Matthews v. Hollingsworth

Filing 21

ORDER denying petition for habeas corpus and dismissing case. Signed by Chief Judge David R. Herndon on 6/27/11. (skp)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

FRANK MATTHEWS, JR.,
Petitioner,
v.
LISA J. HOLLINGSWORTH,
Respondent.

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No. 09-cv-234-DRH

ORDER

HERNDON, Chief Judge:
Introduction & Background
Pending is petitioner Frank Matthews’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (Doc. 1), and petitioner’s two motions for status
report (Docs. 19 & 20). For the following reasons, the petition for writ of habeas
corpus is DENIED. The motions for status report are DENIED as moot.
Petitioner is a prisoner confined at USP-Marion and challenges the Bureau
of Prison’s calculation of his 180 month federal prison term, claiming he should
have received credit for approximately thirteen months served in pretrial custody
between March 15, 1999, and April 10, 2000.
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B), Magistrate Judge Philip M. Frazier
submitted a Report and Recommendation (“the Report”) on July 12, 2010 (Doc.
13). The Report recommends that the Court deny petitioner’s 28 U.S.C. § 2241

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petition for writ of habeas corpus and dismiss his cause of action. Specifically,
Judge Frazier found the time of petitioner’s detention between March 15, 1999
and April 10, 2000 was being credited toward a Tennessee state sentence, and
that 18 U.S.C. § 3585 prohibits double credit. In other words, because time
from March 1999 to April 2000 was counted against a state sentence, it could not
be counted a second time against petitioner’s pending federal sentence.
Upon issuance, the R&R was sent to the parties with a notice informing
them of their right to appeal by way of filing “objections” within fourteen days of
service (Doc. 13-2).

Neither party initially filed timely objections, leading this

Court to adopt the R&R and order the action dismissed (Doc. 14).

Upon

petitioner’s motion for reconsideration (Doc. 16), this Court re-opened the case
upon determining petitioner may not have been properly served a copy of the R&R
(Doc. 17). Petitioner was given until September 14, 2010 to file his objections to
the R&R(Doc. 17). Thereafter, Petitioner timely filed his objections (Doc. 18).
Petitioner’s objections basically re-state arguments he made in his Traverse
Response (Doc. 12), indicating he disagrees with the magistrate’s reasoning based
upon the language in 18 U.S.C. § 3585(b) that “[a] defendant shall be given credit
toward the service of a term of imprisonment for any time he has spent in official
detention prior to the date the sentence commences.” As for the last words of
§ 3585(b), “that has not been credited against another sentence,” petitioner merely
states that “there is no double credit involved which is due to the fact that that 18
U.S.C. 924(e) or penalties are note listed anywhere among the alleged offenses

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charged by the state” (Doc. 18 at p. 4). Petitioner further objects to the R&R’s
reference to Bureau of Prisons Program Statement and also makes an effort to
distinguish case authority cited in the R&R.
Since timely objections have been filed, this Court must undertake de novo
review of the Report.28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b); Southern
District of Illinois Local Rule 73.1(b); Govas v. Chalmers, 965 F.2d 298, 301 (7th
Cir. 1992).The Court may “accept, reject or modify the recommended decision.”
Willis v. Caterpillar Inc., 199 F.3d 902, 904 (7th Cir. 1999).

In making this

determination, the Court must look at all the evidence contained in the record
and give fresh consideration to those issues to which specific objection has been
made. Id.
Based on the pleadings and the applicable law, the Court adopts the
Report.
Facts
In March, 1998, petitioner Matthews was sentenced to an eight-year term of
confinement in Davidson County, Tennessee, for aggravated robbery. The state
court of Tennessee suspended the term of imprisonment and placed petitioner on
probation for seven years. While under supervision, petitioner was arrested for
evading arrest, aggravated burglary, aggravated assault, felon in possession of a
weapon, and resisting arrest.

This arrest also resulted in the instant federal

offense pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 924(e).

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Tennessee revoked the Petitioner’s probation supervision on October 16,
1998 and sentenced him to eight years imprisonment. An arrest warrant was
executed on March 15, 1999, for the federal offense of felon in possession of a
firearm with an enhanced penalty of at least 15 years. The U.S. District Court
essentially took advantage of Matthews’ custody with the state of Tennessee by
issuing an order to produce, and petitioner was transferred to federal custody for
his initial appearance. Petitioner was returned to the state the same day. On
February 29, 2000, the U.S. District Court issued another order to produce,
directing petitioner be transferred to federal custody for sentencing on April 10,
2000. The order further directed petitioner be returned to the custody of state
authorities upon conclusion of the federal proceedings.
On April 10, 2000, the U.S. District Court sentenced petitioner to 180
months imprisonment to run concurrently with his “current TDOC [state] term of
imprisonment.” See Doc. 10-1 ¶ 7. After sentencing, petitioner was returned to
the Tennessee state authorities where, on July 21, 2004, he completed his state
sentence. Petitioner was then released to the U.S. Marshals Service.
The Bureau of Prisons has computed petitioner’s sentence using a
commencement date of April 10, 2000, the date of his sentencing.

Petitioner

received a credit of forty-two days for his detention from September 4, 1998
through October 15, 1998, the day before his state sentence started to run. With
Petitioner’s 180-month sentence, forty-two days previous custody credit, and 682
days of projected good conduct time, his projected release date is April 15, 2013.

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Petitioner believes he is entitled to additional credit towards his federal
sentence as a result of the time he spent in federal custody from March 15, 1999,
to April 10, 2000. During this time, although in federal custody off and on, his
detention was being credited toward his eight year state sentence.

Petitioner,

despite his previous arguments concerning the date of February 24, 1999, states
that his prison sentence should have started on March 15, 1999 rather than April
10, 2000 in his Traverse Response (Doc. 12). Respondent argues that petitioner
has received all pre-sentence credit that he is due. The Bureau of Prisons did not
award credit for the period of March 15, 1999, to April 10, 2000, because
petitioner received credit for that time towards his service of his eight year state
sentence.
Law
Petitioner may obtain habeas corpus relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2241(b)(3) if
he is being held in federal custody in violation of the Constitution or laws of the
United States. Awards of credit for time spent in custody are governed by 18
U.S.C. § 3585, which provides:
(a) Commencement of Sentence. –A sentence to a term of
imprisonment commences on the date the defendant is received in
custody awaiting transportation to, or arrives voluntarily to
commence service of sentence at, the official detention facility at
which the sentence is to be served.
(b) Credit for prior custody. –A defendant shall be given credit
toward the service of a term of imprisonment for any time he has
spent in official detention prior to the date the sentence commences(1) as a result of the offence for which the sentence was
imposed; or

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(2) as a result of any other charge for which the defendant was
arrested after the commission of the offense for which the
sentence was imposed;
that has not been credited against another sentence.
The last clause of that statute prohibits awards of double credit.

See United

States v. Ross, 219 F.3d 592, 594 (7th Cir. 2000). Simply put, when time in
custody is counted against one sentence, it may not be counted a second time
against another sentence.

This is an issue separate and apart from that

associated with concurrent sentences.
The Bureau of Prisons is prohibited by § 3585(b) from giving credit for
prior custody that already has “been credited against another sentence.”

If a

prisoner’s federal and state sentences are concurrent, and that federal sentence is
to run longer than the state sentence (not counting any credits), “[p]rior custody
credits shall be given for any time spent in non-federal presentence custody that
begins on or after the date of the federal offense up to the date that the first
sentence begins to run, federal or non federal.” Grigsby v. Bledsoe, 223 Fed.
App’x 486, 488 (7th Cir. 2007) (quoting the Sentence Computation Manual of
1984, Program Statement 5880.28(2)(c)); see also Willisv. United States, 438
F.2d 923 (5th Cir. 1971).

This Court notes any reference to the Program

Statement is not meant as reliance upon the Program Statement as law, but
rather displays the Bureau of Prisons recognition and adoption of the provisions
of § 3585(b).
The Grigsby case is analogous to petitioner’s case. Grigsby was arrested in
California on a robbery charge and convicted in state court. Grigsby, 223 Fed.
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App’x at 487. Grigsby was sentenced to nine years in state prison, and onemonth
later federal authorities took custody of him to answer a federal indictment. Id.
He was sentenced to 200 months in prison on August 19, 1994 for his federal
offense and was to serve it concurrent with his undischarged state sentence. Id.
Grigsby was returned to state prison until he was paroled to federal officials to
complete the remainder of his federal sentence. Id. Grigsby filed his § 2241
petition claiming that he should have received credit against his federal sentence
for the period between his California arrest on March 28, 1993, and his
sentencing in federal court on August 19, 1994.Id. The magistrate judge for the
Southern District of Illinois found part of Grigsby’s petition asking for credits that
had been already given by the federal court’s sentence moot. Id. As to the period
between Grigsby’s state sentencing and his federal sentencing, August 13, 1993, to
August 19, 1994, the magistrate judge, citing 18 U.S.C. § 3585(b), refused to
credit this period against Grigsby’s federal sentence because the California
Department of Corrections already credited the time against his state sentence.
Grigsby, 223 Fed. App’x at 487. The district court judge adopted the magistrate’s
findings and it was affirmed by the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals. Id. at 487,
489.The Seventh Circuit held that the period of time for which Grigsby sought
credit was not time spent in non-federal presentencecustody.Id. at 489.Because
the time period in question arose after Grigsby’s state sentencing, and since he
obtained credit for this period from the state, Grigsby was not entitled to the same

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benefit from the Bureau of Prisons merely because his subsequent federal
sentence was ordered to run concurrently. Id.

Analysis
Petitioner, in his original petition, traverse response, and objection to the
R&R, seeks credit for time spent while serving his state sentence because he was
also in and out of federal custody at that time and because his subsequent federal
sentence was ordered to run concurrently with his state sentence. Petitioner’s
arguments and objections in his filings are based upon 18 U.S.C. § 3585(b).
Petitioner correctly states that non-federal time served can be counted as
presentence credit.

Yet, there is also important limiting language in the last

sentence of that statute, which states that credit shall be given if “[it] has not been
credited against another sentence.” 18 U.S.C. § 3585(b).

Petitioner effectively

ignores this final sentence in both his petition and in his traverse response, but
addresses it in his objections only to say there is no double credit because the
state indictment did not list out the 18 U.S.C. § 924(e) penalties. That has nothing
to do with the calculations of time served or the determination of double credit.
The forty-two days from September 4, 1998, through October 15, 1998,
spent detained priorto the commencement of petitioner’s state sentence was
properly credited to his 180-month sentence. Once the state sentence began
accruing credit towards petitioner’s incarceration, the Bureau of Prisons properly
refused to credit petitioner’s federal sentence for the same time. Neither the
subsequent order that his federal and non-federal sentences run concurrently,
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nor the fact that petitioner was temporarily detained by federal authorities during
his state sentence transform his time spent in state prison into presentencenonfederal time for purposes of § 3585(b). That section must be read as a whole and
the final sentence of the statute cannot be omitted. Petitioner has failed to
incorporate any sensible or coherent argument that would justify doing so in his
case.
In sum, petitioner is not being held in custody in violation of the
Constitution or federal law. He is not entitled to a writ of habeas corpus pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. The petition for writ of habeas corpus (Doc. 1) is therefore
DENIED. The motions for status report (Docs. 19 & 20) are DENIED as moot.
The Clerk is DIRECTED to send a copy of this Order to petitioner, enter judgment
against the petitioner, and to close this case.

IT IS SO ORDERED.
Signed this 27th day of June, 2011.

David R. Herndon
2011.06.27
05:51:06 -05'00'
Chief Judge
United States District Court

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