Abbott et al v. Lockheed Martin Corporation et al

Filing 481

ORDER. For the reasons explained herein, the motions at Docket Nos. 472 and 474 are DENIED. See attached for details. Signed by Chief Judge Michael J. Reagan on 12/11/2014. (jls)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
ANTHONY ABBOTT, et al.,
Plaintiffs,
vs.
LOCKHEED MARTIN CORP. and
LOCKHEED MARTIN INV. CORP.,
Defendants.

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Case No. 06–cv–0701–MJR–DGW

ORDER
REAGAN, Chief Judge:
Two pre-trial motions have ripened, and come before the Court for
disposition. On the eve of a long-awaited and wide-ranging trial, the undersigned is
discouraged by the lack of informal agreement between the parties as to both issues,
both of which should have and could have been solved without resort to formal
motion practice. See Doc. 63, Order Regarding Discovery (Outlining the simple
process by which discovery disputes are brought before the Court for efficient
resolution via telephonic hearing).

Nevertheless, the Court turns to these

respective tempests in their respective teapots.

1. Plaintiffs' Motion to Exclude Defendants from Offering Demonstrative
Exhibits (Doc. 472)—DENIED
Fifty of the 1,730 entries in Defendants' exhibit list are placeholders with
minimal descriptions like "Defendants' Demonstrative 1."

Plaintiffs, invoking a

district court case from the Northern District of Indiana, complain those
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placeholders are violative of the Federal Rules insofar as they constitute "surprise"
witnesses and evidence and blatantly disregard the rules controlling disclosure of
evidence.

That case, in which the district court found a joint pretrial order

unacceptable, is not on point.
Rather, Baugh ex rel. Baugh v. Cuprum S.A. de C.V., 730 F.3d 701 (7th Cir.
2013), offers some guidance.

There is a difference between, on one hand,

"demonstrative evidence" that serves to clarify or explain other previously
introduced evidence, and, on the other hand, "demonstrative evidence" introduced
in the first instance as having some independent substantive value. Baugh, 730
F.3d at 706–08. According to Defendants' response brief, their placeholders serve as
reservations for demonstrative aids, which are simply of amalgam of other evidence
that, admissibility-wise, has already been vetted.
The record in this case promises to be extremely complex, and any
demonstrative aid has the potential to carry with it its own complexity. To give
Plaintiffs an opportunity to examine Defendants' demonstrative aids and object to
the admissibility of any tardily-disclosed substantive (as opposed to pedagogical or
organizational) evidence, the Court DIRECTS that any such aid be provided to
Plaintiffs three days in advance of their use at trial. See Baugh, 730 F.3d at 708
("When an exhibit is offered as substantive evidence, parties know they must make
any objections they might have to the evidence at that point. Conversely, when an
exhibit is allowed to be used for only demonstrative purposes, the judge and the

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parties understand that the exhibit is argumentative and persuasive in nature.")
(internal citation omitted). Otherwise, Plaintiffs' Motion (Doc. 472) is DENIED.

2. Defendants' Motion to Preclude Plaintiffs' Offer of Proof (Doc. 474)
Apparently Plaintiffs, at the end of trial, plan to make an offer of proof by
submitting "a group of documents and deposition excerpts showing what the
evidence on" previously dismissed claims (on which Plaintiffs assert summary
judgment was wrongly granted) would have been, had that evidence been allowed.
Defendants move to preclude such an offer of proof due to, essentially, (1)
irrelevancy and (2) the fact that summary judgment has long since passed. Though
the Court is inclined to agree that resurrecting dismissed claims via an offer of proof
is inherently improper, it DENIES the instant motion as premature, since assessing
the relevancy (or lack thereof) of Plaintiffs' evidence is better left to a time when the
Court has taken in other evidence and/or reached conclusions as to specific (rather
than blanket) admissibility of individual items of evidence. In other words, at this
juncture, parsing evidence that could be relevant to Plaintiffs' live claims from
evidence that could only be relevant to Plaintiffs' dead claims would be ill-advised.
Defendants' Motion (Doc. 474) is DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATE: December 11, 2014

s/ Michael J. Reagan
MICHAEL J. REAGAN
Chief Judge
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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