Garrett v. Schwatz et al

Filing 85

ORDER granting 64 Motion for Summary Judgment. Signed by Judge G. Patrick Murphy on 8/21/2013. (ktc)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

ROBERT GARRETT,
Plaintiff,
vs.
LIEUTENANT DINTELMAN, and C/O
COLGAN,
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

CIVIL NO. 10-955-GPM

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
MURPHY, District Judge:
Before the Court is the motion for summary judgments of the only remaining Defendants
in this action, Stephen Colgan and Richard Dintelman (Docs. 64, 65).

Plaintiff, Mr. Garrett filed

a two-page “affidavit” restating some of the allegations from his complaint, but otherwise filed
nothing remotely responsive to the motion for summary judgment (Doc. 71). Defendants are
entitled to judgment on the merits, and their motion for summary judgment is GRANTED.
Background
Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Mr. Garrett alleges that Defendant Colgan denied Mr.
Garrett permission to use the restroom while Plaintiff attended a three-hour class in Pinckneyville
Correctional Center (Doc. 10). Plaintiff claims he is lactose intolerant and had ingested milk
before class, upsetting his stomach. He also says he takes “water pills” for high blood pressure.
Because he was not allowed to use the restroom, Plaintiff urinated and defecated on himself. He
was required to proceed to the dining hall after class, and Defendant Dintelmann allegedly refused
Page 1 of 6

to allow Plaintiff to return to his unit to clean himself. As a result, Plaintiff suffered humiliation
and the ridicule of other inmates. Plaintiff’s claim, then is for both a failure to treat a medical
condition (lactose intolerance) by failing to allow him to use the restroom to relieve his resultant
discomfort; and an Eighth Amendment Claim for failure to treat him with basic human decency.
Legal Standards
The standard applied to summary judgment motions filed under Rule 56 is well-settled and
has been succinctly stated as follows.
Summary judgment is proper when the pleadings, depositions, answers to
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show
that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. In determining whether a genuine issue
of material fact exists, [the court] must view the record in a light most favorable to
the nonmoving party. Because the primary purpose of summary judgment is to
isolate and dispose of factually unsupported claims, the nonmovant may not rest on
the pleadings but must respond, with affidavits or otherwise, setting forth specific
facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. The evidence must create more
than some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts. A mere scintilla of
evidence in support of the nonmovant’s position is insufficient; a party will be
successful in opposing summary judgment only when it presents definite,
competent evidence to rebut the motion.
Albiero v. City of Kankakee, 246 F.3d 927, 931-32 (7th Cir. 2001) (internal citations and quotations
omitted). “We often call summary judgment, the ‘put up or shut up’ moment in litigation, by
which we mean that the non-moving party is required to marshal and present the court with the
evidence she contends will prove her case. And by evidence, we mean evidence on which a
reasonable jury could rely.” Goodman v. National Security Agency, Inc., 621 F.3d 651, 654 (7th
Cir.2010).
To prevail on a claim of deliberate indifference to a serious medical need, Plaintiff must
first show that his condition was “objectively, sufficiently serious” and that the prison official

Page 2 of 6

acted with a sufficiently culpable state of mind.” Greeno v. Daley, 414 F.3d 645, 652-653 (7th Cir.
2005) (citations and quotation marks omitted).

“Deliberate indifference to serious medical

needs of prisoners constitutes the ‘unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.’” Estelle v. Gamble,
429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976), quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976). “The infliction of
suffering on prisoners can be found to violate the Eighth Amendment only if that infliction is either
deliberate, or reckless in the criminal law sense.” Duckworth v. Franzen, 780 F.2d 645, 652-53
(7th Cir. 1985). Negligence, gross negligence, or even “recklessness” as that term is used in tort
cases, is not enough. Id. at 653; Shockley v. Jones, 823 F.2d 1068, 1072 (7th Cir. 1987). Prison
officials are not liable under the Eight Amendment’s “cruel and unusual punishments” clause
unless the official “knows of and disregards” a risk of harm. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837
(1994). To amount to deliberate indifference, a prison official “must both be aware of facts from
which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also
draw the inference.” Id. A prison official’s “failure to alleviate a significant risk, that he should
have perceived but did not, while no cause of commendation, cannot under our cases be
condemned as the infliction of punishment.” Id. “Even if the defendant recognizes the substantial
risk, he is free from liability if he ‘responded reasonably to the risk, even if the harm ultimately
was not averted.’” Gayton v. McCoy, 593 F.3d 610, 620 (7th Cir. 2010), quoting Farmer, 511 U.S.
at 843).
Regarding a claim for deprivation of basic human needs, the Supreme Court has stated:
“Prisoners retain the essence of human dignity inherent in all persons. Respect for that dignity
animates the Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. Brown v.
Plata, 131 S.Ct. 1910, 1928 (2011). Thus, an “unquestioned and serious deprivation of basic

Page 3 of 6

human needs” may “deprive inmates of the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities” and
would violate the Eighth Amendment. Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981). “The lack
of heat, clothing, or sanitation can violate the Eight Amendment.” Gillis v. Litscher, 468 F.3d 488,
493 (7th Cir. 2006). In analyzing such a claim, the Seventh Circuit has indicated that it
“consider[s] the totality of the conditions of confinement to determine whether a prisoner has been
deprived of basic human needs.” Johnson v. Pelker, 891 F.2d 136, 138-139 (7th Cir. 1989); See
also DeSpain v. Uphoff, 264 F.3d 965, 974 (10 Cir. 2001) (“An inquiry into conditions of
confinement by necessity relies on the particular facts of each situation; the “circumstances,
nature, and duration” of the challenged conditions must be carefully considered.”). In Johnson, the
Court found that the temporary denial of dry bedding and clothing for two-and-a-half days (which
compelled the Plaintiff to sleep on “a ‘slab of metal’” and resulted in a “severe cold”) was a
“temporary inconvenience” that did not rise to the level of a constitutional violation. Id. 891 F.2d
at 138-139. However, placing an inmate in a cell for three days without running water, with feces
on the walls, and without providing cleaning supplies may be a violation of the Eighth
Amendment. Id at 140.
Discussion
Here, Plaintiff is not entitled to relief under either Eighth Amendment claim. In the first
instance, it is unclear whether serious medical need existed. There is no showing either that
lactose intolerance or high blood pressure are objectively serious, or that Plaintiff had diagnoses of
either. What is damning to his claim, however, is that there is nothing to show that either
Defendant knew of those conditions, or that they were obvious. His deliberate indifference claim
fails because he has not shown any culpable state of mind related to his medical needs. Neither

Page 4 of 6

does Plaintiff show a claim for deprivation of his human dignity. With respect to Defendant
Colgan, Plaintiff admits that there was a policy in place that would prevent bathroom breaks
during GED classes (Garrett Aff. ¶ 6). In their Answer, Defendants state that the policy was
enacted in response to a “staff assault” and that the policy merely indicated that inmates were to
use the bathroom in their cell. Of course, pleadings are not evidence, especially an Answer that is
not in the form of an affidavit. Nonetheless, there has been no showing that there was not a
legitimate purpose for the policy or that Defendant Colgan acted for any reason other than in
furtherance of that policy. See Peckham v. Wisconsin Dept. of Correction, 141 F.3d 694, 697 (7th
Cir. 1998) (conduct that is not done to harass or punish but rather in furtherance of a legitimate
purpose does not offend the Constitution). There is simply no showing that Defendant Colgan was
acting merely to punish or harass Plaintiff. Further, the fact that Plaintiff knew he himself was
lactose intolerant and yet drank milk before a class in which he knew no bathroom breaks were
allowed weighs against him. With regard to his soiled clothing in the lunchroom, there is no
indication on the record when or if Plaintiff requested to clean himself. There is no indication the
length of time he was in his soiled garments. There is simply no evidence that the Defendants’
intent was to harass, punish, or deprive Plaintiff of his human dignity. The evidence shows at
most that this was an unfortunate isolated incident.
Conclusion
Mr. Garrett fails to show any constitutional violation by Defendants. Defendants’ motion
for summary judgment is therefore GRANTED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: August 21, 2013

Page 5 of 6

s/ ZA ctàÜ|v~ `âÜÑ{ç
G. PATRICK MURPHY
United States District Judge

Page 6 of 6