Rockwood v. Pettinger et al

Filing 64

MEMORANDUM Opinion and Order: Defendants Advanced Correctional Health Care Inc. and Tammy Coil's motion for judgment of the pleadings 36 is granted in part as follows: Coil's motion to dismiss is denied, but ACH's is granted without prejudice. Lee County Defendants motion to dismiss 45 is granted in part as follows: Primrose's motion to dismiss the claims against him in his individual capacity is denied, but the claims against Lee County, the Lee County Sheriff and Pette nger are dismissed without prejudice. Plaintiff is given until 10/24/2024 to file any amended complaint. If no amended complaint is filed by that date, the dismissal will convert to dismissal with prejudice. See the attached Order for details. Signed by the Honorable Iain D. Johnston on 9/24/2024: (yxp, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
WESTERN DIVISION
Steven L. Rockwood, Jr.,
Plaintiff,
v.
Sheriff of Lee County, et al.

Case No.: 23-cv-50245
Judge Iain D. Johnston

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff Steven L. Rockwood brings this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action regarding his
incarceration at the Lee County Jail (“the Jail”). Rockwood alleges that numerous
defendants failed to timely and adequately care for his broken hand. Defendant
Tammy Coil and Advanced Correctional Healthcare, Inc. (“ACH”) together answered
the complaint and moved under F.R.C.P. Rule 12(c) for judgment on the pleadings. Lee
County, the Sheriff of Lee County, Jacob Primrose, 1 and Ryan Pettenger together
answered the complaint and moved to dismiss the claims against them. 2 For the
reasons below, the Court denies the motions to dismiss from Coil and Primrose, and
grants the motions to dismiss from ACH, Lee County, the Sheriff of Lee County, and
Pettenger.
I.

Background

The Court takes the following allegations from Rockwood’s second amended
complaint as well as ACH’s and Coil’s exhibits. 3 See Lax v. Mayorkas, 20 F.4th 1178,

The Lee County Defendants’ motion is unclear. Their answer and opening paragraph of
their motion to dismiss indicate that they move on behalf of Primrose. However, they do not
address the claims against him in the motion. The Court treats Primrose as if he also moved
to dismiss the claims against him.
2 Because they answered the complaint, the Court treats the motion to dismiss as a Rule
12(c) motion for judgement on the pleadings. Federated Mut. Ins. Co. v. Coyle Mech. Supply
Inc., 983 F.3d 307, 313 (7th Cir. 2020). The standards are identical. Id.
3 Coil asked the Court to consider her exhibits, citing substantial caselaw supporting their
admissibility. To the extent the exhibits are relevant (and not duplicative), they hurt her
case. Under these circumstances, the Court considers the exhibits without scrutinizing
their precise relationship to the complaint. The exhibits do not impact the decision
regarding the Lee County Defendants. Attaching exhibits in support of a motion for
judgment on the pleadings is far from best practices. If Coil truly wanted the Court to
consider these exhibits, the Court would need to convert the motion into a Rule 56 motion
1

1181 n.1 (7th Cir. 2021); Bogie v. Rosenberg, 705 F.3d 603, 609 (7th Cir. 2013) (a court
may consider exhibits attached to the complaint and documents other than the
complaint “when they are referenced in the complaint and central to the plaintiff’s
claim.”). The Court accepts the allegations as true for purposes of deciding this
motion.

a. Parties
Plaintiff Rockwood is currently incarcerated in the Illinois Department of
Corrections. Dkt. 20, ¶ 8. From November 7, 2018 through August 5, 2021, he was
incarcerated in the Lee County Jail. Dkt. 20, ¶¶ 20, 62. After being convicted, he was
sentenced on June 3, 2021 but remained in Lee County Jail until August 5, 2021. 4
Lee County is a local government in Illinois, and the Sheriff of Lee County is
responsible for the practices and procedures of the Lee County Jail and its employees.
Dkt. 20, ¶ 9-11. Jacob Primrose is a Lee County Deputy who was employed at the
Jail when Rockwood’s injury occurred. Dkt. 20, ¶ 13. Ryan Pettenger was the
superintendent of the Jail when Rockwood’s injury occurred. Dkt. 20, ¶ 14. Lee
County hired ACH to provide medical care and treatment at the Lee County Jail. Dkt.
20, ¶ 16. ACH employed Tammy Coil, a nurse assigned to the Jail when Rockwood’s
injury occurred. Dkt. 20, ¶ 17.
b. Factual History
On Sunday, July 25, 2021, at approximately 11:00 AM, Rockwood was attacked by
another inmate. Id. ¶ 24. Rockwood’s right hand then “immediately became
noticeably swollen and bruised and his finger remained bent in an unnatural
position.” Id. ¶ 26. Shortly after, Primrose entered Rockwood’s cell block and
allegedly noticed “what appeared to be blood” and Rockwood’s broken glasses. Id. ¶¶
27–28. Primrose then reviewed the surveillance video and observed the altercation.
Id. ¶ 29. He returned to Rockwood’s cell block and ordered Rockwood and the inmate
involved in the altercation to their respective cells. Id. ¶ 30. He did not ask Rockwood
if he was injured or required medical attention. Id. ¶ 31.
Rockwood remained in his cell for the rest of July 25 and into the morning of July 26.
Id. ¶ 33. Throughout that time, Rockwood used the cell’s emergency call button “on
multiple occasions” to notify officers that he was in extreme pain from a broken hand
and required medical attention. Id. ¶¶ 35–36. Rockwood also notified officers,
for summary judgment. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d). And, once converted into a summary
judgment motion, Local Rule 56.1 becomes applicable, with which Coil fail to comply.
4
Because Rockwood was sentenced, the Eighth Amendment—not the Fourteenth
Amendment—applies despite Rockwood being housed in a local jail. Aguilar v. Martija, No.
22-cv-1043, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 165805, at *6-7 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 16, 2024).

including Primrose, during their in-person rounds that day and night, and showed
them his hand. Id. ¶¶ 37–39. The officers “took no action,” and instead told Rockwood
that he would need to wait until the next day to see the nurse. Id. ¶ 36. The Jail does
not employ medical staff on Saturdays and Sundays, and no medical staff was present
on that Sunday, July 25. Id. ¶ 46; Dkt. 44, ¶ 46.
The next day, Monday, July 26, at 11:00 AM Rockwood visited the Jail’s nurse,
Defendant Tammy Coil. Dkt. 20, ¶ 49; Dkt 37-1, pg. 4. Coil noted that Rockwood’s
pinky was “very swollen” and “bruised and bent.” Dkt. 20, ¶ 50; Dkt 37-1, pg. 4.
Rockwood told Coil that he sustained the injury during the previous day’s fight, but
Coil could not confirm the origin. Dkt. 20, ¶ 50; Dkt 37-1, pg. 4. Coil noted that
Rockwood was a “poor historian/frequently tells false statements.” Dkt 37-1, pg. 4. In
consultation with a “Dr. A. Martija,” Coil ordered an X-ray of Rockwood’s hand, Dkt
37-1, pg. 4, 5 and gave him an ice pack and acetaminophen. Dkt. 20, ¶ 55.
At or around 8:45 AM on July 28, Rockwood received an X-ray. Dkt. 20, ¶ 57; Dkt 371, pg. 2. It revealed an “acute, nondisplaced fracture of the distal aspect of the fourth
metatarsal.” Dkt 37-1, pg. 2. A report documenting those results was signed at 9:18
AM on July 28. Id. Rockwood alleges that “Defendants” were aware of the fracture
diagnosis on July 28, but did not provide him with a splint. Dkt. 20, ¶ 59. The next
day, July 29, at 2:20 PM, Coil “left a voicemail for Dr. Martija about Rockwood’s hand
X-ray results.” Dkt 37-1, pg. 2. An hour later, Dr. Martija ordered an “ortho” for
Monday, August 2 for a “special splint.” Id. At his August 2 appointment, Rockwood
alleges that a doctor said to the transporting officer something along the lines of “it
has been nine days, what do you expect me to do with it now.” Dkt. 20, ¶ 61. Rockwood
alleges that he still has pain from the injury and that it requires prescription
medication. Dkt. 20, ¶ 63.
c. Procedural History
Rockwood filed an amended complaint pro se on August 14, 2023. Dkt. 6. Screening
the complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, which requires the same 12(b)(6) standard,
Marshall v. Knight, 445 F.3d 965, 968 (7th Cir. 2006), the Court found that “Plaintiff’s
allegations arguably state[d] a constitutional claim for inadequate medical care.” Dkt.
7, pg. 3. The Court ultimately dismissed the complaint without prejudice, and
granted Plaintiff’s motion for attorney representation. Id.
Rockwood filed this second amended complaint on March 28, 2024. Dkt. 20. The
second amended complaint’s factual allegations largely match those in the first
Plaintiff alleges that “defendants did not schedule an x-ray until July 28, 2021.” Dkt. 20, ¶
57 (emphasis added). Plaintiff received an X-ray on July 28, 2021. Coil’s notes, ostensibly
from the July 26 visit, indicate that she planned to order an X-ray. It’s unclear when Coil
scheduled the appointment or if the first opportunity was the 28th.

5

amended complaint. Rockwood named additional defendants and identified some of
the individuals previously listed as “John/Jane Doe.” Counts I, II, and V are § 1983
claims against Primrose, Coil, and Pettenger, respectively. Counts IV, VI, VII are
Monell claims against the Lee County Sheriff, Lee County, and ACH, respectively.
On June 5, 2024, ACH and Coil jointly answered the complaint. Dkt. 35. The next
day, ACH and Coil moved for judgment on the pleadings. Dkt. 36. On June 28, 2024,
Lee County, Ryan Pettenger, Jacob Primrose, and Sheriff of Lee County answered
the complaint and also moved to dismiss it. Dkt. 44, 45.
II.

Legal Standard

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 requires that a plaintiff’s complaint contain a “short
and plain statement” establishing the basis for the claim and the Court’s jurisdiction.
Fed R. Civ. P. R. 8(a). A plaintiff will survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion if the plaintiff
alleges facts sufficient to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl.
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). The
Court accepts all well-pleaded facts as true and draws all reasonable inferences in
favor of the plaintiff. United States ex rel. Berkowitz v. Automation Aids, Inc., 896
F.3d 834, 839 (7th Cir. 2018). The Court “need not accept as true legal conclusions,
or threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere
conclusory statements.” Brooks v. Ross, 578 F.3d 574, 578 (7th Cir. 2009). The moving
party bears the burden of establishing the insufficiency of the plaintiff’s allegations.
Marcure v. Lynn, 992 F.3d 625, 631 (7th Cir. 2021). The Court applies the same
12(b)(6) standard to 12(c) motions for judgment on the pleadings. Federated Mut. Ins.
Co. v. Coyle Mech. Supply Inc., 983 F.3d 307, 313 (7th Cir. 2020).
The Eighth Amendment requires prison officials to provide healthcare to incarcerated
persons. Howell v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc., 987 F.3d 647, 653 (7th Cir. 2021)
(citing Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103–04, 97 S.Ct. 285, 50 L.Ed.2d 251 (1976)).
The Amendment guards against prison conditions that cause “the wanton and
unnecessary infliction of pain.” Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347, 101 S.Ct.
2392, 69 L.Ed.2d 59 (1981). “Denying or delaying treatment to an incarcerated
person suffering from avoidable pain” can give rise to an Eighth Amendment claim.
Howell, 987 F.3d at 653.
Section 1983 creates a private right of action against a “person” who acts under color
of state law to deprive another of a right under federal law, including the
Constitution. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. “A key part of § 1983’s doctrinal structure is the
difference between individual and governmental liability.” Howell, 987 F.3d at 653.
Individual liability requires personal involvement in the constitutional violation and
“depends on each defendant’s knowledge and actions, not on the knowledge or actions
of persons they supervise.” Burks v. Raemisch, 555 F.3d 592, 594 (7th Cir. 2009).
Neither an individual supervisor nor a governmental entity can be held vicariously

liable under § 1983. See Burks, 555 F.3d at 594–95; Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of
City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 691, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978). A local
government may be liable for damages under § 1983 if the constitutional violation is
caused by: “(1) an express government policy; (2) a widespread and persistent practice
that amounted to a custom approaching the force of law; or (3) an official with final
policymaking authority.” Howell, 987 F.3d at 653.
III.

Analysis

a. Individual Capacity Defendants
Prison officials violate the Eighth Amendment when 1) a prisoner experienced an
“objectively serious medical condition” and 2) the prison official was deliberately
indifferent to that condition. Arnett v. Webster, 658 F.3d 742, 750 (7th Cir. 2011).
“Deliberate indifference” means that the official “acted with a sufficiently culpable
state of mind, something akin to recklessness.” Id. at 751. The official acts with that
state of mind when he knows of a substantial risk and either acts or fails to act in
disregard of that risk. Id. Deliberate indifference requires more than negligence and
approaches intentional wrongdoing. Id. Individual liability requires personal
involvement in the wrongdoing. Burks, 555 at 592.
The Court first considers whether Rockwood suffered an “objectively serious injury.”
As this Court found in its 28 U.S.C. § 1915A order, allegations that a person suffered
a broken hand are “sufficient to allege an objectively serious medical condition.” Dkt.
7 at 3. Coil and ACH concede for purposes of their motion that Rockwood sustained
a serious injury. Dkt. 37, pg. 8. Further, in Edwards v. Snyder, plaintiff severely
dislocated his finger during a basketball game. 478 F.3d 827, 828 (7th Cir. 2007). The
Seventh Circuit vacated the district court’s § 1915A order dismissing the case. Id. at
832. It cited numerous cases involving injuries that were “objectively serious” in the
Eighth Amendment context, including a hernia, arthritis, minor burns, and a broken
wrist. See id. at 831 (collecting cases); see also Jackson v. Anderson, 770 F. App’x.
291, 293 (7th Cir. 2019) (characterizing a broken bone as “a clearly serious medical
condition”). The Edwards court concluded that plaintiff’s dislocated finger could
constitute a serious injury. 478 F.3d at 831. Rockwood’s broken finger was similarly
serious.
Next, the Court considers whether Rockwood sufficiently alleges that Defendants
were deliberately indifferent to his serious injury. It considers each Defendant in
turn.
1. Coil
Rockwood visited Coil the morning after he allegedly broke his finger. Both her notes
and Rockwood’s allegations reflect that she provided him with acetaminophen and
ice. She did not give Rockwood a splint, nor arrange an immediate X-ray. Her notes

show that approximately 24 hours passed between when Rockwood’s X-ray revealed
a broken finger and when she left a voicemail message asking the doctor for further
instructions. The notes further suggest that her treatment plan may have been
influenced by the fact that Rockwood, at times, exaggerated his injuries. Coil is right
that “as a nurse [she] generally cannot diagnose illness or prescribe medications or
treatment,” but that does not absolve her of responsibility if she recklessly made an
initial assessment or improperly delayed contact with a physician.
True, “[a] medical professional is entitled to deference in treatment decisions unless
no minimally competent professional would have so responded under those
circumstances.” Roe v. Elyea, 631 F.3d 843, 857 (7th Cir. 2011) (affirming a district
court’s judgement as a matter of a law following a jury trial, not at the motion to
dismiss stage). 6 And as Coil correctly notes, the professional displays deliberate
indifference only if they substantially depart from accepted professional judgment,
practice or standards. Id.. But merely showing “that a plaintiff received ‘some’
treatment does not resolve the issue conclusively.” Id. Rockwood must ultimately
establish more, but whether Coil acted consistent with accepted medical practices is
too uncertain at this early stage. Coil does not establish that Rockwood’s claims are
legally insufficient.
2. Primrose
Rockwood alleges that Primrose entered Rockwood’s cell block shortly after the
altercation and saw blood on the floor and broken glasses. Primrose then reviewed a
video recording of the incident. He sent Rockwood to his cell and did not act in
response to Rockwood’s repeated requests for medical attention. As Coil’s notes show
(and the subsequent diagnosis suggests), Rockwood’s hand was bruised and
disfigured. Whether Primrose’s response constituted “deliberate indifference” at this
stage is unclear, but he does not establish that Rockwood’s claims are legally
insufficient.
3. Pettenger
Rockwood alleges no facts suggesting that Superintendent Pettenger was at all
involved in the incident. A non-medical prison supervisor such as a warden or prison
director “is entitled to relegate to the prison’s medical staff the provision of good
medical care,” Burks, 555 F.3d at 595, and may be held individually liable only if he
“knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety,” Farmer v.
Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837, 114 S.Ct. 1970, 128 L.Ed.2d 811 (1994). See also Arnett,
Coil primarily relies on judgment as a matter of law or summary judgement cases in
support of the Rule 12(c) motion. That’s a mistake. See Standing Order, Supporting
Memoranda & Exhibits (“The Court urges litigants to rely on cases that were decided in the
same procedural posture.”).

6

658 F.3d at 757 (supervisor “must know about the conduct and facilitate it, approve
it, condone it, or turn a blind eye”). The Court dismisses the claims against Pettenger.
4. ACH
Rockwood sued ACH “individually and as an agent of the Sheriff of Lee County.” To
the extent a distinctly individual-capacity claim against a company under these
circumstances is cognizable, it would fail because § 1983 does not permit respondeat
superior liability. Shields v. Illinois Dep’t of Corr, 746 F.3d 782, 790 (7th Cir. 2014)
(quoting Iskander v. Village of Forest Park, 690 F. 2d 126 (7th Cir. 1982) “[a] private
corporation is not vicariously liable under § 1983 for its employees’ deprivations of
others’ civil rights.”).
b. Municipal and Official Capacity Defendants
Rockwood sues formal entities (Lee County and the Lee County Sheriff) as well as
agents in their official capacities (Pettenger, Primrose, Coil, ACH). Official-capacity
suits “generally represent only another way of pleading an action against an entity
of which an officer is an agent.” Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165, 105 S.Ct.
3099, 3105, 87 L.Ed.2d 114 (1985) (quoting Monell, 436 U.S. at 690 n. 55). An officialcapacity suit is not a suit against the official as an individual; the real party in
interest is the entity. Wilson v. Civ. Town of Clayton, Ind., 839 F.2d 375, 381–82 (7th
Cir. 1988). Therefore a plaintiff seeking to recover damages in an official-capacity
suit can look only to the entity itself, not to the official. Id. So, the Court treats Lee
County, the Lee County Sheriff, and the official-capacity suits against Pettenger,
Primrose, and Coil as one claim against Lee County and one claim against ACH—all
under a Monell theory.
In applying Monell, the Court distinguishes between isolated wrongdoing of one or a
few individuals and more widespread practices. Howell, 987 at 654. A municipality
(or an applicable private healthcare provider) 7 is only liable for the latter. Id. No
brightline rule exists regarding the quantity, quality, or frequency of conduct needed
to prove a widespread custom or practice under Monell. Id. “What is needed is
evidence that there is a true municipal [or corporate] policy at issue, not a random
event.” Grievson 538 F.3d at 327; see also Howell, 987 at 654 (citing Seventh Circuit
cases that required a “series” or “pattern” of incidents, not “isolated acts of
misconduct.”).
Rockwood does not identify an express policy, a pattern or practice, or a lawmaking
official’s decision that he claims led to his injuries. He alleges generally that the
county failed to train or supervise its employees, among other administrative failures.
Monell applies to private corporations like ACH, because it contracted with the City to
provide obligatory healthcare. Shields, 746 F.3d at 786.

7

To be sure, Rockwood’s broken finger no doubt caused significant pain, some of which
may have been mitigated by more timely treatment. But without more, those
allegations at best suggest isolated wrongdoing, not a widespread practice.
Rockwood’s Monell claims are dismissed without prejudice; he may therefore refile a
complaint against the municipal defendants. But as it has done before, see Marsden
v. Kishwaukee Cmty. Coll., 572 F. Supp. 3d 512, 525 (N.D. Ill. 2021), the Court offers
a few words of advice: in Illinois, a Monell claim has no practical consequences as to
damages. Jones v. City of Chicago, 856 F.2d 985, 995 (7th Cir. 1988). Under Illinois
law, plaintiffs who prevail will receive the amount of compensatory damages the jury
determines that they are entitled to; plaintiffs do not receive more compensatory
damages just because there are more defendants. Compensatory damages
compensate; they don’t provide a windfall. Hillmann v. City of Chicago, 66 F. Supp.
3d 1109, 1117 (N.D. Ill. 2014). Moreover, under Illinois law, generally, local
governments and their contractual agents are required to indemnify employees for
compensatory damages.745 ILCS 10/2-302; 110 ILCS 805/3-29. And, under Seventh
Circuit law, plaintiffs can simply add an indemnification claim in their complaint to
ensure recovery of compensatory damages. Wilson v. City of Chicago, 120 F.3d 681,
684-85 (7th Cir. 1997). So, adding a Monell claim provides nothing to plaintiffs’
compensatory damages. And, under City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S.
247, (1981), punitive damages are unavailable against units of local government for
violations of claims brought under § 1983. What’s more, under Illinois law, punitive
damages are unavailable against local governments. 745 ILCS 10/2-102. So, in
reality, a Monell claim adds nothing to plaintiffs’ potential damages.
Conclusion
For the reasons above, the Court denies Coil’s and Primrose’s motions; it dismisses
without prejudice the claims against ACH. The Court treats all of the official-capacity
and entity suits as against Lee County and dismisses the claims against it without
prejudice. Rockwood is given one last attempt to state a claim against ACH and Lee
County so long as the attempt is consistent with Rule 11. Rockwood is given until
October 24, 2024 to file any amended complaint. If no amended complaint is filed by
that date, the dismissal will convert to dismissal with prejudice.

Entered: September 24, 2024

By:__________________________
Iain D. Johnston
U.S. District Judge