Boclair v. Illinois Department of Corrections et al

Filing 61

ORDER ADOPTING REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS; The undersigned District Judge ADOPTS in its entirety Judge Williams' Report and Recommendation 52 and GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART Defendants' summary judgment motion 44 . Defendants' motion is denied as to Tina Beardan Monroe and Darrell Westerman. Defendants' motion is granted as to Hulick, Liefer, Maue and Sadler. The only claims which remain for disposition herein are Plaintiff's retaliation claims against Defendants Tina Beardan Monroe and Darrell Westerman. Signed by Judge Michael J. Reagan on 03/14/2012. (dkd )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
STANLEY BOCLAIR,
Plaintiff,
vs.
DONALD HULICK,
TINA BEARDAN MONROE,
BRADLEY SADLER,
TOM MAUE,
DARRELL WESTERMAN,
and DAN LIEFER,
Defendants.

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Case No. 10-cv-0978-MJR-SCW

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
REAGAN, District Judge:
A.

Introduction and Procedural Overview
In this prisoner civil rights suit filed under 42 U.S.C. 1983, Stanley Boclair

alleges deprivations of his federally-secured constitutional rights while incarcerated at
Menard Correctional Center, in the custody of the Illinois Department of Corrections.
On threshold review of Boclair’s complaint under 28 U.S.C. 1915A, the undersigned
Judge dismissed several claims and Defendants, ordered service to be made on the
remaining Defendants, and referred pretrial matters to the Honorable Stephen C.
Williams, United States Magistrate Judge, pursuant to Local Rule 72.1(a).
Subsequent pleadings and Orders clarified and narrowed the case to
retaliation claims against six Defendants: (1) Donald Hulick, (2) Tina Beardan Monroe,
(3) Bradley Sadler, (4) Tom Maue, (5) Darrell Westerman, and (6) Dan Liefer. On
September 23, 2011, these six Defendants moved for summary judgment based on

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Plaintiff’s failure to exhaust administrative remedies as required by the Prison Litigation
Reform Act, 42 U.S.C. 1997e(a).
On January 24, 2012, Judge Williams submitted a Report and
Recommendation (Doc. 52, “the Report”) recommending that the undersigned District
Judge grant in part and deny in part Defendants’ summary judgment motion. 1
Specifically, the Report recommended that the Court grant the motion as to Defendants
Hulick, Sadler, Maue and Liefer. The Report further recommended that the Court deny
the motion (find that Plaintiff did exhaust his claims) as to Defendants Tina Beardan
Monroe and Darrell Westerman. 2
The Report was sent to the parties with a notice plainly advising them that
they must file any objections by February 10, 2012 (Doc. 52-1). Defendants did not
object to the Report.

On February 14, 2012, the Court received Plaintiff Boclair’s

objections to the Report. They had a February 5, 2012 certificate of service and arrived
in an envelope with a February 7, 2012 postmark. Applying the mailbox rule, the Court
construed the objections as timely-filed and set a March 2, 2012 deadline by which
Defendants could respond thereto. Defendants did so (Doc. 59).
Timely objections having been filed, the District Judge undertakes de novo
review of the portions of the Report to which Boclair specifically objected. 28 U.S.C.
636(b)(1); FED. R. CIV. P. 72(b); Southern Dist. Illinois Local Rule 73.1(b).

The

undersigned can accept, reject, or modify the recommendations made by Judge

1

Judge Williams determined that there were no factual disputes as to exhaustion,
and therefore a Pavey hearing was not necessary to resolve the solely legal questions
relating to exhaustion in this case.

2

The Report refers to Tina Beardan Monroe as Beardan.
Monroe in parts of this Order.

She is referred to as

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Williams, receive further evidence, or recommit the matter to Judge Williams with
instructions. Id.
B.

Analysis
►

Overview of Exhaustion Requirement

The Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PLRA), Pub. L. 104-134, 110
Stat. 1321 (1996), requires prisoners to exhaust administrative remedies before they file
suit in federal court. 42 U.S.C. 1997e(a). The exhaustion requirement applies to all
lawsuits challenging prison conditions under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and actions under any
other federal law brought by a prisoner confined in any jail or correctional facility. See
Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 532 (2002)(United States Supreme Court held that
PLRA exhaustion requirement “applies to all inmate suits about prison life,
whether they involve general circumstances or particular episodes, and whether
they allege excessive force or some other wrong”).
Exhaustion is a condition precedent to suit in federal court, so the inmate
must exhaust before he commences his federal litigation; he cannot exhaust while his
lawsuit is pending. See Perez v. Wisconsin Department of Corr., 182 F.3d 532, 535
(7th Cir. 1999); Dixon v. Page, 291 F.3d 485, 488 (7th Cir. 2002). If the inmate fails to
exhaust before filing suit in federal court, the district court must dismiss the suit or
dismiss any claims not fully exhausted. See Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 223 (2007);
Burrell v. Powers, 431 F.3d 282, 284-85 (7th Cir. 2005).
Because exhaustion is an affirmative defense, “the burden of proof is on
the prison officials.” Kaba v. Stepp, 458 F.3d 678, 680 (7th Cir. 2006).

So here,

Defendants bear the burden of demonstrating that Boclair failed to exhaust all available

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administrative remedies before he filed this suit. Kaba, 458 F.3d at 681, citing Dole v.
Chandler, 438 F.3d 804, 809 (7th Cir. 2006).
To properly exhaust within the meaning of the PLRA, the inmate must “file
complaints and appeals in the place, and at the time, the prison’s administrative rules
require.” Pozo v. McCaughtry, 286 F.3d 1022, 1025 (7th Cir. 2002). As an inmate
confined in the Illinois Department of Corrections (“IDOC”), Boclair was obligated to
follow the regulations contained in the IDOC’s grievance procedures.
The IDOC’s three-step administrative process for resolving inmate
grievances is delineated in 20 Illinois Administrative Code Section 504.800, et seq.
(West 2008).

At step one, the inmate presents his complaint to a correctional

counselor. If that fails to resolve the problem, step two entails the inmate submitting a
written grievance on a designated form to the facility’s Grievance Officer within a
specific period (usually the grievance must be filed within 60 days after the inmate
discovers the problem about which he complains). After investigating, the Grievance
Officer forwards his conclusions to the Chief Administrative Officer (CAO). The CAO’s
decision is furnished to the inmate.
If the inmate still is unsatisfied, step three is an appeal in writing to the
Director of the IDOC. The inmate submits the Grievance Officer’s report and the CAO’s
decision to the Administrative Review Board (ARB).

The ARB examines the

documents, determines whether a hearing is needed, may interview the inmate, and
may call witnesses. Ultimately, the ARB submits a written report of its findings to the
Director of the IDOC who makes the final decision on the grievance. Copies of the
ARB’s report and the Director’s final decision are sent to the inmate.

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►

Application to Case at Bar

In the case at bar, Judge Williams’ Report delineates Plaintiff Boclair’s
claims against the six Defendants as well as the steps Boclair took and the grievances
he filed regarding those claims. Surviving threshold review under 28 U.S.C. 1915A
were Plaintiff’s claims that Defendants retaliated against him for filing grievances. The
retaliation allegedly came in the form of threats (by Defendants Sadler and Westerman),
transfer to a cell with an inmate who later attacked Boclair (by Defendants Monroe,
Liefer and Maue), and transfer to a different institution (by Defendant Hulick).
Judge Williams concluded that Plaintiff exhausted his administrative
remedies as to the claims against Defendant Tina Beardan Monroe and Darrell
Westerman.

Neither Defendants nor Plaintiff objected to this conclusion.

Judge

Williams concluded that Plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies on the
claims against Defendants Hulick, Liefer, Maue and Sadler. Plaintiff lodged no specific
objection to Judge Williams’ conclusion as to Defendant Hulick. Plaintiff objects to the
Report’s recommendations only as to Defendant Liefer, Maue and Sadler.
1.

Objection Re: Exhaustion as to Defendant Sadler

Plaintiff devotes one paragraph to challenging the Report’s conclusion as
to exhaustion of the claims against Defendant Sadler. Specifically, Plaintiff relies on
Exhibit 6 to his complaint to argue that he has exhausted his administrative remedies as
to Sadler. This argument is a nonstarter.
Exhibit 6 (Doc. 1-1, p. 12) is a grievance filed by Plaintiff on July 18, 2008,
alleging that Tina Beardan Monroe selected Plaintiff to move to a cell with a hostile,
unstable inmate (“inmate Denton”), that Plaintiff explained his concerns regarding this

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move, that he was moved to the cell with Denton anyway, and that Denton assaulted
Plaintiff (beating Plaintiff with a radio inside a laundry bag, knocking out Plaintiff’s teeth
and causing pain to Plaintiff’s back and head). The grievance further states regarding
the assault by Denton (Doc. 1-1, p. 13): “prison staff have threatened me to my face,
and CEO Beardan ha[s] a propensity to see violent acts and orchestrated the assault
upon me. I beg you for proper protection from her and other staff and the inmates
whom they may directly or indirectly influence.”
As was noted in Judge Williams’ Report, that grievance was fully
exhausted by Plaintiff, and he received a final determination from the ARB on
November 24, 2008.

The exact nature of Plaintiff’s objection to Judge Williams’

conclusions as to Defendant Sadler is unclear. The best the Court can glean, Plaintiff
asserts that his July 2008 grievance references other prior-filed grievances and thereby
notified the prison officials that other correctional staff (presumably including Defendant
Sadler) had threatened Plaintiff.

But the July 2008 grievance focuses entirely on

Defendant Tina Beardan Monroe and does not mention Defendant Sadler. 3
The undersigned District Judge concludes, as did Magistrate Judge
Williams, that Plaintiff failed to fully exhaust his administrative remedies as to his

3

Another grievance (dated October 29, 2007) did complain about Defendant
Sadler threatening Plaintiff. Plaintiff attempted to file that complaint as an emergency
grievance. It was determined that it was not a true emergency and returned to Plaintiff to
be submitted through the normal channels. Plaintiff presented it to his counselor but
failed to follow any further steps of the process. Plaintiff argued that he took this
grievance no further because the counselor told him (a) internal affairs had taken care of
the problem, and (b) Plaintiff ought not “write crap” grievances about staff. Judge
Williams’ Report concluded that neither the counselor nor any other prison official
affirmatively prevented Plaintiff from pursuing this grievance, and no prison official
advised Plaintiff that he had done all that was necessary to complete the grievance
process as to this complaint (Doc. 52, pp. 8-9). Plaintiff did not object to this conclusion.

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retaliation claim against Defendant Sadler.

Accordingly, the Court overrules that

objection to the Report.
2.

Objection Re: Exhaustion as to Defendants Maue and Liefer

In challenging the portion of the Report which concludes that Plaintiff
failed to exhaust administrative remedies on his retaliation claims against Defendants
Maue and Liefer, Plaintiff again relies on the July 18, 2008 grievance regarding Tina
Beardan Monroe “orchestrating” the transfer of Plaintiff into the cell with (and assault by)
inmate Denton. Essentially, Plaintiff maintains that Defendants Maue and Liefer were
not mere rank and file officers but instead – as a Major (Maue) and a Lieutenant (Liefer)
– they were “administrative personnel” with the power to make administrative decisions
such as those involving inmate cell transfers.

Additionally, Plaintiff argues that

Defendant Liefer was assigned on the protective custody unit “during the attack upon
Plaintiff” (Doc. 56, p. 2).
The problem is that the grievance on which Plaintiff relies (the July 18,
2008 grievance) only identified Tina Beardan Monroe; it did not mention Defendants
Maue and Liefer; and it did not assign any responsibility for the Denton assault to
Defendants Maue and Liefer. Accordingly, prison officials were not placed on notice
that Plaintiff was accusing Maue and Liefer of any wrongdoing in connection with this
transfer that culminated in the assault. The record simply does not indicate that Plaintiff
exhausted any such claim as to Maue or Liefer.
In his objections, Plaintiff also criticizes footnote 8 in the Report and
contends that Judge Williams overlooked the true similarity between the issues in this
case and those in Maddox v. Love, 655 F.3d 709 (7th Cir. 2011). In Maddox, the

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Seventh Circuit partially reversed a district judge’s dismissal of an inmate’s § 1983
claims on exhaustion grounds. The Court of Appeals noted that the current Illinois
Administrative Code (as of 2003) requires that a grievance contain factual details,
“including what happened, when, where, and the name of each person who is the
subject of or who is otherwise involved in the complaint.” Maddox, 655 F.3d at 721,
citing 20 Ill. Admin. Code 504.810(b). However, the inmate in Maddox (while filing a
grievance in 2004) was given a 2001 form by the IDOC.
The Court of Appeals determined that the district court incorrectly found
that the plaintiff (Maddox) failed to comply with the directive to furnish details. The
Court of Appeals reasoned that Maddox’s grievance served its function by providing the
prison officials a fair opportunity to address his complaints, especially in light of the fact
that the form in use in the prison at that time (the old form) did not ask inmates to list the
names of the persons subject to the complaint, it only asked the inmate to briefly
summarize the nature of the grievance. Id., 655 F.3d at 722. Furthermore, the Court of
Appeals noted that (given the particular facts of the grievance in Maddox), the prison
administrators would be able to tell just from the nature of the administrative decision in
question (cancelation of religious services) who was responsible for that decision.
Judge Williams’ Report included a footnote distinguishing the facts of the
instant case from those of Maddox (Doc. 52, pp. 10-11, n.8). Footnote 8 is neither
factually inaccurate nor legally incorrect. Maddox can be differentiated from the instant
case in the way Judge Williams pointed out – unlike Maddox, nothing in Boclair’s
grievance alerted prison officials that Maue or Liefer was responsible for the decision to
move Plaintiff in with Denton, and the mere nature of Maue and Liefer’s jobs did not

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indicate that they necessarily or likely would have been involved in the transfer decision
which Plaintiff claims Tina Beardan Monroe orchestrated to retaliate against him.

So

the Court finds no merit in Plaintiff’s objections as to the exhaustion analysis regarding
Defendants Maue and Liefer.
C.

Conclusion
For all these reasons, the undersigned District Judge ADOPTS in its

entirety Judge Williams’ Report and Recommendation (Doc. 52) and GRANTS IN PART
and DENIES IN PART Defendants’ summary judgment motion (Doc. 44), concluding as
follows.
•

Plaintiff exhausted his administrative remedies as to
Defendants

Tina

Beardan

Monroe

and

Darrell

Westerman. Therefore, Defendants’ motion is denied as
to Tina Beardan Monroe and Darrell Westerman.
•

Plaintiff failed to exhaust as to Defendants Donald Hulick,
Dan Liefer, Tom Maue and Bradley Sadler.

So

Defendants’ motion is granted as to Hulick, Liefer, Maue
and Sadler.
If administrative remedies are not properly exhausted prior to filing suit,
the district court must dismiss those claims/defendants without prejudice to the inmate
initiating another action if appropriate and possible after he exhausts those remedies.
See, e.g., Burrell v. Powers, 431 F.3d 282, 284 (7th Cir. 2005), citing Walker v.
Thompson, 288 F.3d 1005, 1009 (7th Cir. 2002)(“Dismissal for failure to exhaust is
without prejudice ….”); Ford v. Johnson, 362 F.3d 395, 401 (7th Cir. 2004)(“We

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therefore hold that all dismissals under § 1997e(a) should be without prejudice”).
Accordingly, all claims against Defendants Hulick, Liefer, Maue and Sadler are hereby
DISMISSED without prejudice based on Plaintiff’s failure to exhaust prior to
commencing this suit.
As a consequence of the Court adopting Judge Williams’ Report and
Recommendation, the only claims which remain for disposition herein are
Plaintiff’s retaliation claims against Defendants Tina Beardan Monroe and Darrell
Westerman.

A jury trial date has been set before the undersigned District Judge

(October 15, 2012), and Magistrate Judge Williams will conduct a final pretrial
conference on September 4, 2012 (see Docs. 39, 40).
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED March 14, 2012.
s/ Michael J. Reagan
Michael J. Reagan
United States District Judge

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