Pittman v. County of Madison, State of Illinois et al

Filing 373

ORDER denying 361 Motion for New Trial and to Vacate Amended Judgment and 363 Motion to Clarify Record. For the reasons detailed in the attached Memorandum and Order, Plaintiff's Motions for New Trial and to Clarify the Record are DENIED. Signed by Judge David W. Dugan on 6/1/2023. (arm)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
REGINALD PITTMAN, by and through
his Guardian and Next Friend, Robin M.
Hamilton,
Plaintiff,
vs.
COUNTY OF MADISON,
ROBERT HERTZ,
RANDY EATON, and
MATT WERNER,
Defendants.

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Case No. 08-cv-890-DWD

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
DUGAN, District Judge:
Now before the Court is Plaintiff’s Motion for New Trial (Doc. 361) and Motion to
Amend/Correct the Record (Doc. 363). Defendants filed a response to both Motions
(Docs. 370, 371), and Plaintiff filed a reply (Doc. 372). For the reasons detailed below, the
Motions will be denied.
Background
In December 2007, Plaintiff Reginald Pittman was a pretrial detainee at the
Madison County Jail. Plaintiff attempted suicide. Although the attempt failed, Plaintiff
sustained severe brain damage. Through his guardian, Robin Hamilton, Plaintiff filed
this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 suit against Madison County, Illinois and then-employees, Sheriff
Robert Hertz, Sergeant Randy Eaton, and Deputy Matthew Werner, alleging that Eaton
and Werner violated the Fourteenth Amendment by failing to provide Plaintiff with

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adequate medical care.
This matter has a lengthy procedural history, involving multiple appeals and three
jury trials. The details of these prior events are more fully contained in the Court record
and the three opinions from the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals (See Docs. 115, 248,
310). As is relevant to these Motions, in August 2022, a third trial was held to determine
whether the conduct of Defendants Eaton and/or Werner was deliberately indifferent
under federal law or willful or wanton under Illinois law. Following a 5-day trial, the
jury found for Defendants and against Plaintiff.
Plaintiff now seeks a new trial pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(a). Plaintiff alleges
prejudicial error caused by the Court’s giving of Defendant’s Proposed Jury Instruction
19 with the Court’s modifications (Doc. 351-1, p. 21). This instruction concerned the
objectively reasonable standard under the Fourteenth Amendment.
Legal Standard
The decision to grant a new trial is committed to the Court's discretion. Johnson v.
Gen. Bd. of Pension & Health Benefits of United Methodist Church, 733 F.3d 722, 730 (7th Cir.
2013). In deciding whether to grant a new trial, the Court considers “if the jury's verdict
is against the manifest weight of the evidence or if the trial was in some way unfair to the
moving party.” Venson v. Altamirano, 749 F.3d 641, 656 (7th Cir. 2014). When a motion for
a new trial is based on a challenge to jury instructions, the trial court’s jury instructions
are analyzed in their entirety, “to determine if, as a whole, they were sufficient to inform
the jury correctly of the applicable law.” Knox v. State of Ind., 93 F.3d 1327, 1332 (7th Cir.
1996). If the jury instructions contain incorrect or confusing legal statements, the Court
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must determine whether a party was prejudiced by the instructions. United Airlines, Inc.
v. United States, 111 F.3d 551, 555 (7th Cir. 1997). “The submission of inadequate jury
instructions requires reversal only if ‘it appears that the jury's comprehension of the
issues was so misguided that one of the parties was prejudiced.’” Soller v. Moore, 84 F.3d
964, 969 (7th Cir. 1996).
Discussion
Plaintiff alleges prejudicial error caused by the Court’s giving of the following jury
instruction:
The United States Constitution requires jail officials to protect
detainees from harming themselves under certain circumstances. To
succeed on this claim, Plaintiff must prove each of the following four (4)
things by a preponderance of the evidence:
1.
There was a strong likelihood that Plaintiff would seriously
harm himself;
2.
Defendant Randy Eaton and/or Defendant Matt Werner were
aware of this strong likelihood that Plaintiff would seriously harm himself
or strongly suspected facts showing a strong likelihood that Plaintiff would
be seriously harmed;
3.
Defendant Randy Eaton and/or Defendant Matt Werner
failed to take objectively reasonable measures to prevent Plaintiff from
harming himself; and
4.
As a result of the conduct of Defendant Randy Eaton and/or
Defendant Matt Werner, Plaintiff was harmed.
If you find that Plaintiff has proved each of these things by a
preponderance of the evidence, then you must decide for Plaintiff, and go
on to consider the question of damages.
If, on the other hand, you find that Plaintiff has failed to prove any
one of these things by a preponderance of the evidence, then you must
decide for Defendant, and you will not consider the question of damages.
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(Doc. 352-1, p. 21).
Plaintiff argues that this instruction was erroneous in light of Kingsley v.
Hendrickson, 576 U.S. 389 (2015) and Miranda v. Cnty. of Lake, 900 F.3d 335, 352 (7th Cir.
2018), requiring pretrial detainee claims brought under the Fourteenth Amendment to be
evaluated under an objectively reasonable test rather than the subjective deliberate
indifference standard employed for Eighth Amendment claims. Plaintiff thus renews his
argument that his proposed instruction No. 9 should have been given in its place.
Plaintiff’s proposed instruction is attached as Exhibit A to Plaintiff’s Motion for New Trial
(Doc. 361-1) and the Court’s Jury Instructions at Doc. 352-4, p. 3. This refused instruction
provides:
The plaintiff has the burden of proving that the acts or failure to act
of one or more of the defendants deprived the plaintiff of particular rights
under the United States Constitution. In this case, the plaintiff alleges the
defendant deprived him of his rights under the Fourteenth Amendment to
the Constitution by failing to refer him to a Crisis counselor, or by failing to
properly record his Crisis request under jail procedures or by failing to
house him in a safe environment pending a Crisis evaluation. Under the
Fourteenth Amendment. a pretrial detainee has the right to be protected
while in custody. To succeed on this claim, Plaintiff must prove each of the
following four things by a preponderance of the evidence:
1.

Defendant made an intentional decision with respect to the
conditions under which Plaintiff was confined.

2.

Those conditions put the Plaintiff at a substantial risk of suffering
serious physical harm.

3.

Defendant failed to take reasonable measures to prevent Plaintiff
seriously harming himself, even though a reasonable officer
would have appreciated the high degree of risk involved-making the consequences of the defendant's decision obvious,
and
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4.

By not taking such measures, the defendant caused the plaintiff's
injuries.

With respect to the third element, the defendant's conduct must be
objectively unreasonable.
(Doc. 361-1, Doc. 352-4, p. 3).
Before addressing the merits of Plaintiff’s arguments, the Court will first dispose
of Plaintiff’s Motion to Supplement the Court Record (Doc. 362). Plaintiff seeks to
supplement the Court Record to include a copy of Plaintiff’s refused Proposed Jury
Instruction No. 9 (Doc. 361-1) believing that a verbatim copy of this instruction was not
included in the court record. However, upon review of the Court’s Jury Instructions
(Doc. 352), a verbatim copy of Plaintiff’s Proposed Jury Instruction No. 9 exists at Doc.
352-4, p. 3. Accordingly, as this instruction is already contained in the Court record,
Plaintiff’s Motion to Clarify the Record (Doc. 363) is DENIED.
Turning to the substance of Plaintiff’s arguments, Plaintiff avers that the Court’s
instruction failed to “limit[] the first prong higher standard of liability, i.e., intentionally
or recklessness, to the physical act performed by the defendants”, specifically Defendants
alleged promise to refer Plaintiff to crisis and failure to follow through with that promise
(Doc. 362, p. 7). Plaintiff maintains that the appropriate causation requirement for this
case only required Plaintiff to “prove that the acts performed by the defendant carry a
substantial risk of serious physical harm.” (Id.). Thus, Plaintiff argues that including the
language, “[t]here was a strong likelihood that Plaintiff would seriously harm himself”
erroneously required Plaintiff to prove that Plaintiff was going to attempt suicide (Id.).

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Plaintiff thus concludes that the instruction erroneously required the jury to find that
Defendants “made an intentional or reckless act concerning the conditions under which
the Plaintiff was confided, [and] also that the defendants acted with the knowledge or
strong suspicion that plaintiff would make a suicide attempt (self-harm).” (Id.). Plaintiff
avers that by setting out these requirements, the instruction “combines a heightened
causation requirement … with an expression of subjective intent that requires that
plaintiff prove that defendants knew or strongly suspected they were, through their
actions, causing a strong likelihood of a suicide attempt” or that defendants “directly and
knowingly caused[ed] the plaintiff’s suicide attempt” (Id. at pp. 7-8).
The Court disagrees. The alleged erroneous language, that “[t]here was a strong
likelihood that plaintiff would seriously harm himself” and Defendants “were aware of
this strong likelihood that Plaintiff would seriously harm himself or strongly suspected
facts showing a strong likelihood that Plaintiff would be seriously harmed” correctly
outlined the first prong of Miranda’s objectively reasonable test, namely that the jury
“must decide whether the ‘defendants acted purposefully, knowingly, or perhaps even
recklessly.’” Pittman by & through Hamilton v. Cnty. of Madison, Illinois, 970 F.3d 823, 827
(7th Cir. 2020). Indeed, in Plaintiff’s most recent appeal, this language was specifically
discussed by the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals. As set forth in the Seventh Circuit’s
opinion, the language in the prior instruction, and as also adopted by this Court,
instructed the jury to decided “whether the defendants ‘were aware of … or strongly
suspected facts showing’ a strong likelihood that Pittman would harm himself” goes to
Miranda’s first inquiry, and correctly encompassed all states of mind except for
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negligence and gross negligence consistent with Miranda.

Pittman by and through

Hamilton, 970 F.3d at 828. Thus, the Seventh Circuit found that this language accurately
conveyed Miranda’s first standard to the jury. Just as at trial, the Court finds no reason
to depart from the Seventh Circuit’s analysis concerning this language, and finds that the
Court’s instruction correctly instructed the jury on the Seventh Circuit’s “objectively
reasonable” test.
For these reasons, Plaintiff’s Motion for New Trial and to Vacate Amended
Judgment (Doc. 361) is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
Dated: June 1, 2023

______________________________
DAVID W. DUGAN
United States District Judge

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