Fuller v. USA
Filing
31
ORDER denying 30 Motion for Reconsideration. Further, the Court denies a certificate of appealability. Signed by Chief Judge David R. Herndon on 6/6/2012. (mtm)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
MONTEZ L. FULLER,
Petitioner,
v.
Case No. 10-cv-267-DRH
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Respondent.
MEMORANDUM & ORDER
HERNDON, Chief Judge:
I. INTRODUCTION
Pending before the Court is petitioner Montez L. Fuller’s motion for
reconsideration pursuant to FEDERAL RULE
OF
CIVIL PROCEDURE 59(e) from the
Court’s Order denying his 28 U.S.C. § 2255 petition (Doc. 30). Petitioner contends
that the Court made various manifest errors of law in denying his petition. For the
Following reasons, the Court DENIES petitioner’s motion.
II. LAW AND APPLICATION
The FEDERAL RULES
OF
CIVIL PROCEDURE do not expressly contemplate
motions to “reconsider.” However, the Seventh Circuit has held district courts
should automatically consider motions challenging the merits of a district court
order under Rule 59(e) or Rule 60(b). See Mares v. Busby, 34 F.3d 533, 535
(7th Cir. 1994); United States v. Deutsch, 981 F.2d 299, 300 (7th Cir. 1992).
Instantly, petitioner filed his motion within 28 days of the entry of the challenged
Page 1 of 7
Order. See FED. R. CIV. P. 59(e) (stating, “[a] motion to alter or amend a judgment
must be filed no later than 28 days after the entry of the judgment”).
However, “whether a motion filed within [28] days of the entry of judgment
should be analyzed under Rule 59(e) or Rule 60(b) depends on the substance of
the motion, not on the timing or label affixed to it.”
Obriecht v. Raemisch, 517
F.3d 489, 493 (7th Cir. 2008) (emphasis in original) (citing Borrero v. City of
Chicago, 456 F.3d 698, 701-02 (7th Cir. 2006) (holding, “the former approachthat no matter what their substance, all post-judgment motions filed within [28]
days of judgment would be construed as Rule 59(e) motions no longer applies”)).
As petitioner purportedly challenges the Court’s substantive application of law,
the Court treats his motion as one under Rule 59(e). See Obriecht, 517 F.3d at
493-94.
A motion for reconsideration serves the limited function of allowing a court
to correct manifest errors of law or fact or to present newly-discovered evidence.
See Caisse Nationale de Credit Agricole v. CBI Indus., Inc., 90 F.3d 1264, 1270
(7th Cir. 1996); see also Publishers Res., Inc. v. Walker-Davis Publ’ns, Inc., 762
F.2d 557, 561 (7th Cir. 1985). Thus, Rule 59(e) allows a court to alter or amend a
previous order only if the movant demonstrates a manifest error of law or
presents newly discovered evidence. Sigsworth v. City of Aurora, 487 F.3d 506,
511-12 (7th Cir. 2007). However, it is well-settled that it is improper “to advance
argument or theories that could and should have been made before the district
court rendered a judgment.” Id. (citing LB Credit Corp. v. Resolution Trust Corp.,
Page 2 of 7
49 F.3d 1263, 1267 (7th Cir. 1995)). Accordingly, “[r]econsideration is not an
appropriate forum for rehashing previously rejected arguments or arguing
matters that could have been heard during the pendency of the previous motion.”
Caisse, 90 F.3d at 1270.
Petitioner instantly challenges the legal and factual bases of the Court’s May
22, 2012 Order denying petitioner’s Section 2255 petition and dismissing his
claims with prejudice. The Order dismissing petitioner’s claims also rendered
numerous motions filed subsequent to his petition moot; namely, petitioner’s
frivolous and unsupported motion for summary judgment (Doc. 23), to which the
government responded (Doc. 25). Petitioner feels the Court’s mooting of his
summary judgment motion was a manifest error of law, as it did not “adjudicate”
said motion “on the merits.”
The RULES GOVERNING SECTION 2255 PROCEEDINGS provide the procedure
under which this Court determines the merits of a pending Section 2255 petition.
Generally, the petitioner files an application specifying all the grounds for relief
available to the moving party, stating the facts supporting each ground. See id. at
2. Following a preliminary review and referral to the judge who conducted the
trial and imposed sentence, id. at 4, the government is ordered to respond to
petitioner’s claims. Id. at 5. Thereafter, petitioner is permitted to submit a reply
to respondent’s answer, provided he complies with time frames fixed by the judge.
Id. At that point, a Section 2255 petition is ripe for review.
Page 3 of 7
Notably, in the instant case, petitioner did not reply within the time frame
permitted, nor did he offer adequate circumstances excusing his repeated and
flagrant disregard for this Court’s Local Rules regarding replies. See SDIL-LR
7.1(c). Thus, this Court repeatedly refused his attempts to file an inexcusably late
reply (See Docs. 13, 15, 18, 22). Therefore, petitioner’s Section 2255 petition was
ripe upon the government’s filing of its response. However, in a final attempt to
improperly advance arguments and introduce supportive materials regarding
petitioner’s then-pending Section 2255 petition, petitioner filed a document titled,
“motion for summary judgment pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a),” on March 30,
2012 (Doc. 23). Importantly, said motion merely reiterates claims alleged in his
Section 2255 petition and additionally raises facts not previously brought to the
Court’s attention.
The government timely responded to petitioner’s motion (Doc. 25). In
response to petitioner’s allegations, the government noted, “[p]etitioner once again
is attempting to supplement his petition by filing a Motion for Summary
Judgment or Partial Summary Judgment as prescribed by Rule 56(a) of the
RULES
FOR
CIVIL PROCEDURE. The Rules that govern Section 2255 proceedings are
specifically set forth in the Federal Criminal Code and Rules, under the section
appropriately entitled ‘RULES-SECTION 2255 PROCEEDINGS.’ Accordingly, this Court
should once again deny [p]etitioner’s attempt to supplement the record.”
The Court agrees with the government’s perception of petitioner’s motives.
Nevertheless, as to the merits of petitioner’s motion for summary judgment,
Page 4 of 7
summary judgment is proper if there is no genuine dispute of material fact and
the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Celotex Corp. v.
Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986); FED. R. CIV. P. 56. Petitioner’s motion merely
expounds upon the alleged facts of his Section 2255 petition, without relevant or
credible evidence in support. Petitioner attached a self-serving affidavit reiterating
portions of the factual allegations of his Section 2255 petition; such affidavits
carries zero weight in determining the merits of petitioner’s motion. See Albiero v.
City of Kankakee, 246 F.3d 927, 933 (7th Cir. 2001) (“Self-serving affidavits
without factual support in the record will not defeat a motion for summary
judgment.”) (citation and quotation marks omitted). Further, petitioner provides
documents referencing the involvement of Officer Dooley in the investigation of his
criminal case. The Court in its denial of petitioner’s claims, in addition to the
Seventh Circuit, have given petitioner’s claims in reference to Officer Dooley more
than their adequate share of judicial attention (See Doc. 28, pp. 9-12); see also
United States v. Fuller, 421 F. App’x 642, 645-46 (7th Cir. 2011). Once again, the
Court reiterates that Officer Dooley’s subsequent conviction is irrelevant to
petitioner’s criminal convictions. Thus, as petitioner’s motion clearly did not
demonstrate relief as a matter of law, this Court’s thorough and thoughtful denial
of his previously filed Section 2255 petition correctly mooted petitioner’s
summary judgment motion. Accordingly, the fact this Court did not “adjudicate”
said motion “on the merits,” was not a manifest error of law.
Page 5 of 7
The
remainder
of
petitioner’s
grievances
merely
demonstrates
his
disagreement with this Court’s denial of his Section 2255 petition. Instantly, he
re-alleges and expands upon the factual basis of his claims. In reviewing the
merits
of
petitioner’s
claims,
this
Court
thoroughly
and
methodically
contemplated the factual and legal allegations presented. As petitioner presented
claims either foreclosed from review or claims of ineffective assistance of counsel
completely inadequate to satisfy the burden required of either Strickland prong,
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984), this Court correctly denied
petitioner’s Section 2255 petition. Thus, as petitioner has not presented a
manifest error of law or newly discovered evidence, Sigsworth, 487 F.3d at 51112, but merely, “rehash[es] previously rejected arguments,” Caisse, 90 F.3d at
1270, the Court DENIES his motion for reconsideration (Doc. 30).
Further, because the Court issues a final order, it will also deny a certificate
of appealability as to the motion for reconsideration. A certificate of appealability
is required before a habeas petitioner may appeal an unfavorable decision to the
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c); FED. R. APP. P. 22(b). The
Court denies a certificate of appealability, as reasonable jurists would not debate
that the denials of both petitioner’s Section 2255 petition and his instant motion
to reconsider are proper. See Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000)
(stating, “a habeas prisoner must make a substantial showing of the denial of a
constitutional right, a demonstration that, . . . reasonable jurists could debate
whether (or, for that matter, agree that) the petition should have been resolved in
Page 6 of 7
a different manner or that the issues presented were “adequate to deserve
encouragement to proceed further”) (citation and quotation marks omitted). Thus,
for the reasons stated above, in addition to the reasons recited in this Court’s
denial of petitioner’s Section 2255 petition, the Court DENIES a certificate of
appealability as to the Court’s instant denial of petitioner’s motion to reconsider.
III. CONCLUSION
IT IS ORDERED that petitioner’s motion to reconsider is DENIED (Doc.
30). Further, the Court also DENIES a certificate of appealability as to the motion
for reconsideration.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Signed this 6th day of June, 2012.
Digitally signed by
David R. Herndon
Date: 2012.06.06
14:38:15 -05'00'
Chief Judge
United States District Judge
Page 7 of 7
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?