Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Aaron Rents, Inc.

Filing 311

ORDER granting in part and denying in part 279 Motion in Limine; denying 280 Motion in Limine; denying 281 Motion in Limine; denying 282 Motion in Limine; granting 283 Motion in Limine. Signed by Judge Michael J. Reagan on 5/3/11. (caa)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
ASHLEY ALFORD,

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Plaintiff-Intervenor,
v.

AARON RENTS, INC., d/b/a AARON
SALES AND LEASE OWNERSHIP, and
RICHARD MOORE,
Defendants.

Case No. 08-cv-0683-MJR

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
ON MOTIONS IN LIMINE
REAGAN, District Judge:
Now before the Court are the parties’ motions in limine (Docs. 279-283),
which are fully briefed and ready for disposition.
The purpose of a motion in limine is to allow the trial court to rule on the
relevance and admissibility of evidence before it is offered at trial. See Luce v. United
States, 469 U.S. 38, 41, n.4 (1984)(“although the Federal Rules of Evidence do not
explicitly authorize in limine rulings, the practice has developed pursuant to the
district court's inherent authority to manage the course of trials”); Fed. R. Evid.
104(a)(“Preliminary questions concerning the qualification of a person to be a
witness ... or the admissibility of evidence shall be determined by the court....”).
Although found neither in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure nor in the
Federal Rules of Evidence, Deghand v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 980 F. Supp. 1176, 1179
(D. Kan. 1997), motions in limine aid the trial process “by enabling the Court to rule in

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advance of trial on the relevance of certain forecasted evidence, as to issues that are
definitely set for trial, without lengthy argument at, or interruption of, the trial.”
Palmieri v. Defaria, 88 F.3d 136, 141 (2d Cir. 1996). Motions in limine also may save the
parties time, effort and cost in preparing and presenting their cases.

Pivot Point

Intern., Inc. v. Charlene Products, Inc., 932 F. Supp. 220, 222 (N.D. Ill. 1996). Often,
however, the better practice is to wait until trial to rule on objections, particularly when
admissibility substantially depends upon facts which may be developed there. See
Sperberg v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 519 F.2d 708, 712 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 423
U.S. 987 (1975).
The movant has the burden of demonstrating that the evidence is
inadmissible on any relevant ground, “for any purpose.” Plair v. E.J. Brach & Sons,
Inc., 864 F. Supp. 67, 69 (N.D. Ill. 1994). The court may deny a motion in limine when
it “lacks the necessary specificity with respect to the evidence to be excluded.” Nat’l
Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh v. L.E. Myers Co. Group, 937 F. Supp. 276, 287
(S.D.N.Y. 1996). Moreover, the court may alter a limine ruling based on developments
at trial or sound judicial discretion. Luce, 469 U.S. at 41.
“Denial of a motion in limine does not necessarily mean that all evidence
contemplated by the motion will be admitted at trial.” Hawthorne Partners v. AT&T
Tech., Inc., 831 F. Supp. 1398, 1401 (N.D. Ill. 1993). Denial only means that the court
cannot decide admissibility outside the context of trial. Plair, 864 F. Supp. at 69.
Clearly, a court may reserve judgment until trial, so that the motion in
limine is placed “in an appropriate factual context.” Nat'l Union, 937 F. Supp. at 287.
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Stated another way, motion in limine rulings are “subject to change when the case
unfolds” at trial. Luce, 469 U.S. at 41. Indeed, “even if nothing unexpected happens at
trial, the district judge is free, in the exercise of sound judicial discretion, to alter a
previous in limine ruling.” Id.
On April 8, 2011, Plaintiff filed her motions in limine (Docs. 279-83).
Defendant responded on April 15, 2011 (Docs. 287-90). Defendant filed a single motion
in limine (with five subparts) on April 8, 2011 (Doc. 283), to which Plaintiff responded
on April 14 (Doc. 286). The Court now rules as follows.
Plaintiff’s motions
Doc. 279 (with subparts)
1.

To exclude evidence concerning Plaintiff’s psychiatric history prior to
her sexual harassment and sexual assault by Defendant Moore:
DENIED. This evidence bears directly on Plaintiff’s damage claim and
is relevant under Fed. R. Evid. 401 and therefore admissible under Fed.
R. Evid. 402 so long as it meets the balancing test of Fed. R. Evid. 403.
Assuming a proper foundation is laid, the questioning is in proper
form and the answer given to the requisite degree of certainty, the
probative value of the evidence is not substantially outweighed by the
danger of unfair prejudice, especially if a cautionary instruction is
tendered and given.

2. To exclude evidence concerning Plaintiff’s drug use: GRANTED. At
best, Plaintiff’s marijuana use and inconsistent statements regarding it
is impeachment on a collateral issue. At worst, it fails the balancing
test of Fed. R. Evid. 403 in that the probative value of the evidence is
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, even if a
cautionary instruction were tendered and given.

3. To exclude evidence concerning Plaintiff’s adolescent behavior:
DENIED. This evidence bears directly on Plaintiff’s damage claim and
is relevant under Fed. R. Evid. 401 and therefore admissible under Fed.
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R. Evid. 402 so long as it meets the balancing test of Fed. R. Evid. 403.
Assuming a proper foundation is laid, the questioning is in proper
form and the answer given to the requisite degree of certainty, the
probative value of the evidence is not substantially outweighed by the
danger of unfair prejudice, especially if a cautionary instruction is
tendered and given.

4.

To exclude evidence concerning Plaintiff’s abortion and miscarriages:
DENIED. Under Berry v. Deloney, 28 F. 3d. 604, 608 (7th Cir. 1994),
this testimony is admissible if the jury could, as a result, find it
diminished Plaintiff’s pain, suffering and emotional injuries. As such,
so long as a causal link is made, this evidence bears directly on
Plaintiff’s damage claim and is relevant under Fed. R. Evid. 401 and
therefore admissible under Fed. R. Evid. 402 so long as it meets the
balancing test of Fed. R. Evid. 403. Assuming a proper foundation is
laid, the questioning is in proper form and the answer given to the
requisite degree of certainty, the probative value of the evidence is not
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. This
volatile evidence is particularly suited for a limiting instruction as
discussed in Berry.

5.

To exclude evidence concerning Plaintiff’s criminal history:
GRANTED. Plaintiff’s fourth-degree assault conviction fails the
balancing test of Fed. R. Evid. 403 in that the probative value of the
evidence is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice,
even if a cautionary instruction were tendered and given.

6.

To exclude evidence concerning Plaintiff’s relationship with other
men: DENIED. This evidence bears directly on Plaintiff’s damage
claim and is relevant under Fed. R. Evid. 401 and therefore admissible
under Fed. R. Evid. 402 so long as it meets the balancing test of Fed. R.
Evid. 403. Assuming a proper foundation is laid, the questioning is in
proper form and the answer given to the requisite degree of certainty,
the probative value of the evidence is not substantially outweighed by
the danger of unfair prejudice, especially if a cautionary instruction is
tendered and given. The evidence may also refute Plaintiff’s claim as
to the etiology of the stain on her sweatshirt which would not run
afoul of Fed. R. Evid. 412(b)(1)(A).

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Doc. 280
To exclude Dr. Althoff’s expert report and testimony: DENIED. Nothing
in Dr. Althoff’s report indicates that any unauthorized questioning
regarding Plaintiff’s prior sexual history was delved into. His report is
silent on her sexual history, and the pages Plaintiff cites in the report as
evidencing inappropriate intrusion into her sexual history do not support
her contention.

Doc. 281
To preclude Dr. Althoff from giving an opinion on definitive
attributions of Plaintiff’s symptoms and their etiology: DENIED. Plaintiff
seizes an admission by Dr. Althoff, in a detailed 42-page report, that he
can not “make any definitive attributions regarding her symptoms, and at
present their etiology is unclear” as cause to strike his report and preclude
his testimony. But his testimony ought not be barred because he cannot
make conclusions to a degree higher than the law requires for
admissibility. He is not required to testify “definitively.” Were that the
case there would never be opinion testimony admitted. So long as he
testifies with the requisite certainty required, absent guess, speculation or
conjecture and with appropriate foundation and relevancy, his opinions
are admissible.

Doc. 282
To exclude Dr. Althoff’s expert report and testimony for violation of Rule
26(a): DENIED. Apparently experts for both sides believe an ethical
principle governing their professions precludes them from disclosing test
questions and answer options. The Court is unsure of the status of the
disclosure of this information by either side at present - or if the experts
have been deposed regarding it. But since the case has been removed from
the trial docket, either side may move to open discovery solely on this
issue, and any prejudice from not having the information may be
ameliorated.
Defendant Aarons’ motion (with subparts)
Doc. 283
1. To exclude reference to the EEOC determination: GRANTED. Plaintiff
seeks to admit the EEOC determination that Aarons did not have an
effective policy to prevent or correct a sexually hostile work
environment. Such testimony, from an official charged with enforcing
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and investigating Title VII claims, is virtually dispositive of the claims
Plaintiff makes in her claim of sexual harassment, negligent retention
and negligent supervision. As such, the evidence fails the balancing
test of Fed. R. Evid. 403 in that the probative value of the evidence is
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, even if a
cautionary instruction were tendered and given. Additionally, in the
instant case, the fact-finder is the jury, not the EEOC. Admitting the
EEOC determination in this case would necessarily cause a trial within
a trial in which the data available to the EEOC becomes the focus. That
would cause impermissible delay and could lead to jury confusion
since the EEOC conclusion is irrelevant to some of the state law claims,
both procedurally and substantively.

2. To exclude reference to the Consent Decree between Aarons and the
EEOC: GRANTED in that no response was filed.

3. To exclude reference to the EEOC’s press release announcing the filing
of its action again Aarons and various newspaper article reporting on
the filing of the action: GRANTED in that no response was filed

4. To exclude reference to documents related to the divorce of Defendant
Moore and his wife: GRANTED in that no response was filed

5. To exclude reference to Defendant Moore’s arrest and the criminal
charge currently pending against him: GRANTED in that no response
was filed.

IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: May 3, 2011

s/Michael J. Reagan
MICHAEL J. REAGAN
United States District Judge

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