Turley v. Bedinger et al

Filing 386

ORDER denying 372 Motion for Reconsideration. Signed by Magistrate Judge Gilbert C. Sison on 7/3/2019. (klh)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

GREGORY J. TURLEY,
Plaintiff,
vs.
FRANK LAWRENCE,
Defendants.1

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Case No. 3:08-CV-0007-GCS

MEMORANDUM and ORDER
SISON, Magistrate Judge:
BACKGROUND
Pending before the Court is Defendant’s October 25, 2018 motion to reconsider
the Court’s Order and injunction (Doc. 370) and Judgment (Doc. 371). Plaintiff
opposes the motion (Doc. 376).2 After reviewing the entire record and the applicable
law, the Court denies the motion.
Originally, Gregory Turley, pro se and a former inmate at Menard Correctional
Center (“Menard”), filed suit for violations of his constitutional rights. Turley alleges,

1

Currently, Frank Lawrence is the Warden at Menard Correctional Center. Thus, the Court

sua sponte SUBSTITUTES Lawrence for defendant Jaqueline Lashbrook.

On March 11, 2019, Turley moved to file a response out of time to the motion for
reconsideration (Doc. 374). The Court allowed the motion and Turley filed the response on March 15,
2019 (Docs. 375 & 376). Turley opposes the motion arguing that it is untimely and that the issues
Defendant raises were addressed previously in his supplemental brief regarding pretext and that
Defendant should have objected to the Court considering his medical conditions without an expert.
2

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inter alia, that being housed in the North I cell house of Menard with a cellmate
constituted deliberate indifference to his health and well-being as a result of the cells
being cramped and too small for two adult inmates. Turley’s claims were dismissed
from the case at the initial 28 U.S.C. § 1915A review while other claims proceeded to
trial. Turley appealed and the Seventh Circuit reversed the dismissal of Turley’s cell
size claims and those claims went to trial. At the close of Turley’s evidence, the Court
dismissed the individual capacity claims against the named defendants leaving a
claim for injunctive relief, which sought an Order prohibiting the Warden of Menard
from placing Turley in the North I cell house with a cell mate.
On September 26, 2018, Magistrate Judge Stephen C. Williams issued an
Order and Injunction enjoining then Menard Warden Jacqueline Lashbrook in her
official capacity, and any of her successors in their official capacity, from housing
Turley in the North I cell house with one or more inmates or cellmates (Doc. 370).3
The following day, the Clerk of Court entered Judgment, inter alia, reflecting the
same (Doc. 371). On October 25, 2018, Lashbrook filed a motion to reconsider the
Court’s Order and Injunction (Doc. 370) and Judgment (Doc. 371). Turley opposes the
motion (Doc. 376). As the motion is ripe, the Court turns to the merits of the motion.

On May 25, 2011, upon consent of the parties and pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) and Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 73, this case was transferred to Magistrate Judge Williams for final disposition
(Doc. 78). On January 9, 2019, this case was reassigned to the undersigned magistrate judge for
disposition (Doc. 373).
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ANALYSIS
The Seventh Circuit has held that a motion challenging the merits of a district
court order will automatically be considered as having been filed pursuant to either
Rule 59(e) or Rule 60(b). See Mares v. Busby, 34 F.3d 533, 535 (7th Cir. 1994).
Different timetables and standards govern these motions. Rule 59(e), for example,
permits a court to amend a judgment only if the movant demonstrates a manifest
error of law or fact or presents newly discovered evidence that was not previously
available. See Sigsworth v. City of Aurora, 487 F.3d 506, 511-512 (7th Cir. 2007).
Rule 60(b), on the other hand, permits a court to relieve a party from an order or
judgment based on such grounds as mistake, surprise or excusable neglect by the
movant; fraud or misconduct by the opposing party; a judgment that is void or has
been discharged; or newly discovered evidence that could not have been discovered
within the 28-day deadline for filing a Rule 59(b) motion. However, the reasons
offered by a movant for setting aside a judgment under Rule 60(b) must be something
that could not have been employed to obtain a reversal by direct appeal. See Bell v.

Eastman Kodak Co., 214 F.3d 798, 801 (7th Cir. 2000).
Both Rule 59(e) and 60(b) eliminate the finality of a judgment and permit
further proceedings, but Rule 59(e) generally requires a lower threshold of proof than
does Rule 60(b). See Helm v. Resolution Trust Corp., 43 F.3d 1163, 1166 (7th Cir.
1995). See also Ball v. City of Chicago, 2 F.3d 752, 760 (7th Cir. 1993)(distinguishing
the “exacting standard” of Rule 60(b) from the “more liberal standard” of Rule 59(e)).

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The purpose of a motion to alter or amend judgment under Rule 59(e) is to ask the
court to reconsider matters “properly encompassed in a decision on the
merits.” Osterneck v. Ernst & Whinney, 489 U.S. 169, 174 (1989). “A Rule 59(e)
motion will be successful only where the movant clearly establishes: (1) that the court
committed a manifest error of law or fact, or (2) that newly discovered evidence
precluded entry of judgment.” Cincinnati Life Ins. Co. v. Beyrer, 722 F.3d 939, 954
(7th Cir. 2013)(citation and quotation marks omitted).
Relief pursuant to a Rule 59(e) motion to alter or amend is an “extraordinary
remed[y] reserved for the exceptional case.” Foster v. DeLuca, 545 F.3d 582, 584 (7th
Cir. 2008). A Rule 59(e) motion may be used “to draw the district court's attention to
a manifest error of law or fact or to newly discovered evidence.” United States v.

Resnick, 594 F.3d 562, 568 (7th Cir. 2010). A manifest error “is not demonstrated by
the disappointment of the losing party. It is the wholesale disregard, misapplication,
or failure to recognize controlling precedent.” Oto v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 224
F.3d 601, 606 (7th Cir. 2000)(citation and quotation marks omitted). Furthermore,
“a Rule 59(e) motion is not an opportunity to relitigate motions or present arguments,
issues, or facts that could and should have been presented earlier.” Chapman v.

United States, No. 3:16-CV-0691-DRH, 2016 WL 6095316, at *1 (S.D. Ill. Oct. 19,
2016).
First, the Court addresses the untimeliness issue raised by Turley in his
opposition. Turley argues that Defendant’s motion is untimely as it was filed 29 days

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after the September 26, 2018 Injunction Order was entered. By the Court’s
calculation, however, the Court finds the motion is timely filed. The final Judgment
in this case was entered on September 27, 2018. The motion to reconsider the Order
and Injunction and the Judgment was filed on October 25, 2018, which is 28 days
after the Judgment was entered. Therefore, the Court will address the motion under
the easier to prove Rule 59(e) standard. See, e.g., United States v. Deutsch, 981 F.2d
299, 301-302 (7th Cir. 1992)(recognizing bright line rule for determining whether a
motion falls under Rule 59(e) or Rule 60(b) as dependent on the date of service of the
motion).4
The Court finds that Defendant is not entitled to relief under the Rule 59(e)
standard. After reviewing the record, the Court finds that Defendant identifies no
manifest error of law or newly discovered evidence which would warrant the granting
of relief under the rule. For example, Defendant has not presented new evidence or
new arguments that were not previously unavailable at the time of the Court’s
rulings. Instead, Defendant merely reiterates arguments that could have been and
should have been raised previously. Specifically, Defendant contends that the Court
erred when it found that Turley’s transfer was pretextual. Rather, the Defendant
contends that as a result of the transfer the case was moot. The Defendant further
contends that the Court erred when it made findings regarding Turley’s medical

Assuming arguendo that the motion was untimely, which it is not, the Court notes that the
motion also fails under the Rule 60(b) standard as Defendant failed to identify any fraud, mistake, or
excusable neglect that would dictate a different result.

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conditions absent the support of medical evidence. The Court rejects these
arguments.
Regarding the pretextual transfer, Judge Williams specifically found as
follows:
“As Plaintiff points out, the reasons relating to visitation makes no sense.
He has not had any visitors for 27 years and did not request the transfer
to Hill in the first place. A second explanation given is that Mr. Turley
meets the criteria for under 30 years to transfer to a Medium Security
Facility. On its face, this seems like a simple, concrete, and nonpretextual reason for a transfer for which Plaintiff has no answer. But a
quick review of the inmates at Hill Correctional Center that have cases
currently open in this district, reveals that at least one inmate who is
detained at Hill, Ricky Patterson, still has 37 years remaining on his
sentence.
The final rationale for transferring Mr. Turley, good
adjustment – to include time on an Inside Grounds Crew, does appear
credible. In fact the Court observed Mr. Turley working on the crew when
it conducted the site visit in November 2016.
Nevertheless, given the facts before the Court, the Court concludes that
the other rationales provided for Mr. Turley’s transfer are pretextual: Mr.
Turley did not request the transfer, the transfer in no way facilitated
visitation, and the supposed 30 year rule does not seem to actually apply,
even when looking at the relatively small sample size of Hill inmates that
currently have cases before the Court. Because these other reasons appear
to be pretextual, the Court does not assign much weight to be given to Mr.
Turley’s adjustment as being responsible for the transfer. In fact, it
appears that it is equally probable that the transfer had something to do
with the pendency of this case.”
(Doc. 370, ps. 17-18). Based on the above, it is clear that Judge Williams
carefully considered and weighed the various rationales for transfer offered by
the Defendant. He ultimately chose not to give much weight to the one reason
offered by the Defendant that did not appear to be pretextual and concluded that
it was equally probable that Turley’s transfer was motivated by the instant case.
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As the trier of fact, Judge Williams had the discretion to weigh the evidence in
the manner he saw fit. Indeed, based on the prevailing case law, Judge Williams
had good legal grounds for his decision. See, e.g., Knox v. Service Employees

Intern. Union, Local 1000, 567 U.S. 298, 307 (2012)(noting that “[a]fter
certiorari was granted, however, the union sent out a notice offering a full refund
to all class members, and the union then promptly moved for dismissal of the
case on the ground of mootness. Such post[-]certiorari maneuvers designed to
insulate a decision from review by this Court must be viewed with a critical
eye.”)(citing City News & Novelty, Inc. v. Waukesha, 531 U.S. 278, 283–284
(2001)).
Furthermore, the cases relied on by Defendant regarding pre-text are
procedurally and substantively different from the case at bar.

Those cases

were at the summary judgment stage and in the employment context, where the
ultimate issue was whether the non-moving party submitted sufficient evidence
to send this case to the jury, i.e., the trier of fact. Here, this case was at the posttrial briefing stage after Judge Williams held a bench trial and heard and
received evidence on the matter. Judge Williams also permitted supplemental
briefing on the issue of mootness and injunctive relief because Turley had been
transferred after the trial had concluded. Judge Williams rendered his decision
after the supplemental briefing had been submitted, obviously taking into
account the argument of the parties. But, as the trier of fact, Judge Williams
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was also permitted to consider, reject and weigh the evidence received at trial,
and the Court does not find any manifest error in his findings.
With respect to the medical issues, Judge Williams found the following:
“The Cells in the North I cell house are too small to house two grown men
for any extended period of time. The Court finds the practice of double
celling inmates in North I over an extended period, even when taking into
account ideal conditions wherein the inmates receive all scheduled
recreation, programming, and meals outside of the cell, provides those
inmates inadequate living space to meet ‘minimal civilized measure of life’s
necessities.’ These conditions are so extreme that they also cause an
excessive risk to inmates’ mental and physical health.
…
Do these additional conveniences, beyond what would be available in the
two man box, in combination with the out of cell time available to inmates
in North I, provide those inmates with the minimum civilized measure of
life’s necessities? They do not. Having stood inside one of these cells the
Court, in considering all of the evidence, draws what seems to be the only
logical and obvious, conclusion – the conditions are inhumane.
Furthermore, why the Court does not have sufficient evidence to conclude
that any of Mr. Turley’s various physical ailments were caused by his time
double celled in North I, the Court easily concludes that the cell size likely
exacerbated his arthritis and Irritable bowel syndrome and further caused
him considerable emotional distress beyond what can be expected, and
accepted, in a prison setting.
…
It is obvious that inmates need exercise. The cells in North I do not allow
for exercise. It is obvious that housing two inmates in a metal box where
there is barely enough room to use the toilet or get out of the cell will, over
a significant period of time, put the inmates at risk of severe mental
distress. It is obvious that housing violent felons in these conditions over
lengthy periods of time will create substantial increased risk of violence
between inmates and directed at staff. And it is obvious that allowing
inmates out of these cells for approximately 18 hours per week (when not
on lockdown and the schedule is operating smoothly) is not enough to
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alleviate these conditions.”
(Doc. 370, ps. 9-14).
Clearly, Judge Williams provided a sound analysis of the evidence presented
based on a review of the extensive record. The Court heard Turley’s claim during a
jury trial and heard the issue of injunctive relief during a bench trial. Further, Judge
Williams visited Menard and physically stood and walked inside Turley’s former cell
on North I. Thus, as the trier of fact, Judge Williams was in the best position to make
these findings. Additionally, Judge Williams allowed post-trial and supplemental
briefing on the availability of injunctive relief in light of Turley’s transfer. Simply
put, Defendant failed to meet his burden under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e).
Further, the Court does not find error in Judge Williams’s factual findings or legal
conclusions. In rendering this Order and the Memorandum and the Order and
Injunction, the Court examined the record and the case law submitted by the parties.
This Court does not find that there is any clear or manifest error of law or fact in
Judge Williams’s thorough findings and conclusions.
CONCLUSION
Accordingly, the Court DENIES the motion to reconsider the Court’s Order
and injunction (Doc. 370) and judgment (Doc. 371) (Doc. 372).
IT IS SO ORDERDED.
Date: July 3, 2019.

Digitally signed by
Judge Sison
Date: 2019.07.03
13:02:54 -05'00'
_________________________________
GILBERT C. SISON
United States Magistrate Judge
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