Waller v. Randle et al
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER granting defendants' Motions to Dismiss 25 , 38 , 59 . The Court dismissess all defendants except IDOC with prejudice. Clerk of Court to enter judgment accordingly at close of case. The Court dismisses Waller's Com plaint 1 without prejudice and grants Waller leave to file an amended complaint no later than July 15, 2011. The Court denies as moot IDOC's argument concerning alleged unavailability of pinitive damages. The Court denies as moot 69 MOTION for Extension of Time to Complete Discovery filed by Patil and 68 Motion for Extension of Time except insofar as it relates to IDOC. Signed by Judge J. Phil Gilbert on 5/31/2011. (dka, )
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
HENRY L. WALLER, JR.,
Case No. 10-cv-495-JPG-SCW
MICHAEL P. RANDLE, Director, Illinois
Department of Corrections, et al.,
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
This matter comes before the Court on Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss (Doc. 25, 38,
59). Plaintiff Henry Waller, Jr. (“Waller”) filed Responses (Doc. 35, 62, 63) thereto.
Defendant Dr. Patil also filed a Reply (Doc. 40) brief.
For the following reasons, the Court, inter alia, GRANTS the instant motions.
For purposes of a motion to dismiss, a district court must accept all factual allegations
in the complaint as true and draw all reasonable inferences from those facts in favor of the
plaintiff. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007); Tricontinental Indus., Ltd. v.
PricewaterhouseCoopers, LLP, 475 F.3d 824, 833 (7th Cir. 2007). The Court, accepting all
of Waller’s allegations as true and drawing all reasonable inferences in his favor, finds as
As late as 2008, Waller worked in an unspecified capacity for Tamms Correctional
Center, a prison facility within Defendant Illinois Department of Corrections (“IDOC”). On
February 19, 2008, Waller took a break from his shift to pray in the prison’s “G-Pod” mail
room. For some unspecified reason, Defendant Lieutenant Chad Parrish did not like this.
Lieutenant Parrish informed Defendant Correctional Officer George Johnson and other
employees that Waller “was going to shoot somebody” instead of pray. Doc. 1, p. 6. This lie
quickly spread, and Waller would soon have to speak with his supervisor, Defendant Major
Because of Lieutenant Parrish’s lie, IDOC immediately placed Waller on
administrative leave until he was evaluated by Defendant Dr. Patil. Waller underwent such
an evaluation on June 16, 2008, where Dr. Patil found him to be unfit for duty. One month
later, IDOC placed Waller on unpaid medical leave of absence pursuant to Dr. Patil’s
findings. The forced medical leave also represented retaliation for Waller’s continuous
reportage of abuse of Muslim inmates’ legal right to receive food on religious holidays. Dr.
Patil thereafter refused to sign medical forms that would allow Waller to be paid during his
Relevant Procedural Posture
Waller eventually initiated four proceedings before the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”). After conducting an investigation, the EEOC could not
determine that Defendants had violated any statute. The EEOC subsequently sent Waller a
“right-to-sue” letter for each charge on April 1 and April 2, 2010, which stated that any
corresponding federal lawsuit “must be filed WITHIN 90 DAYS of your receipt of [the
letter]; or your right to sue based on this charge will be lost.”1 Doc. 1-1, p. 2-5 (emphasis in
original). Waller received all of these letters on April 8, 2010.2
On July 7, 2010, at approximately 4:15 p.m., or 90 days after he received the right-tosue letters, Waller arrived at the East St. Louis courthouse, United States District Court for the
Southern District of Illinois, to file his federal lawsuit.3 The East St. Louis courthouse, like
As an aside, the Court notes that this information comes from matters outside of
Waller’s operative Complaint (Doc. 1). Ordinarily, courts may not rely upon materials
outside of the pleadings when considering a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6) without converting the motion to one for summary judgment. Fed. R.
Civ. P. 12(d). There is an exception to this general rule, however, where the attached
material is expressly referenced in the complaint and is central to the plaintiff’s claim.
Tierney v. Vahle, 304 F.3d 734, 738 (7th Cir. 2002); Wright v. Associated Ins. Cos., 29 F.3d
1244, 1248 (7th Cir. 1994) (relying upon Venture Assocs. v. Zenith Data Sys., 987 F.2d 429,
431 (7th Cir. 1993)). See Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(c).
Here, because the right-to-sue letters were referenced in Waller’s complaint, attached
thereto, and have a strong bearing to the underlying claims, the Court has considered them in
its review and analysis of the instant motion.
This information too stems from material outside of the operative complaint. There
are, however, several reasons why the Court can and will consider it.
First, in his response briefs, Waller does not dispute that he received the right-to-sue
letters on April 8, 2010. Doc. 35, p. 3; Doc. 62, p. 5 (“Defendant’s [sic] counsel states the
Rights to Sue Letters were delivered at 4:38 p.m. on April 8, 2010. Plaintiff does not dispute
the time and date.”); Doc. 63, p. 10 (“[M]y official 90 days did not expire until the exact time
that I received and signed for the letters at the post office at 4:38 p.m. [on April 8, 2010,]
which would be the actual time of 90 days.”). Second, the letters contain “certified mail
numbers” that reveal a receipt date of April 8 when plugged into the United States Postal
Service’s website. The letters’ reference to and incorporation of the certified mail numbers
means that the corresponding receipt date may be considered. See supra note 2; Fed. R. Civ.
P. 10(c). And, lastly, the Court takes judicial notice that the Postal Service’s website displays
a receipt date of April 8. Fed. R. Evid. 201(b); Ray v. City of Chi., 629, F.3d 665 (7th Cir.
2011) (“[I]t is well established that district courts may take judicial notice of certain
documents . . . when deciding motions to dismiss.”); Pugh v. Tribune Co., 521 F.3d 686, 691
(7th Cir. 2008). See Denius v. Dunlap, 330 F.3d 919, 926-27 (7th Cir. 2003) (collecting
cases) (courts may take judicial notice of information provided on government agency’s
Dr. Patil argues that allegations concerning Waller’s July 7, 2010, trip to the East St.
Louis courthouse, which support an equitable tolling argument, may not be considered
because they are unsupported by affidavit or evidence. Because this proposition itself is
the Benton courthouse, is “open to the public from 9:00 a.m. to 4:30 p.m., Monday through
Friday, except holidays.” http://www.ilsd.uscourts.gov/ (last visited May 26, 2011). Waller
explained to an unidentified female employee in the Clerk of Court’s office that he needed to
promptly file his suit due to the looming deadline. The employee, however, told Waller that
she had already shut down her computer and that “it would take time to turn on the computer
and file all [of the] documents correctly[.]” Doc. 35, p. 1; Doc. 62, p. 3. See also Doc. 35, p.
1-2; Doc. 62, p. 3 (“There just is not enough time for me to file it today, come back in the
morning when the computer is running and I have more time to file it.”). She further stated
that nobody could be in the office past 4:30 p.m. because of security concerns. Finally, the
employee assured Waller that he would not run afoul of the 90-day deadline referenced in the
right-to-sue letters because “the office was closing and the computer was already shut down
when [he] arrived.” Doc. 35, p. 2; Doc. 62, p. 3. Convinced that he could not force the
employee to accept his documents and file the complaint, Waller left the courthouse and
decided to return the next day.
On July 8, 2011, Waller filed suit in this Court against Defendants, alleging violations
of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-5, et seq. The
same female employee Waller had met on July 7 assisted him in filing his complaint on July
8. She again assured him that all documents were timely and correctly filed. Waller
subsequently made several attempts to uncover the identity of the Clerk’s office employee, but
unsupported by legal authority, the Court deems it waived. Moreover, the record itself
indicates that Waller filed his complaint one day late; accordingly, the Court must allow him
to offer equitable arguments as to why he failed to comply with the deadline. See Rennie v.
Garrett, 896 F.2d 1062 (7th Cir. 1990).
his efforts proved unsuccessful. Upon entering the case, Defendants filed the instant motions,
arguing, inter alia, that Waller did not file a timely complaint pursuant to § 2000e-5(f)(1) and
that Waller’s complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted pursuant to
Timeliness of Waller’s Complaint
90-Day Statute of Limitations
Title VII is remedial in nature, and courts should construe its provisions broadly to
effectuate its purpose. See Brown v. J.I. Case Co., 756 F.2d 48, 50 (7th Cir. 1985). The law
states, in pertinent part, as follows:
If a charge filed with the Commission . . . is dismissed by the Commission, . . .
the Commission . . . shall so notify the person aggrieved and within ninety
days after the giving of such notice a civil action may be brought against the
respondent named in the charge . . . by the person claiming to be aggrieved . . .
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (2006). In other words, a plaintiff has 90 days from the date he
receives a right-to-sue letter from the EEOC to file a federal lawsuit. See Grayson v. O'Neill,
308 F.3d 808, 817 (7th Cir. 2002). This time limit “is not a flexible guideline even for pro se
litigants and even a one-day delay is fatal.” Thomas v. United Parcel Serv., No. 99 C 6258,
2000 WL 290279, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 17, 2000).
Notably, the 90-day deadline “is not a jurisdictional requirement, . . . [i]nstead, it is a
statute of limitations requirement.” Duiker v. Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ill., No. 08-3181, 2009
WL 1636993, at *1 (C.D. Ill. June 11, 2009) (citations omitted). As such, the Title VII filing
requirement is subject to the doctrines of equitable tolling, estoppel, and waiver “when equity
so requires.” Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 121 (2002) (citing Zipes
v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455 U.S. 385, 398 (1982)) (quotation marks omitted); Beamon
v. Marshall & Ilsley Trust Co., 411 F.3d 854, 860 (7th Cir. 2005). That said, there is a general
presumption that the plaintiff could have filed his complaint before the expiration of the
statutory period. Wheeldon v. Monon Corp., 946 F.2d 533, 537 (7th Cir. 1991).
The doctrine at issue in this case is that of equitable tolling, “which often focuses on
the plaintiff’s excusable ignorance of the limitations period and on lack of prejudice to the
defendant . . . .” Mull v. ARCO Durethene Plastics, Inc., 784 F.2d 284, 291 (7th Cir. 1986)
(citation and quotation marks omitted). The applicability of equitable tolling also depends
upon whether disability, irremediable lack of information, or extreme circumstances prevented
plaintiff from timely filing his lawsuit. Miller v. Runyon, 77 F.3d 189, 191 (7th Cir. 1996).
To successfully invoke equitable tolling, the plaintiff must demonstrate that “he could
not by the exercise of reasonable diligence have discovered essential information bearing on
his claim.” Cada v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 920 F.2d 446, 452 (7th Cir. 1990). Thus, with
respect to the 90-day filing requirement, the relevant question becomes clear: “Would a
person in the plaintiff's position, using reasonable diligence, have known the necessary
information to file within the statutory period?” Freeman v. U.S. Postal Serv., No. 91 C 1459,
1991 WL 249724, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 15, 1991).
Typically, “[r]eliance on an unidentified person in the clerk’s office is not enough to
warrant equitable tolling.” Davis v. Browner, 113 F. Supp. 2d 1223, 1228 (N.D. Ill. 2008)
(collecting cases). Equitable tolling, however, may be applicable if the court or one of its
employees misleads a pro se plaintiff into believing he has done everything required of him or
otherwise misleads him in the filing of his complaint. See Baldwin Cnty. Welcome Ctr. v.
Brown, 466 U.S. 147, 151 (1984). See, e.g., Johnson v. Brown, 803 F. Supp. 1414, 1419
(N.D. Ind. 1992) (collecting appellate cases); Mumphrey v. James River Paper Co., Inc., 777
F. Supp. 1458, 1461 (W.D. Ark. 1991).
Waller Timely Filed His Complaint
The Court finds that the 90-day statute of limitations was tolled from July 7, when
Waller attempted to file his federal lawsuit at the East St. Louis courthouse, until August 26,
2010, when the Court granted Waller in forma pauperis status;4 as such, Waller timely filed
his complaint against Defendants. There can be no doubt that Waller pressed his luck —
despite receiving ample notice of the 90-day deadline in his right-to sue letters, he did not
attempt to file his lawsuit until mere minutes before the statute of limitations expired. That
said, the simple fact is that Waller tendered his complaint to the Clerk of Court at a time when
it should have been accepted and formally filed. When the unknown Clerk’s office employee
impliedly refused to accept the complaint during her office’s normal business hours, Waller
exercised all of the diligence necessary to file his lawsuit within the statutory period, thereby
necessitating the application of equitable tolling. Put another way, the employee’s refusal
represented an “extreme circumstance” contemplated by Miller. Not only that, but the Clerk’s
Although Waller was originally denied leave to proceed in forma pauperis, Doc. 7,
p. 1-2, the Court holds that the limitations period was tolled for a reasonable period of time
thereafter in light of Title VII’s remedial nature. See Williams-Guice v. Bd. of Educ. of City
of Chi., 45 F.3d 161, 165 (7th Cir. 1995). See, e.g., Chatman v. Condell Med. Ctr., No. 99 C
5603, 2001 WL 881305, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 6, 2001); Bailey v. Gilmore, 5 F. Supp. 2d 587,
591 (N.D. Ill. 1998).
office employee assured Waller that he had done everything required of him so long as he
came back to file the complaint on July 8, which Baldwin County Welcome Center and its
progeny have found to support the invocation of equitable tolling. And, finally, Defendants
have not seriously argued that they will suffer prejudice if the Court deems Waller’s
Defendants rely heavily on Thomas v. United Parcel Service, 2000 WL 290279 (N.D.
Ill. Mar. 17, 2000) for the proposition that equitable tolling should not apply to the instant
case. Of course, because it is a district court decision, Thomas is at best persuasive. In
Thomas, the pro se plaintiff filed his Title VII complaint one day late because an unidentified
person in the clerk’s office told him on the telephone that he could do so without adverse
consequences. Id. at *1. The Thomas Court found that, despite ample notice, the plaintiff did
not take adequate precautions to ensure timely filing of the complaint and ultimately held that
the Title VII claim failed due to untimeliness. Id. at *2-3. Like the plaintiff in Thomas,
Waller did not officially file his complaint until 91 days after he received his right-to-sue
letters. Waller, however, tried to file his lawsuit on the 90th day but was turned away by an
employee of the Clerk of Court. Had the unidentified employee not impliedly refused to file
his complaint, Waller would have brought his lawsuit on time. The Thomas plaintiff cannot
say the same, and Waller’s reasonably diligent efforts adequately distinguish him from
Defendants’ principle case.
It bears mentioning that the Court is highly suspect of Waller’s version of events. The
Court has never known a Clerk’s office employee to shut his or her computer down more than
fifteen minutes before the end of a work day, let alone refuse a pro se litigant access to the
Court when the courthouse is open to the public. The Court also finds it difficult to believe
that Waller could not find one person in the East St. Louis Clerk’s office — an office that
employs more than twenty individuals — to accept his complaint and file it as timely at 4:15
p.m. on a Wednesday. But, Waller has painted a portrait of futility, and, at this phase in the
litigation, the Court must accept his allegations regarding refusal as true.5 Defendants’ statute
of limitations argument is therefore without merit.
Legal Sufficiency of Waller’s Complaint
Individual Liability under Title VII
The individual Defendants argue that they are immune from liability because Title VII
only targets a plaintiff’s employer.6 Indeed, “a supervisor does not, in his individual capacity,
fall within Title VII’s definition of employer[.]” Williams v. Banning, 72 F.3d 552, 555 (7th
Cir.1995). Accord Silk v. City of Chi., 194 F.3d 788, 797 n.5 (7th Cir. 1999). This is because
Congress only intended for employers to be liable for their agent’s actions under the
respondeat superior theory of liability, not for such agents to be personally accountable. See
id. at 554; Gastineau v. Fleet Mortg. Corp., 137 F.3d 490, 494 (7th Cir. 1998). Thus, a
plaintiff’s individual managers or supervisors cannot be individually liable for purported
violations of Title VII or other federal discrimination statutes. Schandelmeier-Bartels v. Chi.
Park Dist., 634 F.3d 372, 380 (7th Cir. 2011).
As a further aside, the Court notes that Waller’s additional equitable tolling
arguments — concerning his lack of gainful employment and wages, his inability to pay bills,
and road construction and one-lane traffic near the East St. Louis courthouse — are meritless
and do not warrant application of the rarely-invoked doctrine.
Dr. Patil does not expressly make this argument, but the Court assumes as much due
to its obvious merit.
Here, the binding precedent discussed above clearly dictates that the individual
Defendants shall be dismissed. Although Waller may view Defendants Michael Randle,
Director of IDOC, and Pat Quinn, Governor of the State of Illinois, to be his employer, any
recovery against said Defendants would also be available against IDOC. As such, all
Defendants except IDOC will be dismissed with prejudice.
Notice Pleading Generally
The federal system of notice pleading requires only that the plaintiff provide “a short
and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
8(a)(2). Therefore, the complaint need not allege detailed facts. Pisciotta v. Old Nat'l
Bancorp, 499 F.3d 629, 633 (7th Cir.2007).
However, in order to provide fair notice of the grounds for his claim, the plaintiff must
allege sufficient facts “to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Id. (quoting Bell
Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). The complaint must offer “more than
labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of a cause of action's elements will not do.”
Id. The plaintiff's pleading obligation is to avoid factual allegations “so sketchy that the
complaint does not provide the type of notice of the claim to which the defendant is entitled
under [Federal] Rule [of Civil Procedure] 8.” Airborne Beepers & Video, Inc. v. AT & T
Mobility LLC, 499 F.3d 663, 667 (7th Cir. 2007). However, “when a complaint adequately
states a claim, it may not be dismissed based on a district court’s assessment that the plaintiff
will fail to find evidentiary support for his allegations or prove his claim to the satisfaction of
the factfinder.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 563 n.8.
The complaint at issue has been brought by a pro se litigant, and courts must liberally
construe pro se pleadings. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972); Hudson v.
McHugh, 148 F.3d 859, 864 (7th Cir. 1998). A pro se complaint is not required to explicitly
refer to the proper statute or legal theory so long as relief is possible under a statute or theory
and is consistent with the facts pled. Kennedy v. Nat'l Juvenile Det. Ass'n, 187 F.3d 690, 695
(7th Cir. 1999); Tolle v. Carroll Touch, Inc., 977 F.2d 1129, 1134 (7th Cir. 1992).
Title VII Discrimination
It is very difficult to determine how Waller is proceeding under Title VII due to the
complaint’s brevity and lack of clarity. His complaint, however, clearly hints at a theory of
To make out a prima facie case of discrimination under Title VII, a plaintiff must
establish the following elements: (1) he is a member of a protected class; (2) he was meeting
his employer's legitimate performance expectations; (3) he suffered an adverse employment
action; and (4) he was treated less favorably than similarly-situated individuals who are not
members of his protected class. Barricks v. Eli Lilly & Co., 481 F.3d 556, 559 (7th Cir.2007).
Meanwhile, to adequately plead a claim of gender or race discrimination, a plaintiff may
allege less than is required under Barricks. The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals recently
instructed that “a plaintiff alleging employment discrimination . . . may allege [such] claims
quite generally.” Tamayo v. Blagojevich, 526 F.3d 1074, 1081 (7th Cir. 2008). More
precisely, “in order to prevent dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6), a complaint alleging
[employment] discrimination need only aver that the employer instituted a (specified) adverse
employment action against the plaintiff on the basis of her [protected status].” Id at 1084.
“[O]nce a plaintiff alleging illegal discrimination has clarified that it is on the basis of [his
protected status], there is no further information that is both easy to provide and of clear
critical importance to the claim.” EEOC v. Concentra Health Servs., Inc., 496 F.3d 773, 782
Here, Waller clearly fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The only
allegations that bear a tinge of religious discrimination are that Lieutenant Parrish spread the
lie that Waller “was going to shoot somebody” when in fact he was going to pray in Tamms’
G-Pod mail room and that Waller was reprimanded on the basis of that lie. Doc. 1, p. 6.
These allegations, however, do not sufficiently plead that IDOC took adverse employment
actions against Waller due to his Islamic faith. In fact, as the complaint is written, it appears
that Waller was placed on unpaid leave and ultimately terminated because he was viewed to
be a violent threat, not because of any religious motivation. Further, Waller’s right to relief
currently appears to be speculative because the complaint fails to mention whether Waller was
otherwise meeting his employer’s performance expectations or whether he was given less
favorable treatment than similarly-situated non-Muslims. And, IDOC has not been given
adequate notice of the claim asserted against it, perhaps best evidenced by the fact that the
complaint does not clearly allege how its employees engaged in racial discrimination.
Title VII Retaliation
Waller’s complaint also appears to assert a claim of retaliation under Title VII.
To successfully prove a claim for retaliation, a plaintiff must demonstrate “(1) that [he]
engaged in an activity protected by Title VII; (2) that [he] suffered an adverse action taken by
the [defendant]; and (3) [that there is] a causal connection between the two, under either the
direct or indirect method of proof.” O'Neal v. City of Chi., 588 F.3d 406, 409 (7th Cir. 2009).
Of course, bearing in mind Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 and Pisciotta v. Old Nat'l
Bancorp, 499 F.3d 629 (7th Cir.2007), a complaint need not allege every element of a
retaliation claim for it to be legally sufficient. Scott v. City of Chi., 195 F.3d 950, 951-52 (7th
Cir. 1999) (citing Hemenway v. Peabody Coal Co., 159 F.3d 255, 261 (7th Cir. 1998)).
Here, like his religious discrimination claim, Waller has failed to adequately plead a
claim of Title VII retaliation. The allegedly protected activity is Wallers’ reportage of abuse
of Muslim inmates’ legal right to receive food on religious holidays, which is referenced in
the complaint’s prayer for relief. The complaint, however, offers no linkage whatsoever
between this activity and adverse employment actions taken against Waller. The complaint
also fails to allege any details about how or to whom Waller reported abuse of Muslim
inmates. Put simply, the retaliation allegation appears very sketchy. Additionally,
Defendants have been deprived of the necessary Rule 8 notice because the complaint does not
make clear who purportedly retaliated against Waller and how they did so.
Leave to Amend
The Seventh Circuit has made it clear that “[u]nless it is certain from the face of the
complaint that any amendment would be futile or otherwise unwarranted, the district court
should grant leave to amend after granting a motion to dismiss.” Barry Aviation Inc. v. Land
O’Lakes Mun. Airport Comm’n, 377 F.3d 682, 687 (7th Cir. 2004). The Court believes
Waller may be able to state a claim for religious discrimination and retaliation if he amends
his complaint and describes, in detail, how his supervisors and coworkers discriminated
against him. Waller would be wise to consult the relevant statutes and case law, a sampling of
which are referenced in this memorandum and order.
For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss (Doc.
25, 38, 59), whereby the Court DISMISSES all Defendants except IDOC with prejudice and
DIRECTS the Clerk of Court to enter judgment accordingly at the close of this case. Further,
the Court DISMISSES Waller’s Complaint (Doc. 1) without prejudice and GRANTS
Waller leave to file an amended complaint no later than July 15, 2011. If Waller does not file
an amended complaint by said date, this matter shall be dismissed without prejudice and
corresponding judgment shall enter. The Court DENIES as moot IDOC’s argument
concerning the alleged unavailability of punitive damages. Additionally, the Court DENIES
as moot Dr. Patil’s Motion for Extension of Time (Doc. 69) and Defendants’ Motion for
Extension of Time (Doc. 68) except insofar as it relates to IDOC.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: May 31, 2011
s/ J. Phil Gilbert
J. PHIL GILBERT
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?