Hernandez v. Williams et al

Filing 77

MEMORANDUM Opinion and Order: The Court grants the motion to dismiss 55 . Defendants Jamie Cater, Nicole Perez, Kelly Peterson, Madison Rauch, McKenzie Belan, Eliana Castillo, and Unknown Medical Schedulers are terminated from the case. Signed by the Honorable Iain D. Johnston on 3/12/2025:(yxp, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
WESTERN DIVISION
Hector Hernandez,
Plaintiff,

Case No.: 23-cv-50267

v.

Judge Iain D. Johnston

Tarry Williams, et al.
Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
After waiting several years for a set of dentures, Plaintiff Hector Hernandez
claims that employees in IDOC’s medical scheduling office were deliberately
indifferent to his serious medical needs in violation of the Eighth Amendment. The
Medical Schedulers successfully move to dismiss the claims against them under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) because Hernandez’s Third Amended
Complaint doesn’t plausibly suggest that they personally caused or contributed to
his injuries.
I.

Background
Plaintiff Hector Hernandez is one of several IDOC inmates contending

that Defendant Wexford Health Sources maintains a policy, practice, or custom of
denying and delaying inmate dental care. Dkt. 20. The plaintiffs in these cases are
commonly represented by the same attorney using, essentially, a form complaint.
See, e.g., Hernandez v. Williams, No. 23-cv-50267, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 171151
(N.D. Ill. Sep. 23, 2024); Smith v. Williams, No. 23-cv-50074, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
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195325 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 28, 2024). The complaint alleges misconduct by Wexford
employees and, at the tail end, tucks in a sentence alleging that the IDOC
administrative employees responsible for scheduling medical appointments (“the
Medical Schedulers”) “failed to schedule an appointment for [the plaintiff] to be
fitted for upper plate dentures.” E.g., Dkt. 20, ¶ 33. The Medical Schedulers then
move to dismiss the claims against them—as sure as death and taxes—arguing that
a standalone conclusory allegation doesn’t plausibly suggest their personal
involvement in the alleged injuries. See e.g., Dkt. 55. That motion is very effective.
See Smith, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 195325.
Shortly after the Court rejected an identical claim made using this template,
Hernandez added new allegations to his Response in this case. Dkt. 59, 1. As
Hernandez claimed in his Response—but not in his thrice amended Complaint—he
asked the Medical Schedulers if they could schedule an offsite appointment for him
“because the individuals responsible for his dental care wouldn’t do it.” Id. at 2. He
also added for the first time that each of the Medical Schedulers personally
observed his injuries. Id. In their Reply, the Medical Schedulers oppose the
introduction of new allegations and maintain that, in any event, Hernandez hasn’t
stated a deliberate indifference claim. Dkt. 60.
II.

Legal standard
Under Rule 8, the plaintiff must allege facts sufficient to “state a claim to

relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570
(2007). A plaintiff's well-pleaded factual allegations must allow “the court to draw
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the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). The Court accepts as true all the
plaintiff's well-pleaded allegations and views them in the light most favorable to the
plaintiff. Landmark Am. Ins. Co. v. Deerfield Constr., Inc., 933 F.3d 806, 809 (7th
Cir. 2019).
“Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the
speculative level on the assumption that all of the complaint's allegations are true.”
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 545. “But the proper question to ask is still ‘could these
things have happened, not did they happen.’” Carlson v. CSX Transp. Inc., 758 F.3d
819, 827 (7th Cir. 2014) (quoting Swanson v. Citibank, N.A., 614 F.3d 400, 404–05
(7th Cir. 2010) (emphasis in original)). Importantly, on a motion to dismiss, the
defendant bears of the burden of establishing the insufficiency of the complaint's
allegations. Gunn v. Cont'l Cas. Co., 968 F.3d 802, 806 (7th Cir. 2020).
III.

Analysis

Claims of constitutionally inadequate medical care by inmates serving prison
sentences are governed by the Eighth Amendment. Perez v. Fenoglio, 792 F.3d 768,
776 (7th Cir. 2015). To state a claim of inadequate medical care under the Eighth
Amendment, an inmate must plausibly suggest that (1) he suffered from an
objectively serious medical condition, and (2) the defendant was deliberately
indifferent to that serious condition. Id. Essentially, deliberate indifference occurs
“when a defendant realizes that a substantial risk of serious harm to a prisoner
exists but then disregards that risk.” Perez, 792 F.3d at 776 (citing Farmer v.
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Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994)) (cleaned up); Brown v. Osmundson, 38 F.4th
545, 551 (7th Cir. 2022) (deliberate indifference is a “demanding standard”).
It goes without saying—or at least, it’s already been said—that the lone
allegation in Hernandez’s Third Amended Complaint doesn’t state a claim. See
Smith, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 195325 (dismissing Smith’s identical claim, based on
the same allegation, because it doesn’t plausibly suggest that the Medical
Schedulers knew of his injuries). Where the same counsel presents the same
allegation in support of the same claim, the outcome is, not surprisingly,
unchanged. That’s the danger of a copy-paste complaint, only exacerbated in this
case by a single conclusory allegation regarding six defendants. Based only on that
allegation, the Court cannot conclude that the Medical Schedulers knowingly
disregarded Hernandez’s medical needs.
What’s more, the Court rejects Hernandez’s attempt to amend his
Complaint—for, essentially, the fourth time—in a responsive pleading. Hernandez
asks the Court to consider the allegations of his Third Amended Complaint
alongside the additions of his Reply, simply by stating:
‘Plaintiffs may add factual allegations in response to a motion to dismiss so
long as those allegations are consistent with facts already alleged in the
complaint.’ Fulson v. Dart, 648 F. Supp. 3d 1022, 1027 n.5 (N.D. Ill. 2023)
(citing Geinosky v. City of Chicago, 675 F.3d 743, 745 n.1 (7th Cir. 2012)).
Dkt. 59, 1. 1
1 It’s true that a party can add factual allegations in response to a Rule 12 motion.

But this
doesn’t mean that it’s best practices. Indeed, it’s poor practice. Just because a party can do
something, doesn’t mean the party should do something. See, e.g., Blazek v. U.S. Cellular
Corp., 937 F. Supp. 2d 1003, 1013 (N.D. Iowa 2011) (“A zealous defense does not necessarily

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But Hernandez makes no effort to square the allegations in his Reply with the
silence of his Third Amended Complaint. Unlike the informal amendments and
clarifications that the Seventh Circuit has previously entertained—where the
parties preview allegations in a complaint and refine them during briefing—
Hernandez rushed to beat the decision in Smith by making new allegations in this
case. See, e.g., Geinosky v. City of Chicago, 675 F.3d 743, 745 n.1 (7th Cir. 2012).
And even then, Hernandez doesn’t state which Medical Schedulers he allegedly
spoke with, what he said, or when. Though these vague allegations would’ve been
entitled to deference if properly pled, they carry no weight with the Court when
thrown into the mix at the bottom of the ninth inning. See United States v.
Berkowitz, 927 F.2d 1376, 1384 (7th Cir. 1991) (perfunctory and undeveloped
arguments are waived). As the Court previously warned the Parties, there is no
pinch-hitting in pleading. Hernandez v. Williams, 2024 WL 4265204, n.1 at *3
(warning Hernandez several months ago that “in court, as in baseball, three strikes
and you’re out.”) (citing Bank of Am., N.A. v. Knight, 725 F.3d 815, 818-19 (7th Cir.
2013); Harrell v. U.S., 13 F.3d 232, 236 (7th Cir. 1993).
Given the long procedural history in this case, the Court doesn’t believe that
any further amendments are in order. In fact, accepting Hernandez’s proposed
amendments would likely plead him out of Court. If the Medical Schedulers knew

require invocation of every potential procedural bar to an employment discrimination
lawsuit, particularly when an expeditious determination of the merits by a factfinder would
often be a more cost-effective means of disposing of claims.”); Bailey v. State Farm Fire &
Cas. Co., 414 F.3d 1187, 1191 (10th Cir. 2005) (“Indeed, just because a district court can
issue an injunction does not mean a fortiori that it is required to do so.”).

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that medical providers refused to refer Hernandez for offsite treatment, what could
they have done instead? Nothing in the Constitution requires administrative
employees to override the choices of treating physicians. See, e.g., McCann v. Ogle
Cnty., Illinois, 909 F.3d 881 (7th Cir. 2018). Indeed, that contention stretches the
imagination beyond the breaking point; Seventh Circuit precedent “encourages nonmedical security and administrative personnel”—such as medical schedulers—“to
defer to the professional medical judgments of the physicians and nurses treating
the prisoners in their care without fear of liability for doing so.” Berry v. Peterman,
604 F.3d 435, 440 (7th Cir. 2010) (collecting cases). So, any leave to amend
Hernandez’s claims against the Medical Schedulers would be futile.
IV.

Conclusion
For the reasons stated above, Hernandez’s claims against the Medical

Schedulers (Nicole Perez, McKenzie Belan, Kelly Peterson, Eliana Castillo, Jamie
Cater, Madison Rauch, and Unknown Medical Schedulers) are dismissed. Given
the futility of the proposed amendments, as well as Hernandez’s repeated failure to
cure deficiencies in his Complaint, the Court exercises its discretion to dismiss these
claims with prejudice. See Arreola v. Godinez, 546 F.3d 788, 796 (7th Cir. 2008)
(district courts have broad discretion to deny leave to amend for both reasons).

Entered: March 12, 2025

By:__________________________
Iain D. Johnston
U.S. District Judge
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