Henderson v. Bramlet et al
Filing
124
ORDER granting in part and denying in part 97 Motion for Summary Judgment. Signed by Magistrate Judge Donald G. Wilkerson on 2/15/2012. (hbs)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
DONTE HENDERSON,
Plaintiff,
v.
BRAD BRAMLET, SEAN
STARKWEATHER, and JEREMY
ANDERSON,
Defendants.
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Case No. 3:08-cv-15-DGW
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER ON MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
WILKERSON, Magistrate Judge:
Now pending before the Court is a Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Defendants
Brad Bramlet, Sean Starkweather, and Jeremy Anderson (Doc. 97). For the reasons set forth
below, the motion is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. Defendant Anderson is
DISMISSED from the action. Judgment will be entered in his favor at the close of the case.
FACTUAL SUMMARY
In his amended complaint (Doc. 75), Plaintiff Donte Henderson, a former inmate at the
Menard Correctional Center, alleged that Defendants Bramlet, Starkweather, and Anderson
violated his constitutional rights in events surrounding Bramlet’s alleged use of excessive force on
June 19, 2007, in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. According to Plaintiff Henderson, on that day
officers were supervising the release of inmates from their cells for showers. The officers
“running showers” skipped Plaintiff’s cell. When Plaintiff asked Correctional Officer Biggs (not
a defendant) why officers skipped his cell, she told him to ask his cellmate. Later, Defendant
Bramlet walked by Plaintiff’s cell. Plaintiff asked him if he could speak to a lieutenant about the
denial of his shower. Bramlet ignored him, which prompted Plaintiff to yell obscenities at
Bramlet. A short time later, Bramlet and Starkweather arrived at Plaintiff’s cell. Bramlet asked
Plaintiff if he still wanted to shower. Plaintiff said yes, and Bramlet and Starkweather handcuffed
him and escorted him to the shower room on the gallery. Plaintiff alleged that en route he
apologized to Bramlet for yelling obscenities at him. Bramlet placed Plaintiff Henderson in the
shower and removed his handcuffs. Then, according to Henderson, Bramlet spit in his face.
Henderson turned to Defendant Starkweather and asked him if he was going to do anything about
Bramlet’s action.
Starkweather told Henderson to “just take [his] shower.”
Bramlet and
Starkweather left the area while Henderson showered. Approximately fifteen minutes later,
Bramlet returned to the shower cell alone.
Bramlet entered the shower cell, and without
provocation, began beating Plaintiff. Plaintiff was able to exit the shower cell, but Bramlet
followed, continuing to punch him. Additional officers began to arrive on the gallery, some of
whom joined Bramlet in punching Henderson. Henderson alleged the officer continued to beat
him, even after he was fully restrained. After the incident, several officers, including Defendant
Anderson, transported Plaintiff to the health care unit. Plaintiff alleged that during transport the
officers, including Anderson, intentionally rammed Plaintiff into walls and dropped him on the
asphalt.
Plaintiff’s amended complaint raised three claims:
1) Defendants Bramlet and
Anderson used excessive force in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983; 2) Defendants Bramlet and
Anderson committed battery under Illinois law; and 3) Defendant Starkweather failed to protect
Henderson from the beating by Defendant Bramlet.
Now before the Court is Defendants’ motion for summary judgment. Defendants argue
that 1) the claims against Defendant Anderson are barred by the statute of limitations; 2) the state
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law claims for battery are barred in federal court by sovereign immunity; 3) Plaintiff has not met
his burden of establishing that Defendant Starkweather failed to intervene in violation of the
constitution; and 4) Starkweather is entitled to qualified immunity.
LEGAL STANDARDS
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c), summary judgment is proper only if the
moving party can demonstrate Athat there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.@ Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317,
322 (1986). See also Ruffin-Thompkins v. Experian Information Solutions, Inc., 422 F.3d 603,
607 (7th Cir. 2005); Black Agents & Brokers Agency, Inc. v. Near North Ins. Brokerage, Inc., 409
F.3d 833, 836 (7th Cir. 2005). The burden is upon the moving party to establish that no material
facts are in genuine dispute; any doubt as to the existence of a genuine issue must be resolved
against the moving party. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 160 (1970). See also
Lawrence v. Kenosha County, 391 F.3d 837, 841 (7th Cir. 2004). A fact is material if it is
outcome determinative under applicable law. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248
(1986); Ballance v. City of Springfield, Illinois Police Dep’t, 424 F.3d 614, 616 (7th Cir. 2005);
Hottenroth v. Village of Slinger, 388 F.3d 1015, 1027 (7th Cir. 2004). Even if the facts are not in
dispute, summary judgment is inappropriate when the information before the court reveals that
Aalternate inferences can be drawn from the available evidence.@ Spiegla v. Hull, 371 F.3d 928, 935
(7th Cir. 2004). See also Anderer v. Jones, 385 F.3d 1043, 1064 (7th Cir. 2004).
PLAINTIFF’S CLAIMS AGAINST DEFENDANT ANDERSON ARE BARRED BY THE STATUTE OF
LIMITATIONS.
Plaintiff filed his original complaint in the action on January 7, 2008 (Doc. 1). The
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original complaint named as Defendants “Officer Bennet (Bramlet), Officer Anthony (White),
Officer Starkweather, Officer John Doe (The 1 Assisting), Officer Biggs.” After a waiver of
service was returned unexecuted as to Defendant White, Plaintiff filed with the Court a “Letter to
Judge and Clerk” (Doc. 20), in which he informed the Court that he did not mean to sue Anthony
White, but Officer Anthony, who is white. The Court ordered the United States Marshals Service
(“USMS”) to serve summons upon Officer Anthony. The summons was returned unexecuted on
February 12, 2010.
On June 21, 2010, the Plaintiff informed the Court that the intended
defendant was not Officer Anthony, but Officer Anderson (Doc. 63). On June 23, 2010, the Court
ordered the USMS to serve summons upon Officer Anderson (Doc. 64). In the same order, the
Court appointed counsel to represent Plaintiff. Summons was returned executed as to Officer
Anderson on October 5, 2010 (Doc. 74). On October 28, 2010, with assistance of counsel,
Plaintiff filed an amended complaint naming Brad Bramlet, Jeremy Anderson, and Sean
Starkweather as defendants (Doc. 75). Anderson filed an answer to the complaint on December
22, 2010 (Doc. 84). In the answer, Anderson raised the affirmative defense that the applicable
statute of limitations barred Plaintiff’s claims against him. In the pending motion for summary
judgment now before the Court, Defendant Anderson argues that judgment should be entered in
his favor because the statute of limitations bars Plaintiff’s claims (Doc. 97).
In section 1983 actions, a federal court applies the statute of limitations for personal injury
actions in the state “where the incident forming the basis of the claim occurred.” King v. One
Unknown Federal Correctional Officer, 201 F.3d 910, 913 (7th Cir. 2000) (citing Wilson v.
Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 275 (1985)). In Illinois, that period is two years. See 735 ILCS 5/13-202.
The events described in Plaintiff’s complaint occurred on June 19, 2007. Under the
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Illinois statute, Plaintiff should have filed his claims against Defendant Anderson by June 19,
2009. Plaintiff first identified Officer Anderson to the Court on June 21, 2010. Plaintiff filed the
amended complaint naming Anderson as a defendant on October 28, 2010. Both of these dates
fall outside of the two-year period. Thus, Plaintiff’s claims against Defendant Anderson are
barred by the statute of limitations unless the statute was somehow tolled under Illinois law, or the
complaint “relates back” to the date of the original complaint under Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c).
Tolling of the Statute of Limitations
In section 1983 actions, a federal court also applies the state rules and provisions on tolling.
See Johnson v. Rivera, 272 F.3d 519, 521 (7th Cir. 2001). Illinois law provides that the statute of
limitations is tolled during the time a prisoner exhausts his administrative remedies, which is
required by the Prisoner Litigation Reform Act. 42 U.S.C. §1997e(a). Johnson, 272 F.3d at 521.
Plaintiff filed a grievance about the incident--in which he names Officer Anderson--directly with
the Administrative Review Board (“ARB”) on June 19, 2007 (Doc. 97-2, p. 1, Exh. A). The ARB
recommended that the grievance be denied. Department Director Roger E. Walker concurred on
November 2, 2007 (Doc. 1, p. 7). Applying the state’s tolling provision, Plaintiff should have
filed his claims against Defendant Anderson by November 2, 2009, two years after Plaintiff
exhausted his available administrative remedies.
Because Plaintiff did not identify Officer
Anderson to the Court until June 2010, and did not name him as a defendant in a properly-filed
amended complaint until September 2010, the tolling provision cannot save the claims.
Plaintiff argues that equitable tolling should apply to save the claims against Defendant
Anderson because “despite the exercise of due diligence and through no fault of his own,
Henderson was unable to ascertain Anderson’s name prior to the expiration of the statute of
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limitations.” See, e.g., Shropshear v. Corp. Counsel of City of Chicago, 275 F.3d 593, 595 (7th Cir.
2001). The Court disagrees. Plaintiff’s June 19, 2007, grievance names Defendant Anderson,
which indicates that Plaintiff knew the identity of Defendant Anderson well before the expiration
of the statute of limitations. The grievance demonstrates Plaintiff knew Anderson’s identity on
the day of the incident.
Relation back under Rule 15(c)
Rule 15(c)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that an amended pleading
“relates back to the date of the original pleading when”:
(A) the law that provides the applicable statute of limitations allows relation back;
(B) the amendment asserts a claim or defense that arose out of the conduct, transaction, or
occurrence set out--or attempted to be set out--in the original pleading; or
(C) the amendment changes the party or the naming of the party against whom a claim is
asserted, if Rule 15(c)(1)(B) is satisfied and if, within the period provided by Rule 4(m) for
serving the summons and complaint, the party to be brought in by amendment:
(i) received such notice of the action that it will not be prejudiced in defending on
the merits; and
(ii) knew or should have known that the action would have been brought against it,
but for a mistake concerning the proper party's identity.
The Supreme Court recently reiterated that the proper inquiry under Rule 15(c)(1) focuses
on whether the new defendant knew or should have known before the statute of limitations expired
that a plaintiff intended to sue him. See Krupski v. Costa Crociere, 130 S.Ct. 2485, 2493 (2010).
Under 15(c)(1)(C)(ii), if a defendant was aware that a plaintiff was attempting to sue him, but the
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plaintiff mistakenly identified the defendant, defendant’s knowledge of a plaintiff’s intention is
sufficient to overcome a statute of limitations defense. See Joseph v. Elan Motorsports
Technologies Racing Corp., 638 F.3d 555, 559-60 (7th Cir. 2011) (attributing knowledge under
Rule 15(c) within statute of limitations period to Elan Corp. when plaintiff mistakenly named Elan
Inc. as defendant).
Here, Defendant Anderson has demonstrated, in deposition, that he did not know of the
lawsuit until he was informed by IDOC legal services and signed the waiver of service in 2010
(Doc. 97-3, p. 2, Exh. B). Plaintiff has not come forward with any evidence demonstrating
Defendant Anderson’s knowledge of the lawsuit within the statute of limitations period.1 Thus,
under the Supreme Court’s interpretation of Rule 15(c), Plaintiff has not shown that Defendant
knew or should have known that but for a mistake regarding a defendant’s identity, that action
would have been brought against him. As such, Plaintiff’s amended complaint naming Anderson
does not meet the requirements for relation back under Rule 15(c). Because the amended
complaint was filed outside the two-year state of limitations and it does not relate back to the date
of the original complaint, Plaintiff’s claims against Defendant Anderson are barred. Defendant
Anderson is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Accordingly, summary judgment is
GRANTED in favor of Defendant Anderson.
THE COURT EXERCISES SUPPLEMENTAL JURISDICTION OVER THE STATE TORT CLAIMS.
A federal district court has supplemental jurisdiction “over all claims that are so related to
claims in the action within such original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or
controversy under Article III of the United States Constitution.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). A district
court may exercise this supplemental jurisdiction within its discretion so long as the state claims
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The Court notes, in fact, that Plaintiff contends Rule 15(c) is inapplicable (Doc. 112, p. 9).
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“derive from a common nucleus of operative fact” with the federal claims. See Houskins v.
Sheahan, 549 F.3d 480, 495 (7th Cir. 2008) (quoting Wisconsin v. Ho-Chunk Nation, 512 F.3d
921, 936 (7th Cir. 2008)). The standard is not burdensome; “loose factual connections” are
considered sufficient. Houskins, 549 F.3d at 495 (citing Baer v. First Options of Chicago, Inc., 72
F.3d 1294, 1299 (7th Cir. 1995)).
Defendant Bramlet argues that the Court may not hear the pending state law claims raised
in the amended petition because the Illinois Court of Claims has exclusive jurisdiction over claims
that a state employee committed a tortious act “solely by virtue of his State employment.” In such
cases, Defendants contend, sovereign immunity bars other courts, including federal courts, from
hearing the claim.
The Court disagrees. Sovereign immunity does not bar the claims in this case. The
Seventh Circuit has dismissed state law claims from federal actions on the grounds that they
belong in the Illinois Court of Claims. See Turner v. Miller, 301 F.3d 599, 602 (7th Cir. 2002). It
has done so, however, only in cases where a defendant is alleged to have “breached a duty held
uniquely by State employees holding the job at issue,” not in cases in which a state employee owes
the same duty to the public at large. Turpin v. Koropchak, 567 F.3d 880, 882-83 (7th Cir. 2009).
The Court in Turpin opined that the Illinois jurisdictional limitation was not meant for cases in
which “everyone has a duty to refrain from such conduct,” but for cases in which the duty is so
closely linked with state employment that the State is the “real party in interest.” Id. See also
Nelson v. Murphy, 44 F.3d 497, 505 (7th Cir. 1995) (holding that Illinois Court of Claims
“possesses exclusive jurisdiction of all claims against the state itself, but not of claims against state
employees”). Other district courts in the circuit have specifically held that the duty not to commit
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assault and battery arise independently of state employment. See Donelson v. Prado, Case No. 09
C 6227, 2011 WL 941233 (N.D. Ill. March 16, 2011); Cruz v. Cross, Case No. 08-cv-4873, 2010
WL 3655992 (N.D. Ill. September 10, 2010). That is also the case here. Defendant Bramlet
owes a duty to everyone, not just inmates, to refrain from committing battery against them. His
duty is not exclusive to his job as a correctional officer. Thus, the state tort claims against him are
raised against him as an individual. The State of Illinois is not the real party in interest.
Accordingly, the Illinois Court of Claims does not possess exclusive jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s
state-law claims. This Court may, and will, exercise its supplemental jurisdiction over the statetort claim of battery against Defendant Bramlet. The state-law claim of battery is part of the same
case or controversy and “derive[s] from a common nucleus of operative fact” with the section 1983
claims. Consequently, summary judgment on this point is DENIED.
GENUINE ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACT EXIST REGARDING STARKWEATHER’S DUTY TO
INTERVENE.
A corrections officer may be held liable under section 1983 for failing to prevent a fellow
officer from using excessive force against an inmate when he or she had a “realistic opportunity”
to intervene to prevent the violation of a constitutional right. Fillmore v. Page, 358 F.3d 496,
505-06 (7th Cir. 2004).
Any such claim necessarily requires an underlying constitutional
violation. Harper v. Albert, 400 F.3d 1052, 1064 (7th Cir. 2005). In Yang v. Hardin, the Seventh
Circuit held that an officer witnessing the use of excessive force by a fellow officer was under a
duty take action to stop the improper use of force. 37 F.3d 282, 285 (7th Cir. 1994). “One who is
given a badge of authority of a police officer may not ignore the duty imposed by his office and fail
to stop other officers who summarily punish a third person in his presence or otherwise within his
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knowledge.” Id. (quoting Byrd v. Brishke, 466 F.2d 6, 11 (7th Cir. 1972)). Even if the observing
officer was unable to physically come between his fellow officer and the arrestee, the Seventh
Circuit noted that he could have taken other actions, including calling for backup, calling for help,
or at least telling the officer to stop. Yang, 37 F.3d at 285.
Defendant Starkweather argues that Plaintiff has failed to establish a claim against him
because Defendant Starkweather could not have realistically prevented Defendant Bramlet from
spitting on Plaintiff. Plaintiff counters by arguing that after Starkweather witnessed Bramlet spit
on Plaintiff, and Plaintiff asked Starkweather to do something, Starkweather should have acted in
some manner to prevent the alleged future beating.
At the very least, Plaintiff argues,
Starkweather should have told Bramlet to stop.
The Court finds, based on the evidence before it, that genuine issues of material fact exist
with respect to Defendant Starkweather’s duty after witnessing Defendant Bramlet spit on
Plaintiff, and whether his actions sufficiently conformed to the duty of his office. The Court
believes it would be difficult to demonstrate that Starkweather could have physically come
between Bramlet and Plaintiff in such a way as to prevent Bramlet from spitting on Plaintiff. But
that is not the only open factual question. According to Henderson, he looked at Starkweather
and asked him whether he was going to do anything about Bramlet spitting on him. Starkweather
told him to take a shower. Did Starkweather’s duty require him to do something more? What
additional steps did Starkweather have a realistic opportunity to take? These are questions of fact
for the jury. Consequently, the existence of unresolved factual issues prevents a grant of
summary judgment in favor of Starkweather on the failure-to-intervene claim.
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DEFENDANT STARKWEATHER IS NOT ENTITLED TO QUALIFIED IMMUNITY.
“The doctrine of qualified immunity shields government officials against suits arising out
of their exercise of discretionary functions ‘as long as their actions could reasonably have been
thought consistent with the rights they are alleged to have violated .’ ” Jones v. Wilhelm, 425 F.3d
455, 460 (7th Cir. 2005) (quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 638 (1987)). Officers
“who act unreasonably or ‘who knowingly violate the law’ ” are not protected by qualified
immunity. Sornberger v. City of Knoxville, 434 F.3d 1006, 1014 (7th Cir. 2006) (quoting Hunter v.
Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 228 (1991)). The Court makes two key inquiries in evaluating a qualified
immunity defense: (1) whether the facts, taken in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, show that
the defendant violated a constitutional right and (2) whether the constitutional right was clearly
established at the time of the alleged violation. Gonzalez v. City of Elgin, 578 F.3d 526, 540 (7th
Cir. 2009).
As stated above, factual issues exist regarding the duty of Defendant Starkweather to
intervene or take some action after he witnessed Defendant Bramlet spit in Henderson’s face.
Taken in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, Starkweather should have done something to prevent
Bramlet’s future unconstitutional actions. Because he ignored Henderson’s request to act, he
could be held liable under section 1983 for failure to intervene. Furthermore, the duty of an
officer of law to step in when he witnesses a fellow officer using excessive force was clearly
established. In other words, the state of the law at that time was such that Starkweather had
“reasonable notice” that his failure to take action with regard to Bramlet’s alleged battery could
potentially violate the Constitution.” See Roe v. Elyea, 631 F.3d 843, 858-59 (7th Cir 2011). Due
to the open questions of fact, a grant of summary judgment based on qualified immunity is
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DENIED at this time.
CONCLUSION
Accordingly, the Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Defendants Bramlet, Anderson,
and Starkweather is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.
Defendant Anderson is
DISMISSED from the action because Plaintiff did not bring claims against him within the
two-year statute of limitations. Judgment should be entered in his favor at the close of the case.
Plaintiff may proceed at trial on the excessive force and state-law battery claims against Defendant
Bramlet, and against Defendant Starkweather on a theory of failure to intervene.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: February 15, 2012
DONALD G. WILKERSON
United States Magistrate Judge
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