Pittman v. County of Madison, State of Illinois et al
Filing
106
ORDER denying 100 Motion for New Trial and denying as moot 101 Motion for Leave to File. Signed by Chief Judge David R. Herndon on 8/31/12. (klh, )
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
REGINALD PITTMAN,
By and through his Guardian and
Next Friend,
ROBIN M. HAMILTON,
Plaintiff,
v.
COUNTY OF MADISON, STATE
OF ILLINOIS, et al.,
Defendants.
No. 08-0890-DRH
MEMORANDUM and ORDER
HERNDON, Chief Judge:
I. Introduction and Background
Pending before the Court is plaintiff’s motion for new trial pursuant to Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 59(b) and/or to amend judgment pursuant to Federal Rule
59(e) (Docs. 100 & 102). Defendants filed a response (Doc. 104). Based on the
following, the Court denies the motion.
On December 23, 2009, Reginald Pittman, by and through his Guardian and
Appointed Next Friend, Robin M. Hamilton, filed a Third Amended Complaint
containing fourteen counts against the County of Madison, State of Illinois, Captain
Joseph Gulash, Sheriff Robert Hertz, Sergeant Randy Eaton, Barbara J. Unfried,
Matt Werner, Robert Blankenship, M.D., Jeffrey Hartsoe, Lieutenant Renee
Stephenson, John Doe 6 through John Doe 10, and John Doe Entity 1 through John
Doe Entity 5 (Doc. 42). Counts I, III, V, VII, VIII, IX, X, XI, XII and XIII are directed
Page 1 of 7
against the County of Madison, Gulash, Hertz, Eaton, Unfried, Werner, Blankenship,
Hartsoe, Stephenson and the John Doe defendants. In these counts, plaintiff alleges
violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in that plaintiff claims that these defendants were
deliberately indifferent to Pittman’s suicide risk by failing to provide him with needed
medical attention and protection. Counts II, IV and VI are directed against the
County of Madison, Gulash, and Hertz. In these counts, plaintiff alleges, inter alia,
state law claims for willful and wanton actions in that plaintiff claims that these
defendants failed to remove materials from Pittman’s cell that could be used for a
suicide attempt. Lastly, Count XIV is directed against the County of Madison,
Gulash, and Hertz. In this count, plaintiff alleges violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and
seeks injunctive relief and requests that the Court order defendants to provide a
written plan for each jail detainee receiving psychiatric services.
As this matter was decided at the summary judgment stage and judgment was
entered, the Court analyzes plaintiff’s motion under Rule 59(e) standards.
A motion to alter or amend judgment filed pursuant to Rule 59(e) may only be
granted if a movant shows there was mistake of law or fact, or presents newly
discovered evidence that could not have been discovered previously. Harrington v.
City of Chicago, 433 F.3d 542, 546 (7th Cir. 2006); Romo v. Gulf Stream Coach,
Inc., 250 F.3d 1119, 1121 n. 3 (7th Cir. 2001)(“Rule 59(e) requires that the moving
party ... ‘present newly discovered evidence’ or ‘clearly establish a manifest error of
law or an intervening change in the controlling law.’”); Matter of Prince, 85 F.3d 314
(7th Cir. 1996), reh'g and suggestion for reh'g en banc denied, cert. denied 519
U.S. 1040; Deutsch v. Burlington Northern R. Co., 983 F.2d 741 (7th Cir.1993).
Page 2 of 7
Although Rule 59 relief is appropriate if the movant “presents newly discovered
evidence that was not available at the time of trial or ... points to evidence in the
record that clearly establishes a manifest error of law or fact,” such relief is not
properly awarded based on arguments or theories that could have been proffered
before the district court rendered judgment. County of McHenry v. Insurance Co.
of the West, 438 F.3d 813, 819 (7th Cir. 2006)(citing LB Credit Corp. v. Resolution
Trust Corp., 49 F.3d 1263 (7th Cir. 1995)). The Seventh Circuit has emphasized
that Rule 59(e) may not be used to relitigate issues already argued or to present new
arguments that could have been presented before judgment was entered. See, e.g.,
Caisse Nationale de Credit Agricole v. CBI Indus., Inc., 90 F.3d at 1264, 1270 (7th
Cir. 1996); Bally Export Corp. v. Balicar Ltd., 804 F.2d 398, 404 (7th Cir. 1986);
Publishers Resource, Inc., v. Walker-Davis Publications, Inc., 762 F.2d 557, 561
(7th Cir. 1985).
Plaintiff contends that the Court should hold a new trial and/or alter amended
the judgment on the state law causes of action in Counts II, IV and VI because the
Court did not address the issues of negligence and willful and wanton failure to
provide medical treatment contained in those counts; that Court should vacate the
summary judgment order should be vacated as defendants were on notice in a
negligence context that the suicide prevention policies were ineffective; and that
certain facts were missing from the Court’s order and that an issue of law requires
vacation of judgment. Defendants maintain that these issues have been addressed
and analyzed and that the motion should be denied.
First, plaintiff contends that the Court did not fully address the negligence
Page 3 of 7
claims contained in Counts II - against County of Madison; IV - against Gulash and
V- against Hertz and that there is a surfeit of evidence supporting the proposition that
these defendants, acting by and through their agents, were negligent in failing to
monitor and correctly house Pittman. Further, plaintiff maintains that defendants
Madison County, Gulash and Hertz were willful and wanton in that they failed to give
medical care to Pittman. Specifically, plaintiff contends that Madison County, Gulash
and Hertz were on notice through the jailers that Pittman was a suicide risk. The
Court disagrees with plaintiff’s assessment of the facts and the record demonstrates
otherwise.
Illinois's Local Governmental and Governmental Employees Tort Immunity Act
provides that as a general matter, “[n]either a local public entity nor a public
employee is liable for injury proximately caused by the failure of the employee to
furnish or obtain medical care for a prisoner in his custody ...” 745 Ill. Comp. Stat..
10/4–105 (2004). This immunity however, does “not apply where the employee,
acting within the scope of his employment, knows from his observation of conditions
that the prisoner is in need of immediate medical care and, through willful and
wanton conduct, fails to take reasonable action to summon medical care.” Williams
v. Rodriguez, 509 F.3d 392, 405 (7th Cir. 2007). The Seventh Circuit has held that
the “willful and wanton [standard] is ‘remarkably similar’ to the deliberate
indifference standard.” Id at 405; Chapman v. Keltner, 241 F.3d 842, 847 (7th Cir.
2001)(citing Payne for Hicks v. Churchich, 161 F.3d 1030, 1041 n. 13 (7th
Cir.1998)). Further, Madison County’s liability is premised on vicarious liability for
the actions of its employees. 745 Ill. Comp. Stat. 10/4–105.
Page 4 of 7
Bradley Banovz, the inmate housed next to Pittman and plaintiff’s main
witness, testified that Pittman never told a jail officer that Pittman was suicidal.
However, Banovz did testify that Pittman allegedly told jail officers Eaton (December
18, 2007) and Werner (December 14, 2007) he wanted to speak to CRISIS prior to
the suicide attempt.1 While a request to speak to CRISIS should be taken seriously,
it does not always put jailers on notice of a suicide risk. The record does not reveal
that defendants were aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a
substantial risk of suicide existed and that defendants recklessly or intentionally
disregarded a known risk of suicide. In fact, the record reveals that Pittman in the
past requested CRISIS to manipulate the prison staff into moving him to different
housing. For instance on October 21, 2007, medical staff saw Pittman and indicated
that he did not have suicidal ideation but that he informed jail staff that he was
suicidal in the hopes of being moved to a different housing unit. He was referred to
CRISIS after this. From August 16, 2007 to December 19, 2007, Pittman saw
CRISIS at least three times and each time Pittman stated that he was not suicidal and
CRISIS found the same. As the Court granted summary judgment in favor of
defendants on the § 1983 claims, the Court finds that summary judgment was proper
on negligent claims and the willful and wanton claims for failure to provide medical
care. The same reasoning applies these claims against Madison County as it relates
to its vicarious liability for defendants’ conduct. Thus, the Court rejects plaintiff’s
1
The record also reflects that on December 19, 2007, jailers conducted the required 30
minute rounds to Pittman’s cell. During officer Hill’s rounds (6:00 p.m.; 6:30 p.m.; 7:00 p.m.; and
7:30 p.m.), Hill saw Pittman sitting on his bed and Pittman did not mention that he was suicidal or
that he needed to see CRISIS.
Page 5 of 7
argument regarding the negligent and willful and wanton claims contained in Counts
II, IV and VI.
Further, there is no evidence in the record that defendants were on notice of
a suicide problem in the Madison County Jail. Moreover, there is no evidence that
the suicide prevention program in place in at the Madison County Jail is inadequate.
Plaintiff has not shown that the policies and procedures of the Madison County Jail
were so inadequate that the County of Madison was put on notice that at the time
Pittman was detained there was a substantial risk that he would be deprived of
necessary medical care in violation of the Eighth Amendment. Plaintiff has not
shown a pattern of suicides from which an inference could be drawn that defendants
were aware that the jail policies were constitutionally inadequate. Likewise, the
Court applied the correct deliberate indifference standard in this case. See Williams
v. Rodriguez, 509 F.3d at 403.
Lastly, plaintiff suggests that the Court erred when it found and cited to
Collins v. Seeman, 462 F.3d 757 (7th Cir. 2006) that a request to see a crisis
counselor is not sufficient to put defendant on notice that an inmate poses a
substantial threat and imminent risk of suicide. Plaintiff maintains that Kathleen
Suda testified “that a request for “crisis” counseling implies a mental health crisis
which use [sic] to be immediately addressed.” The Court again rejects this argument.
As stated supra and in its previous Order, the Court found:
Also, the record indicates that Pittman in the past requested CRISIS to
manipulate the prison staff into moving him to different housing. See
Collins, 462 F.3d 761 (“inmates often request meetings with crisis
counselors for reasons both serious and mundane, and sometimes
make requests as a means of manipulating prison staff.” The Seventh
Page 6 of 7
Circuit has stated: “A request to see a crisis counselor, standing alone,
is not sufficient to put defendant on notice that an inmate poses a
substantial threat and imminent risk of suicide.” Collins, 462 F.3d 761
(quoting Matos, 335 F.3d at 558 (“[N]ot every prisoner who shows signs
of depression or exhibits strange behavior can or should be put on
suicide watch.”)).
Pittman’s alleged request to Eaton and Werner to speak to CRISIS does not establish
that these defendants were aware of the facts from which inference could be drawn
that a substantial risk of suicide existed. Thus, the alleged request to speak with
CRISIS did not alert the individual defendants to the likelihood that Pittman was a
genuine suicide risk.
The Court finds that plaintiff neither presented newly discovered evidence nor
identified a manifest error of law or fact. The motion mainly takes umbrage with the
Court’s ruling. Plaintiff has not demonstrated -and the record reveals -no basis
warranting relief under Rule 59(e). The Court remains convinced of the correctness
of its decision.
Accordingly, the Cour DENIES plaintiff’s motion for new trial pursuant to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(b) and/or to amend judgment pursuant to Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) (Doc. 100). Further, the Court DENIES as moot
plaintiff’s motion to file fourth amended complaint (Doc. 101).
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Digitally signed by
David R. Herndon
Date: 2012.08.31
15:56:47 -05'00'
Signed this 31st day of August, 2012.
Chief Judge
United States District Court
Page 7 of 7
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?