occurred while he
was in custody at Dixon Correctional Center. (Id.) Defendant Arthur Manzano was the Internal
Affairs Lieutenant at Dixon Correctional Center during the relevant time period. (Id. at ¶ 2.)
Defendant Michael Castanedo worked in the Intelligence Unit at Dixon Correctional Center during
the relevant time period. (Id. at ¶ 3.) Defendant Megan Skrzypinski worked in the Intelligence
Unit at Dixon Correctional Center during the relevant time period. (Id. at ¶ 4.)
On February 1, 2021, Plaintiff was involved in a fight with another individual in custody.
(Id. at ¶ 7.) This fight occurred near the shower area of Plaintiff’s housing unit. (Id. at ¶ 8.)
Plaintiff claimed that Correctional Officer Rodriguez was the floor officer at the time of this
incident, and according to Plaintiff, Officer Rodriguez was supposed to roam the unit every fifteen
minutes to see what is occurring. (Id. at ¶ 9.) On February 2, 2021, Plaintiff met with internal
affairs at Dixon and during the interview admitted involvement in a fight with a fellow inmate on
February 1, 2021, refusing to identify that inmate. (Dkt. 89, Pl. Ex. A-8 and A-9)

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Subject-matter jurisdiction is proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1), and venue is proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1402(b).

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On February 4, 2021, with Skrzypinski, Castanedo interviewed Plaintiff about the fighting
incident. (Defs. SOF, Dkt. 71, ¶ 10.) Castanedo and Skrzypinski were both aware that Plaintiff
had admitted involvement in the February 1, 2021, fight during the February 2, 2021, interview
with internal affairs going into their interview of Plaintiff. (Id. at ¶ 11.) During the February 4,
2021, interview, Plaintiff was shown a lineup of photos and asked to identify the person with whom
he was involved in a fight. (Id. at ¶ 12.) Plaintiff refused to identify anyone, and the interview was
ended. (Id. at ¶ 13.) During the February 4, 2021, interview, Plaintiff stated something to the
effect of if Officer Rodriguez had done his security check that night, the incident may not have
happened. (Id. at ¶ 14.) Skrzypinski recalls Plaintiff mentioning a male officer “Rodriguez”
during the interview, but to Skrzypinski’s knowledge, there was no such officer because, at that
time, there were two officers named Rodriguez at Dixon but both were women. (Id. at ¶ 15.)
Castanedo does not recall any mention of a “Rodriguez” during the interview. (Id. at ¶ 16.)
Plaintiff received a disciplinary ticket for fighting on February 27, 2021, which stated that
Plaintiff admitted to fighting in the internal affairs interview on February 2, 2021. (Id. at ¶ 17.)
Plaintiff was issued the disciplinary ticket because he admitted to being involved in the fighting
incident on February 1, 2021, not because of any complaints about staff or his actions towards
staff. (Id. at ¶ 18.)
Plaintiff did not speak with Defendant Manzano at all about the fighting incident or about
the investigation into the fight. (Id. at ¶ 19.) Plaintiff sued Manzano because he thought Manzano
would have some “say-so” in the investigation. (Id.) But Plaintiff submitted a document that
indicates Manzano’s involvement in the investigation. (Dkt. 89, Pl. Ex. A-10). The document is
an e-mail in which Manzano writes that the decision to issue the disciplinary report to Plaintiff on
February 27, 2021, was due to his involvement in the February 1, 2021, fight. Id. The Illinois

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Department of Corrections Administrative Review Board ultimately expunged the disciplinary
report, finding not that Plaintiff was not involved in the fight, but that the Adjustment Committee
did not establish factual details necessary to support its determination that Plaintiff was guilty of
the offense of fighting. (Dkt. 89, Pl. Ex. A-11).
DISCUSSION
I.

Summary Judgment Standard
On summary judgment, the Court must view the record in the light most favorable to the

non-moving party and grant the motion if the record shows that there is no genuine dispute as to
any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Gupta v. Melloh, 19
F.4th 990, 997 (7th Cir. 2021); Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Summary judgment is warranted “against a
party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element that is
essential to that party’s case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Celotex
Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986).
The party seeking summary judgment bears the initial burden of showing the grounds for
their motion. Id. at 323. Once that party does so, “the burden shifts to the non-moving party to
provide evidence of specific facts creating a genuine dispute.” Carroll v. Lynch, 698 F.3d 561,
564 (7th Cir. 2012). Mere “metaphysical doubt” is not enough. Id. (quoting Matsushita Elec.
Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986)). A factual dispute is genuine when a
reasonable jury could return a verdict in favor of the non-moving party. Id.
The Court must construe all facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and
draw all legitimate inferences in favor of that party. Nat’l Athletic Sportswear, Inc. v. Westfield
Ins. Co., 528 F.3d 508, 512 (7th Cir. 2008). “A court’s role is not to evaluate the weight of the
evidence, to judge the credibility of witnesses, or to determine the truth of the matter, but instead

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to determine whether there is a genuine issue of triable fact.” Id.
II.

Analysis
Defendants seek summary judgment on Plaintiff’s claim of retaliation for several reasons:

(1) Defendants did not discipline Plaintiff due to First Amendment protected activity; (2) even if
they did have retaliatory motive, Plaintiff would have been disciplined regardless because he
admitted to being in a fight; (3) Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity; and (4) Defendant
Manzano was not personally involved in any discipline of Plaintiff. Because the record is devoid
of any evidence of retaliation, Defendants are entitled to summary judgment.
To establish a claim of retaliation, a prisoner must show: (1) that he engaged in a protected
activity; (2) he suffered a deprivation likely to prevent future protected activities; and (3) there was
a causal connection between the protected activity and the deprivation. Watkins v. Kasper, 599
F.3d 791, 794 (7th Cir. 2009); Bridges v. Gilbert, 557 F.3d 541, 546 (7th Cir. 2009); see Mays v.
Springborn, 575 F.3d 643, 650 (7th Cir. 2009) (prisoner must show that the protected activity was
“at least a motivating factor” in the retaliatory action). If the plaintiff satisfies these elements, the
burden shifts to the defendant to rebut the causal inference with evidence showing that he would
have taken the same action without any retaliatory motive. See Mays, 575 F.3d at 650; Hasan v.
U.S. Dep't of Labor, 400 F.3d 1001, 1005–06 (7th Cir. 2005).
If the defendant provides legitimate and non-retaliatory reasons for his actions, then the
burden shifts back to the plaintiff to demonstrate that the proffered reason was pretextual and that
the real reason was retaliatory animus. See, e.g., Thayer v. Chiczewski, 705 F.3d 237, 252 (7th
Cir. 2012); Zellner v. Herrick, 639 F.3d 371, 379 (7th Cir. 2011). “At the summary judgment
stage, this means a plaintiff must produce evidence upon which a rational finder of fact could infer
that the defendant’s proffered reason is a lie.” Zellner, 639 F.3d at 379.

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Plaintiff alleges that the February 27, 2021, disciplinary report Defendants issued him was
in retaliation for First Amendment protected activity. His allegation seemingly stems from his
refusal to cooperate in the investigation of the February 1, 2021, altercation Plaintiff was involved
in with another inmate, or from a complaint about the manner in which an Officer Rodriguez
completed his rounds (or failed to complete his rounds) during the altercation on February 1, 2021.
The record indicates that Plaintiff was involved in an altercation with at least one other
inmate on February 1, 2021. The record further indicates that Plaintiff admitted to being involved
in the altercation in an interview with internal affairs on February 2, 2021, and that Defendants
Castaneda and Skrzypinski were aware of the admission when they interviewed Plaintiff on
February 4, 2021. Plaintiff refused to cooperate with Defendants Castaneda and Skrzypinski
during the interview and would not identify the person(s) with whom he had the February 1, 2021,
altercation.
To the extent Plaintiff is asserting that his refusal to cooperate in the investigation was the
reason for the alleged retaliation, such refusal is not First Amendment protected activity. Caffey
v. Maue, 679 F. App’x 487, 490 (7th Cir. 2017). To the extent Plaintiff asserts that his complaints
about an Officer Rodriguez are the motivating factor behind any alleged retaliation, the record is
less clear. Defendant Skrzypinski was unaware of any such Officer Rodriguez as described by
Plaintiff during the interview in his complaints. Defendant Castaneda has no memory of Plaintiff
complaining about an officer Rodriguez.
What is clear from the record, though, is that Plaintiff admitted to being involved in the
February 1, 2021, altercation underlying the disciplinary report issued on February 27, 2021.
Multiple exhibits submitted by Plaintiff contain statements that he admitted to being involved in
the altercation but refused to cooperate in the investigation. A prisoner challenging a retaliatory

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disciplinary action does not have a colorable claim when he admits to having committed the
alleged misconduct. See LaBoy v. Clements, No. 15 CV 10771, 2017 WL 2936705, at *8 (N.D.
Ill. July 10, 2017) (St. Eve, J.) (plaintiff who admitted he was making impermissible three-way
calls could not argue the disciplinary action was retaliatory in nature, even if he was not convicted
of every disciplinary charge); see also Whitfield v. Snyder, 263 F. App’x 518, 522 (7th Cir. 2008)
(finding that a plaintiff who admitted to committing the misconduct giving rise to his discipline on
several counts could not pursue retaliation claim); Harris v. Hodge, No. 3:11-CV-0097, 2016 WL
6581294, at *4 (S.D. Ill. Nov. 4, 2016) (Rosenstengel, J.) (inmate’s retaliation claim failed because
he admitted that officers searched his cell because they suspected him of having contraband).
In this case, Defendants took adverse action against Plaintiff in writing the disciplinary
ticket on February 27, 2021, and the undisputed evidence shows that the ticket was based on a
proper, non-retaliatory motive. Specifically, the disciplinary ticket was issued after an ongoing
investigation into the underlying altercation during the month of February 2021, and that Plaintiff
was interviewed twice (refusing to cooperate both times) and that as a result of the investigation,
and Plaintiff’s admission as to being involved in the altercation, he was issued a disciplinary report.
Plaintiff attempts to counter the evidence of non-retaliatory motive by Defendants in
issuing the disciplinary report by pointing to the Illinois Department of Corrections Administrative
Review Board expunging the disciplinary report on September 20, 2021. Plaintiff argues (in his
additional statements of fact) that the ARB “DID NOT BUY Dixon’s Internal Affairs version of
events.” (Dkt. 86, ¶ 5 (emphasis in the original)). However, Plaintiff mischaracterizes the findings
of the ARB, which stated in its September 20, 2021, notice that “while Blanchard reportedly
admitted to Internal Affairs the occurrence of a fight, the committee failed to establish factual
detail of such and there were no specifics on the 202.” (Dkt. 89, pg. 6.) The document indicates

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that the ARB found the report and evidentiary support for the adjustment committee findings to be
lacking, not that Plaintiff did not admit to being in a fight. In short, the ARB found what amounts
to a procedural defect, which does not support a finding, absent more, that Plaintiff’s admission to
being involved in the February 1, 2021, fight was the motive behind issuing him a ticket, and not
a pretext for retaliatory motive. Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s attempt to create a
question of fact in the face of the undisputed evidence that he admitted to being involved in the
underlying incident is merely argumentative, and insufficient to create a material question of fact.
See Rivera, 319 F. Supp. 3d at 1018.
Because the record establishes that Defendants had a non-retaliatory motive for issuing
Plaintiff the disciplinary report, and Plaintiff provides no admissible and uncontroverted evidence
that the non-retaliatory motive was pretextual, Defendants are entitled to summary judgment.
Defendant Manzano argues that there is no evidence of his personal involvement in the alleged
retaliation; however, the record includes documentation of his involvement in the investigation
that led to issuing Plaintiff the disciplinary report. (Dkt. 89, pg. 5.) Accordingly, the Court finds
that questions of fact remain as to whether he was personally involved. However, because the
Court has found that the undisputed record establishes a non-retaliatory motive for issuing the
disciplinary report and Plaintiff’s failure to show that such motive was pretextual that failed
argument does not impact the outcome of the motion. Additionally, because Defendants prevailed
on their other arguments, the Court need not consider their argument that they are entitled to
qualified immunity.

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CONCLUSION
Defendants’ motion for summary judgment [70] is granted. The Clerk is directed to enter
final judgment. Plaintiff’s motion for attorney representation [90] is denied as moot. If Plaintiff
wishes to appeal, he must file a notice of appeal with this Court within thirty days of the entry of
judgment. See Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1). 2 If Plaintiff appeals, he will be liable for the $605.00
appellate filing fee regardless of the appeal’s outcome. See Evans v. Ill. Dep’t of Corr., 150 F.3d
810, 812 (7th Cir. 1998). If the appeal is found to be non-meritorious, Plaintiff could be assessed
a “strike” under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).

DATE: August 28, 2024

______ ___________________
Iain D. Johnston
United States District Judge

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Plaintiff need not bring a motion to reconsider this Court’s ruling to preserve his appellate rights. However, if
Plaintiff wishes the Court to reconsider its judgment, he may file a motion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e)
or 60(b). Any Rule 59(e) motion must be filed within 28 days of the entry of this judgment. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e).
The time to file a motion pursuant to Rule 59(e) cannot be extended. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(b)(2). A timely Rule 59(e)
motion suspends the deadline for filing an appeal until the Rule 59(e) motion is ruled upon. See Fed. R. App. P.
4(a)(4)(A)(iv). Any Rule 60(b) motion must be filed within a reasonable time and, if seeking relief under Rule
60(b)(1), (2), or (3), must be filed no more than one year after entry of the judgment or order. See Fed. R. Civ. P.
60(c)(1). The time to file a Rule 60(b) motion cannot be extended. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(b)(2). A Rule 60(b) motion
suspends the deadline for filing an appeal until the Rule 60(b) motion is ruled upon only if the motion is filed within
28 days of the entry of judgment. See Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(4)(A)(vi).

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