Bovee v. Broom

Filing 17

ORDER DISMISSING CASE without prejudice for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. Signed by Chief Judge David R. Herndon on 12/20/2011. (mtm)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

TERRY BOVEE,
Plaintiff,
v.
CLAUDIA BROOM,
Defendant.

Case No 10-cv-946-DRH

MEMORANDUM & ORDER
HERNDON, Chief Judge:
I.

INTRODUCTION

In this Order, the Court raises sua sponte the issue of whether it has
subject matter jurisdiction over this case. See Craig v. Ontario Corp., 543 F.3d
872, 875 (7th Cir. 2008) (citing Sadat v. Mertes, 615 F.2d 1176, 1188 (7th Cir.
1980) (stating, “it has been the virtually universally accepted practice of the
federal courts to permit any party to challenge or, indeed, raise sua sponte the
subject-matter jurisdiction of the court at any time and at any stage of the
proceedings”)).

The current dispute necessitates this inquiry, as “[w]ithout

jurisdiction the court cannot proceed at all in any cause. Jurisdiction is power to
declare the law, and when it ceases to exist, the only function remaining to the
court is that of announcing the fact and dismissing the cause.”

Ex parte

McCardle, 74 U.S. 506, 514 (1868); Steel Co. v. Citizens for Better Env’t, 523
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U.S. 83, 94 (1998). Further, the FEDERAL RULES

OF

CIVIL PROCEDURE similarly

hold that, “[i]f the court determines at any time it lacks subject-matter
jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the action.”

Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3).

Accordingly, “[s]ubject-matter jurisdiction is so central to the district court’s
power to issue any orders whatsoever that it may be inquired into at any time,
with or without a motion, by any party or by the court itself.” Craig, 543 F.3d at
875.
In the instant proceeding, plaintiff filed a one count complaint pursuant to
42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1988, on November 19, 2010. Generally, plaintiff alleges
defendant Claudia Broom, plaintiff’s sister, violated plaintiff’s constitutionally
protected liberty interest in familial relations (See Doc. 2). The factual allegations
stem from defendant’s role as a guidance counselor at Carbondale Community
High School where plaintiff’s son and daughter attend. Plaintiff alleges defendant
criticized his parenting skills, “indicating that he was ‘bad at being a father’” (Doc.
2, p. 1).

Plaintiff alleges these comments alienated his children from him,

undermined his authority, and enabled his children “to engage in parental abuse”
(Doc. 2, p. 2). Thus, plaintiff alleges defendant’s comments “violated [his] liberty
interest in familial relations, and the rights of parents to raise their children in the
manner and methods they see fit” (Doc. 2, p. 2).
On October 24, 2011, defendant filed a motion for summary judgment
alleging no genuine issues of material fact remain outstanding subsequent to

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plaintiff and defendants’ depositions, as the applicable statute of limitations bars
plaintiff’s claim (Doc. 12).

On November 28, 2011, plaintiff responded to

defendant’s motion (Doc. 14). Upon reading defendant’s motion and plaintiff’s
response, the Court ordered plaintiff to brief the jurisdictional basis for this cause
of action, believing it more properly construed as a state defamation claim (Doc.
15). Thus, on December 14, 2011, plaintiff filed a jurisdictional memorandum
citing to Doe v. Heck, 327 F.3d 492, 517-25 (7th Cir. 2003), and similar cases
construing familial liberty interests under the Fourteenth Amendment, as
providing the jurisdictional basis for his claim (Doc. 16). The Court finds the
cases plaintiff cites are fundamentally distinguishable from the allegations at
hand.

Accordingly, plaintiff’s claim is dismissed for lack of subject-matter

jurisdiction.
II.

ARGUMENT AND ANALYSIS

In arguing he has stated a claim grounded in the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, plaintiff compares the allegations at hand to those set
forth in Doe v. Heck. See Doe, 327 F.3d at 517-25. In Doe, parents of students
at a private Christian elementary school brought claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §
1983, alleging a caseworkers’ investigation violated the Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendments. Over the objection of the school’s principal, and without parental
notification or consent, the caseworkers interviewed students concerning
allegations of parental-inflicted corporal punishment, in addition to other familial

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matters. Notably, the caseworkers also threatened to remove children from their
parents’ custody. Id. at 499.
The majority of the opinion centers on inapplicable arguments concerning
the Fourth Amendment and the caseworkers’ right to qualified immunity. Id. at
499-517, 525-527. Instantly, plaintiff cites to the Seventh Circuit’s discussion of
the caseworkers’ violation of the plaintiffs’ constitutional right to familial relations
under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause as informing the subject
matter jurisdiction of the case at hand. See id. at 517-526. At the outset, the
Seventh Circuit noted, “[t]he Supreme Court has long recognized, as a component
of ‘substantive’ due process, that parents have a liberty interest in familial
relations, which includes the right to ‘establish a home and bring up children’ and
‘to control the education of their own.’” Id. at 517 (citing Meyer v. Nebraska, 262
U.S. 390, 399 (1923); Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000); Brokaw v.
Mercer County, 235 F.3d 1000, 1018 (7th Cir. 2000)).
Allegations of child abuse instigated the dispute in Doe. However, the Doe
Court found the caseworkers disregarded the constitutional presumption “that fit
parents act in the best interests of their children,” when they treated corporal
punishment as child abuse per se. Id. at 522 (citing Troxel, 530 U.S. at 68).
Thus, in recognition of the “plaintiff parents’ liberty interest in directing the
upbringing and education of their children,” including “the right to discipline
them by using reasonable, nonexcessive corporal punishment,” the Doe Court

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held the caseworkers’ custodial interview of the children violated the plaintiffs’
right to familial relations, as they “had no evidence giving rise to a reasonable
suspicion that the plaintiff parents were abusing their children, or that they were
complicit in any such abuse.” Id. at 524. Further, the Seventh Circuit held the
caseworkers’ threat to remove students from parental custody also violated the
plaintiffs’ right to familial relations, as that liberty interest includes maintenance
of the family unit.

Id. (citing Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972);

Duchesne v. Sugarman, 566 F.2d 817, 825 (2d Cir. 1977)).
As the jurisdictional basis of the complaint at hand, plaintiff cites to 42
U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1988, and the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution.

Thus, plaintiff relies on federal question jurisdiction.

See 28

U.S.C. § 1331. Federal question jurisdiction extends only to those cases in which
a well-pleaded complaint establishes “either that federal law creates the cause of
action or that the plaintiff’s right to relief necessarily depends on a resolution of a
substantial question of federal law.” Franchise Tax Bd. of State of Cal. v. Constr.
Laborers, 463 U.S. 1, 27-28 (1983).
As plaintiff notes in his jurisdictional memorandum, Section 1983, “creates
no new substantive rights . . . it merely provides a federal cause of action for the
violation of federal rights that are independently established either in the Federal
Constitution or in federal statutory law” (Doc. 16, p. 2) (citing Nevada v. Hicks,
533 U.S. 353, 404 (2001)) (citation omitted). The factual allegations as stated in

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the instant complaint, amounting to allegations that defendant criticized plaintiff’s
parenting style, fundamentally differ from the factual scenarios of Doe and the
cases it relies upon. The instant allegations do not allege the type of interference
with familial relations; specifically, the parental rights associated with the
upbringing of one’s children, protected under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due
Process Clause.

There is no allegation here that defendant took the plaintiff’s

children from the home, instituted proceedings to do so or even threatened to so.
The only allegation here is that the defendant criticized the plaintiff’s parenting
skills.

No matter how one words the complaint, it is nothing more than a

defamation action.

Accordingly, plaintiff’s claim is DISMISSED without

prejudice.

IT IS SO ORDERED.
Signed this 20th day of December, 2011.

David R. Herndon
2011.12.20
10:59:33 -06'00'
Chief Judge
United States District Court

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