Dooley v. United Industries Corporation et al

Filing 196

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER denying Objection 106 . Signed by Judge J. Phil Gilbert on 4/25/2011. (dka, )

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
THOMAS DOOLEY,
Plaintiff,
v.

Case No. 10-cv-37-JPG-SCW

UNITED INDUSTRIES CORPORATION,
SPECTRUM BRANDS, INC., EUGENE
HOGE, and ALLISON FOLEY,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
This matter comes before the Court on Plaintiff Thomas Dooley’s (“Dooley”)
Objection (Doc. 106). Defendants filed a Response (Doc. 112) thereto, to which Dooley
filed a Reply (Doc. 113).1
The instant objection (or appeal à la Local Rule 73.1(a)) targets an Order (Doc. 102)
of Magistrate Judge Clifford J. Proud that denied Dooley’s renewed Motion to Join Rebeckah
Long and Motion to Amend the Complaint. Magistrate Judge Proud denied said motion on
the following two grounds: 1) the corresponding proposed complaint did not underline the
material sought to be added to the operative complaint, and the proposed complaint did not
indicate which defendants were tied to which claims for relief; and 2) prematurity because it
was primarily based upon a choice-of-law issue that this Court had yet to decide.

1

In filing an 8-page reply brief, Dooley disregarded the Local Rules of the Court.
See S.D. Ill. L. R. 7.1(g) (“Reply briefs shall not exceed 5 pages. Requests for additional
pages are not allowed.”). The Court admonishes Dooley to adhere to the Court’s Local
Rules in the future lest his filings be wholly or partially stricken.

As a preliminary matter, the Court notes that its analysis is confined to the underlying
order of Magistrate Judge Proud at the time it was entered. The Court also notes that a
renewed Motion to Join Rebeckah Long (Doc. 165) is pending before Magistrate Judge
Proud.
A district court reviewing a magistrate judge’s decision on non-dispositive issues
should only modify or set aside that decision if it is clearly erroneous or contrary to law. 28
U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A) (2006); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a); SDIL-LR 73.1(a). Accordingly, the
Court will affirm Magistrate Judge Proud’s decision unless his factual findings are clearly
erroneous or his legal conclusions are contrary to law.
Here, it is clear that Magistrate Judge Proud’s decision does not fall below the
deference afforded him. Dooley’s failure to underline only the new material contained in his
proposed amended complaint represents a clear violation of the Court’s Local Rules, which
state that “[a]ll new material in an amended pleading must be underlined.” SDIL-LR 15.1
(emphasis added). And, indeed, failure to comply with Local Rule 15.1 may warrant denial
of a plaintiff’s motion to amend. See, e.g., Barnes v. Broy, 08-cv-290-MJR, 2008 WL
3875258, at *2 (S.D. Ill. Aug. 19, 2008); Johnson v. Ill. Dep’t of Corrs., 04-cv-222-MJR,
2006 WL 741318, at *1 n.1 (S.D. Ill. Mar. 22, 2006). The fact that Dooley did not specify
which claims were to be asserted against Rebeckah Long only further demonstrated the
inadequacy of the proposed complaint and the lack of clarity therein.
While there were more than enough “technical” reasons for Magistrate Judge Proud to
deny the underlying motion, his denial also rested upon valid concerns of judicial economy.
Dooley believes it is “fatuitous” to assume Magistrate Judge Proud’s opinion relies upon
2

concerns of judicial efficiency. Doc. 113, p. 1. The Court, however, finds that a judicial
economy rationale permeates the underlying order.
At the time of denial, there were two motions to dismiss before the Court as well as a
related motion to strike and numerous briefs. The motion to amend heavily referenced a
choice-of-law issue that the dismissal motions revolved around. It would be a waste of the
Court and the parties’ time for Magistrate Judge Proud to engage in a choice-of-law analysis
when this Court would undertake the very same analysis in ruling on Defendants’ motions to
dismiss.2 The rule of procedure preceding all others states that the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure “should be construed and administered to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive
determination of every action and proceeding.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 1. Magistrate Judge Proud
would not have adhered to this hallmark of federal litigation had he engaged in superfluous
analysis. More importantly, it can hardly be said his decision represents clear error or runs
contrary to law.
As a final matter, the Court will not be accepting Dooley’s invitation to revisit its
choice-of-law analysis.
For the foregoing reasons, the Court DENIES Dooley’s Objection (Doc. 106).
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: April 25, 2011
s/ J. Phil Gilbert
J. PHIL GILBERT
DISTRICT JUDGE

2

Contrary to Dooley’s repeated assertions, a dismissal motion is dispositive.
Govas v. Chalmers, 965 F.2d 298, 301 (7th Cir. 1992) (“A motion to dismiss is a
dispositive motion[.]”).
3