Bobbitt v. Randell et al

Filing 19

ORDER DISMISSING CASE with prejudice for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. This dismissal shall count as a strike for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to enter judgment accordingly. Signed by Judge G. Patrick Murphy on 6/16/2011. (tjk)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

JOSEPH BOBBITT,
Plaintiff,
vs.
DIRECTOR RANDELL, et al.,
Defendants.

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CIVIL NO. 10-806-GPM

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
MURPHY, District Judge:
Plaintiff filed this action while he was an inmate in the Stateville Correctional Center
(Stateville), claiming deprivations of his constitutional rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. This
case is now before the Court for a preliminary review of the complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1915A, which provides, in pertinent part:
(a) Screening.– The court shall review, before docketing, if feasible or, in any event,
as soon as practicable after docketing, a complaint in a civil action in which a
prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a
governmental entity.
(b) Grounds for Dismissal.– On review, the court shall identify cognizable claims
or dismiss the complaint, or any portion of the complaint, if the complaint–
(1) is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim on which relief
may be granted; or
(2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such
relief.
28 U.S.C. § 1915A.
An action or claim is frivolous if “it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.” Neitzke
v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). An action fails to state a claim upon which relief can be

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granted if it does not plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell
Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). Conversely, a complaint is plausible on its
face “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference
that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949
(2009). Although the Court is obligated to accept factual allegations as true, some factual
allegations may be so sketchy or implausible that they fail to provide sufficient notice of a plaintiff’s
claim. Brooks v. Ross, 578 F.3d 574, 581 (7th Cir. 2009). Additionally, Courts “should not accept
as adequate abstract recitations of the elements of a cause of action or conclusory legal statements.”
Id. At the same time, however, the factual allegations of a pro se complaint are to be liberally
construed. See Rodriguez v. Plymouth Ambulance Serv., 577 F.3d 816, 821 (7th Cir. 2009).
Upon careful review of the complaint, the Court finds it appropriate to exercise its authority
under § 1915A; Plaintiff’s claims are subject to summary dismissal.
FACTS ALLEGED IN COMPLAINT
On June 1, 2009, Plaintiff was “violate’ed” by “the parole board,” which caused him to serve
his sentence at Stateville until August 27, 2009. He claims that he was incarcerated past his “out
date” until he pleaded guilty to an apparent pending charge and was transferred back to his “parent
facility,” Lawrence Correctional Center (Lawrence), in October 2009. While back at Lawrence,
Plaintiff received his “parole paper” in the mail showing that he was “violate’ed.” Plaintiff informed
the record office that he had received this paper.
DISCUSSION
Plaintiff appears to be claiming that he stayed too long in Stateville, which is “one of the
[worst] place[s].” He also claims that he was not able to “bond out” – apparently on the charge to

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which he pleaded guilty. Plaintiff sues M. Randell as the Director of the Illinois Department of
Corrections “because he oversee[s] everything and … his signature is on everything.” He sues Lee
Ryker as the Warden at Lawrence “because it’s his facility and run by him[;] everyone goes threw
[sic] him.” He sues Ms. Jockish as the “head of records” at Lawrence because “she is responsible
this, this is her job title to make sure the right papers get move along correctly instead she allow me
to do over the maxi[m]um time I was sup[p]ose to do.”
The Court surmises the gist of Plaintiff’s complaint as this: had Defendants forwarded his
parole paperwork to Stateville, he would have been released from Stateville before pleading guilty
to the subsequent charge. This claim misses a step: it does not appear that Plaintiff was charged
after he was supposed to have been released. Rather, it appears that his parole was revoked and he
was charged with a separate offense, to which he pleaded guilty in October 2009. At some point,
he was transferred back to Stateville, which was where Plaintiff was incarcerated when he filed this
action in September 2010 (or so he lists on the complaint). He since has been released from the
Department of Corrections. There simply is nothing to suggest that Plaintiff’s incarceration at
Stateville between August 2009 and October 2009 was unrelated to the parole violation and/or the
then-pending charge. Plaintiff does not contend that he should have been transferred to a county
facility for pretrial detention on the pending charge; he claims that he should have been released.
Defendants’ failure to accommodate this request does not rise to the level of a constitutional
violation under these facts. Finally, whatever sentence Plaintiff received on his guilty plea that
resulted in his transfer back to Lawrence would have accounted for the time he spent in pretrial
custody. Plaintiff cannot show a constitutional violation; accordingly, this action must be dismissed.

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DISPOSITION
For the foregoing reasons, this action is DISMISSED with prejudice for failure to state a
claim upon which relief may be granted. This dismissal shall count as a strike for purposes of 28
U.S.C. § 1915(g). The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to enter judgment accordingly.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: 06/16/11
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G. PATRICK MURPHY
United States District Judge

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