Santander Consumer USA Inc. v. Pearson et al
Filing
23
ORDER granting 16 Motion to Dismiss. Signed by Judge G. Patrick Murphy on 5/20/2011. (ktc)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
SANTANDER CONSUMER USA INC.,
Plaintiff,
vs.
FRANK T. PEARSON and DONNA K.
PEARSON,
Defendants;
and
FRANK T. PEARSON and DONNA K.
PEARSON,
Counter-Claimants,
vs.
SANTANDER CONSUMER USA INC.,
Counter-Defendant;
and
FRANK T. PEARSON and DONNA K.
PEARSON,
Third Party Plaintiffs,
vs.
HSBC BANK and HSBC AUTO FINANCE,
Third Party Defendants.
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CIVIL NO. 11-17-GPM
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Page 1 of 8
MURPHY, District Judge:
Before the Court is Plaintiff/Counter-Defendant/Third Party Defendants Santander Consumer
USA, Inc., HSBC Bank, and HSBC Auto Finance’s (“Santander’s”) motion to dismiss
Defendants/Counter-Claimants/Third Party Plaintiffs Frank T. and Donna K. Pearson’s counterclaim
and third party complaint (Doc. 16). Per Santander, the Pearsons’ third party complaint improperly
names “HSBC Bank” and “HSBC Auto Finance” as third party defendants while “Santander
Consumer USA, Inc., successor in interest to HSBC Auto Finance, Inc.” is the proper (and only)
Counter-Defendant/Third Party Defendant. This motion to dismiss is made on behalf of named
Counter-Defendant and Third Party Defendants “Santander Consumer USA, Inc.,” “HSBC Bank,”
and “HSBC Auto Finance,” so the allegedly-incorrect party names do not preclude the Court’s
consideration of the instant motion.1 Santander filed this motion February 11, 2011, and the
Pearsons responded February 17, 2011 (Doc. 17).
Upon due consideration, the Court GRANTS the motion to dismiss. The Pearson’s counterclaim against “Santander Consumer USA, Inc.” and third party complaint against “HSBC Bank” and
“HSBC Auto Finance” are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6).
BACKGROUND
This action began on November 19, 2010 in Illinois’s Fifth Judicial District, Cumberland
County, where Santander brought a “verified complaint for detinue and other relief” against Frank
T. and Donna K. Pearson. Santander, an auto finance company, claims that it is the ultimate
1
In their response to the motion to dismiss, while the Pearsons protest that they have
“sued the right firms,” they also admit that “HSBC Bank, HSBC Auto Finance and Santander are
all one of the same” (Doc. 17).
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assignee of a contract for a 2006 Dodge Ram, which provided that the Pearsons make monthly
payments to the seller’s assignee (HSBC then Santander). Should the Pearsons default, the contract
provided for repossession of the vehicle. Santander claims that the Pearsons did default on their
payments and then refused to surrender possession to an independent contractor repossession
company hired by Santander. Santander seeks repossession of the vehicle and damages for the
Pearsons’ alleged wrongful detention of the vehicle.
On December 17, 2010, the Pearsons filed a “complaint and countersuit” against Santander
and HSBC Bank, HSBC Auto Finance, the FBI, the Director of the FBI, the Cumberland County
Sheriff, and the Cumberland County Sheriffs Office. This “complaint and countersuit” is the subject
of the instant motion to dismiss. It is worth including the counterclaim in its entirety here:
COMES NOW DONNA K. PEARSON AND FRANK T. PEARSON AND STATES
THE FOLLOWING TO THIS COURT;
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
HSBC, and Santander has violated every banking and truth and lending law
there is.
HSBC and Santander has violated Frank t. Pearson and Donna K. Pearsons
civil right.
HSBC and Santander has violated the ricco law.
HSBC and Santander has caused great physical pain, by having the Pearsons
attacked and beaten, emotional, property and personal damage to the
Plaintiffs.
HSBC and Santander have sent people onto private property to commit
carjacking, theft of personal property, destruction of personal property,
harassment, intimidation criminal trespass, stealing of federal mail belonging
to the Pearsons, personal pain and injury to the Pearsons.
HSBC and Santander had no signed Judges order from any court to trespass
onto private property, steal private property, physically and emotionally
attack private citizens, and violate the Pearsons civil rights.
HSBC and Santander have attaked [sic] the Pearsons private property,
damaged personal property and attempted to steal the Pearsons property.
Donna K. Pearson and Frank T. Pearson have no leagally [sic] signed
contracts or oral contracts with Santander.
Donna K. Pearson has called the FBI in Springfield, Illinois to report all of
the criminal acts by Santander and HSBC Auto finance. The FBI and the
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10.
Director of the FBI are guilty of nonperformance of duty.
HSBC Auto Finance and Santander have sent people 33 times on to private
property to attack and harass the Pearsons. The people hired by Santander
and HSBC Finance used the Federal 911 system to call the Cumberland
County Sheriffs office 8 times to illegally come on the Private Property
where the Pearsons lived. The Cumberland County Sheriff, and The
Cumberland County Sheriffs office have violated the Civil rights of the
Pearsons (8) eight times.
WHEREFORE, Donna K. Pearson and Frank T. Pearson the Plaintiffs in this action
are asking for 50 million Dollars of each defendant for the pain and suffering they
have suffered at the hands of these defendants, A trial by Jury and they ask that if
anything happens to them while this case is still in progress that another attorney be
allowed to continue in this case if they are incapable, or dead. Donna K. Pearson and
Frank T. Pearson prays this court finds in their favor. HSBC Auto finance, and
Santander should not be allowed to sue Donna and Frank Pearson in any court or get
away with bank fraud, truth and lending fraud, mail fraud, carjacking, theft of
personal property, damage to real estate, physical attacks damaging the Pearsons
health, violation of Illinois State Laws, trespass, harassment of the Pearsons, and
violation of the Pearsons civil rights. The Pearsons are asking for all legal fees, court
costs of this action, all medical bills for the physical attacks, and emotional abuse to
be paid for by the defendants.
The FBI and the Director of the FBI removed the action to this Court and simultaneously filed a
motion to dismiss. The Pearsons later filed a motion for voluntary dismissal of their third party
claims against the FBI, the Director of the FBI, the Cumberland County Sheriff, and the Cumberland
County Sheriff’s Office, which was granted pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
41(a)(1)(A)(i) (Doc. 11). Santander then responded to the Pearson’s counterclaim with this motion
to dismiss.
Santander argues that the Pearsons’ counterclaim “is devoid of any specific references to
conduct committed by Santander” and that Santander cannot discern what they are required to
defend from the Pearsons’ claims. Santander argues that the counterclaim fails under Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 8 because it provides nothing “more than an unadorned, the-defendantunlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009). Santander also
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argues that the counterclaim should be dismissed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) as it “fails to put
Santander on notice as to what purported statutory provisions have been allegedly violated, fails to
identify what conduct was allegedly committed by Santander that runs afoul of any statute, and fails
to identify the factual and/or legal basis for any of the relief requested.” Santander further argues
that, because the Pearsons voluntarily dismissed an identical claim against Santander in another
action in this District before Judge Gilbert (Pearson et al v. HSBC Bank et al, 10-959-JPG-SWC),
this Court should apply Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(1)(B) to dismiss with prejudice.
In their response, the Pearsons claim that Santander hamstrung itself by admitting that it
hired an independent repossession contractor. “Santander admits to this court and all concerned that
they knowingly broke Federal and State laws. Santander admits they sent ‘independent contractors’
(uneducated thugs with guns) to go onto private property to harrass [sic], beat, threaten, tresspass
[sic], intimidate, destroy private property, stalk, and violate the Pearsons’ civil rights. They have
admitted to this court that they hired people to break the law.” In response to Santander’s Rule 8
and 12(b)(6) arguments, the Pearsons attached four pages to their response as “proof” of the claims
in their counterclaim. One attachment appears to be a handwritten note from an “Eric” with
“Precision Recovery” asking for a call in connection with an attempt to “pick up the Dodge Ram.”
While this note is unremarkable, if not polite, the tone of the other two notes is more alarming. One
handwritten note claims “We have your mail. Put the key in the mailbox you get your mail back.”
Another handwritten note is taunting, profane, and threatens to “beat that old Federal Police Officer
[apparently, Mr. Pearson] to death. Give us the keys you [b]itch.” That note says that “Sergio
Padilla of Santander told me to do whatever it takes to get that Dodge Truck.” The Pearsons give
little foundation or explanation for these attached notes, but the insinuation is that these are
Page 5 of 8
handwritten notes left after repossession attempts.
DISCUSSION
To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual
matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, —
U.S. —, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009), quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. V. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570
(2007). Plausibility “asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.
Where a complaint pleads facts that are merely consistent with a defendant’s liability, it stops short
of the line between possibility and plausibility.” Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949. While “[s]pecific facts
are not necessary,” the pleaded facts must “give the defendant fair notice of what the…claim is and
the grounds upon which it rests.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007). The Seventh Circuit
has succinctly elucidated post-Twombly pleading standards:
So, what do we take away from Twombly, Erickson, and Iqbal? First, a plaintiff
must provide notice to defendants of her claims. Second, courts must accept a
plaintiff’s factual allegations as true, but some factual allegations will be so sketchy
or implausible that they fail to provide sufficient notice to defendants of the
plaintiff’s claim. Third, in considering the plaintiff’s factual allegations, courts
should not accept as adequate abstract recitations of the elements of a cause of action
or conclusory legal statements.
Brooks v. Ross, 578 F.3d 574, 581 (7th Cir. 2009). It is, therefore, “not enough to give a threadbare
recitation of the elements of a claim without factual support.” Bissessur v. Indiana Univ. Bd. Of
Trs., 581 F.3d 599, 603 (7th Cir. 2009). Some factual allegation in the complaint (or here, the
counterclaim) is necessary as “[a] complaint which consists of conclusory allegations unsupported
by factual assertions fails even the liberal standard of Rule 12(b)(6).” Jackson v. E.J. Branch Corp.,
176 F.3d 971, 978 (7th Cir. 1999). The claimant need not “‘show’ anything to survive a motion
under Rule 12(b)(6),”–but the claimant does need to allege. Brown v. Budz, 398 F.3d 904, 916 (7th
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Cir. 2005).
The Pearsons’ counterclaim fails to meet these requirements. “[T]he plaintiff must give
enough details about the subject-matter of the case to present a story that holds together. In other
words, the court will ask itself could these things have happened” Swanson v. Citibank, N.A., 614
F.3d 400, 404 (7th Cir. 2010) (emphasis in original). The problem here, is that the Court is left
asking itself: what ‘things’ are even alleged to have happened? The dearth of factual allegations in
the counterclaim makes it not just implausible, but impossible, to determine what the Pearsons’
‘story’ is. There are no facts to notify Santander as to the nature of the claims. Instead, there is a
laundry list of (often exceptionally vague) laws which Santander is purported to have broken.
“[E]very banking and truth and lending law there is” is a good example. This counterclaim is
paradigmatic of “bare legal conclusions” which fail to state an actionable claim.
“[A] Rule 12(b)(6) motion must be decided solely on the face of the complaint and any
attachments that accompanied its filing.” Miller v. Herman, 600 F.3d 726, 733 (7th Cir. 2010),
citing FED.R.CIV.P. 10(c), 12(d); Segal v. Geisha NYC LLC, 517 F.3d 501, 504-05 (7th Cir. 2008).
Thus, the “notes” included in the Pearsons’ response to the motion to dismiss do not save the faulty
complaint itself. It is true that where a complaint “refers to and rests on a contract or other
document that is not attached to the complaint, a court might be within its rights to consider that
document in ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss the complaint without converting the
motion into one for summary judgment, so long as the authenticity of the document is unquestioned”
Minch v. City of Chicago, 486 F.3d 294, 300 n.3 (7th Cir. 2007), but the copies of handwritten notes
in the Pearson’s response are not unquestionably reliable. The Court will not consider this
extraneous “evidence” for the purpose of this motion to dismiss. Importantly, even if the Court were
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to consider the veracity of these notes, they do not necessarily make the Pearsons’ claims against
Santander more plausible. The Pearsons claim that because Santander hired an independent
contractor to repossess the vehicle, Santander has acceded to all state and federal claims against it.
The argument seems to be that the alleged note-writers must have been agents of Santander. This
is neither clear nor necessarily true. Any connection between these unauthenticated notes and the
counterclaim is too tenuous and too sketchy to resurrect the Pearsons’ factually bare counterclaim.
Santander asks the Court to apply Rule 41(a)(1)(B) and dismiss with prejudice here, but Rule
41(a)(1)(B) explicitly applies when the plaintiff voluntarily dismisses the action. The Pearsons have
not moved for voluntary dismissal in this caseSthough they did dismiss an identical complaint
against Santander in the action before Judge Gilbert. The counterclaim will nonetheless be
dismissed with prejudice. The state of this complaint is beyond repair. The counterclaim is a brief
list of ‘defendant-broke-this-law’Svague and wholly unsupported. The Pearsons cannot state a claim
against Santander, and their “complaint and countersuit” is therefore DISMISSED WITH
PREJUDICE.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: May 20, 2011
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G. PATRICK MURPHY
United States District Judge
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