Pittman v. County of Madison, State of Illinois et al

Filing 146

ORDER granting in part and denying in part 130 Motion to Dismiss. Signed by Judge Staci M. Yandle on 11/24/14. (ajr)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
REGINALD PITTMAN, By and through his
Guardian and Next Friend, Robin M.
Hamilton,
Plaintiff,
vs.

Case No. 08-cv-890-SMY-DGW

COUNTY OF MADISON, STATE OF
ILLINOIS, et al.,
Defendants.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
This matter comes before the Court on Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss and Motion to
Strike Plaintiff’s Fourth Amended Complaint (Doc. 130). Plaintiff Reginald Pittman filed his
response (Doc. 137). For the following reasons, the Court grants in part and denies in part the
motion.
Background
Plaintiff was a pretrial detainee at the Madison County Jail at the time he attempted
suicide on December 19, 2007. In the months preceding his suicide attempt, he had requested
assistance from Chestnut Health Systems (“CRISIS”) on several occasions. According to inmate
Banovz, defendants Deputy Werner and Sergeant Eaton ignored Plaintiff’s requests for CRISIS
assistance in the days immediately prior to the suicide attempt. Banovz indicated Plaintiff asked
Deputy Werner to speak to CRISIS on December 14, 2007. Deputy Werner, however, failed to
refer Plaintiff to CRISIS and joked about the request. Deputy Werner denies the incident.
Banovz further indicated that on December 18, 2007, Plaintiff cried for three to five hours and
asked Sergeant Eaton to talk to CRISIS. Banovz maintained that Sergeant Eaton agreed to refer

Plaintiff to CRISIS, but Plaintiff was never taken to CRISIS. The next day, Plaintiff used a
blanket tied to his cell bars to hang himself. As a result, he suffered ischemic anoxic injury to
his brain leaving him severely brain-damaged.
The Court granted summary judgment as to all defendants on the ground that Plaintiff
failed to produce sufficient evidence of deliberate indifference or willful and wanton misconduct.
Plaintiff appealed. The Seventh Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part the grant of
summary judgment. Specifically, the Seventh Circuit found that there was an issue of fact with
respect to the claims against Deputy Werner and Sergeant Eaton. It also reversed summary
judgment with respect to Madison County and Sheriff Hertz to the extent they may be
vicariously liable on Plaintiff’s state law claims.
Plaintiff has now filed his Fourth Amended Complaint in which he brings the following
claims: (1) Count I – indemnity for civil rights violation against Madison County; (2) Count II –
a state law claim against Madison County; (3) Count III – a civil rights claim against Captain
Joseph Gulash (noting the Seventh Circuit affirmed the entry of judgment against Gulash on this
claim); (4) Count IV – civil rights claim against Hertz, Unfried, Blankenship, Hartsoe,
Stephenson, John Doe Defendants 6 – 10, and John Doe Entities 1 – 5 (noting the Seventh
Circuit affirmed the entry of judgment against these defendants); (5) Count V - a state law claim
against Sheriff Hertz, in his capacity as sheriff and custodian of the Madison County Jail; (6)
Count VI – a civil rights claim against Sergeant Eaton; (7) Count VII – a civil rights claim
against Deputy Werner; and (8) Count VIII – injunctive relief against Madison County, Captain
Gulash, and Sheriff Hertz (noting that the Seventh Circuit affirmed the entry of judgment on this
claim).

2 

Analysis
Now before the Court is Defendants’ Motion to Strike and Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s
Fourth Amended Complaint. The Court will address the arguments in turn.
Motion to Strike
The Court may strike “any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(f). The Court is also mindful that under the law of the case doctrine, “a
district court may address only (1) the issues remanded, (2) issues arising for the first time on
remand, or (3) issues that were timely raised before the district and/or appellate courts but which
remain undecided.” United States v. Morris, 259 F.3d 894, 898 (7th Cir. 2001).
Defendants first argue that the Court must strike Paragraph Six of Plaintiff’s Fourth
Amended Complaint because those allegations imply liability for all Defendants, including
Defendants that were already dismissed. Plaintiff argues that these should not be stricken
because they are general duty allegations. Further, Plaintiff maintains that the Seventh Circuit
did not limit the vicarious liability of Madison County and Sheriff Hertz to the actions of Deputy
Werner and Sergeant Eaton and that vicarious liability may still arise from the unnamed officer’s
actions. The Court finds it unnecessary to strike the allegations in Paragraph Six because they
are general duty allegations and denies the motion to that extent.
The Court further denies Defendants’ motion to strike Paragraphs Seven and Eight.
These paragraphs do not improperly revive claims against defendants Hertz or Madison County.
Rather, these paragraphs address the vicarious liability of these defendants which the Seventh
Circuit explicitly approved in its opinion.
Count II sets forth a state-law claim against Madison County and Count V sets forth a
state law claim against Hertz. In Count II, Plaintiff states “[t]hat the defendant, acting by and
through its agents, servants and employees, including defendants, Sergeant [] Eaton and
3 

[Deputy] Werner . . . .” In Count V, Plaintiff states: “[t]hat the defendant, acting by and through
his agents, servants and employees, including defendant Sergeant [] Eaton and Deputy [] Werner
and the other custodial staff at the Madison County Jail . . . .” These allegations set forth a
vicarious liability claim, and the Court will not strike them to that extent. However, as the Court
previously explained, the Seventh Circuit explicitly found that summary judgment was properly
entered against other defendants. As such, the Court will strike from Count V the portion stating
“and the other custodial staff at the Madison County Jail.”
Next, Defendants ask the Court to strike the portion of Plaintiff’s Complaint in which he
purports to preserve his appellate rights. The Court finds it unnecessary to strike these portions
of the complaint and denies Defendants’ motion to that extent.
Motion to Dismiss
When reviewing a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the Court accepts as true all
allegations in the complaint. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (citing Bell Atl. Corp.
v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). To avoid dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to
state a claim, a complaint must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the
pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). This requirement is satisfied if the
complaint (1) describes the claim in sufficient detail to give the defendant fair notice of what the
claim is and the grounds upon which it rests and (2) plausibly suggests that the plaintiff has a
right to relief above a speculative level. Bell Atl., 550 U.S. at 555; see Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S.
Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009); EEOC v. Concentra Health Servs., 496 F.3d 773, 776 (7th Cir. 2007). “A
claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to
draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 129
S. Ct. at 1949 (citing Bell Atl., 550 U.S. at 556).

4 

First, Defendants contend that Plaintiff’s state law claims against Madison County and
Sheriff Hertz must be dismissed under the Illinois Tort Immunity Act. Specifically, Defendants
assert that “Plaintiff’s request for judgment to be entered against Madison County for any
judgment entered against [Sergeant] Eaton or [Deputy] Werner should be dismissed” because the
Court would first have to find that these defendants were acting within the course and scope of
their employment. This is merely a prayer for relief, not a misstatement of the law. As such, the
Court denies Defendants’ motion to dismiss to that extent.
Defendants next argue that Plaintiff’s prayer for attorneys’ fees must be dismissed.
Plaintiff concedes that “Madison County is not required to indemnify either [Sergeant] Eaton or
[Deputy] Werner for an award of attorney fees against them” (Doc. 137, p. 12). As such, the
Court grants Defendants’ motion to dismiss to that extent.
Finally, Defendants maintain that Counts II and V of Plaintiff’s Fourth Amended
Complaint must be dismissed because Madison County and Hertz can only be held liable under
the doctrine of vicarious liability for Plaintiff’s state law claims. Counts II and V, however,
address vicarious liability. In Count II, as to Madison County, Plaintiff alleges “[t]hat, the
defendant, acting by and through its agents, servants and employees, including defendants,
[Sergeant] Eaton and [Deputy] Werner . . . .” (Doc. 123, p. 5). Count V similarly alleges a
vicarious liability claim against Sheriff Hertz.i Defendants argue that the Complaint should be
dismissed to the extent it asks the Court to “enter relief against Madison County and/or [Sheriff]
Hertz for any action other than the willful and wanton acts of [Sergeant] Eaton and [Deputy]
Werner, performed in the scope of their employment” (Doc. 131, p. 10). However, it will be for
the jury to determine whether the alleged acts of Sergeant Eaton and Deputy Werner were willful
and wanton, thus supporting vicarious liability for Sheriff Hertz and Madison County. The Court
thus denies the motion to the extent it seeks dismissal of Counts II and V.
5 

Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the Court grants in part and denies in part Defendants’ Motion
to Dismiss and Motion to Strike Plaintiff’s Fourth Amended Complaint (Doc.130). Specifically
the Court:


GRANTS the motion to the extent it
o STRIKES from Count V the portion stating “and the other custodial staff
at the Madison County Jail”; and
o DISMISSES Plaintiff’s claim for indemnification for attorneys’ fees
against Madison County.



DENIES the motion to the extent it
o declines to strike Paragraphs Six through Eight;
o declines to strike Counts II & V (with the exception of “and the other
custodial staff at the Madison County Jail”);
o declines to dismiss the state law claims against Madison County and
Hertz; and
o declines to dismiss Counts II and V.

IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: November 24, 2014
s/ Staci M. Yandle
STACI M. YANDLE
DISTRICT JUDGE

i

The Court already struck the portion of Count V which states “and the other custodial staff at the Madison County
Jail.”

6