Knox v. Furlong et al
Filing
75
ORDER granting 60 Motion for Summary Judgment; granting in part and denying in part 63 Motion for Summary Judgment. Summary judgment is GRANTED in favor of Defendants Terry Caliper, Wexford Health Sources, Inc., and Dr. Dennis Furlong. Summar y judgment is DENIED with respect to Defendants Kathie Butler, Marilyn Melton, Carol George, Laura Qualls, and Jhan Miller. Consistent with this Order, this case will proceed against Defendants Butler, Melton, George, Qualls, and Miller. Signed by Judge G. Patrick Murphy on 03/27/13. (klh)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
TED KNOX
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
vs.
)
)
DOCTOR FURLONG, TERRY CALIPER, )
KATHIE BUTLER, MARILYN MELTON, )
CAROL GEORGE, LAURA QUALLS,
)
WEXFORD HEALTH SOURCES, INC.,
)
and JHAN MILLER,
)
)
Defendants.
CIVIL NO. 10-1001-GPM
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
MURPHY, District Judge:
Plaintiff Ted Knox is currently incarcerated at Menard Correctional Center. He filed this
pro se lawsuit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claiming Defendants were deliberately indifferent to
his serious medical need in violation of his Eighth Amendment Rights. 1 Plaintiff alleges that
during the summer of 2008 while he was incarcerated at Tamms Correctional Center, Defendants
were aware of his need for dental care for his broken tooth, but delayed access to such care.
Defendant Terry Caliper filed a motion for summary judgment on July 31, 2012 (Doc. 60).
Defendants Dennis Furlong, Kathie Butler, Marilyn Melton, Carol George, Laura Qualls, Jhan
Miller, and Wexford Health Sources, Inc. also filed a joint motion for summary judgment on July
31, 2012 (Doc. 63). Both motions are supported by a memorandum and exhibits (Docs. 61, 63).
Ms. Caliper claims she was not deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff’s serious medical need, and
asserts qualified immunity (Docs. 60 and 61). Defendants Furlong, Butler, Melton, George,
1
Plaintiff’s state-law claims for medical malpractice set forth in Count II and Count III of the
complaint were dismissed with prejudice on February 21, 2012 (Doc. 50).
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Qualls, Miller, and Wexford Health Sources, Inc. claim they were not state actors and therefore not
subject to claims under § 1983.
In the alternative, they argue they were not deliberately
indifferent to Plaintiff’s serious medical need, and also assert qualified immunity (Doc. 63).
Plaintiff Ted Knox, filed response briefs to both motions for summary judgment, as well as
supporting exhibits on August 31, 2012 (Docs. 66 and 67). The Court has considered the briefs,
along with all other related materials submitted by the parties.
For the following reasons
summary judgment as to Defendants Butler, Melton, George, Qualls, and Miller is denied, and
summary judgment as to Defendants Wexford Health Sources, Inc., Dr. Furlong, and Terry
Caliper is granted.
I. FACTS
Defendant Wexford Health Sources, Inc. (“Wexford”) is a private corporation that
contracts with the Illinois Department of Corrections (“IDOC”) to provide health care services to
inmates detained in IDOC facilities (Doc. 63). At all times relevant to this lawsuit, Dr. Dennis
Furlong was employed by Wexford as a dentist at Tamms Correctional Center (“Tamms”) (Doc.
63). Defendants Jhan Miller, Marilyn Melton, Kathie Butler, Carol George, and Laura Qualls
were all employed by Wexford as nurses at Tamms (Doc. 63). Defendant Terry Caliper was the
Health Care Unit Administrator at Tamms (Doc. 61).
Inmates at Tamms could request to see a dentist by submitting a written slip to a nurse or a
correctional officer (Doc. 61), or by making a verbal request to a nurse during daily rounds in the
units (Doc. 61). Medical request slips were collected daily between 11 p.m. and 7 a.m. by the
shift nurse assigned to each housing unit (Doc. 61). The slips were reviewed by the nursing staff
between 3 p.m. and 11 p.m., and appointments for the inmates were scheduled appropriately (Doc.
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61). When an inmate requested specific routine or non-emergency dental service, the service had
to be scheduled, but not necessarily performed, within 14 days of the request (Doc. 61).
On June 17, 2008, Plaintiff submitted a written request for various dental services,
including a teeth cleaning, removal of his left upper molar, and a partial prosthetic (Doc. 61-1).
Plaintiff’s request was received and reviewed on June 18, 2008 by Stacey Williamson, Director of
Nursing (Doc. 61-1). Two days later, on June 20, 2008, an appointment was made for Plaintiff to
see the dentist on August 8, 2008 (Doc. 61-1).
On July 2, 2008, Plaintiff’s molar broke (Doc. 61-1 pp. 15–16), and he later testified that
he told Defendant Butler that his tooth had broken and that he “needed medical attention. I
needed to see a dentist” (Doc. 61-1 pp. 16, 18-19). He claims Defendant Butler said “[t]hat
basically she wasn’t no dentist and wasn’t nothing she would be able to do about it” (Doc. 61-1 p.
20). Plaintiff claims he also told Defendant Qualls that he “needed urgent medical care” (Doc.
61-1 p. 26), and that she also told him there was nothing she could do (Doc. 61-1 p. 27). On July
23, 2008, Plaintiff claims he told Defendant Melton that “I had a broken tooth on the left upper side
of my mouth. Pus and blood and stuff was coming up out of the surrounding area. I was in a lot of
pain and stuff like that” (Doc. 61-1 pp. 29-31). Defendant Melton also told Plaintiff that there
was nothing she could do (Doc. 61-1 p. 31). Plaintiff claims he then complained to Defendant
Miller on July 26, 2003 (Doc. 61-1 pp. 31-33, 35). It is unclear what Defendant Miller’s response
was to Plaintiff’s complaints, although it seems that she also did not respond to his requests.
Responding to Defendants’ motions for summary judgment, Plaintiff submitted affidavits
from inmates Markus Hunter and Jason Trimby corroborating that Plaintiff complained to various
nurses about his dental issue (Doc 66-2). Mr. Hunter stated the nurses told Plaintiff “that he was a
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crybaby and wasn’t [sic] going to get in the middle of the dentist, Mr. Furlong, and Terry Caliper’s
decisions regarding care” (Doc. 66-2).
Plaintiff also produced written medical requests dated July 2, 5, 10, and 28, 2008 and
August 8 and 9, 2008 addressed to Terry Caliper and/or Dr. Furlong indicating that he was in
urgent need of dental care (Docs. 66-1, 66-2). Nigel Vinyard, the Health Care Unit Administrator
at Tamms, countered that the only medical requests the Health Care Unit received from Plaintiff
were his original dental request dated June 17, 2008 and his request dated August 9, 2008 (Doc.
61-1).
Plaintiff filed a grievance on July 27, 2008 claiming that he was being “deliberately denied
medical treatment” and requesting “dental care without further delay” (Doc. 61-1). Defendant
Caliper claims she received Plaintiff’s grievance on August 1, 2008, and she responded by telling
Plaintiff that if he requested to see a dentist that he would be scheduled accordingly (Doc. 61-1).
On August 8, 2008, Plaintiff did not see the dentist despite his previously scheduled
appointment. That same day, Plaintiff claims he submitted a written request to see the dentist
(Doc. 66-2). The next day, August 9, 2008, Plaintiff submitted another written request to see a
dentist (Doc. 61-1). Defendant Caliper claims Plaintiff’s written request dated August 9, 2008
was received by the Health Care Unit on August 12, 2008 (Doc. 61-1). An appointment was then
made for Plaintiff to see a dentist three days later on August 15, 2008 (Doc. 61-1). On August 15,
2008, Plaintiff was examined by Dr. Furlong and his tooth was extracted (Doc. 61-1).
II. ANALYSIS
The standard applied to summary judgment motions under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
56 is well-settled and has been succinctly stated as follows:
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Summary judgment is proper when the pleadings, depositions, answers to
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show
that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. In determining whether a genuine issue
of material fact exists, [the Court] must view the record in a light most favorable to
the nonmoving party. Because the primary purpose of summary judgment is to
isolate and dispose of factually unsupported claims, the nonmovant may not rest on
the pleadings but must respond, with affidavits or otherwise, setting forth specific
facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.… A mere scintilla of evidence
in support of the nonmovant’s position is insufficient; a party will be successful in
opposing summary judgment only when it presents definite, competent evidence to
rebut the motion.
Albiero v. City of Kankakee, 246 F.3d 927, 931-32 (7th Cir. 2001) (citations and quotations
omitted). “We often call summary judgment, the ‘put up or shut up’ moment in litigation, by
which we mean that the non-moving party is required to marshal and present the court with the
evidence she contends will prove her case. And by evidence, we mean evidence on which a
reasonable jury could rely.” Goodman v. National Security Agency, Inc., 621 F.3d 651, 654 (7th
Cir. 2010).
All of the Defendants, with the exception of Wexford, claim that there is no Eighth
Amendment violation for deliberate indifference to a serious medical need and they are therefore
entitled to qualified immunity. The doctrine of qualified immunity shields government officials
from suits arising out of their discretionary functions when their actions do not violate clearly
established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.
Hernandez v. Cook County Sheriff’s Office, 643 F.3d 906, 914 (7th Cir. 2011). Officers “who act
unreasonably or ‘who knowingly violate the law’” are not protected by qualified immunity.
Sornberger v. City of Knoxville, 434 F.3d 1006, 1014 (7th Cir. 2006), quoting Hunter v. Bryant,
502 U.S. 224, 228 (1991). The Court makes two inquiries in evaluating a qualified immunity
defense: (1) whether the facts, taken in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, show that the
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defendant violated a constitutional right; and (2) whether that constitutional right was clearly
established at the time of the alleged violation. Hernandez, 643 F.3d at 914.
The Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects prisoners from being
subjected to cruel and unusual punishment. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII; Berry v. Peterman, 604 F.3d
435, 439 (7th Cir. 2010). Prison officials violate the Eighth Amendment’s proscription against
cruel and unusual punishment when their conduct demonstrates “deliberate indifference to serious
medical needs of prisoners.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976).
This includes
intentionally delaying access to medical or dental care. Rodriguez v. Plymouth Ambulance Serv.,
577 F.3d 816, 829 (7th Cir. 2009).
A claim of deliberate indifference to a serious medical need contains both an objective and
a subjective component. Greeno v. Daley, 414 F.3d 645, 653 (7th Cir. 2005). To satisfy the
objective component, a prisoner must demonstrate that his medical condition is “objectively,
sufficiently serious.” Greeno, 414 F.3d at 653, citing Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834,
(1994) (internal quotations omitted). A serious medical condition is one “that has been diagnosed
by a physician as mandating treatment or one that is so obvious that even a lay person would
perceive the need for a doctor’s attention.” Edwards v. Snyder, 478 F.3d 827, 830–31 (7th Cir.
2007). To satisfy the subjective component, a prisoner must demonstrate that the prison official
“knew of a substantial risk of harm to the inmate and disregarded the risk.” Greeno, 414 F.3d at
653. “Deliberate indifference cannot rest on negligent actions or inactions, but must instead rest
on reckless indifference to the plight of an inmate.” Cavalieri v. Shepard, 321 F.3d 616, 626 (7th
Cir. 2003).
Here, the first prong of the deliberate indifference analysis—a serious medical
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condition—is not arguably in dispute (See Docs. 61, 63). Plaintiff had a molar that was loose and
eventually broke. The unrefuted evidence shows that the broken tooth was infected, discharged
blood and pus, and caused severe pain rendering Plaintiff unable to talk or eat. When Plaintiff
was seen by a dentist, the tooth was immediately extracted. Such tooth decay constitutes a serious
medical condition because of the pain and the risk of infection. Berry v. Peterman, 604 F.3d 435,
439 (7th Cir. 2010), citing Board v. Farnham, 394 F.3d 469, 480-81 & n. 4, 482-83 (7th Cir. 2005).
The second prong of the deliberate indifference analysis—whether the Defendants were
deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff’s serious dental need—requires a closer look.
A.
Wexford Health Sources, Inc.
Defendants argument for summary judgment in favor of Wexford is undeveloped (See
Doc. 63). Defendants assert without elaboration that Wexford is not a state actor and therefore
not liable under § 1983 for Plaintiff’s claim of deliberate indifference (Doc. 63). “But stating
blankly what one's argument is and actually arguing a position are different things.”
Raghunathan v. Holder, 604 F.3d 371, 378 (7th Cir. 2010) (emphasis in original). Defendants did
not cite to any case law, did not reference the legal standard for holding a private corporation liable
under § 1983, and did not set forth or analyze any relevant facts. “[I]t is not the obligation of this
court to research and construct the legal arguments open to parties, especially when they are
represented by counsel.” United States v. Holm, 326 F.3d 872, 877 (7th Cir. 2003).
Nevertheless, Defendants’ motion for summary judgment as to Wexford is granted. It is
well-established that there is no respondeat superior liability under § 1983, and a private
corporation is not vicariously liable for its employee's deprivations of another's civil
rights. Jackson v. Ill. Medi–Car, Inc., 300 F.3d 760, 766 (7th Cir. 2002) (quotation marks and
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citations omitted). To maintain a § 1983 action against a private corporation, a plaintiff must
demonstrate that a constitutional deprivation occurred as the result of a policy or practice of the
corporation. Id.
Plaintiff alleged that Wexford is liable under § 1983 because his injuries were caused by
“the failure of Wexford to have proper policies or procedures for the treatment of his condition”
(Doc. 67-1). Specifically, Plaintiff argues that Wexford failed to have a policy in place regarding
the dental care of “diabetic patients with a gum disease” (Doc. 67-1). Plaintiff further argues that
Wexford should have had a policy in place to provide access to a 24-hour on-call dentist to an
inmate with a broken tooth, however, Wexford only had one dentist available for eight hours per
week (Doc. 67-1).
Plaintiff’s allegations are not sufficient to conclude that Wexford’s express policy, or lack
thereof, violated the Constitution. Wexford does not and could not have policies in place about
virtually everything that might happen. See Calhoun v. Ramsey, 408 F.3d 375, 380 (7th Cir.
2005). The Supreme Court has repeatedly cautioned against drawing the inference that the
absence of a policy reflects a decision to act unconstitutionally. Id. Additionally, Plaintiff has
not made a showing that the alleged constitutional deprivation was anything more than an isolated
incident. There is no evidence that other inmates were affected by the absence of the two policies
described by Plaintiff. In situations where an inmate complains about the absence of an express
policy, “the claim requires more evidence than a single incident to establish liability.” Calhoun,
408 F.3d at 380. Therefore, Plaintiff’s claims against Wexford must fail as a matter of law and
summary judgment is granted in favor of Defendant Wexford Health Sources, Inc.
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B.
Nurses Employed by Wexford Health Sources, Inc.
Defendants Butler, Melton, George, Qualls, and Miller were employed by Wexford as
nurses at Tamms Correctional Center. The nurses seek summary judgment in their favor on
several grounds. First, they argue they were not state actors but rather employees of a private
corporation, and therefore are not subject to claims of deliberate indifference under § 1983. In the
alternative, the nurses argue that if they were acting under the color of state law, they were not
deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff’s serious medical needs, and they are protected by qualified
immunity (Doc. 63). For the following reasons, the nurses fail to establish they are entitled to
judgment as a matter of law and Defendants’ motion for summary judgment as to Defendants
Butler, Melton, George, Qualls, and Miller is denied.
Physicians and nurses employed by private corporations that contract with prisons to
provide medical care to inmates can be held liable under § 1983 if they acted under color of state
law. Berry v. Peterman, 604 F.3d 435, 439 (7th Cir. 2010). In the Seventh Circuit's view, a
private actor who voluntarily assumes the state's responsibility to provide medical care to prisoners
at any location should be deemed a state actor. Rice ex rel. Rice v. Corr. Med. Servs., 675 F.3d
650, 672 (7th Cir. 2012); Rodriguez v. Plymouth Ambulance Serv., 577 F.3d 816, 827–28 (7th Cir.
2009).
When a party enters into a contractual relationship with the state penal institution to
provide specific medical services to inmates, it is undertaking freely, and for
consideration, responsibility for a specific portion of the state's overall obligation to
provide medical care for incarcerated persons. In such a circumstance, the provider
has assumed freely the same liability as the state. Similarly, when a person accepts
employment with a private entity that contracts with the state, he understands that
he is accepting the responsibility to perform his duties in conformity with the
Constitution.
Rodriguez, 577 F.3d at 827. Conversely, a private actor who has “only an incidental and
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transitory relationship with the state's penal system” or “an attenuated relationship with the
prisoner-patient” should not be deemed a state actor. Rice ex rel. Rice, 675 F.3d at 672;
Rodriguez, 577 F.3d at 827–28.
Wexford contracted with the IDOC, and voluntarily assumed the State of Illinois’
responsibility, to provide medical care to inmates incarcerated at IDOC facilities. In turn,
Defendants Butler, Melton, George, Qualls, and Miller accepted employment with Wexford as
nurses at Tamms Correctional Center (Doc. 63). Therefore, during their employment with
Wexford, the Defendant nurses were acting under color of state law, and they are subject to claims
of deliberate indifference under § 1983.
The nurses argue that they could not have acted with deliberate indifference to Plaintiff’s
serious medical need because they were subjectively unaware of Plaintiff’s dental condition and
pain (Doc. 63). The nurses rely exclusively on their own affidavits in which they each aver that
Plaintiff never complained to them about his dental concerns (Doc. 63). Conversely, Plaintiff
asserted in his own sworn deposition testimony that he told each nurse he required dental care
(Doc. 61-1).2 Plaintiff also submitted the affidavits of two fellow inmates which corroborate his
testimony (Doc. 66-2). This is a classic swearing contest, the resolution of which would require
the Court to make credibility determinations and weigh the competing testimony. However, on
summary judgment the Court cannot decide who to believe; it can only determine if there are
2
The deposition does not specifically refer to Nurse George. In his Complaint, Plaintiff states
that he complained to Nurse George on July 28, 2008 and that she ignored him and failed to
provide care (Doc. 1). As a general rule, allegations in a Complaint are not evidence. Nisenbaum
v. Milwaukee County, 333 F.3d 804, 810 (7th Cir. 2003). However, while the Complaint in this
matter is not in the form of an affidavit, in his deposition while under oath, Plaintiff referred to his
Complaint as being an accurate representation of the events and an accurate statement of the facts
(Doc. 61-1). This Court gives the benefit of the doubt to Plaintiff and finds his sworn deposition
testimony that essentially states the allegations made in the Complaint are true, converts his
Complaint into a sworn statement.
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factual disputes. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 254 (1986). The competing
testimony establishes nothing if not the existence of a factual dispute as to whether the nurses were
subjectively aware of Plaintiff’s serious medical need.
The nurses also argue that even if they had been aware of Plaintiff’s serious medical need,
they were not deliberately indifferent to such need because they were not involved in the
scheduling of treatment and their “role is merely to pass on written requests for nursing care to the
medical coordinator at Tamms Correctional Center” (Doc. 63). If Plaintiff had complained to
them, the nurses would have checked Plaintiff’s chart and saw that he was already scheduled for a
dentist appointment on August 8, 2012 (Doc. 63). It appears that Defendants are arguing that the
nurses were not deliberately indifferent because their role was limited to that of a messenger, and it
is apparent that the message had been received because Plaintiff had an appointment to see the
dentist. However, Plaintiff asserts that when he told each nurse that his tooth broke and his
condition had worsened, the nurses indicated to Plaintiff that they would do nothing. If the
nurses’ job was merely to pass along requests for urgent medical care, a jury could find that the
nurses exhibited deliberate indifference to Plaintiff’s dental needs when they wholly ignored his
requests. Of course, a jury could also find that the nurses exhibited deliberate indifference by
failing to take any steps to address his complaints of pain, such as providing Plaintiff with pain
medication, or examining Plaintiff to investigate whether his condition had in fact worsened and
he was having a dental emergency.
Because there is an issue of fact as to whether the nurses were subjectively aware of
Plaintiff’s serious medical need, and a reasonable jury could conclude that Defendants were
deliberately indifferent to such need, Defendants’ motion for summary judgment as to Defendants
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Butler, Melton, George, Qualls, and Miller on the issue of deliberate indifference is denied.
Furthermore, the Defendant nurses are not entitled to qualified immunity.3 As discussed
above, the Court has concluded that under the version of facts most favorable to Plaintiff, a
reasonable jury could conclude that the nurses were deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff’s serious
medical need. The law is clear that inmates have a constitutional right to adequate medical
treatment, and “dental care is one of the most important medical needs of inmates.” Board v.
Farnham, 394 F.3d 469, 480, 481 (7th Cir. 2005). Therefore, Plaintiff has met his burden of
showing that a genuine issue of fact exists as to whether the nurses violated one of his clearly
established constitutional rights. Defendants’ motion for summary judgment as to Defendants
Butler, Melton, George, Qualls, and Miller on the issue of qualified immunity is denied.
C.
Dr. Dennis Furlong
Defendant Dr. Furlong was employed by Wexford as a dentist at Tamms Correctional
Center. Dr. Furlong sets forth the same arguments as the nurses regarding his entitlement to
summary judgment—that he was not a state actor, that he was not deliberately indifferent to
Plaintiff’s serious medical need, and that he is protected by qualified immunity (Doc. 63). Dr.
Furlong’s argument that he was not state actor must fail. Similar to the nurses, during his
employment with Wexford, Dr. Furlong provided care to inmates at the prison pursuant to
Wexford’s contract with the Illinois Department of Corrections. Therefore, he was acting under
color of state law, and he is subject to claims of deliberate indifference under § 1983. However,
in considering the facts in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, the Court finds that Plaintiff has
failed to establish that Dr. Furlong acted with deliberate indifference to Plaintiff’s dental condition
3
Defendants assert in the point heading for section C of their brief that the nurses are entitled to
qualified immunity (Doc. 63). However, the only analysis on the issue of qualified immunity
relates to Dr. Furlong (Doc. 63). As it relates to the nurses, Defendants did not set forth any facts
or actually argue their position (See Doc. 63).
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and pain. That is, even taking Plaintiff’s version of events as true, the facts do not show that Dr.
Furlong violated Plaintiff’s constitutional right.
Plaintiff assumed that his written medical requests, his grievance, his counselor, and the
nurses alerted Dr. Furlong to Plaintiff’s dental condition (Doc. 61-1). However, there is no
evidence that medical requests were regularly forwarded to Dr. Furlong or that part of Dr.
Furlong’s job was to review medical requests. There is also no evidence that the nurses or the
counselor actually spoke to Dr. Furlong about Plaintiff. Additionally, Dr. Furlong had no control
over when he would examine or treat the inmates (Doc. 63). The inmates were scheduled to see
Dr. Furlong by the IDOC employees and when Dr. Furlong arrived each day at Tamms, he was
provided with a list of the inmates that he would be seeing that day (Doc. 63). Thus, Plaintiff
cannot show that Dr. Furlong was aware of his dental condition. In turn, Dr. Furlong could not
have acted with deliberate indifference to Plaintiff’s dental condition and pain if he was not even
aware of it. Therefore, Defendants’ motion for summary judgment as to Dr. Furlong is granted.
D.
Terry Caliper
At all relevant times herein, Defendant Terry Caliper was employed by the IDOC as the
Health Care Unit Administrator at Tamms (Doc. 61-1). Ms. Caliper seeks summary judgment in
her favor on the grounds that “Plaintiff cannot meet the subjective burden of a deliberate
indifference claim,” and she is entitled to qualified immunity (Doc. 61). In considering the facts
in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, the Court agrees with Ms. Caliper and finds that Plaintiff
has failed to establish that Ms. Caliper acted with deliberate indifference to Plaintiff’s serious
medical need.
Plaintiff did not personally discuss his condition with Ms. Caliper, but assumed that she
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received notice of his condition from the nurses to whom he verbally complained, or through the
written medical requests he submitted (Doc. 61-1). However, there is no evidence that the nurses
actually spoke to Ms. Caliper about Plaintiff. Additionally, there is no evidence that Ms. Caliper
knew of Plaintiff’s written requests until August 1, 2008 when she received the grievance that he
had filed (Doc. 61). Ms. Caliper responded to Plaintiff’s grievance and indicated that if Plaintiff
requested to see the dentist, he would be scheduled accordingly (Doc. 61). Plaintiff then
submitted a request to see a dentist on August 9, 2008, which was received by the Health Care Unit
on August 12, 2008 (Doc. 61). That request was reviewed and initialed by Ms. Caliper, and
Plaintiff was scheduled to see a dentist on August 15, 2008 (Doc. 61). Thus, Ms. Caliper did not
act with deliberate indifference to Plaintiff’s serious medical needs, because she scheduled
Plaintiff for medical treatment within 14 days of becoming aware of his condition, and within 3
days of receiving his request for medical care (Doc. 61). Defendants’ motion for summary
judgment as to Ms. Caliper is granted.
III.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, summary judgment is GRANTED in favor of Defendants Terry
Caliper, Wexford Health Sources, Inc., and Dr. Dennis Furlong. Summary judgment is DENIED
with respect to Defendants Kathie Butler, Marilyn Melton, Carol George, Laura Qualls, and Jhan
Miller. Consistent with this Order, this case will proceed against Defendants Butler, Melton,
George, Qualls, and Miller.
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IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: March 27, 2013
s/ G. Patrick Murphy
G. PATRICK MURPHY
United States District Judge
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