Pittman v. County of Madison, State of Illinois et al

Filing 298

ORDER. Plaintiff's Motion for New Trial (Doc. 287 ) is DENIED. Signed by Judge Staci M. Yandle on 9/12/2019. (dah).

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
REGINALD PITTMAN,

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Plaintiff,
vs.
COUNTY OF MADISON, et al.,
Defendants.

Case No. 08-CV-890-SMY-DGW

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
YANDLE, District Judge
Pending before the Court is Plaintiff’s Motion for New Trial (Doc. 287). For the following
reasons, the Motion is DENIED.
Background
Plaintiff Reginald Pittman was booked into the Madison County Jail on August 16, 2007.
Defendants Sergeant Randy Eaton and Officer Matt Werner were employees of the Madison
County Jail during Pittman’s detention. On December 19, 2007, after being detained for more
than four months, Pittman attempted suicide by hanging himself with a bed sheet in his jail cell.
As a result of his suicide attempt, Pittman suffered ischemic anoxic injury to his brain rendering
him severely brain damaged and legally disabled.
In October 2018, a 5-day trial was held to determine whether the conduct of Defendants
Eaton and/or Werner was deliberately indifferent under federal law or willful or wanton under
Illinois law. The jury found for Defendants and against Plaintiff. Plaintiff now seeks a new trial
asserting: 1) erroneous jury instructions; 2) erroneous evidentiary rulings; and 3) that the conduct
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of Pittman’s Guardian prejudiced the Plaintiff.
Discussion
Jury Instructions
When a motion for a new trial is based on a challenge to jury instructions, the trial court’s
jury instructions are analyzed as a whole to determine if they accurately stated the law and did not
confuse the jury. Knox v. Indiana, 93 f.3d 1327. 1332 (7th Cir. 1996).

If the

jury instructions contain incorrect or confusing legal statements, the Court must determine
whether a party was prejudiced by the instructions. United Airlines, Inc. v. United States, 111 F.3d
551, 555 (7th Cir.1997). The submission of inadequate jury instructions requires reversal only if
it appears that the jury's comprehension of the issues was so misguided that one of the parties was
prejudiced. Soller v. Moore, 84 F.3d 964, 969 (7th Cir.1996).
Pursuant to F.R.C.P. 51, a party wishing to contest a jury instruction must distinctly state
“the matter objected to and the grounds for the objection.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 51(c)(1). “The objection
must be specific enough that the nature of the error is brought into focus.... There are no formal
requirements, but pragmatically speaking the district court must be made aware of the error prior
to instructing the jury, so that the judge can fix the problem before the case goes to the
jury.” Schobert v. Ill. Dep't of Transp., 304 F.3d 725, 729–30 (7th Cir.2002) (citation omitted).
Moreover, “…the party must state the same grounds when objecting to the jury instruction as it
does in its motion for a new trial or on appeal.” Id. at 730.
Notwithstanding Defendants’ argument to the contrary, Plaintiff preserved his objection to
the issues instruction given by the Court. While it is arguable that Plaintiff’s Counsel initially
consented to the instruction (Doc. 295, Tr. Tran. Day 4, 357:1-12), he did make a record of his
position that the instruction was inconsistent with Miranda v. County of Lake, 900 F.3d 335 (7th
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Cir. 2018) and therefore erroneous, prior to the Court instruction the jury (Doc. 296, Tr. Tran. Day
5, 370:13-371:21). That said, Plaintiff’s contention that the jury instruction given required a
finding of subjective intent which was rejected by the Seventh Circuit in Miranda is simply
incorrect.
Because Pittman was a pretrial detainee, Plaintiff’s claim arises under the Fourteenth
Amendment’s Due Process Clause, rather than the Eighth Amendment’s Cruel and Unusual
Punishment Clause. See, Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 135 S.Ct. 2466, 192 L.Ed.2d 416 (2015);
Miranda v. County of Lake, 900 F.3d 335, 350-351 (7th Cir. 2018). Under Kingsley and
Miranda, in order to prove a failure to protect claim, a plaintiff need only establish that the
defendant's conduct was objectively unreasonable – not that the defendant was subjectively
aware that it was unreasonable. Miranda, 900 F.3d at 352-53. In other words, a plaintiff must
show that a defendant “knew, or should have known, that [a] condition posed an excessive risk
to health or safety” of the detainee and “failed to act with reasonable care to mitigate the risk.” Id.
This is a more exacting standard than that required to prove negligence, or even gross negligence
and is “akin to reckless disregard.” Id.
The Court submitted the following issues instruction to the jury:
The Constitution requires jail officials to protect detainees from harming
themselves under certain circumstances. To succeed on this claim, Plaintiff must
prove each of the following four (4) things by a preponderance of the evidence:
1. There was a strong likelihood that Plaintiff would seriously harm himself. A
mere possibility of serious harm is not a strong likelihood.
2. Defendant Randy Eaton and/or Defendant Matt Werner were aware of this
strong likelihood that Plaintiff would seriously harm himself or strongly
suspected facts showing a strong likelihood that Plaintiff would be seriously
harmed, but refused to confirm whether these facts were true.
3. Defendant Randy Eaton and/or Defendant Matt Werner consciously failed to
take reasonable measures to prevent Plaintiff from harming himself. In
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deciding this, you may consider how serious the potential harm to Plaintiff
was, how difficult it would have been for Defendant Randy Eaton and/or
Defendant Matt Werner to take corrective action and whether these
Defendants had legitimate reasons related to safety or security for failing to
take action.
4. Plaintiff would have suffered less harm if Defendant Randy Eaton and/or
Matt Werner had not disregarded the risk.
(Submitted Jury Instructions - Doc. 280, p. 21). Consistent with Miranda then, the jury was
correctly and clearly instructed that in order to succeed on his claim, Plaintiff must have shown
through the evidence that Eaton and/or Werner were aware of or should have been aware of a
strong likelihood that Pittman would harm himself but failed to take reasonable measures to
prevent him from doing so. Therefore, Plaintiff is not entitled to a new trial based on erroneous
jury instructions.
Evidentiary Rulings
Next, Plaintiff argues the Court’s rulings on the Motions in Limine barring any witness
from offering an opinion as to whether Defendants were deliberately indifferent with respect to
Pittman and barring Bradley Banovz’s deposition testimony regarding unnamed guards to be read
to the jury were improper. Defendants argue that Plaintiff has failed to show that either of the
Court’s evidentiary rulings were in error on an extraordinary level, that any rulings were improper
and had a substantial influence over the jury, or that the result reached was “inconsistent with
substantial justice.” Shick v. Ill. Dep’t of Human Servs., 307 F.3d 605, 611 (7th Cir. 2002).
An erroneous evidentiary ruling warrants a new trial only if it had a “substantial and
injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict.” Williams v. Pharmacia Inc., 137 F.
3d 944, 951 (7th Cir. 1998). A party seeking a new trial based on erroneous evidentiary rulings
bears a “heavy burden.” Alverio v. Sam's Warehouse Club, 253 F.3d 933, 942 (7th Cir. 2001).
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Therefore, even if the trial court's decision was erroneous, “[a] new trial is warranted only if the
error had a substantial and injurious effect or influence on the determination of a jury and the result
is inconsistent with substantial justice.” Lewis v. City of Chi. Police Dep't, 590 F.3d 427, 440 (7th
Cir. 2009).
Plaintiff contends the Court erred in forbidding any witness from testifying that the
defendants were deliberately indifferent given the admissions made by the parties and witnesses.
But while Plaintiff objected to Defendants’ Motion in Limine during the final pretrial conference,
at no time during trial did Plaintiff renew his objection or otherwise challenge the evidentiary
ruling. Thus, Plaintiff failed to preserve this issue for appeal. Jenkins v. Keating, 147 F.3d 577
(7th Cir. 1998); United States v. Addo, 989 F.2d 238 (7th Cir. 1993). Moreover, the Court properly
excluded such evidence under Federal Rules of Evidence 701, 702 and 704, which prohibit lay and
expert witnesses from offering opinions as to outcome determinative issues within the province of
the jury, such as whether a defendant was deliberately indifferent. See, King v. Kramer, 763
F.3d635, 646 (7th Cir. 2014); Roundy’s Inc. v. NLRB, 674, F.3d 638. 648 (7th Cir. 2011).
Plaintiff also challenges the Court’s ruling on the Motion in Limine barring Bradley Banovz
from testifying about Banovz or Reginald Pittman notifying jail personnel other than the named
defendants about threats of suicide. Specifically, Plaintiff argues that since Banovz was found to
be unavailable at trial, the transcript of his testimony from the first trial regarding the unnamed
defendants should have been read to the jury. Plaintiff further argues that since the testimony given
by Banovz in the first trial is consistent with his deposition testimony quoted by the Seventh Circuit
on appeal, the testimony should have been allowed in this trial. Finally, Plaintiff asserts that the
parties filed a stipulation regarding this testimony, and therefore, it should have been allowed. In
response, Defendants point out that the Seventh Circuit reversed and remanded this case solely
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based on this Court’s exclusion of Banovz’s videotaped interview during the first trial – not the
related testimony – and rejected Plaintiff’s claim of error regarding this testimony.
As an initial matter, the Court notes the parties are discussing two separate Seventh Circuit
Opinions. Plaintiff references the Opinion that reversed the Court and remanded this case after
summary judgment was granted for the defendants (Pittman ex rel. Hamilton v. Cty. of Madison,
Ill., 746 F.3d 766, 781 (7th Cir. 2014)), while Defendants reference the Opinion finding that this
Court abused its discretion in excluding the videotaped interview of Bradley Banovz and
remanding the case for retrial (Pittman by Hamilton v. Cty. of Madison, Illinois, 863 F.3d 734, 737
(7th Cir. 2017). Plaintiff’s reliance on the former decision to challenge the Court’s evidentiary
rulings in the second trial is misplaced.
On appeal following the first trial, Plaintiff addressed entering the transcript of the
statement into evidence. The Seventh Circuit succinctly rejected Plaintiff’s challenge:
“Pittman’s brief raises several other issues relating to how the judge conducted the trial. None of
these arguments has merit.” Pittman by Hamilton v. Cty. of Madison, Illinois, 863 F.3d 734, 738
(7th Cir. 2017). During the second trial, this Court again barred Banovz from testifying regarding
unnamed guards because the information was irrelevant, immaterial, and prejudicial (Doc 291,
FPT. Tran. 13:12-22). Plaintiff has failed to establish that barring this testimony had a substantial
and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict or that the result reached was
inconsistent with substantial justice. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s request for a new trial on this basis
is denied.
Robin Hamilton’s Conduct During Trial
Lastly, Plaintiff contends the conduct of Robin Hamilton, Plaintiff’s Co-Guardian and Next
Friend, during the trial warrants a new trial. Specifically, while the Court was addressing
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objections at a side bar and Ms. Hamilton was on the witness stand, she improperly addressed the
jury, stating “there is so much more that I want you to know” (Doc 294, Tr. Tran, Day 4 pg.128).
Defendants immediately moved for a mistrial arguing that the jury had been infected by this direct
contact and attempt to influence them. In response, Plaintiff argued that Ms. Hamilton didn’t
provide any information to the jury and therefore, Defendants suffered no prejudice. Plaintiff
further argued the issue could be handled with a curative instruction.

The Court denied

Defendants’ motion for a mistrial, gave a curative instruction to the jury, removed Ms. Hamilton
from the courtroom and struck her testimony, and gave the jury a curative instruction. Plaintiff
now argues he was prejudiced as Ms. Hamilton’s testimony was necessary to present damages to
the jury regarding Pittman’s care needs.
Additionally, when a juror survey was returned, in response to the question “Do you feel
that your privacy or personal safety was compromised during the jury selection process?” a juror
wrote “Somewhat. mother (witness) tried speaking to me and was removed but she was sitting
outside the doors and her daughter tried to get in the elevator with me. Made me uncomfortable”
(Doc. 286-1 pg. 2). Plaintiff argues that Hamilton’s conduct towards this juror combined with the
outburst during trial prevented Plaintiff from receiving a fair trial.
As to this issue, Defendants argue Plaintiff’s failure to timely move for a mistrial preclude
relief under Rule 59. The Court agrees. While Ms. Hamilton’s conduct was highly inappropriate,
the Court specifically inquired of Plaintiff’s Counsel whether he desired a mistrial. Counsel not
only objected to a mistrial, he specifically requested that a curative instruction be given instead.
“When error is invited, not even plain error permits reversal.” Naeem v. McKesson Drug Co., 444
F.3d 593, 609 (7th Cir.2006) In other words, a party cannot complain of errors that it committed,
invited, induced the court to make, or to which it consented. Weise v. United States, 724 F.2d 587,
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590 (7th Cir. 1984).
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff’s Motion for New Trial (Doc. 287) is DENIED in its
entirety.

IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: September 12, 2019
__________________
STACI M. YANDLE
United States District Judge

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